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SPECIMENS
OF
FOREIGN STANDARD LITERATURE.

VOL. XIII.

SPECIMENS
OF
FOREIGN STANDARD LITERATURE.

EDITED
BY GEORGE RIPLEY.

VOL. XIII.
CONTAINING
HUMAN LIFE;
OR,
PRACTICAL ETHICS.

FROM THE GERMAN
OF
DE WETTE.

BOSTON:
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY.
LONDON:
JOHN GREEN, 121 NEWGATE STREET.
1842.

As wine and oil are imported to us from abroad, so must ripe understanding, and many civil virtues, be imported into our minds from foreign writings; — we shall else miscarry still, and some short in the attempts of any great enterprise.

MILTON, *History of Britain*, Book III.

Art. Clark

HUMAN LIFE;
OR,
PRACTICAL ETHICS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

OF

DE WETTE.

BY SAMUEL OSGOOD.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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BOOK SECOND.

PRACTICAL ETHICS.

DE WETTE.

DE WETTE.

LECTURE XL.

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE IN A STRICTER SIGNIFICATION, AS HONESTY AND EQUITY, AS MODESTY, AS PEACEABLENESS, PLACABILITY, AND PUBLIC SPIRIT.

SINCE we have considered, under the civil duty of justice, the foundation of the moral duty or the virtue of justice, we now proceed to this, and indicate the conduct of a just man within the confines of regulated civil society. In our consideration of the former, we are obliged always to refer to legal relations; but moral justice lifts us above these. As a work of art must needs conform to certain external proportions, which in the outset must be defined and regulated, that no trouble nor confusion may arise; as in a picture the relations of light and color, in a poem the laws of probability, must be regarded; but as the spirit of art and poetry rises freely above all these relations and laws, and beauty merely appears in them, but does not consist in them; — so outward civil ordinances are but the limits in which the spirit of justice freely unfolds itself.

Justice, in the stricter sense, of which we would to-day treat, consists in respecting our neighbor as ourselves, and in the free, equal reciprocity in which we stand towards him; the sentiment, by virtue of which we accord to another the same position and the same rights in the moral commonwealth which we demand for ourselves; the observance of the precept, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." Reciprocity is the elementary law of the moral world, and a reciprocity, indeed, which does not destroy the balance, but preserves it.

Since the moral community of men is first defined and guarantied by legislation and civil government, justice, in the first place, brings with itself the conscientious observance of the laws, or legality and honesty, and, indeed, not merely as outward form, for appearance's sake, or from prudential motives, but as the result of moral sentiment. The moral duty demands the exercise of the civil duty as moral duty; law is sacred to the heart of the just for the sake of justice. But true justice is neither limited, like mere legality, to the literal observance of the laws, which often may be interpreted wrongly, nor to the strict sense of them, as legal honesty is; for laws are always imperfect, and allow more or less room for injustice. True justice transcends law, and is subject to the sense of equity. That is equitable which cannot be strictly proved from the laws, and defined according to their standard, but which, from the nature of things, and according to the standard of circumstances, is proper, in order to avoid damage, loss, and mortification. The compensation of the laborer is legally de-

cided, partly by contract, partly by the market price; but, where these decisions fail, or are inapplicable, equity must come in, and assign the laborer his due.

By the laws the real and personal rights of men are defined, and every moral community has immediate reference to these rights: in regard for these, honesty and equity will necessarily be manifested. As respects property, in so far as it is decided by inheritance and purchase, only the most shameless and base injustice can invade it, by treachery, chicanery, and legacy-hunting; and the violations by which the property of one is wrested away by another, — robbery and theft, — thank God! rarely take place among us, and we will not speak of them. But, under the mask of prudence, unfairness will creep into business and intercourse, and, by every sort of adroit art, enrich itself at the expense of a neighbor. Suppose, for instance, that any one is compelled to sell quickly a piece of real estate, or the furniture of a house, and is hindered from awaiting a favorable opportunity; if another has the wish and means to purchase what is offered for sale, and makes use of the embarrassment of the owner to purchase it far below its value, he will not be accused of unfairness, according to the prevalent notions; and yet he would avail himself of a neighbor's emergency to rob him of part of his property. The laws forbid a sacrifice of more than half the value; but equity will go farther, and avoid all such sacrifice. It would be another thing, if the buyer, by this operation, did the seller a favor, or, by the low price, was first determined and enabled to make the purchase, and consequently acted without unjust love of gain. It would be acknowledged disgrace-

ful to press the seller down to a low price by certain artifices, to prevent competition, or to conspire with competitors. In usual business dealings, it is a decided injustice, if any one, by means within his power of acting upon the market and prices, compels another to strike off his goods under their value; or if a dealer in state paper, by spreading a false report about war and peace, occasions a depreciation of paper, and draws profit thereby to himself. In business, men should not overreach and harm each other, nor carry on a knavish war with each other, but only be emulous as to who shall be first in useful prudence, industry, and enterprise. There is scarcely any one, to whom an opportunity does not present itself to overreach and take the advantage of a fellow-citizen and associate in business, from which a sense of rectitude alone can keep him, or who does not, to his harm, have experience of some such unfairness in others. Deceit, especially, like a subtle poison, is diffused through trade and the arts, and buyers and sellers are almost confessedly in an eternal war with one another. Of that, a word hereafter. Dishonesty and unfairness, deceit and breach of trust, as soon as disclosed, are despised and abhorred by every body, and are incompatible with an honest character; but the want of equity is usually blamed, but not despised and abhorred; it is only a mark of rudeness and harshness. Many are forced to be inequitable, because they have been unjustly treated, and are placed in emergency; they must return injustice by injustice. There is universally too much forbearance towards want of equity in buying, and it is deemed allowable to purchase an article as cheaply as

possible, since it is supposed that the dealer will know how to indemnify himself in some way. This may indeed be regarded as a momentary loss, and fortune will favor him another time; still there is a distinction between damages, and the sense of equity will not allow the buyer to take every advantage. It is especially cruel to oppress the laborer in trade, and to beat him down from his hard earnings.

Honesty in business is a very grateful spectacle in life. If we meet in traffic an honest man, it is as if we emerged from a dark, overgrown wood, where robbers and wild beasts lie in wait for us, into the open plain, where the highway receives us. But equity is still more grateful; from it the warmth of love and benevolence breaks forth; it is to us, when we meet it, as if, in the tumultuous market-place of a strange city, among entire strangers, we met at once a fellow-countryman, to whom we cling with confidence.

The more important rights of man are life, freedom, and honor; and many possess nothing on earth but these; to many, nature has denied the gifts and energies which are requisite to acquire other goods. So much the more sacred to us should these inalienable rights be, which belong to the poor in spite of his poverty, and to which wealth would bring no increase. To attack the life of a man is with us an offence only of the robber and the savages, who allow themselves, in the heat of passion, or the blindness of desire, to be carried away into crime, or of the tyrants, who, favored by imperfect laws and civil uproar, sacrifice innocent victims to their suspicion or their party spirit. Even the rudest men do not allow themselves assaults

upon the person, except in heat or drunkenness. Against such outrages, for the most part, the laws protect us, and the police prevent them. The war of revenge in Italy, which citizens carry on with one another by banditti, has never, thank God! found a home in Germany. Freedom is least of all exposed to the attacks of individuals; no robber knights leave captives to pine in the dungeon; and to the police only it is permitted, in many countries, to deprive the suspected of their freedom, without law and without sentence. But independence, without which freedom is nothing, becomes often the prey of arrogance and wilfulness. We have no slaves; but, by many a master, the servant, purchased by necessity and habit, is treated worse than a slave. He must bear every caprice of the domestic despot, comply with his strict, selfish regulations, be always ready at his nod; and he is never, even for a moment, his own master. A certain dependence in business does not conflict with personal dignity; but an occupation, whose order is prescribed, not by the nature of the thing, not by the insight of him who follows it, — in which the laborer must always obey the will of another, — is purely unjust. Such a subservience is necessary at most for the sick, whose whims may be pardoned; but he who always needs it, is morally sick. Equitable masters and mistresses allow their domestics full scope in their assigned sphere, look only to what is performed, and not to the manner in which it is performed, and alleviate in every way the hard condition of their dependants. Poor unfortunates! what friend of humanity does not feel with you the oppression under which you groan! You

have seldom the consolation of feeling your burden lightened by the pleasure of exertion, the joy of accomplishing something! You roll the stone of Sisyphus, you fill the vessel of the Danaides, you turn round in eternal circle, without ever reaching an end! Only the Sunday bell announces to you the short jubilee when your chains are loosed! and, ah! were every Sunday only a day of sunshine, in which you might hail the green meadow, and gaze freely upon the maternal face of nature! Never is the storm more doleful than on Sunday, when it destroys the only recreation of so many domestics, laborers, and other drudges of civil life. Lawgiver of Israel! had you only given the law of the Sabbath, you would even then have been a divine messenger of justice! The Sabbath was founded especially for this—that slaves and maidservants might breathe freely. We Christians have taken the Sabbath, and transferred it to Sunday, when Christ rose victorious from the grave. Indeed, for those poor ones, it is a day of resurrection from the prison of slavery, when they may expand freely their cramped breast,—when they may feel themselves as men,—when they may assemble with their masters in Christian equality in church, to hear the word of the gospel, which declares to them the liberty of the children of God. But to the Jews, the Sabbath was a festive day; therefore sacrificial feasts were established, and slaves, strangers, and the poor, were invited to them. The Romans had at least their Saturnalia, when the slaves yearly felt for once the joy of life. But a misunderstood, superstitious sanctification of the Sabbath amongst us, forbids to the oppressed classes

of men almost every social joy. We should not only allow these, under suitable oversight, but even contribute to the promotion of their joy, by providing for them, at least from time to time, public festivals and amusements. It is wrong to refuse to whole classes of men that participation in the joys of life, to which every man has claim. O ye rich! you know not in what unrighteousness you live! you know not how many flowers of human happiness you trample down in your career of avarice!

An entirely false view and an unkind disposition lie at the foundation, when masters justify their severity towards their servants by saying, "We pay them for their service, and make a bargain with them; how can we help it, if fate has placed them in this condition of dependence?" We ought not to use the necessity of a man to exact of him any thing wrong: necessity founds no right. No more than the laws would permit a man to be bought, even if he wished it, as a slave, does morality allow a contract to be made by which the freedom of a man is harmed, and he is placed in the condition of servitude.

That which occurs most decidedly in the relation of servants to their masters, finds more or less place in the relation of hired laborers to their employer, officers to their superior. There is clearly a wrong in the relation of unconditional obedience in the brethren of an order to their superior, since it makes them mechanical instruments, which men should never be: hence it has come, that the domineering spirit of this unrighteous relation has subverted the most abominable knavery. Where the free acts by the free, iniquity

always finds hinderances; but by slaves, on the other hand, it can accomplish all things. Only in war is unconditional obedience necessary, but even, by the nature of the thing, limited to that occupation, which peculiarly should lie beyond the sphere of peaceful life.

Even the fair relation of love in marriage, where the subordination of the woman to the man should be resorted to only as the last means of the preservation of harmony, is abused by making the husband or the wife subject to an unworthy thralldom. We will not regard the cases in which the rudeness of the man or the bad temper of the woman makes use of deceit and evil speaking, in order to arrogate a sort of sway; we will suppose that the married couple sincerely love each other: but love itself can be despotic, while it allows no free individuality, or jealously watches every step, or, with selfish fondness, is bound to rule and punctilio, so as to fetter the other in intolerable chains. The wife is often no better than a slave; she must serve the caprice of the husband, and await his nod; or she bears the yoke of a strict domestic discipline, without ever enjoying a breath of freedom; or she can follow no favorite inclination, no individual taste, can have no peculiar opinion, and only be the echo of her husband. Alas! and the poor creature must hide the chains of this slavery, and can never once pour out her grief into the bosom of a friend, since she loves her husband, and would not see the connection which is sacred to her, desecrated by any estranged regard. More seldom that the husband sacrifices his freedom to the quarrelsomeness and jealousy of his wife, from weakness or excessive love for quiet, while he re-

nounces the joy of friendship and society, or of a favorite taste, and resigns himself in gloomy coolness to his labors. Nay, even friendship, which yet is the freest connection, can, by the abuse which one makes of his ascendancy over another, become a means of arrogance and of injustice, so that, instead of a free reciprocity, the relation of dependence ensues, and the weaker loses to the stronger his freedom of opinion and of action. But, since arrogance can intrude into relations which belong to free love, we must therefore so much the more beware of carrying it into those which already imply the dependence of one upon another.

A usual fault, which oppresses our social life, is the transfer of mercantile subordination to all society, whereby manners maintain a stiff, servile stamp. Beyond business, master and servant, superior and subordinate, should be upon terms of equality with each other, and each one preserve his civil and human dignity. But it is wholly otherwise with us, where certain distinctions of caste exist, — where the noble looks down haughtily upon the citizen, the superior finds himself reluctantly in company with his inferior, the officer treats the soldier always as his subject, — where the titles held in social intercourse, and transferred even to the women, constantly remind one of the relations of rank, and the odious distinction of pronouns in conversation marks the different classes addressed.¹ 'Our

¹ [In Germany, different pronouns are used in addressing equals and inferiors. In addressing an equal, the word *Sie* is used, whereas an inferior is addressed as *Er*. — TRANSL.]

manners have already gained much in this respect; we no longer entitle the noble, Your Grace; people no longer cast themselves as abject servants at his feet, and are very prodigal of the complimentary pronoun, which, however, still remains, the offspring of a servile, hypocritical spirit, and ought to be entirely done away. It is sad that our courtesy has preserved the name and stamp of the court, where there is no reference to human equality; we ought, instead, to say civility, and our politeness should be merely civil, not courtier-like. The French revolutionaries were correct, when they sought to introduce the address Citizen instead of the title Master, — Citoyen instead of Monsieur, — since, if the odious “Monsieur” would mean any more than master of oneself, which, however, it never implied, it then contradicted civil and human equality, according to which, no one, except in relations of business, should be, or be addressed as, master of another.

Together with independence, honor, too, is often lost sight of in these relations. The servant must bear the humiliating blame, the outbursts of his master's violence, and suffer himself to fall into a subjection which goes beyond the relations of business, and even extends to his person; he must feel that the latter regards himself personally as better, and thinks he stands upon a higher grade of humanity. This delusion of personal superiority, so dishonoring others, is prevalent among the nobility, and was in former times still more so. Since, in all purely monarchical states, the throne is the source of all honor, those who alone have the right of free access to the society of the sovereign must naturally deem themselves personally

better than others. Then others imitate the prince, and surround themselves with their equals; and, where no distinction of birth and station exists, money decides personal dignity. What a miserable pride, to be puffed up on account of outward superiority, and never be conscious of pure, manly dignity, — of the excellence of personal perfection in the relation of man to man! How disgraceful and pitiful it is to make a heap of metal the footstool of one's dignity! If only the fleeting gold disappears from beneath his feet, the wretched idol lies shattered upon the ground. How shameful to accord to another personal preference on account of his money, and to bow the knee to Mammon! Against such insolence of station and pride of wealth no tribunal protects us; nay, there are even laws which punish offences more or less severely according to distinctions of rank. Against such arrogance, nothing protects us but the sense of justice in some; and of honor in others, and a tone of manners, into which the upright, free spirit of citizenship has pressed itself.

Besides the arrogance of rank and wealth, there is the arrogance of personal superiority in native gifts and acquired excellences, which becomes dangerous to honor, and against whose outrages there is no legal protection. Beauty, mental endowments, knowledge, ready talents, are indeed personal excellences; but they do not enhance the human dignity of him who possesses them above that of others who possess them not; and those distinguished should not therefore meet others with contemptuous arrogance. The weapons with which this arrogance exercises its oppression, are

usually those of wit and ridicule. Many take a cruel satisfaction in making sport of others, and rendering them the butt of ridicule. Often, indeed, the false vanity and sensibility of those who deem themselves neglected, or turned into ridicule, err in judgment upon the right and wrong in this point; but a pure heart will always hit upon the right standard. An especial censure is due to that scholastic pride, which often figures awkwardly and ludicrously in society, and seldom wounds others, but always has its source in a misconception of personal excellence, and sets itself above others. In the commonwealth of letters, this pride often exercises the basest injury towards rising authors, who are met by a dogmatical, repulsive criticism. It may, indeed, be said that the censure of a book does not extend to the person; but, if the mortification caused by this is well weighed, does not unjust criticism proceed from an unjust, arrogant heart? Even the sense of moral excellence, and censure of the faults of others, may be injurious to personal honor, by ungentle, sarcastic expressions. Indeed, the laws do not allow that he who has been guilty of a transgression, should be reproached with it in an injurious manner. I may not denounce him who has falsified, as a liar, but merely reprove him, as having told an untruth. Farther than the laws, the equity of the just, the Christian man extends, who is mindful of the words of Christ, "He who says to his brother, Thou fool! the same is in danger of hell fire." The just man will not only allow himself no abusive word, but not even a judgment which throws upon the character of a neighbor a light disadvantageous, and degrading him

in the eyes of others; he will blame his actions, but not his motives, and will even judge the former with gentle forbearance. Spiritual pride is in every point of view intolerable, but most so when it attacks the holiest sense of honor — the sense of moral worth. It may disguise its contempt of those who differ in opinion, ever so assiduously under the mantle of humility; the ravening wolf, the unjust, unkind disposition, always peers out from beneath.

From this contemptuous arrogance, only the sense of modesty guards us, which is puffed up as little by fortune and rank as by personal and moral perfection; be it, however, the true modesty, which does not seek by elaborate and excessive humility to force the homage of others, and is at pains to undervalue its own merit only that others may observe it. It does not affect those protracted and tedious courtly flourishes, which are as deficient in taste as in cordiality. The truly modest man does not press towards the place which is accorded to his merit, but does not make much ado about taking it, since he sets little value upon it, and, by an unrestrained carriage, makes it appear that he does not degrade others, who take a lower position. True modesty is accompanied by simplicity and straightforwardness, and will always be followed by a natural grace, so that all in its vicinity are at ease, since every one finds himself in his place, and can feel as a man. It breaks every fetter of false fear and timidity, unbinds every genuine individual feeling, awakens slumbering confidence; the poor man feels himself no more oppressed; the lowly dares lift up his eyes; the ungifted and uneducated enjoys the

notice of another; without any sense of degradation. In modesty, justice comes forward personally, and, as it were, in living form, and stamps its divine seal upon the human countenance; at the same time it makes itself known in immediate personal intercourse, and places person with person in harmonious relation, while otherwise it only regulates and adjusts mediate relations. The genuine modesty is a costly pearl, so much the more costly, since the spurious, counterfeit one is but too often offered in its stead, to which an undisguised arrogance might almost be preferred, just as rudeness is always better than hypocrisy.

From the aforesaid violations of honor, no tribunal but that of public opinion and of social manners can protect us; and there is still a sad want of that spirit of justice, which takes part with the oppressed, and shows to arrogance its limits. Other attacks upon honor are punished by the tribunal, or at least decidedly condemned by public opinion; I mean particular offences, so called, or injuries by word or deed. Wherein honor and its injury consists, custom and feeling assure us: this matter is so little to be comprehended under a definite proposition, that even the laws recognize as indication of injury only the *animus injuriandi*—the intention to injure, or the contemptuous disposition of the injurer. It is the highest rudeness, to express without provocation, from mere arrogance, contempt of another by words and deeds which invade his honor. Commonly offences are called forth by provocations, since it is believed that others approach too near, and one must protect his honor. Yet those are temperate who return but an equal insult; but they

are in the wrong if they think they thus do what is proper; since moral reciprocity does not permit an immoral action to be returned, else it would not be moral; according to it, passion should not be met with passion, unreason with unreason; the other is always injured by an injury returned, since, although, as aggressor, he is in the wrong, he can always demand the respect belonging to him as a man, which the result always shows, since such returns usually increase the bitterness: in fine, we lose sight of respect for civil intercourse, by indulging in insults, and thereby helping to break the public peace. It is worse if the insult is returned with addition, or if one is provoked to a return which contributes nothing to his honor. The source of all such actions lies partly in natural violence of temper, and in want of moderation; and in this case they at first deserve palliation, although rudeness always deserves censure: partly they spring from selfishness and want of respect for our neighbor; and then they are entirely the fruits of injustice. There are men who regard themselves as the centre of all, and repel with violence every one who seems to approach them even in a peaceable manner, or to touch any one of their rights; who regard every misunderstanding as an insult, and who deem their honor sacrificed by giving an explanation; who consider every wrong that occurs to them as treason against their majesty, and cast contempt upon the offender, as if he were not a man, and as if he once for all had forfeited all respect, whereas even the greatest transgressor still demands our forbearance.

As falsehood and treachery are more shameful than

vialent injury, since they make open defence impossible, so slander is the most shameful attack upon a fellow-man's honor, and it is rightly computed among the blackest vices. It is so much the more disgraceful, since it has not the excuse of provoked, momentary violence, and does not express one's own contemptuous opinion about the slandered, but seeks to turn the mind of another against him. It is not like the provoked snake, which, enraged, attacks its enemy, and sheds its poison into his wounds; but it is a mingler of poison, who prepares, with treacherous art and calculation, the fatal drink, and mixes it in the cup of the unwary.

Honor is the holiest right of man — holier than life and freedom. Without self-respect no man can live; with it, on the contrary, every misfortune, and even loss of freedom, can be borne. Self-respect is indeed in itself independent of the honor which is shown us by the esteem of others, and rests upon a sense of our own worth, and the witness of a good conscience. But as man is nothing without society, and cannot at once attain a full consciousness of himself; so self-respect is in a manner dependent upon the esteem of others. If any one experiences contempt from all, and sees himself repulsed by all, he must have great strength of mind not to lose faith in himself; and the probable consequence of such treatment would be insanity and suicide. To the public regard which a man enjoys, every member of society contributes; and, if any one injures his neighbor, he subtracts a portion, lessens the amount of universal respect which the former possesses, and, since self-respect in a manner depends upon this, he lessens this also. But, if man lives only by self-respect,

then the offender, by violating this, commits murder, and strikes a dagger into his neighbor's inmost heart. It is a vulgar view of morality to hold the life of man as chief of his possessions. A murder is something hateful and horrible; but the murder of honor is something diabolical; for it is spiritual murder. Therefore punishments with the loss of honor are utterly unjust and immoral; the fallen man is thereby cast into an abyss of annihilation, from which even faith cannot save him. I have seen a criminal upon the pillory, and still shudder when I think of it: not the sense of pity, of wretchedness, rent my heart, but the gaze into that fearful nothing, that eternal night, that inner death, filled me with horror. What had the wretched man to oppose to the penetrating gaze of the multitude? Not the sense of innocence, for he was guilty; not the hope of reform, for how can one reform under universal contempt? and even had he been able, could he ever wash out the stain? There he stands, with crushed spirit, forever an outcast from society, despairing of himself, and even of life, staring into a dark future! Ah! the criminal who is broken alive upon the wheel, — who, in the most terrible torments, awaits death from the spear, — is not so pitiable; since he atones in the body, finds compassion, and has hope of deliverance by death. Punishments with loss of honor are purely unjust, since they punish one or more civilly dishonorable actions with loss of entire civil right; since experience shows that this is lost irrecoverably. But these punishments also annihilate moral honor and dignity; since, for the disgraced, no improvement is possible, since he nowhere finds welcome, confidence,

friendship, — can go nowhere honorably, and is deprived of all courage and self-confidence, without which no improvement is conceivable. But what crime can be so great as to demand in retribution the annihilation of the inner man? Usually the slight trespass against honor is punished as if punishments with loss of honor were the least of all. Must we always carry this relic of barbarism, and thereby perpetuate rudeness and immorality among the people?

The honor of a man, like his innocence, is easily injured, but not to be healed but with great difficulty. The loss of civil honor is never wholly to be made good; for personal insults there are indeed satisfactions, but a stain still remains, and calumny is the most difficult to wash away, because, like the pestilence, it steals on in secret. The master principle of slanderers is, "There always remains something to fix upon;" and they are perfectly right in this, and know the mind of the great multitude. So much the more let him who still bears any respect for the honor of his neighbor, beware of ever making so scandalous and hardly reparable an assault upon it, and keep his tongue in check, if a neighbor's reputation is concerned.

Justice and the rights of fellow-men are supported by the virtue of peacefulness. Common avarice and wickedness, rough violence, which invade the quiet of others, lie, as it were, beyond the sphere of morality, and he who dwells therein is insensible to the pure feeling of human respect, and to the dictates of wisdom. But men often fail of moral sentiment by overstrained ideas of honor and right, and lack the just standard, since they do not recognize the duty of mod-

eration in certain cases. Such may be satisfied with the doctrine that justice, far removed from seeking strict right, is rather often sacrificed in order to keep the peace, and that no individual right is so important as civil intercourse, towards which it enjoins the tenderest forbearance.

We have already remarked that selfishness thereby becomes a peace-breaker, and indulges in offences towards neighbors, — that it considers itself as the centre, and allows all else to fall a sacrifice to its supposed right and imagined honor. Hence ensues not only too great irritability in affairs of honor, but also that unhappy quarrelsomeness, which seeks an idle reputation for courage and bravery, by provoking others to strife. This moral weakness formerly prevailed among the youth in the German universities. Such lovers of strife were called *renowners*, who sought to promote their renown by showing themselves always ready to fight. This was a sort of childishness, but it shows how far selfishness may go. There is also a more subtle selfishness, which conducts itself as the strict, irreconcilable avenger of actual injuries, and acts upon the principle of the strict jurists — “Justice must be upheld, even if the world should be ruined by it.” Men of such disposition are quite ready for controversy whenever any body touches any of their rights; they are like a two-edged sword, which, at the slightest touch, starts from the scabbard, and wounds; and they pursue every strife even to extremities. To these belong those litigants, who are always at strife with their fellow-citizens, and whose passion is directly nourished in those states where lawsuits, by

the imperfection of the courts, and the artifices of attorneys, are long protracted. It may be that such men are often in the right, and that the motives of their unfortunate undertakings lie in a vivid sense of justice, which they show by gladly joining in the controversies of others, and, by counsel and action, taking the part of the innocent. Many also find in strife a sort of entertainment and mental occupation: by such means good lawyers and judges are corrupted, or the public spirit for public affairs has been morbidly developed in them. Others, whose condition imposes upon them a stricter care for their honor, are inexorable under affronts, and allow themselves to be appeased only by complete satisfaction. They are as strict in affairs of honor towards friends and foes; they weigh points of honor with gold scales; blood is to them a slight balance-weight, which they shed with lavish hand. But equally precious, nay, even more so, than the life of a man frivolously put at hazard, is peace, endangered by a strained, irritable disposition, which resembles the state of war in respect to reciprocal mistrust, and allows no free, moral intercourse. In this punctilious and revengeful disposition, there is an objectionable lack of true respect towards fellow-men, and especially towards the moral community. We must show how from this respect the duty of peacefulness flows, as an essential part of justice. •

The respect towards fellow-men, which justice demands, is not grounded upon this or that worth which experience has acquainted us with; (this sort of respect, which belongs to merit, or reputation, is another thing, and does not appertain immediately to justice;)

it is founded still less upon the advantages and benefits which we have received from it; (gratitude is indeed a duty, but not, like justice, towards all, without distinction;) it is founded not upon this or that relation in which we stand to our fellow-men, but it is directed purely to the person, and the moral communion in which we stand with him. It is the original, immutable idea of man which we have to recognize in our fellow-men, — that which he is, apart from his circumstances, — and the idea of the communion which we ought to respect in relation to him. We ought to be just towards him who is destitute of all personal cultivation, no less than towards him whom we value and admire on account of his excellences; since it is not cultivation that constitutes true human worth. We ought to be just even towards him, who, by his immorality, merits our displeasure and blame; since, notwithstanding this, he yet remains man; only in appearance, or in this or that respect, has he injured the dignity of man in himself, and degraded it in our eyes; but in itself, it abides by him, and he can recover what he has lost, — he can better himself. If any one has injured us, and is decidedly wrong in our view, then he indeed appears to us immoral; but he has not therefore destroyed the respect which we owe him; only his conduct, perhaps, deserves contempt, not he himself. Would we on that account retaliate upon him, we then, on account of a single action, forget the whole man, and incur wrong. Respect for the moral communion must keep us from this. He has indeed impaired this, but by no means done it away; it still exists, and should be wholly restored. O, could men

only distinguish the deed from the person, and keep their heart, which glows with indignation, free from hatred towards the latter! could they elevate the narrow look above an impaired relation, above a momentary error, to a free view of life! Afterwards, we judge the hostile deed that has harmed us, far more mildly than at the moment, because time frees us from momentary narrowness, and has taught us to regard things from a higher point of vision.

Respect for the immutable dignity of man, and for the moral fellowship, must not merely deter us from retaliating the enmity of the offender; it must dispose us, from love of peace, to waive a trifling right, in order to avoid a greater wrong. No right is in itself so unconditional as the dignity of the person, and the sanctity of the peace of the moral community. If I respect any good more highly than these inviolable goods, I sin against humanity, and betray an immoral disposition. It cannot, indeed, be required that every invaded right should be sacrificed to peace; since to self and to family we owe the duty of preservation. No unconditional rule, however, can be prescribed for peaceableness; in this, every thing depends upon circumstances, and the just decisions of the sense of right. The aim of peaceableness is the maintenance of peace; to this I should make sacrifices, but not waste them uselessly. Had I to do with a rude man, who would make use of the magnanimity with which I would treat him only to oppress and harm me the more, it would be casting pearls before swine. A noble man, on the contrary, whom passion merely has driven to harm me, or who has become my enemy through misunderstanding,

will be touched by the magnanimous sacrifices which I make for the love of peace, and also led to magnanimity and reconciliation. The nearer I have stood to my enemy, the more confidence I cherish in his good disposition, the greater sacrifice ought I to make for the sake of peace; the more remote, on the other hand, I stand from him, the more fiercely and rudely he presents himself to me, the more ought I to insist upon my right from him in the way of controversy. Towards friends and relatives I should be milder and more magnanimous than towards others, since the preservation of the pacific connection with them is especially enjoined upon me; fellow-citizens, also, I ought to seek to win over by magnanimity, because I may hope that they will be sensible of it, and peace with them must be valuable to me. On the contrary, with strangers, who conduct hostilely towards me, I must be upon my guard; peace with them cannot be so precious that I should purchase it at great sacrifices. Of love of peace towards those who stand to us in no regular civil connection, or who assume the relation of rude force, we have already spoken. The disposition is the same which I have to indicate in strife with friends, fellow-citizens, decided enemies; in every case peace should be dear to me, and worth every proper sacrifice; but, from this disposition, I shall be obliged to act differently in different cases. If I cannot, by yielding, preserve peace without too much compromising myself and my rights, then I will enter the contest with energy, and, if need be, even draw the sword, but yet, in the contest itself, retain my love of peace, and at every moment be ready to lay down the weapons.

There is no contradiction in the assertion that war can be carried on in the love of peace; since rudeness can often be brought to order in no way but by force.

That is the true spirit of Christian peace and love of enemies. The language of Christ upon this duty has been taken literally, and therefore misunderstood. He says that we should not resist evil, and should yield passively to force; but he speaks against rude vengeance in sharp antitheses, in the way of Oriental proverbial wisdom, yet means only that, which we, enlightened by his spirit, ought to apply according to varying circumstances and gradations. If, now, from the steppes of Asia a wild horde should rush forth, and sweep over our peaceful plains, ought we to yield all that we love as a prey to its wild lusts, abandon house and land, and wander in misery? Can Christianity, the doctrine of love, demand that we should be untrue to the feelings of noblest love, which prompt to the battle? Yet we must love our enemies; but do we not also love the unruly child whom we punish, and whom we love even while we punish him? We should bless them who curse us; certainly we must wish them well, but, before all things, that they may recover from their passionate delusion in which they curse us; and to seek to recover them by word and deed, by earnestness and gentleness, will be our duty. He who in conflict preserves his gentleness and love of peace, and, by noble moderation, keeps himself within the bounds of equity, evinces the purest disposition. In peace it is easier to be peaceful, than in the heat of battle to keep the heart pure from wrath and hatred.

There is nothing more perverse than a quarrelsome

disposition; it does not allow the quiet, secure enjoyment of peace; it constrains others to be upon their guard, keeps them in a constrained, anxious position, and repels every free movement, every artless expression. The quarrelsome man, if he do not wield sword and lance, is to be compared to the robber and the waylayer, and exercises a subtle kind of club-law. He may begin a strife without cause, or merely when he is provoked; he always breaks the peace; he produces more harm than the arrogant, against whom quiet patience at least affords a sort of protection; for towards him we can stand in no placid relation; hardly is one strife settled, when he commences a new one; hardly is one relation adjusted, than he invades another; and so he keeps up an eternal collision, by which all patience and complacence are worn out. Alas! that so often the domestic quiet should be disturbed by this evil spirit, and that even the tender, gentle sex, whom nature has destined to still, patient peacefulness, know the vice of contentiousness! Hellish spirit of contention! must thou ravage the sacred asylum of peace — domestic life? Away to the battle-fields, and satiate thyself with blood, to quiet thy cruelty; but leave the peace of the household, that sanctuary of love, undisturbed! Hail to the man of peace! he spreads quiet and security wherever he goes; he disarms all passionate vehemence, does away all misunderstanding, dispels every cloud of suspicion; he unlocks all burdensome reserve, gives to every individual talent full play, and allows scope to every effort; and, if constraint and conflict occur, he knows how to restore all soon with gentle hand. Hail to the peaceful wife, who, with the cheerful, gentle

look of patience and tranquillity, dispels the clouds from the brow of her husband, passes over the expressions of his displeasure, or mildly interprets them, and meets violent temper with silent composure and moderation! O peacefulness! angel of tranquillity, with the gentle smile of heaven! happy the man over whom thou holdest thy palm-branch in defence, so that he finds peace around and within him, and quietly performs his daily work! happy the people in whom thy gentle spirit prevails! happy the house which you have chosen for an abode! in which the dwellers, returning from the struggle of life, recover their lost quiet, and from which, entering again into busy life, they carry with them the spirit of mildness!

Magnanimity towards enemies is one of the sublimest virtues. Magnanimous sacrifice for affectionate friends has something touching and striking in it; it is the warm breath of love that floats forth from it. On the other hand, magnanimity towards enemies excites the sense of sublimity, of pure reverence; it is spiritual grandeur that is presented to us; for it is attended by the lofty tranquillity of control. When Scipio had conquered New Carthage, in Spain, his soldiers brought him a noble captive of surpassing beauty. The young hero glowed with passion towards her; but he heard she was the betrothed of a Celtiberian prince, named Allucius, and resisted his inclination. He called for the parents and bridegroom, who approached him in timorous uncertainty. He gave them back the maiden, while he said to the bridegroom, "Here is your bride; receive her inviolate and without ransom, and be a friend to the Romans." Allucius was deeply touched,

seized the hand of Scipio, and prayed the gods to reward the noble Roman. The parents offered a noble ransom; the magnanimous hero refused it; they urged it upon him; but he gave it to Allucius for his nuptials. Full of joyful, grateful admiration, he returned to his home, declared every where the praise of Scipio, and won for the Romans the friendship of his people. "A youth," said he, "has come to Spain wholly like the gods, who not merely with weapons, but also by love and beneficence, conquers all."

The virtue of placability accompanies that of peacefulness. That is no true peace which is shut up within the heart, just as the wound is badly healed which still festers under the skin. Heart to heart, man should stand with man, show him justice not only in actions, but in disposition. The remark is often heard, "I will forgive it him, but I cannot forget it." That is no placability. The feeling of injury sustained should be entirely washed from the heart, like paid debts from the record, in order that a new, pure connection may begin in love and confidence; the consequences of a bad action ought to be extirpated, like the roots of a hurtful tree, in order that they may not send forth new shoots. Implacability has its foundation in selfishness, in severity of judgments, and in want of confidence. The selfish man measures every thing by himself, and refers all to himself alone; the injury of his profit, of his pride, he considers as something irreparable; the wrong of another does not seem to him a violation of a mutual relation, which must be dear to him upon his own, as well as the other's account, to which he owes restitution, and which is restored as

soon as the other asks forgiveness or gives satisfaction; he regards only himself in the connection; he has rights only, no duties; he has sucked the venom of injury deeply into his heart, and cannot open it again to love. The implacable man judges his enemies too severely, whilst he derives from wickedness what is partly the fruit of precipitancy and excitement, partly of error, and does not think that perhaps he himself fails daily through the same weakness as the one so severely condemned by him. He is, in fine, also distrustful; he confides in nothing good in him who has once manifested evil, and holds either their penitence to be insincere, or denies them the power of reformation. All this is unjust; man should never look to himself alone, and never so judge another as if he no more belonged to the moral fellowship, — as if he had separated from it by his wickedness, — as if he could no more conform to its laws, — and as if, as it were, he had become morally null.

A nobler implacability is that of indignation on account of violation of the universal right, or the right of friends, the source of which is not selfishness, but only that severity of judgment and that distrust, united with an aversion, in itself laudable, of the evil one. But we may abhor the evil, and yet mildly judge, and honor with confidence the person who has incurred it. As noble as it is to take the part of the injured, and to make common cause with him against the unjust, or to glow with disinterested indignation against wrong, yet equity in judgment is indispensable. Were he judged according to the strictness of the law, no man would be justified. All have their weaknesses and

faults; and even he who judges so severely, must, if not blinded by pride and vanity, confess his weakness. "Judge not, that ye be not judged." This equity of judgment upon the moral character of others saves from carping, or petty, malicious censure, with which hard-hearted men observe and make observable every failing of another, however insignificant it may be, and take a satisfaction in finding fault with and blackening his character. This also is a kind of quarrelsomeness; and the general peace, which can exist only through confidence and respect, is at least harmed by such a course.

Placability is a godlike virtue, for God is exalted above evil; he allows his sun to shine upon the just and unjust; he is the Father of all his children, of the obedient and disobedient; he pardons sins, and denies to no penitent sinner his grace. It is a beneficent, healing virtue; it lays upon the wounds which passion and provoked selfishness inflict, the soothing, healing balsam of forgetfulness, forgiveness, confidence; it binds it on with gentle, warm hand: herein it is also godlike. Through God's creation a sanative power is diffused, which opposes every disease, every hurt, permits nothing dead, and seeks constantly to restore the lost equilibrium. The wound inflicted upon the tree soon dries up, is covered by the growing bark; the broken twig grows out in another direction, and the germ bursts through the tender clod to come to light. From the decaying body other animals derive their nourishment, or it is changed into fertile soil, so as to nurture a fresh vegetable growth. Thus be it my care to heal the morally diseased and dead, and renew them

into life! Let us, by forbearance and gentleness, help to lift up the feeble power, — lead to its true aim the erring tendency, — restore the erring to knowledge. What would become of our existence, if we not only left sin and error without our aid, but sought to carry on a constant war against them? We should extirpate one another, and apply the power of life to its destruction. How could a society continue, if no one were disposed to pass over and conceal the weaknesses and faults of another, but would rather draw them forth, and judge them severely? It would not accomplish that which constitutes the end of their existence, whether it be support, counsel, or common employment; consequently it would destroy itself. The implacable man tears open wounds afresh, instead of healing them; and drops poison into them. Whilst he persecutes that which harms existence, evil and wrong, with inexorable hatred, he perpetuates and confirms its consequences, and hence commits evil himself.

The most deadly of all is revenge, which not only does not allow wounds to heal, but inflicts new, and retaliates every offence, however tardily, and ruptures anew the peace apparently restored. As magnanimity towards foes belongs to the sublimest moral spectacles, so revenge deserves our utmost abhorrence. It is selfish, like contention, and, besides, acts with malicious purpose, whilst it defers its gratification to a suitable time, and unmercifully reserves its victims. No more hateful spectacle appears in Roman history than the civil war of Marius and Sylla, who, one after the other, like wild beasts, revelled in the blood of their enemies, and the last of whom could not be satiated. Caesar

appeared great by the placable magnanimity which he exercised towards both. He gave life to many of his foes, and bound them to him by favors; he restored the statue of Pompey; and, had he resigned himself wholly to this magnanimity, not celebrated a triumph over the sons of Pompey, which must injure every Roman feeling, and at the same time moderated his ambitious pride, perhaps he would have escaped his fate.

Selfishness is the root of all injustice, because it destroys equal reciprocity and fellowship: justice hence is fulfilled by public spirit, which is in itself respect for the community; and the sanctity of this is the aim of its forbearing, regulating, moderative, and sanative endeavor. The virtue of public spirit is intimately connected with modesty, which never arrogates to itself an unjust prerogative; and with peaceableness, which even sacrifices an acknowledged right; it constantly subordinates individual right to general justice, and seeks not its own, but another's. Yet it is not that devoted, inspired love, which sacrifices all it has for the beloved; it is the tranquil, constant virtue, the same towards all, both friend and foe; it is the duty of every one, since without it no just society on a large scale can exist. But public spirit shows itself not merely in the relation of one to another, and to the whole community; it enters into foreign and public affairs, and becomes, in seasons of disturbance of the balance and of peace, regulator, umpire, pacifier. It holds the impartial scales, which weigh out equal right to all; it carries the white wand, which guides heated party spirit to quiet and order. It is the peculiar virtue of statesmen, whom their profession constitutes guardians of public

order; but every private citizen can also manifest it in his position towards the whole. It is the republican virtue, and the safeguard against arrogance, which is the most dangerous foe of republican freedom. But this genuine republican freedom can and may be shown in monarchical states, if only in these justice and civil equality exist. Yet too easily, in such states, the aristocratic spirit of certain favored classes, — who deem themselves alone called to rule, and others to obey, — who claim for themselves rights only, but for others duties only, — and who, by flattery, corrupt the sovereign, about whom they crowd, fawning, — wins the upperhand. However, even in free states this unrighteous spirit not seldom lifts up its haughty head. Certain families seize upon the administration, and oppress the people; they assign only to themselves rights equal with one another, but they feed the people with the crumbs, which they condescendingly cast to them. This oligarchical nobility is worse than the monarchical; it draws a rigid, close chain about the people, which can be broken only by revolt, whereas an enlightened, patriarchal autocrat can at once subdue this arrogant brood, and, like that iron Count of Thuringia, who put the haughty nobility to the plough, can place upon the oppressors the yoke which they before laid upon others. It is a pitiful pride which delights in the oppression of free citizens; it seeks by coward trickery a superiority, which belongs only to virtue and talent, and can be won only by effort; it would be nobly born, rather than noble; in its inward vacuity, it feels great only when others are prostrate in the dust before it; devoid of all sense of manly dignity, it sets

its foot on the neck of the free, and is puffed up by its own shame, since shame it is to shame the dignity of man. And what folly to seek distinction by prostrating every thing around, — to receive from stupidity and servility a wretched homage, while the breast of the free cherishes contempt, — in the general night to glimmer as a feeble light! But the foolish prepare their own recompense. While they yield themselves a prey to indolence, they sink into the slime of luxury and vice; while they avoid emulation, mental torpor and vacuity is their lot; they tremble at every show of energy among the people; every bright mental light terrifies them, since they feel the end of their impotent sway approaching. And it comes, — it comes sooner or later; a mighty deluge rushes forth, and overthrows their robber-castles, buries them in their ruins, and the execration of the people devotes their memory to abhorrence.

He is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven who most serves his brethren: this is done from true public spirit, by the just citizen, who subjects himself, and his profit, and glory, to the common good, — who feels himself great only in the general sentiment of civil dignity, — who seeks distinction only in securing to each one the place that belongs to him, and restoring the balance among equals. He is great as a citizen, and great as a man, who, like Cincinnatus, descends from the dictator's tribunal to return to his rural home. This public spirit may be shown in many relations, and is by no means confined to public life. Wherever an inequality, an oppressive preponderance, exists, it administers in the spirit of temperance; wherever a strife

breaks out, it goes as pacifier and mediator; it takes the part of the weak and the injured, opposes every public evil in open, fair contest, and unites all good citizens in resistance to the ill-disposed.

In cheerful, amiable guise, this disposition enters the social circle, as the spirit of free, purely human companionship, which removes all false distinctions of rank, obscurity, pretension, assigns to each his place, puts every talent and quality into full play, and favors every distinction only in so far as it adds to the pleasure and satisfaction of all. The modest man, indeed, by his appearance in society, exerts a cheering, liberalizing, and regulating influence, while he keeps himself within his own limits. But he who, with social public spirit, not only surrenders all pretension, but also keeps it off in every other one, and takes timidity into protection, diffuses, creative and fertilizing, the spirit of cheerfulness and complaisance, of free intercourse, of noble emulation in society; and, while he claims for himself a modest place, and conceals what he does behind what he leaves others to do, he stands, like an invisible creator, in his sphere; and the less thanks are thought to be owing him, the more he is thanked; since every joyous eye, without his being aware of it, smiles upon him his reward.

VOL. II.

D

LECTURE XII.

THE DUTY OF VERACITY.

By veracity, and the confidence corresponding to it, the primal ground of civil intercourse among men is established, whilst contracts are closed and relations entered into; but only by means of language men learn one another's meaning, and this end can be reached only by a veracious use of it. By the same means all human intercourse is fixed and maintained. By the mother's sweet caresses, the child first awakens to a consciousness of existence; it takes the fond words of the mother as truth, and, lisping, repeats them, with the trusty feeling that as yet knows nothing of falsehood. By language only, education becomes possible; by it the child receives from parents' lips the first ideas of right and wrong, the first rudiments of life; by it the child receives instruction and direction, and gains the elements of faith, by which the spiritual world is opened to his mind. By language the sacred community of the church exists, in which we find comfort and repose for all life—in which we are strengthened, inspired, sanctified. By it that scientific intercourse is kept up, which promotes the culture of the mind and the investigation of truth. How could ~~all~~ ~~these~~ communications be made, were not

language used for its rightful object — truly to reveal the inner man? Language, according to its object, should be a pure, transparent element, through which the mental ray, like the sunbeam through the air, passes undimmed and unbroken. It should be the pure fountain, in which, like the countenance in the water, the human spirit is mirrored. What an offence against mankind to dim this pure element — to hinder and disturb the passage of the light which belongs to all, and should illumine all! Alas! how can friendship, the fairest that earth knows, exist without truthful, confidential communion by language? How could it, indeed, at first be formed? As two children, playing before the mirror, kiss each other, and delight in the image of their unconscious friendship, so the Psyche of friend inclines fondly to that of friend before the mirror of language. By a word, the covenant of love is closed, whose bonds mutual glances have woven with tender threads; if that word is spoken, then soul meets soul in entire confidence, — then all mysteries are done away, all veils fall, hearts lie revealed to each other, — then the word of holy writ is fulfilled, “As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man.” How then can the bond of love be joined, if the word *love* does not mean love, — if the guile of seduction marks impure desires with this heavenly name, — if selfish deceit, with flattering speech, decoys the word of confidence, only to betray it? How can friendship exist, if the word of man be worth no more than a fleeting sound that moves the air, or if it be only the hypocritical enticement of cunning? if friend cannot swear to the word of friend, and trust him as himself?

O, life itself would be a lie, were there no veracity! since its fairest, purest possession is maintained only by the truthful, trustworthy word, by which the spiritual world is opened to us, and even the mystery of the eternal life is made manifest. Christ is the eternal, divine Word, in whom is no deceit, no lie; him we trust with unfaltering confidence; by him language has been sanctified; he has deposited eternal truth within its veil, and hallowed it by his speech; as he, by his incarnation, has united human nature with the divine.

Accordingly the use of language must be a matter of duty and of conscientious regard; but this regard should not be overstrained in a superstitious way, and referred to externals. Language itself, and its use, is something external, arbitrary, and factitious, and, as such, not an immediate object of respect. Nothing external, merely as such, — no institution and convention of social life, — is immediately obligatory. Property should be indeed respected by us, but not in itself, but because without this institution no moral life is possible; it is properly only the civil relation which we respect in property. Language is a similar external form, like property, although reaching further, and more important; since the latter, with all other institutions of a civil kind, rests upon veracity. It is not immediately, and merely in itself considered, important to a man that another should tell the truth, but only in so far as he stands in connection with him, and has with him some business or affair. The community uses language; that is the object, this the means; and, universally, the object only demands our immediate and direct regard, but the means only our mediate

regard. In the community with men, it is only the man, properly, whom we respect; the community contains only the relations under which we have to show him respect. If I, therefore, have to respect conversational intercourse by veracity, then I show respect properly only to the man with whom I am in intercourse; and it therefore follows, that veracity is not an immediate, but only a mediate duty, and that the immediate duty in it is respect for man, or justice.

This principle is extremely important. In the first place, it serves to restore morality to its proper sphere, the heart, and to guard it from the mistake, that it depends upon outward form and appearance. The truth may be spoken from prudence, or from loquacity and vanity: this has no moral worth, is rather in part culpable, and has nothing in common with conscientious veracity, but outward appearance.

Secondly, this principle serves to deter us from making veracity an irrefragable duty, which cannot be fulfilled without almost interrupting life, and confounding its relations. We ought always to be just, but veracious we cannot always be, since the duty of justice is directed purely to the person, but that of veracity only to an external relation, and this is subject to vicissitude. If, then, it be finally acknowledged that the duty of veracity suffers exceptions and limitations, we yet find, in the duty of respect for man, which lies at its foundation, a fixed rule, by which we can decide those exceptions and limitations.

A difference of opinion has heretofore prevailed among moralists as to whether veracity be an immediate duty, or whether, in certain cases, it be per-

mitted to tell an untruth. Even in this modern age, Kant and his followers have professed the strict opinion that we are bound always to tell the truth. We must avow a different, milder opinion, whilst we are far from that laxity and wilfulness in which it is permitted to prudence to tell the truth or not, and there is no obligation to abide by any principles. Many moralists have made utility the standard, by which prudence has to decide whether and when we may depart from the truth. If we understand by this not selfish utility, which cannot by any means be taken as a rule, without taking selfishness as the elementary moral law, whereas it is the root of all immorality; if we understand by it the utility of others, this is yet so fluctuating a thing, and its decision depends so much upon the varying culture of prudence, and its result upon contingencies, that we cannot possibly build so weighty a matter as veracity upon so insecure a foundation.

Before we give our view of the allowable limits of the duty of veracity, we will first consider the different kinds of untruth, and arrange them according to their greater or less importance.

If we regard the relation of what is said with what is thought, there are then two principal kinds of untruth, the negative and affirmative: by the former, we merely conceal and dissemble what is in our mind; by the latter, we give forth in its stead something which is not. If I make any body believe I have not done something that I have actually done, — that I am ignorant of something that I actually know, — then I tell an untruth negatively; or I can maintain that I have done something that I have not done, or I have done it otherwise

than I have done; or I can give him a false idea of that about which I pretend to know; then I tell an untruth affirmatively. Negative falsehood is again twofold. I either keep secret from another what I know, without his having any intimation of it, or even making claim to any knowledge of it, or, when he addresses me upon something of which he suspects that I know, or that I have done it, and believes he has a right to know, then I may deny him. That concealment is very frequent in life, and we cannot have much intercourse with others without being obliged to use some secrecy; nay, it is sometimes a duty to use concealment in regard to certain persons. Denial is more opposed to veracity than concealment: by this I leave another only in uncertainty; by that I occasion him a false opinion, and make him believe something has not taken place which actually has taken place: hence, by denial, I confuse the interchange of thought, which by silence I only refrain from keeping up. Indeed, to deny is called lying, at least in certain cases; but this epithet properly belongs only to affirmative untruth, by which the interchange of thought is still more confounded. The belied not only represents to himself that something is not, which actually is, but also that something else has taken place in its stead; and the liar will lead him yet further from the truth than the denier, since he urges upon him a wholly false representation.

If we look at the disposition which leads to the departure from truth, and to the object sought by it, concealment may then be more culpable than denial or lying. The malicious man may conceal something from his neighbor, whereby the latter suffers much

harm, and thereby may show his wicked, unkind disposition, whilst the affectionate husband, who denies his sick wife something which may mortally terrify her, or represents to her a troublesome affair otherwise than it was, directly evinces by this his love. All the untruths, by which I unjustly and unkindly act against my fellow-men, and indulge selfishness or revenge, are culpable on account of the same disposition. If the disposition is immoral, so, without doubt, is the act and the means by which I show this. But is it the question, whether, without a malicious, unjust disposition, we can make use of untruth, and how far the duty of self-preservation and duty to friends allow a limitation to the truth? In respect to this, we may infer a steadfast rule from our main principle.

The duty of veracity is respect for the interchange of human thought. We may hence establish it as a general rule, that this respect takes place only when the interchange of thought itself takes place, and that it ceases when this ceases; since respect presupposes some person to be respected. The intercourse of thought among men has not only its different departments and degrees, and is different between different persons, but is sometimes, in so far as it exists and should exist, abrogated. It is one thing between the married, another between friends, another between fellow-citizens, another between strangers. How can we, under these different circumstances, make veracity alike a duty? The wife feels hurt by the concealment of something which her husband should impart to her, whilst a friend makes no claim to the disclosure of the secret, and it does not occur to the neighbor to deem

himself injured because another does not take him into confidence. In these different spheres of interchange of thought, the moral relation, which this subserves, is concerned. With one, I stand merely in civil relation as fellow-citizen, and in universal human relation as a man; to one I owe the truth only in so far as I thereby have to fulfil towards him civil duty and human love. With another, I stand in more intimate intercourse of love, confidence, common occupation, and effort; to such I owe the truth, not only as a means of justice, but also for the maintenance of friendly relationship, — for the promotion of the common object. According to the standard of these different steps of intercourse, the negative untruth of silence may find more or less place, and, at most, towards those who least concern us, although we may, in certain cases, be reserved towards confidential friends, if it is not done from want of confidence, but from motives of respect or love. On the other hand, the justification of denial and lying is not founded upon these different degrees of intercourse. I may not lie to a stranger rather than to my friend; nay, towards the latter, rather than the former, a deception, in sport, for instance, is allowable. I may use concealment towards him who does not expect or deserve my confidence; but in denial and deceit I can take refuge only when another deserves my mistrust, — when he, by hostile conduct, has destroyed the interchange of thought which should take place between himself and me, and if I have just apprehension that he can and will abuse my veracity.

The falsehood of necessity is that which a just moral-

ist cannot unconditionally condemn. It supposes a case of self-defence, in which we are placed by the guilt of another, or by circumstances. If we have brought ourselves into an emergency, from which we are compelled to deliver ourselves by a falsehood, such a falsehood of necessity will always fail of the perfect justification of the moralist, if, at the same time, it was an actual transgression that drove us to the refuge and excuse of falsehood. It verifies the sad experience, that sin always creates new sins. The selfish, spoiled child will be deceitful also; the thief, the voluptuary, the traitor, must lie to keep their works of darkness from the light of day. Such lies of necessity are the refuge of false self-defence, and violate mental intercourse, in respect to those who are not only innocent, but perhaps the injured party. The position of self-defence, by which we are justified in a falsehood of necessity, must be brought on by him against whom we use the necessary falsehood, as an unavoidable defence; we should not annul truthful intercourse, but the other party. By the falsehood of necessity, one duty need not be violated for the sake of another, — not the duty of respect for man for the sake of self-preservation; but the duty of respect must, through the conduct of the other, be waived, at least for the moment, and in reference to the veracity otherwise due him. If an emergency, induced by circumstances, compel us to a necessary falsehood, yet he whom we deceive must have deserved our distrust; in reference to him, the kind of intercourse under consideration does not apply; so that, by the untruth, we do not violate the respect otherwise due him. This kind of necessary falsehood

will be far more grievous to the truthful man than that for which there is more complete justification.

That falsehood on the ground of necessity is most justifiable when civil intercourse between myself and another is abrogated by his violence or treachery. He who violently assaults me has abrogated, by his own guilt, the right, otherwise his, of demanding the truth of me; and I may not only conceal it from him, but seek to lead him astray by false assertions. I may deceive the thief who would force me to point out the place where I keep my money, and tell him it is in a chamber where it is not, but where my servant sleeps, whom I can call to my aid. The strict friends of truth need not infer that I love my money better than the truth; since the thing concerned is not to sell the latter for the former, but to meet a case of right and of self-defence against wrong. Perhaps some one may not care enough for his money to carry on such a war of deception: he is free to do as he pleases; but towards the thief, if he deceive him, he violates no duty. Falsehood is noble, indeed, if used as a safeguard of others; since the noble one gives himself as the victim rather than others. If a murderer rushes into the house to kill my father, and asks me where he may find him, then surely I will not tell him the truth, but seek to deceive him. It may be argued, on the other hand, that such falsehood may easily miss its aim, and the false assertion that father is in the garden may deliver him into the robber's hands, since he may, meanwhile, have gone into the garden; and that it is better to tell the truth, or, at least, to ignore it. This is just like blaming the son for going, dagger in

hand, to the succor of his father, who is struggling with a murderer, because it is possible that, while he falls between the combatants, the father may expose himself to his assailant, and receive a deadly thrust. It is not the consequence that here decides, but the intention and disposition. To the proconsul Piso horsemen were sent to put him to death. At dawn of day, they rushed into his house, and, not far from the chamber where he was to be found, met his slave, whom they asked where Piso was. "I am he," said the slave, and was immediately slain. Rightly Tacitus calls this a noble falsehood; it is indeed noble, because a noble self-sacrifice was connected with it. But must not the rigid condemners of every falsehood condemn this? and should we call it noble if they are right? It was in vain; and in vain the faithful slave perished for his master: but should we judge an honorable deed by its result? No; this falsehood is a thousand times preferable to truths told under the ordinary circumstances of life; this liar is as far exalted above those pedantic friends of truth, as heroic virtue is above the dry morality measured out by the systems of the schools.

The civil duty of veracity must be most sacred to us when we stand before the tribunal, which is appointed to defend the civil relation, and has the right to demand the truth upon all that is necessary to the administration of justice. But, if the tribunal has fallen into the power of a party, or of a tyrant, and either abuses the laws with outrageous wilfulness, or transgresses the sphere of jurisdiction, and makes dispositions, instead of actions, subjects of penal investigation, then the ac-

cused, strictly speaking, is absolved from the duty of veracity, since he stands purely in the attitude of self-defence, and finds himself in opposition to an unjust power. This is the case with revolutionary and inquisitorial tribunals. If the accused, from respect for the tribunal, which is still sacred to him in spite of the injustice with which it is administered, and from zeal and enthusiasm for the cause on account of which he is persecuted, abandons all self-defence, and falls a victim, then he acts a grand and noble part, and perhaps contributes, by his sacrifice, towards putting an end to the perversion of law, whilst indignation at the shedding of his innocent blood may cheer the just to rise, and wrest from the unjust the usurped sway, or to set bounds to their wilfulness. The example, also, of magnanimous respect for public veracity, which he presents, will act beneficially upon the sense of justice in the people, and contribute to the restoration of a sound, upright civil relation. He who is enthusiastic for his faith, will gladly seize the opportunity to profess it publicly, and win respect for it by steadfast frankness. But the enthusiast for a certain political view should prevail upon himself to conceal his opinion, rather than fall a useless victim. At any event, we will not blame him who seeks to escape from unrighteous violence, by denying the truth which it has no right to demand of him, if, at the same time, he does it not from anxious care for himself, but from love for his friends.

A sure rule against the abuse of necessary falsehood is this: Be always forced to it, and go no further than necessity demands; use it not to attain any thing by

it, but only to defend yourself and others from violence, unfaithfulness, importunity; harm no one by it; and, above all, never violate confidence. It is always noble to suffer wrong from love of truth—to endure loss, and to sacrifice not merely selfishness, but also allowable self-love; only in support of friends, and their right, will the truthful man ever take this allowable means of defence.

The mental intercourse between men is different in proportion to the confidence which exists between them; it varies with the different ability to interchange thoughts with one another, and to receive the entire truth; and this difference of ability limits the right and the duty of veracity. Children are not able to enter into full mental intercourse with adults; we must therefore not only conceal much from them, but must also feast their precocious curiosity with fables, and especially veil from them the mystery of the sexes. The sick bear the same relation to physicians and nurses, who sometimes assiduously conceal from them their situation, and withhold from them the whole truth, which would probably increase their disease. In such cases, friend may even deceive friend. The mentally-diseased, hypochondriacs, melancholics, lunatics, especially need the beneficial deceits of the physician, and one delusion must often crowd out another. In certain cases, we must treat the healthy as sick, or as mentally diseased, if that which is to be imparted actually exceeds their natural energies. Thus we gradually impart overwhelming intelligence, and feign this or that preparatory tidings. The passionate, at least for the moment, are to be treated as mentally

diseased; the excited, the vindictive, we must patiently restore to reason, whilst we represent ourselves as justifying his passionate purposes, and offer our aid in their execution, until he is cool enough to hear the pure language of reason. The broadest theatre for accommodation is presented to the teacher, — especially the religious teacher, — when he has to do with the prejudiced and uneducated; but, at the same time, dishonesty is here very difficult to avoid, and very fatal in its results.

It requires no proof that the capacity of comprehending the truths of religion is very variable. It would be not only folly, but even unkindness, to introduce a simple peasant to the scientific course of thought of a learned theologian; to impart to him the doubts to be solved, the objections to be removed by the theologian, with the counter-arguments; to try to raise him to the abstract mode of representation which is peculiar to the thinker, upon the subjects which he can conceive of only figuratively. The natural consequence would be, either to bewilder his faith, or to fill him with distrust towards the author of such communications. It is therefore the teacher's duty not only to withhold from the pupil much that he knows and thinks upon religion, and impart to him only as much as he can apprehend and apply, but also to speak to him as much as possible in his own language and mode of conception. But what is to prevent wilfulness in this matter? and what divides truth from falsehood? In the first place, love. If the teacher is free from all selfishness, it devolves upon him not to keep the pupil in unworthy dependence

upon himself, not to cherish the prejudices that contribute to this, and not to give occasion to new errors; it devolves upon him only to promote the pupil in knowledge; then, even in the limitation of veracity, he will be veracious and faithful. Again, a fixed limit is placed between truth and falsehood, by referring accommodation merely to the intellectual knowledge of religion, or to opinion and its expression in language, but not to faith and sentiment, in which alone the essence of religion consists. The teacher of religion may and ought to leave many erroneous or imperfect notions of religion for a time untouched, until the pupil is capable of receiving others that are better; he may even use sensuous representations as figurative veils, until the mind of the learner is ripe for the truth without figure; but he ought never to accommodate himself to that which is opposed to faith and pious feeling, and keep back nothing that is necessary to these. In a word, he should prove himself thoroughly veracious and trusty in that which constitutes the object of mental intercourse, which is faith; but the means, which are language and conceptions, he should use according to the standard of the pupil's capacity. This rule is especially important in all communication of thought; we should always have in sight what the object of intercourse demands. The physician has to talk with the sick upon his disease; and here the object is to keep him from disturbing representations. In conversation with a child, we ought to have his education and development in sight, and adjust all to this object. But respect and love teach us to hold fast this object; and thus both rules unite in religious in-

struction — unite in the prompting of love to give the learner what he expects and needs, strength and purity of faith.

Nowhere is veracity so sacred a duty as in religious instruction, and especially in the church; for here the most important subject of communication is concerned — eternal truth; here it is that mind takes its deepest gaze into mind, and mutually reveals itself in its inmost life. The matter at stake is not to observe another's opinion upon some worldly affair, nor his meaning and view upon this or that matter of controversy; here the elementary condition and direction of the mind must be unveiled, — that on which all peace and joy depends, and which decides the inmost worth of man. Are language and intercourse intended to bring spirits, that otherwise meet and come in contact only by means of the body, into a proper, self-made communion, and to reveal themselves to each other, — then, since it concerns the inmost essence of the spirit, communion upon religion must be the most intimate of all. As immortal souls, in the eternal realms of heaven, must meet each other without veil, and behold each other face to face, so should they here, in the divine kingdom of piety here below, like sisters join in faith in the Eternal and in eternal love, and in fond unison enjoy the intimations of heaven. But, alas! never have deceit, hypocrisy, insincerity, been more put in play, than in the religious community. It was a long time the main principle of priests to keep the people in darkness and superstition, and to give them enigmatic figures instead of truth; and, even now, many shudder — even evangelical clergy.

men—at every beam of light that falls into the dark sphere of their dominion.

On the other hand, the communication of thought has nowhere excited so much strife as in the church. That which should unite men most intimately, has separated them, rent them into different sects, inflamed them to hatred, discord, and bloody wars. This comes from the fact that, in the sphere of religion, the communication of thought is so very difficult and defective; that faith can neither be embraced wholly in symbols and propositions, nor be securely imparted in words, since our knowledge is smattering, and our language on divine things is a childish lisp. Upon faith itself, men have contended less than upon creeds and usages, about which they misunderstand each other. But, even on that account, it is necessary, in religious communication, to be no less circumspect than truthful. Love for the sake of peace bids us impart nothing to others which may perplex and provoke them to controversy, as creeds and dogmas do; since these always presuppose a certain development of the understanding, and are unintelligible without this. Jesus himself, and the apostles, have gone before us, unerring models of propriety; but they have, at the same time, taught us how to connect with this the purest truth. A Christian teacher should imitate them as well in prudential teaching as in veracity, and should try quite as much to promote the development of intelligence as to preserve the bond of uniform faith and of peace.

Finally, courtesy sometimes may induce us to disguise the truth. There are certain civilities, and tokens of respect, which are like worn, and therefore

depreciated coin, and which no longer mean what they originally designated. Strictly taken, it is a falsehood to profess high respect, at the end of a letter, to one whom we are far from respecting. But, in such cases, the individual is not free; he must, in order to avoid giving offence, comply with customary formalities, and postpone rigid veracity to peace. But let every one beware of further corrupting the hypocrisy of manners, and of putting fresh coin into circulation, which contributes to the depreciation of that already current; let him strive rather to produce greater simplicity of manners. And we may congratulate ourselves that we are on the return to simplicity, and that the most distinguished bearing is now that which is unconstrained.

Let not the necessity of acknowledging these limitations of veracity awaken anxiety lest we cannot live in noble love of truth. The cases where, in just distrust, we must depart from the truth, are very rare; and only then is peaceful, friendly intercourse broken. The other kinds of untruth do not appertain to the relations of hostility, but rather promote love, benevolence, peace. Life, God be thanked, is not yet so corrupt, that we cannot exercise the fair virtue of truth and uprightness. Indeed it is a fair virtue, and has a fair name. The truthful man is upright; he walks erect, freely lifts up his head, raises his eye firmly and calmly, and seeks the gaze of others. The false one, on the contrary, can look no one in the face; his gaze wanders about unstably, and, if he has not attained impudence, his whole bearing denotes insecurity and constraint. Even the veracious man, who sees himself forced to necessary falsehood, will feel himself de-

graded by it, and deems his dignity somewhat abandoned. Noble pride and truthfulness, cowardice and falsity, will commonly be coupled together. The truthful man goes forth upright, proud, and free, and all who come in contact with him feel free and easy, and it appears to them as if they entered upon a free, open plain, and breathed a pure air. But, in company with the false, the breast is cramped, as amidst impure, oppressive air, in a narrow, dismal dell.

There is a twofold kind of falsehood—the hostile and treacherous, which uses untruth as a means of fraud and cunning, and the good-natured or yet harmless, which uses deception as a means of preservation, or as a refuge in the little embarrassments of social life. Hostile, malicious falsehood, or falsity proper, is a perverse, degrading vice, and worse than open, rude injustice and violence, since cowardice accompanies it, and since it treacherously undermines the peace and security of life, poisons public veracity, and calls forth distrust. The other kind of falsehood is only a courtly trick, and no vice, and only corrupts the noble manner of intercourse, but not the serious relations of business and civil life. It is the bad trick of the tattler, who makes up by lying his want of news; the witling, who would impart a charm to his fictions by the show of truth. It is worse in go-betweens and gossips, who, partly from good-natured officiousness, unasked, carry on the business of mediators and reconcilers, but by their lying often cause still greater estrangement; who partly take a satisfaction in setting people against each other, and strive for this even to the shameful vice of detraction. Fi-

nally, there is a kind of liars, who are very numerous among the female sex, who, by all manner of petty tricks, by indiscretion and levity, fall into one embarrassment after another, and try to help themselves out by lies of necessity, but find themselves, therefore, always driven to fresh lies. With many, the taste for lying has become so prevalent, that it is usually agreeable to them to help others out of trouble by it. A rigid, and yet not judicious education, and the distrustful severity of husbands, form such liars, who, indeed, in the main, may be honorable and virtuous women, but they will be always deficient in true nobility and genuine purity.

Sincere and truthful we ought and may be towards all who have given us no just cause of distrust: the truthful man avoids the dishonorable, who deal in falsehood, in order not to be entangled by them in the meshes of deceit. But veracity is very compatible with reserve, which dictates caution toward those who do not stand to us in the relation of tried, intimate friendship. Reserve is the opposite of frankness and openheartedness, which alone befit friends. He who is openhearted towards all, without distinction, acts not only against prudence, but squanders, as it were, the treasure of friendship; for what can he offer to friends, if he shows to all the same confidence? Reserve is very different from dissimulation; that merely conceals, this deceives. To dissimulation towards a feared enemy, the truthful man may perhaps be constrained; but to hypocrisy he will never accommodate himself. Brutus pretended idiocy, in order to secure himself from the cruelty of the king, Tarquinius Su-

perbus, who had already put his father and brothers to death; but he did not pretend friendship for him. Hypocrisy is the worst kind of falsity, because it not merely destroys civil intercourse, but betrays the confidence of friendship, and perverts it to the tool of base designs. Alas! could we no longer believe the voice of friendship, in whom could we then believe? O, shameful treason to humanity, hypocritically to entice the confidence of friendship, and then insidiously murder it! It is the treachery of Judas Iscariot with a kiss. And how degrading to steal, by pretended friendship towards a man of influence, an advantage, — thus to give the noblest of prizes, the sentiment of love, for something other than mutual love! The hypocrite is yet more shameful than the flatterer, who only pretends admiration; for this is not, like love, the inmost, costly property of the heart, and he who belies it does not violate the holiest confidence.

Untruthfulness has introduced distrust, and, as precautions against it, oaths and asseverations, into human society. Falsehoods of necessity and jesting have not done this, but those of hostile, treacherous falsity. Falsehoods of necessity are too much limited to certain rare instances to be hurtful to ordinary intercourse; and falsehoods in joke, at the worst, in company of certain rude, wild associates, lead to frivolous swearing, which, however, always has its source in rudeness. Treachery, insincerity in civil intercourse, has obliged the state to enforce certain declarations by oath. The oath is a warranty of truth, by the attendant assertion that it is considered a sacred duty, and that this duty is to be conscientiously fulfilled. Since the appeal to

God, the All-Wise and All-Holy, is nothing but the highest ground of acknowledged duty, and professed before men, it is a declaration of an intention to speak the truth, as certainly as God is believed in and feared; it is making the highest dignity of man, pure conscientiousness, the pledge of veracity. The oath, as a safeguard against falsehood, is, however, an evil; since, were all men truthful, and could they be left to their simple word, no oath would be required; it presupposes distrust, and distrust is one of the chief moral corruptions: but it is a necessary evil, as long as men remain imperfect; and the state should make but sparing use of it, and be content with slighter modes of assurance. Some Christian sects professedly deem oaths unallowable, and unworthy a Christian. They are right, if Christian perfection be meant,—if they apply this demand to the present state of things. From obedience to government, and love of civil order, which cannot yet dispense with the oath, the Christian will comply with a ceremonial, which, indeed, is superfluous for him, but needful to the administration of justice. Meanwhile, it may be to him a summons to prove himself conscientious in the testimony to be given, in order not to depart by levity from the truth.

The violation of veracity under the form of an oath, or the crime of perjury, is one of the deadliest moral offences. The lie is twofold, since thereby the last safeguard against falsity is made futile, and the interchange of thought, in its most sacred, inviolable sense, is destroyed. The perjurer makes himself an utter outcast from the moral commonwealth, and withdraws far from all men, into the kingdom of darkness, where

only suspicion, but no light of evidence, can follow him. What an offence against the moral commonwealth, to acknowledge the duty of veracity by the holiest asseveration, and to break it at the same moment! What a sin against self, to throw away his highest dignity and honor, that of pious conscientiousness, and thus to sink into moral nullity.

Even in common life, some men are in the habit of using oaths and protestations, and as if demanding belief only when they have sworn, and staked their souls or their honor. They speak their own condemnation. Had they not often lied, they would not be obliged to swear; had they not often violated their honor by infidelity, they would not be in the habit of giving their word of honor. Falsehoods of jesting, however, have made certain asseverations necessary; but an "in earnest," or "without joking," suffices between well-bred men. The vivacious man is fond of certain protestations, for the sake of emphasis; but between such and swearing there is great difference; and even the former will not be habitual with the moral man. Those who, in part to enforce the truth, in part to excite attention, are prodigal of protestations, and have them constantly on their lips, will be soon compelled to strengthen them, in order to obtain credence on serious, weighty subjects, and at last nobody will believe them.

How true is Christ's saying — "Let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay; whatsoever is more than this, cometh of evil!" And it is, in fact, practicable. We can easily bring ourselves to do without all swearing and protestations, if we are only not frivolous in

nor assertions, nor exaggerated, and never intentionally tell an untruth. How much it exalts the dignity of a man, when his simple word is as good as his word of honor! when it enters into no one's mind to doubt his veracity, or to place him under suspicion! Credibility is necessarily connected with moral respect, since it excludes the suspicion of indiscretion, want of moderation, and all impure intentions; it manifests a firm, pure spirit. And how veracity facilitates and simplifies every business and every intercourse! A host of useless words and precautionary forms are thereby dispensed with; word and response, summons and deed, follow each other in secure succession; mind and mind meet, recognize, and commune with each other; all good, fair deeds, thrive in such secure, untroubled spiritual communion; power meets power, will joins will, resolve follows resolve, and confidence bears on and raises all with unfaltering steadfastness; all the flowers of mind, science, art, religion, thrive in the pure, healthful air of truthfulness; the light of heaven is shed undimmed upon life, and warms and fertilizes every germinating plant. Honor to the truthful man! Hail to the people with whom this manly virtue prevails! Joy to mankind, when this daughter of light wins the victory over Falsehood, and thrusts her back into that kingdom of darkness whence she sprang!

LECTURE XIII.

THE DUTY OF FIDELITY AND RECOMPENSE.

VERACITY, the duty which, in its whole extent, we last considered, brings with it fidelity, which we have already considered, as a part of the civil duty of justice. By veracious speech, man expresses his intention, and represents himself as what he actually is: by fidelity, he maintains his declaration in actual practice; he actually does what he has promised, and not only to-day, but to-morrow, and in all time to come. Thus he maintains his will and disposition, as that of a rational being, in himself one, independent, and conformable to moral law. Mind is mind only by its superiority to the vicissitude of things; not turned hither and thither, not drawn now here, now there, but willing only what is according to its nature, and steadfastly following out its will; choosing only aims in themselves valid and good, and acknowledging the pursuit of them as the law of action. This steadfastness, and conformity to law, man proves by the certainty of fidelity; the uncertainty of infidelity, on the contrary, proves him to be changeable and at discord with himself. If he promise any thing, he ought to perform it with rational discretion, and not without having reflected upon it; but, if he has done this, then

he has prescribed to himself a law, by which he ought to live. Is it not unworthy the mind, to-day to build, and to-morrow to tear down? to-day to strike into a path, and to-morrow to desert it? to-day to join a bond, and to-morrow to sever it? Yet there is in nature scarcely any thing so changeable: that only which is a prey to dissolution and decomposition, like the light flake, the sport of the winds, — or the cloud, the fleeting production of vapors rising from the earth, which is immediately attracted again by the mountain, or absorbed by the air, — resembles the fickle purpose of the faithless man. Even the plants put forth no buds without unfolding leaves and flowers from them, unless some internal disease or outward want prevents them. The beast remains true to his instincts, and securely walks the path prescribed for him by nature. The stork and the swallow resume their deserted nest, unless the enmity of man drives them away. Man alone is faithless, through the wilfulness with which he can free himself from the instincts of nature, without ever binding himself, as he ought, to the higher law of freedom. He can waver in unhappy uncertainty between necessity and freedom, and be at variance with himself. The faithless man is untrue to himself: whilst he breaks the word of trust, he shatters the firmness of his will, and wounds his spirit, which has its true life only in independence; whilst he turns his aim now here, now there, and destroys what he has begun, he ruins his own nature by impairing that noble energy of the mind, which is preserved and improved only by constancy of purpose and action. O, if the faithless man would only think of this, whenever he

has a pure, profound sense of his spiritual nature, and does not live in ignorance of himself, drawn hither and thither by variable lusts,—he would shudder at the offence he commits against himself, rouse himself, and resolve to be henceforth steadfast and trustworthy!

But the faithless one offends likewise against him towards whom he breaks his trust. The latter has confided in his word, his promise,—lived in this confidence; and now the faithless man deceives him. Shameful treason against confidence! wicked sundering of the heavenly bond that binds man to man! Must you entice your brother to yourself, and inspire him with confidence, in order afterwards to turn from him, and to desert or treacherously harm him? The faithless man injures him towards whom he does not practically keep his promise. In confidence in the promise, the latter undertakes something, which he cannot perform if he see himself deceived and deserted. Aid, support, participation, is promised him: he depends upon this in devising his plan—in entering upon his career: if what is promised, do not follow, he must stop upon the way or turn back: labor and trouble are lost, and good-nature also; and perhaps he with difficulty resolves upon a fresh undertaking. As the faithless man dissipates his own energy, so he occasions the other a vain waste of energy, annihilates a part of his moral self, and inflicts a wound upon his heart that makes it bleed. But the worst wound which he brings upon him, he inflicts by the contempt with which he treats him. The respect which man should show to man refers especially to his will; against his will, I should do nothing which concerns him; for in

the will a man's freedom is shown, and freedom is a man's most precious property. If I give another a promise, and he receives it, then I bind my will to his, and establish with him a common law of mutual action, which I, as well as he, must abide by. If I break my promise, and thereby partially and wilfully abrogate this common law, then I show that his will passes for nothing with me, that I set his person at naught, and regard his condition, his purpose, his undertaking, merely as objects of my caprice. The faithless man is like the unjust one, who sacrifices the property and dignity of another to his own purposes, wilfully and selfishly tramples upon his rights, as if he were not in existence, or as if he belonged to the mass of mere things which await the pleasure of mankind. The untrue is unjust in the proper sense, since the other, by his promise, has a right to the promise; the aid, support, participation, promised him, is his property, and the former has no longer arbitrary disposal of it. But if he assume it, and withdraw from the other his right, he throws contempt upon him, and violates his dignity.

The faithless man sins also against the moral commonwealth, which cannot exist without fidelity. The elementary law of the moral world is reciprocity, and fidelity is nothing but the maintenance of an assumed relation of reciprocity. The one promises, the other confides; in this confidence he acts, and the former answers this confidence by fulfilling the promise; and thus it is a mutual affair. Then, he who deceives breaks this alternation, and nullifies the relation. Now, if no fidelity remained, then no moral community could

exist; and he who faithlessly annuls a single relation, ever sins against the whole moral community, since it is made up purely of individual cases. Civil intercourse rests upon purity in contract, which fidelity has to keep and fulfil; the faithless man, therefore, shakes the foundations of all civil and moral life.

Even in nature, every thing reposes upon-reciprocal fidelity: let the faithless look upon the secure, steadfast universe, and let it shame them! In reciprocal attraction, suns and planets hang to one another as with bonds of constancy; and, for thousands of years, the benignant, preservative, life-giving, and life-cherishing relation has existed. What would become of thee, O man, if the earth, faithless, should break away from its mother, the sun, and rush into infinite space? With the cessation of the warmth of the sun upon it, all life would be extinguished; and also the feeble flame of thy life, like a lamp in the wind, would go out. As the earth hangs upon the sun, and sucks from it light and vital power, so upon its bosom hang plants, and beasts, and men, and suck, and fidelity is the firm bond that binds them to life. With the first smile of love, with which the mother greets the new-born, she vows to him love, care, and nurture, and the slumberer receives this promise in the mysterious impulse that draws him to her breast; a sacred covenant is closed between them both; and the angels of love, who hover as guardians over the child, consecrate and bless them. It is fidelity which binds and preserves the sacred band of marriage, and this is the foundation of all society. Without marriage, no civil relation, no national existence, no moral union, no pious com-

munity; it is the nursery of all moral culture and virtue; within its holy precincts we all grow up to manhood. Fidelity is accordingly our vital element, our maternal lap; and, if we sin against it, we tear open our own vitals, and thrust the dagger into our own heart.

Fidelity shows itself most decidedly in the virtue of the man of his word, in keeping his promise and contract. To the just, firm man, his word must be sacred; he gives it not without reflection; but, if he has given it, he keeps it; he considers it as a dear pledge, which he must redeem, — as a firm handle, which he extends to his neighbor, in order that he may hold on to it, without wavering, and which he may not take away. He is firm in himself, and firm as a column in intercourse with others. If he receives the word of another in exchange for his own, it is so much the more sacred to him; he renders the fidelity which he expects. But, if he gives his word in a free conversation, on his own part, and expects no return, yet he will just as little break it, since others expect its fulfilment. Many falsely believe that a promise of generosity or magnanimity can be abrogated upon one part, as it was given: a promise given is no longer our own; it belongs to him who received it, since he has trusted us, and acted in this trust.

If promises and contracts concern such affairs as come under the department of civil jurisdiction, and are guarantied by the judicial administration, then civil duty demands that they should be kept. Contracts about buying and selling, — about loaning, associate enterprises and works, commercial associations, part-

nership in business, and companies for the sake of protecting and administering goods and affairs on commission, — are of this kind. Often, the mutual conditions will be sufficiently definite, and laid down in writing; then fidelity can be legally enforced, and the fulfilment of it belongs merely to legality. But the virtuous man will act in this case, as always, not merely for the sake of outward peace and honor, but from feeling, and conduct himself with equity. He will manifest equity not merely in avoiding controversy, in freely closing up any chasm in the contract, and gladly fulfilling the conditions, which, though not strictly defined, are yet self-evident, but, besides this, in imposing upon himself and fulfilling obligations, which do not flow as strictly legal demands from the elementary conditions, but whose fulfilment makes the contracting party more secure and comfortable, facilitates the common business, and knits more firmly the bond of union. Genuine fidelity will not confine itself to words and conditions, but bears in sight the relation itself, its object and essence, and will fulfil all that appertains to its observance. If we enter into a partnership, we unite for a common object, which is attainable for us only under certain conditions; if these conditions are not all expressly stated, yet equity demands their fulfilment; nay, in unforeseen cases, we shall, in view of the object, subject our will to the good of the whole, and must, perhaps, make a slight sacrifice, that the union may continue.

Fidelity has very broad scope in the care of others' affairs, in which definite contracts are not often possible, because all cases of ensuing danger, or of favorable op-

portunity, cannot be foreseen. Here fidelity will evince the most conscientious care, by acting as if it stood in the other party's place, and obtaining him every advantage, and warding off every harm. The honorable man will rather set an accidental loss to his own account, and bear the greater part of the common loss, than submit to the charge of having been negligent; but he acts not for the sake of appearance, but from regard for the confidence shown him. The opportunity may readily occur to the administrator of another's affairs, to gain for himself an accidental advantage; and this may often be done; but fidelity constantly puts itself in the place of him whose business it has undertaken, and does more than the latter expects, in order not to deceive him in his expectations.

Secrets imparted are often very important property in trust, in keeping of which, the carefulness of fidelity is shown in secrecy. If these are of a penal character, the sincere man will not receive them, or, if he have received them, without having given his word, he will do what duty otherwise demands. But, if the disclosed guilt of his neighbor merits forbearance, his peace and honor will be sacred to him, and he will bury the secret forever in his breast. Even a secret, inconsiderately confided to him, will be as sacred to him as if he had promised silence by letter and seal, because the other has shown him a confidence which merits regard. Upon keeping many secrets depends a great advantage or detriment to him who confides them; and therefore fidelity will consider them an important property. But sometimes it is only the tender feeling and anxiety of the communicant that pledges to secrecy; and, in this

case, the word given; or the wish of another, should be sacred to us, without our assuming to judge upon the necessity of silence. It is enough that the party wishes his secret kept concealed; he trusts us, and we should show him fidelity. In no point are men more frivolous than in respect to secrecy. If they do not cause actual harm by telling, they deem themselves quit of their duty; and, if they do not tell the secret directly and publicly, they confide it to a friend, under seal of silence, and do not think that they themselves, who have first broken it, cannot impose it upon another, and, whilst they have deceived confidence, cannot rationally expect fidelity from others. Moreover, they do not think, that, in secrecy, the matter to be kept secret is not alone concerned, but also confidence and fidelity, and that they, by their frivolity, excite distrust against themselves, and undermine the respect paid them.

Often, the relations in which confidence and fidelity are conditions, are based upon tacit contracts and presumptions. This is the case with trade. The buyer expects of the tradesman articles good, serviceable, and worth the price. The price is indeed a fluctuating thing, and depends not only upon the state of the market in general, but also upon the will of him who has the monopoly of the goods. But it is a main condition, that the article should at least be serviceable. It is usually left to the buyer's judgment whether it is so, and the seller deems himself justified, if the former has made the examination as well as he could. But perhaps, he could not discover the hidden faults, and is deceived. On one ground, it may be said that the tradesman, the shopkeeper, is in a position to do no

otherwise, unless he would resign his business, since he will often deceive himself; but such a relation is always hostile and treacherous, and unworthy a straightforward, honorable man. It is very frequently the case that manufacturers put forth an article of poorer quality for the sake of superior cheapness, so that it is as good as useless; but yet buyers are often enticed by the low price, and deceived. Many stuffs are not, indeed, to be had in their primitive excellence, and disappear wholly from the market; and thus faithless industry, like Saturn, devours its own children. However free or involuntary the individual may be in this procedure, I cannot decide; but the procedure itself cannot appear to a professor of religion otherwise than faithless and untrustworthy; and it is allowable, perhaps, to ask such a one, whether a stop cannot be put to it by the firm, united will of well-meaning men.

There are also indefinite relations, which bring with them as indefinite obligations, but which the man of true moral sense acknowledges as much as if they were closely defined. For instance, the nature of a relation in which one man stands to another, justifies the one in expectations which the other has to fulfil, if he would not deceive him. Two strangers have met by chance upon the same journey; and, since they have the same destination, they enter into companionship without any contract. Whilst both protect and cheer each other upon the journey, and have become mutually necessary to each other, the tacit presumption is formed between them, that they will abide by each other. But, if one avails himself of an opportunity that occurs, to finish his journey more conveniently and securely, and aban-

does the other, without being compelled to it by necessity, then he in conscience breaks fidelity, and conducts himself ungratefully and selfishly. Society imposes upon us similar obligations. When we enter into a company which has assembled for entertainment, it expects of us some contribution to the common satisfaction — at least no hinderance; if we, from dislike to any man whom we meet there, or from ill-humor, or from self-will and captiousness, disturb the pleasure of the company, — then we violate the fidelity and respect which we owe society. Neighborhood is a vague and wholly indefinite relation, and yet it imposes certain duties of fidelity. Without a close acquaintance with my neighbor, I am bound to assist him in certain cases of need and emergency; or, if I chance to take a glance into his secrets, I am bound to keep them as conscientiously as if they were intrusted to me under the seal of secrecy; for this is implied in the nature of the relation, and the law of reciprocity, since I expect the same of him in similar cases.

Fidelity has the widest scope in personal relations — in the relations of servants to their masters, of subordinates to their superiors and chiefs, and the reverse, and of equal companions. Whilst such relations are founded upon expressed or implied contracts, they are to be judged by the principles which apply to these. Whenever one confides to another something in trust and keeping, he demands of him carefulness, zeal, and attention; when he expresses confidence towards him, by allowing free access and free sympathy, in a manner without any security from him, he expects of him

secrecy and honor; and, if the master leave open a cabinet that is usually closed, in which his secret papers are kept, the faithful servant will not avail himself of the occasion to gratify his curiosity, because the master did not take him into service to be a spy over him. But such relations will unite his companions in the same way in regard to the object for which they are associated, with a personal bond. The servant who has, for a long time, served me with tried fidelity, I shall, even without the obligation of a contract, not wilfully and needlessly discharge, because he confidentially cherishes the hope of remaining in my service. Man, in all his relations, seeks constancy, permanence, security; and it always grieves him to sever a bond once joined. In all personal relations, he strives for friendship and love; and, in order that this may be formed, fidelity and respect must go before. The man of moral sensibility will, if possible, subordinate matters of business to personal relations, since these properly constitute life. An old, trusty servant, perhaps, no longer discharges his duty with the readiness of the youth who offers himself in his stead; but I would not sacrifice him to my utility, if he confidently depends upon me; and I cannot deceive his confidence. It is not established, by the indentures of service, that the master shall maintain his servant in his house during sickness, and take care of him; but, if it be possible, he will do it; and not merely from pity, as he takes care of another sick person, but from sense of duty, because the sick servant stands to him in the personal relation of fidelity and attachment. Brothers in arms, without express agreement, and without being direct

friends, will aid each other in common dangers; they will otherwise lend each other every assistance which the one can expect from the other. If one is wounded, then will the other bear him from the battle, and take care of him; if one wants, the other will share with him. Most beautifully fidelity appears in the relations of man and wife, of parents and children, of brothers and sisters, — where respect hovers over love, and the fulness of the latter is made known by every tender care and attention, about which there are no rules. But fidelity to justice is the firm foundation of free reciprocity; before all, imperious duty must be done, and its strict rule be fulfilled; then may love shed upon it its abundance, and the noble emulation be inflamed, as regards who can surpass the other in benevolence and gratitude.

Fidelity sustains, confirms, and builds up: faithlessness shatters, loosens, and destroys. The reverse of the certainty which we place in a man of his word, stands the uncertainty which has its source in want of firmness of will, and manly, active energy, without being directly connected with the intention to harm, or with base selfishness and avarice. This fault is not only blamable, and unworthy the manly character, if it be concerned about the essential affairs of mine and thine, the business of life, and associate labor, since thereby a hurtful insecurity invades intercourse; but even in unimportant affairs, where it relates to the giving of courtesies, to participation in the light occupations and entertainments of life, since, even here, insecurity is troublesome and perplexing. Many men act always from momentary impulses; promise readily,

but allow themselves afterwards to repent; readily enter into obligations, but afterwards quit them again. Uncertainty appears, moreover, in want of carefulness in the administration of the affairs of others; and want of reserve in keeping secrets. The uncertain man is an unfit member of society, a shaking reed, a fragile support; he takes a position in life which cannot be reckoned upon, which must be considered as nought; he nullifies himself, because he is worth nothing to others; whilst he does not respect others, he makes himself contemptible.

Unfaithfulness, with the purpose to do harm and gain an advantage at another's expense, is fraud; and this is not only more shameful than untrustworthiness, but even than open violence; because confidence is deceived by it, and wrong, like a deadly poison, creeps into human society; and because cowardice is connected with it. The fraudulent would keep up the appearance of honor, and consume their spoil in quiet; they make use of peace and confidence as the cloak of their knavery, which the honorable man does not anticipate, and therefore cannot secure himself against; they are like ignoble beasts of prey, who timidly and feebly catch their booty by lurking in by-paths; they are, at the same time, liars and hypocrites. But, what is worst, they live in insincerity with themselves; justify their injustice before themselves as before others; and upon the dimness and perplexity of their mind no enlightening ray falls, to show them their vice in its frightful form, that they may come to themselves and reform. More frightful still is fraud, as betrayal of personal confidence, by the disclosure

of important secrets, by the sacrifice of honor, by the surrender of freedom and of life. Such betrayal is more detestable than fraud in general, because it not only violates the fidelity befitting business relations, but outrages immediate personal relations — since not merely the rights of property, but the inalienable rights of person, are thereby enfeebled and sacrificed. Fraud and treachery become still darker by the use of artifice and knavery, since the intentional wickedness is increased by these, and confidence systematically ensnared. O, there is nothing more odious, abominable, and degraded, than artifice and knavery! these are truly diabolical vices! they are the blackest progeny of hell! There is no bad disposition which is not connected with them; injustice and dishonor, contempt for man and unkindness, selfishness and degradation, constitute the features of that horrible shape, before which every pure heart shrinks back, and shudders to the core; it is the abyss of moral abomination, into which no ray of the sun falls, where serpents and all vermin riot, and from which poisonous damps arise to infect the air.

Fraud, treachery, knavery, and artifice, are never allowable; and necessary falsehood in self-defence differs wholly from them, since it does not cherish confidence in order to betray it. In war, stratagem is allowable, since there distrust is presumed, and he who believes the pretensions of an enemy but deceives himself. But, even in war, progressive civilization, and the more perfect regularity with which it is carried on, to the honor of humanity, has almost wholly suppressed stratagem. In a hostile relation, where weak-

ness has to contend with overwhelming force, stratagem would be permitted, but not treachery; the moral man should not first hypocritically seek to win the confidence of the enemy, in order then to betray him, but, at the utmost, to put to sleep his watchfulness, to make him careless, and then to unwind himself and escape from his bonds. Even the holiest objects of patriotism do not justify the use of treachery and artifice. The artifice of Hermann, by which he lured Varus to destruction, pretended friendship, and was enabled by hypocritical arts to lull to sleep the suspicion which Segest excited against him, may be praised by those who, from national pride, glorify every thing that is handed down to us from our forefathers, or who favor the principle that the end sanctifies the means: I praise it not; I see in it but a stain that dims Hermann's heroic glory. Treachery is a poison, with which no noble man defiles himself, since it corrupts all it touches. Necessity does not justify all things, but yet demands element judgment; and the individual is to answer only for his own transgressions. What would be said, if the state, which has the power, and is under the obligation, to administer justice in verdict and act, should have recourse to cunning and artifice? Often, robbers and thieves who have escaped all ambushes, have been taken by deceit and treachery; obdurate criminals, by all sorts of treacherous arts, have been induced to confess, whilst the examining judges have stooped to falsehood and fraud. Why need justice make use of injustice? Is it not an inward contradiction? A judge may, perhaps, in his zeal, go too far, and mean well; but, when the state uses, for the

discovery of criminals, such men as are no less abandoned than those for whom they hunt, and are, perhaps, distinguished from them only by carrying on roguery as a legal business, is not this casting out devils by Beelzebub? And if, besides, a government holds out the net of artifice, not only towards the enemies of the state, but towards quiet citizens, and surrounds them with the emissaries of a secret police, who spy out their sentiments, and use the most shameful arts of dissimulation, then it has pronounced upon itself sentence of condemnation; since it places itself in the most unwholesome opposition with its people, and allows itself towards them that which should not be allowed towards an enemy.

Still another aspect of fidelity is to be considered, by which it appears as public virtue. The citizen of the state, the member of society, takes upon himself a host of obligations by the general compact—partly expressed, partly tacit compact—which he assumes by entering the state and society. He recognizes the civil constitution under which he lives, and binds himself to respect and observe it. He acknowledges the prevalent manners, and pays regard to them. All others do the same, and expect it of him, their fellow-citizen and countryman. In this expectation, they live confidently; and this expectation and this confidence pledges each one to fidelity. To obedience to the laws of the state, in which this fidelity is in part shown, the allegiance already given to the government binds us; but deeper and more comprehensive, and, at the same time, more vital, is that general obligation, which rests upon reciprocity with all.

The laws of state should properly be nothing but the expression of the common will, whose demand is universal justice; they should accord to all equal right, secure freedom to all, and assign to every one the place belonging to him, and suitable scope for his powers. If they fulfil the just demands of all, they may be regarded as if all had given them their voice, although this be not actually done, as is the case in democratic states, and even there but imperfectly. Fidelity, then, to such laws, is nothing more than fidelity to one's own will; as fidelity properly is always fidelity to self, whilst we accord to others what is claimed for ourselves, and abide by laws prescribed for ourselves. Happy condition of civil society, where the problem of general content, and of the harmony of every individual will with the collective will, is solved! where every citizen is at the same time lawgiver and subject! There obedience is a pleasure; there is no need of terror and force; there all is done from the free impulse of the heart; there life flows from the breast, like a freshly-gushing fountain, and unites in a mighty stream, which bears all along upon its mighty waves.

But legislation has nowhere reached this pitch of perfection, and perhaps never will reach it. It is lamentable, whenever the government voluntarily sets itself at variance with public opinion, by its legislation and administration, so that the transgression of the laws among the people is partly excused, and partly regarded as a matter of honor. This is the case with the oppressive imposts, which often force even the honorable merchant to carry on a war of artifice against them, and wherever the government makes no

report of the public revenue and taxes, and thereby nourishes distrust in the people against the administration, on account of which, many consider themselves permitted not to be very conscientious in the payment of their taxes. They are wrong; since, even were the administration unfaithful, this does not justify them in disloyalty; but the government, however, bears part of the guilt. It is shameful, when the citizens of a free commonwealth thus betray a government, against which they are justified in cherishing no suspicion of unfaithfulness. Strange, that greater honor should be observed towards individuals than towards the state, and that it should seem to be believed that no one is hurt by taking any thing from the state! But, by lessening wilfully the proper burden of some, their fellow-citizens are overburdened; since, if the government do not receive enough, the taxes must be raised, and the honest suffer through the guilt of the dishonest. It is, moreover, much more shameful to betray the state than individuals, because we owe it entire justice, as being the guaranty, as it were, of all individual rights; but to the individual we are bound to accord only his private rights. The other point, regarding the transgression of the laws as a matter of honor, comes up in case of the laws against duelling in monarchical states, where the spirit of caste, otherwise countenanced, demands this mode of settling disputes of honor. By such laws, so opposed to prevalent manners, the state forces its fellow-citizens to be voluntary transgressors.

But, in addition to the fixed will of government, legislation remains imperfect by the difficulty of the problems to be solved. It is especially the case, as has

already been shown, that the problem of securing, by distributive and remunerative justice, the poor from the preponderance of the rich, and from the oppressive influences of fluctuating and stagnant trade, is not, and will, perhaps, never be wholly solved. While the rich and thriving may feel very well under the existing constitution, may wish its continuance, and tremble at every restless movement, the poor man may feel himself oppressed, may obey the laws with murmuring, and, perhaps, watch for the first opportunity to throw off the grievous yoke. The people of England are in this situation, and the radicals promise them its remedy in a fundamental reform of the state.

Here arises the important question upon the right of revolution. In order to see it clearly, we must distinguish the aim from the mode and way of attaining it. If it is acknowledged that a civil constitution is wrong and oppressive to the people, with the moralist there is, then, no doubt that it must be reformed: the aim of such reform is the restoration of justice; and who can condemn this aim? But, as to the mode and way of realizing it, the moralist demands that it should be done by means of peaceful, tempered discretion, and common consent, since only thus legislative wisdom will be able to prevail. In the storm and pressure of revolt, the wild voice of passion, but not reason, will be heard; unless it be, that God gives the people noble, inspired heroes and leaders, who know how to restore clearness and order amidst the confusion. But it is always dangerous to tear away the dam of public peace; for not only will many fall victims, but it is uncertain whether from wrong greater wrong will not

arise. The just, noble man will do all for the reform of civil society; that can be done within the limits of obedience and peace; and least of all will he on account of his own right rear the standard of rebellion, but rather endure wrong. Yet if the storm of revolution actually breaks out in a state, then it is evident to the impartial, that the government and the favored classes bear the chief part of the guilt, because they had the power to anticipate the outbreak, and to suppress the fermentation. The people are so fond of peace and quiet, and so much used to obedience, that they must be very severely provoked in order to be driven to revolt; and it only requires, on the part of the government, a firm, good will, in order to keep them in quiet. But nothing is usually judged so partially and passionately as such affairs, since men are so very onesided and so stimulated by self-interest; justice is dumb, or speaks only the language of passion, and provokes those to stiff-necked opposition, from whom sacrifices to the common good are required. In such internal commotions, it is as in wars between nation and nation, where Reason ceases to be umpire, since the deluded no longer hear her; nay, it is worse, since the sway of Reason among the people themselves ceases. It is an humiliating, but true remark, that men in masses, without leaders and regular discipline, are as irrational and uncontrollable as the wildest beast, and that civilization, by bringing perversity in its train, and causing the simple, natural relations to cease, makes such a condition only the more dangerous.

In a similar relation, like whole ranks and classes, individuals may go against the state, whilst they, forced

by necessity or the severity of the laws, disturb tranquillity and break the peace. The general opinion, without more ado, calls them criminals; but often the state shares the guilt with them, since it has driven them to despair, or provoked and enticed them to crime, by unwholesome imposts, which educate smugglers, and, from these, thieves and robbers. There have been moralists who have deemed it allowable to steal from necessity; in this they have gone too far; but, in fact, most criminals rather deserve our pity, than our condemnation. They must suffer the legal punishment; but so much the more mildly ought we to judge them as men. To us it is an easy and agreeable duty to respect and spare the public tranquillity, because we chance to find ourselves beneath its protection; but this confers no merit upon us, and does not justify us in passing severe judgment upon those deluded men.

Fidelity towards society in general extends to the manners which precedent has hallowed, to the laws of behavior and propriety, to prevalent opinions, and even prejudices. The moral man regards these also in that humility which keeps individuals from the arrogance of wishing to appear wiser and better than all others, — which at least hinders him from obtruding offensively his own superior insight. There is the same demand for that fidelity which acknowledges an obligation in the universal respect shown towards the prevalent customs, and in the general presumption, that every one will regard them; and it is considered as a sort of breach of peace to depart from the forms and ways of society, and occasion a variance or strife. Yet this accommodation need not go so far, as to do aught against

conscience. To war with harmless prejudices, and to be thus at variance with all, is not worth the trouble; and the disturbance of peace is a too dear price for the advantage gained; but no one, to whom God has given the commission, should be deterred by that humility and fidelity from eradicating a hurtful delusion, a corrupt custom — from going forth as teacher of truth and reformer of morals, wherever truth and virtue require it. What holds good of society at large, is repeated in the lesser circles of social life, and the family. The husband will comply with the innocent habits and prejudices of his wife; for she expected, when she united with him, that he would share them with her; at least he will, by tender forbearance, seek to win her gradually from them. It is still more proper for the son to sacrifice his superier judgment and better taste to his parents; since not only fidelity, but reverence also, is due them; but, if aught ever conflict with duty and conscience, the obedient son, although modestly, will use his right to censure and oppose. God has called us to peace; in many external forms, a just, noble, moral life can manifest itself, and the pious man disturbs nothing gladly, even if it is but an indifferent form; but inward peace is more than the outward: truth, justice, virtue, are purchased at no price too dear; and higher than the duty of fidelity to the existing quiet is that of fidelity to the eternal laws of the moral world, which, older than all present customs, still hold good when many an outward form is scattered to the dust, and will hold good to all eternity.

The duty of recompense completes the circle of duties of justice. We have already considered it as a part of

the civil duty of justice. It is founded, like fidelity, upon the fundamental law of equality and reciprocity, and refers immediately to the division of labor and of business, and the mutual dependence of men upon each other, of which we have already spoken. The master and servant, the undertaker of a work and his laborers, stand in an expressed or implied contract, by which desert on the one side is the condition of debt on the other, and demands its reward. But the labor of men is not merely productive and communicative; it may also be destructive and predatory, partly from error, partly from wickedness. I may harm another in his business, and thereby do him injury; I may depreciate or carry away his property, and in this way run into debt to him, for which I am bound to give him reparation; since, by the injury, inequality and disproportion arise, and therefore the law of reciprocity demands equalization and restitution. Recompense is, therefore, partly rewarding, partly indemnifying.

Inasmuch as recompense belongs to the maintenance of the civil relation, or is a civil duty, the state watches over its discharge, whilst it secures to the laborers their wages, and guards the dependent from oppression, although public justice, in this respect, leaves much to be desired. The public tribunal also forces him who has done injury, to reparation; and herein its jurisdiction is, perhaps, most complete. If harm is done forcibly and maliciously, and the public peace and security are thereby disturbed, and the higher rights of man—honor, freedom, and life—outraged, then the state considers an attack as made upon the public justice, and demands for it reparation; which, however, since here full

Indemnity is impossible, consists in fine and punishment. That from the fundamental law of reciprocity the right of capital punishment proceeds, we have already remarked. On the other hand, the state should reward merit for the common good, and in this respect also satisfy the law of reciprocity. The further treatment of the requiting power of the state belongs to the science of law and government. We are here limited to the duty of the individual, which indeed stands in connection with the whole civil relation, but can be properly treated by itself.

Recompense is, first of all, civil duty, and belongs to legality and rectitude; but Virtue makes it her duty, and demands its fulfilment from moral sentiment, from respect for the dignity of man, and the moral relation. It does not insist, however, upon strict law, but makes equity the judge of that which belongs to each, and which each can demand as a reward for his service. The productions of industry find often in the market little or no price; the equitable man will not be guided by this, but will estimate by a just standard the labor and value of a work. Rich men! you are not burdened with the sweat of poverty! It is a heavy, oppressive load, beneath which the heart cannot beat with cheerfulness and joy. Alas! more than that, the tears of sorrow often fall upon what you obtain for a slight price, as a means of your pleasure, and which you, perhaps, proudly waste in a merry hour, or prodigally give away! The fine linen with which you deck yourselves, cost the poor spinner, who knows how many sleepless nights? the weaver, who manufactured it, worked, perhaps, amid the cries of his hungry children, amid the groans of a sick wife, to

whom he can afford no cordial. You may not be in a condition to give these laborers their fair recompense, nor to change the current price of work. But look around you, and you will find enough to do, if you would only be equitable, if not strictly magnanimous. Would every one fill his sphere with just, equitable, benevolent conduct, then the wounds of civil life would be healed, the galling friction be removed, and the general satisfaction would enhance the happiness of every individual. Let the laborer be not only paid his due, but let him be paid soon; since it is true of this, that he who soon gives, gives double. Alas! many a poor creature reckons anxiously upon the pence which he is to receive, and which the rich man does not give him merely because he is too easy to draw out his purse. But perhaps it is a bashful poor man, who shrinks from asking the expected reward, and whose state is so much the more pressing, the less it is suspected.

Not all that is done for our good can be paid with money and goods; and if it demands its wages, but the least part of it is requited. All more weighty, valuable services, especially such as require not merely effort and industry, but love of the cause, care, fidelity, personal confidence, and attachment, should be requited only by gratitude and respectful acknowledgment. Gratitude, in its tenderer expressions, is a matter of free love, and requites the benefits of love; but in many cases, also, the duty of justice and respect demands gratitude. I cannot requite the faithful servant either by the slight compensation that I pay him, nor by presents; he is rewarded only by the gratitude which shows him personal respect, and recognition of his good disposition.

In such relation person stands with person, and here only the personal reciprocity of respect for respect holds good. As little can a teacher's desert be requited with money and goods. Is he a hireling, then he may receive his hire, as an equivalent; but such a one I would not select for a teacher, because he cannot but teach badly. The good teacher will not work merely for the hire, which, however, he needs, since he applies his time and powers to the work; but the cause should be dear to him, — useful activity, the diffusion of useful knowledge, the culture of a favorite science; it should be his concern, that the scholar should learn something, and this can be requited only by grateful acknowledgment. It is a common fault of the rich and distinguished to believe that such personal merits can be paid by money alone, — to labor under the error, dazzled by the power of money, which goes for so much in life, that every thing can be requited by it, — in the pride of their rank and their independence, to feel oppressed by every personal obligation, and to deem themselves abased, by placing themselves upon an equality with a meritorious but poor and obscure man. Whilst, perhaps, where money is the truly proper means of settlement, in business and commerce, they are covetous, and fatten upon the sweat of poverty, they are very ready with compensation and gifts, where a word of respect and gratitude is the only proper reward. Miserable pride, which deems itself disgraced by that which is the only true honor, and fears to lower its dignity by acknowledging with it the dignity of a respectable man! What moral penury, what inward emptiness, what poverty of heart, to grudge respect and its tokens to that which deserves respect! The sense of manly

dignity is a treasure, which increases the more as it is the more expended ; respectful acknowledgment is met by grateful return, and a hearty word often is a pledge to affectionate devotion and trusty attachment. O that the illustrious and powerful knew how little it costs them to win the hearts of men ! that they would only be men, and show themselves such towards others ! that they would only have faith in men, and attribute to them more than self-interest and hunger ! Even the most ordinary man feels himself exalted by personal respect ; he forgets his want and necessity in the joyous feeling of seeing himself owned as a man, and what he does not for pay, he gladly undertakes for the reward of thankfulness.

If we ought to requite good with good, we ought still less to harm others, and least of all recompense good with evil. If any one, from error, or from passion, or from malice, has deprived others of their own, defrauded and oppressed them, and sees his fault and repents of it, then he owes reparation, and complete reparation. Thus only does he make good what he owes ; thus only he restores the lost equilibrium, and heals the rent which he has made in the moral order ; reparation is the only proof of true repentance. It is of no avail to parley and bargain with guilt, to buy, in a manner, expiation by alms-giving and pious endowments, in order to be able to enjoy the remainder of the booty with quiet conscience. These are merely superficial emollients for conscience, which do not heal the deep wounds ; there is but a single thorough means, and that is complete reparation. Throw off the burden of gold which presses down thy conscience, thou unjust man,

that thou mayst stand pure and just; tear away the bonds of Mammon from thine heart; then will it be sound! And, if you are then even poor and destitute, you will enjoy your dry bread with good conscience, and need not tremble at the grave, to which you are going. You say you can make no reparation to those whom you have defrauded, because they are no longer alive, or because you cannot decide to whom you owe reparation, and what and how much belongs to each one. Very well! then keep your wealth, but show, by the use you make of it, that the false love of it has left your heart; be charitable, but not in order to purchase indulgence, but, in benevolence and love, consider yourself as the just administrator of goods in trust; use them to put an end to those wrongs, to which you owe your wealth; interest yourself in the oppressed classes; remove the disproportions that oppress them; further every cause of common good; work for justice, truth, education, good morals! By this benignant activity, your heart will be healed of its wounds, and the joyful consciousness of reformation will blot out the sense of guilt.

It is shameful to requite good with evil, and to meet him whom we owe gratitude, not only with ingratitude, but also with enmity, contempt, arrogance, and injury. Only a bad heart, wholly pervaded by the poison of selfishness, is capable of such misdeeds. There are examples of men having ruined and overthrown their benefactors, only in order not to be reminded by the sight of them of the gratitude due, which makes them feel oppressed. They had been raised from the dust by them, or received support from them in their

former lowliness; and afterwards, in their greatness, they hate the witnesses of their lowly origin. The ingratitude of certain upstarts has gone so far as to deny, or even to destroy, their parents, and brothers, and sisters, in order to spare themselves a false shame. Is such an abomination indeed possible? Can the human heart be so depraved, as to turn the noblest affections into poison, and return hatred for love? No! we do not believe it! We cannot believe it! for we believe only in the possible, and to us this is not so.

It may be the case with us, that, for wrong done us, we must not only demand satisfaction, but must also call in the retribution of the law against the trespasser and defrauder. We, perhaps, owe the first to our own self-preservation; the latter is demanded not only by our own, but also by the common security. Fraud and trespass must have a stop put to them, and violated justice demands their expiation. Even for personal insults, public usage compels us, in most cases, to seek satisfaction. Not only natural morality, but even the spirit of the gospel, well understood, not only allows, but commands, us to defend our right. But we should do it, in the first place, not from selfishness, but from true love of justice, which must be equally dear to us in reference to others and ourselves. Justice is the common property, and each one has to support it, be it in whatever case it may. But if we do not defend our right from selfishness, then we should, secondly, do it without revenge. Moral reciprocity demands recompense of good with good, but not of evil with evil. In nature, power reacts upon power, blow upon blow; the

wild beast answers fury with fury, but not the rational man, who ought to be master of his passion. Moral reciprocity is that of free mind towards free mind; but the passionate man is not free. The virtuous man steadfastly resists the passionate trespasser and injurer, and does not allow himself to be trampled upon; but he does not give back the insult, and even in the irrational man respects the dormant reason. But, if we defend our right without selfishness and revenge, we should also do it with peaceableness; and this is the *third* requisition which morality has here to make of us. The pacific man will first seek his right by the way of kindness and reconciliation, and make every effort to convince the deluded offender of his wrong; he will long exercise forbearance and patience, and make every sacrifice to peace, which is consistent with honor; and even if he stand with the enemy before the tribunal, or if the weapon of honorable retribution is already drawn, he will even then be ready to extend to him the hand of reconciliation.

The peaceableness which attends obedience to the laws excludes also the revenge, which substitutes the reciprocity of brute force instead of mediatorial and retributive justice, and establishes the licentious rule of club-law. Only in case that such a state already prevails, and the public jurisdiction is overturned, or not instituted, will the pacific man seize upon the just means of defence; yet, if possible, by the aid of arbitrators and mediators, he will endeavor to supply the want of a regular tribunal, and upon all that he is forced to do he will stamp the seal of justice and peace. Then he

will, with sword in hand, contribute towards putting an end to the state of lawlessness; and the wounds that he makes will be the healing incisions of the physician of peace.

Finally, the duty of recompense unites with that of public spirit, to make us, as much as in us lies, the guardians and helpers of public recompense. We ought, as much as is in our power, to contribute to the right administration of compensative justice in general life. If it stands in our power to remove the disproportions of trade, to help on a better division of labor, to effect the employment and maintenance of the poor, and to raise the wages of labor, then it is our duty to do it, as well as the duty of the rulers; since every member of the commonwealth should answer for himself. If we see merit obscured or misapprehended, then we ought to draw it to light, and procure its due recognition and reward. This is a sweet duty; and, whilst the modest man with a blush receives upon his head the crown due to his merit, a joyous feeling rises in the bosom of him who places it there. Sadder is the duty of becoming an informer for the sake of bringing the transgressor to just punishment; and a certain prejudice against this exists. But there is a broad distinction between malicious, base, treacherous informing, and the conscientiousness of the honorable, disinterested citizen, who does from public spirit what the judge and magistrate does from official duty. That prejudice has its source in want of public spirit, or rather in a certain distrust towards government, by force of which citizens sometimes make common cause against it, just as disobedient, unruly scholars

keep up a sort of false public spirit against harsh, unkind teachers, and brand with disgrace the informers among their schoolmates. Wherever the prevalent usage is at variance with legislation, the well-disposed man will generally incline to the side of public opinion; since he obeys not the letter of the law, but the sense of justice in the people, and respects even the prejudice and diseases under which they labor, because, by their violent suppression, the good also will be suppressed. Even against dishonorable transgressors of the laws, as against smugglers, the good citizen will enter into conflict less than against the bad legislation itself, which intentionally calls forth fraud, and he will make every effort towards repealing such unjust ordinances. But especially will the just citizen take the part of oppressed innocence and weakness, become the champion of the widow and the orphan, the poor and neglected, and protect them against the rapacity and insolence of the powerful. And he will rise up most gladly in their aid, when the uplifted arm of mighty oppressors threatens every one who would wrest away their plunder, and if all tremble, and none dares to raise the voice of truth. Confidence in the good cause for which he strives, and in the spirit of justice which prevails among the people, will give him courage and energy, and the sense of duty will not let him waver.

Happy the people and the state in which such a sound, just public spirit lives, — where every citizen is a guardian of the laws, — where there is need of no spies of police to effect their observance, — where every one considers the wrong done to another as done to himself,

and resents it more zealously than the wronged one himself does,—where each stands up for all, and all for each, and government and people are leagued in confidence and love! And it is no visionary ideal of perfection, that cannot be realized. We will, we can believe in its realization; for among us it is already real.

LECTURE XIV.

LOVE, UNIVERSAL PHILANTHROPY, SYMPATHY, BENEVOLENCE,
BENEFICENCE, GRATITUDE.

FROM the main and fundamental duty of piety, the development of which constitutes the science of duty, we have thus far, in our treatment of the relations of life, separated the duty of justice, or of strict respect for others; but, with this, we have by no means exhausted the deep sentiment of the dignity of man, and a rich overplus yet remains. The man of fervent piety will treat his neighbor not merely with respect; his heart will beat yet more warmly towards him; he will love him. The duties of justice are but the necessary laws of human society and reciprocity, without which no community could exist among men. They are the fixed, firm forms, as it were the skeleton of moral life, the props and pillars of the vital organism. They are as the elementary laws of the moral geometry, by which the necessary relations of forces towards each other may be defined. Such elementary laws pervade all nature; they may be seen in the course of the stars, in the formation of the crystal, and even of the body of the earth itself,—in the motion of light, water, and air, and of all other bodies,—in the action of natural forces upon each other; even the form

of man, although manifold in its individual parts, may be referred to a regular, elementary shape; even the arts have their proportions and measurement; and this is especially the case in music, in which all must be first adjusted according to the strict rules of harmony, before the higher and freer beauty of sound can be produced. But, necessary as these rules are, they are far from being sufficient to bring forth a full life. The most imperfect formation on earth is the crystal, whose structure may be well enough defined upon strict mathematical principles. The most perfect form, on the contrary, the human, first receives its beauty and grace, when vital fulness fills up the regular outline, and gives it free individuality. Music, which is in perfect accordance with rule, does not please on that account, and the most perfect theorist, as such, is not a good composer. To regularity, the creative power of mind, wealth of thought and feeling, must be added in appropriate applications, in order to the production of a beautiful work of art. As little is done in morals barely with the necessary duties of justice. It must be a regular, but cold and defective life, which moves merely in the limits of justice; men would do nothing against each other, but also nothing for each other. It is just so with a social interview, in which mere etiquette prevails, and not benevolence and friendship; it remains cold and tedious, and does not meet the purpose of society. Love first sheds over life its warmth, grace, fulness, freedom, and variety; this is the living flesh, with its lovely tints, and its wavy outlines; this is the grace and fulness of melody and harmony; this is

the creative spirit, with all the affluence of its forms; this is the true life.

We distinguish love in general from that respect which is expressed in justice, as something which is added to fill out the strict measure of this feeling. Respect is implied in love, and exalted, enlarged, animated, and warmed by it; without respect there is no love: but what is it in the latter, which is additional to the former?

Respect, and the duty of justice resulting from it, give properly only prohibitions and warnings. We should not encroach upon the dignity of the person or his rights; not do harm to any one, not disturb the peace, nor mar, by any disproportion, the reciprocity of social intercourse; but maintain the balance, and the even rule. Respect and justice are opposed to enmity. But love desires not merely order and peace, but vital, hearty alliance, benevolence, and friendship. Men should not walk along with each other merely in appointed paths without conflict and disturbance, but go together hand in hand, arm in arm, breast to breast; they should not only do nothing against each other, but every thing for each other; they should, in their activity, not merely not harm each other, — every one should not merely fulfil a marked circle of duty, — but to this quiet routine a living, warm, hearty sympathy, fraternal interchange, friendly aid and interest, should be added. Love not merely forbids, warns, protects, and supports, but bids, encourages, edifies, and animates; it is a creative, productive power.

But this is connected with another distinction between love and respect. Respect considers all men as equal, and knows no distinction of persons. We should be no

more just towards one, than towards another, since in that case we are not just, but partial. Right is a strict, equal measure, which should be granted to one as to another. Its contents, indeed, differ in magnitude; one possesses more, and extends his reputation and influence more widely into life, than another; but one man should be supported in his rights as well as another. Moreover, the highest, unconditioned rights of person, freedom, and civil honor, are equal in extent with all, and one should enjoy them in the same unimpaired degree as another. All rights, which respect and justice spare, and preserve inviolate, unite in personal dignity; and this is in all the same, just as an immortal soul belongs to all. But this personal dignity in such exact equality holds good only before God in eternity, and in this earthly life only in civil or legal society; in all other relations, men appear to us of different worth. We prize one man more than another in reference to his moral bearing and disposition, or in view of his mental culture, his gifts, knowledge, and capability. One attracts us more than another by the charm of his intellect and the beauty of his person. One stands nearer to us than another by social relations, as brother, kinsman, neighbor, countryman. One harmonizes with us more than another in his dispositions and purposes, and we feel ourselves inclined to form a closer acquaintance with him than with another. Now, this different estimate, this inclination, this harmony, belongs to love, which in its nature brings with itself a difference of degree and variety.

Even this variety in love is connected with its peculiar, productive, and creative activity. Those only who

feel themselves drawn peculiarly to each other, in close congeniality, will undertake any thing together, and unite in a common work ; just as, in a social circle, those will unite in more lively intercourse, who take most pleasure in each other. But this variety, as well as this productive activity of love, has its foundation in the fact, that it is directed not to the unconditioned worth of life, but to the relative state of perfection, which may be now greater, now less. I love one man more than another, because he is more perfect, because he bears in himself an especial worth, whether of mind or of body. I harmonize with one more than another, because he is interested in what I am interested, because he has chosen with me, as an object of effort, the attainment of some point of perfection, whether mental culture or some social accomplishment. One stands nearer to me than another, because I share with him certain social advantages, such as education, society, language, form of government. Perfection and love are mutual conditions, and not only inasmuch as we love what is already perfect ; but all activity of love tends to advance and exalt the improvement of oneself and others, to increase the means, pleasures, ornaments, and excellences of life, to make men freer, richer, happier, nobler, and more amiable. Love wishes the dignity of man to be shown in full, vital richness, that the tree of humanity may be covered with leaves, blossoms, and fruits, desirable to the eye and joyful to the heart of sensibility ; it wishes to see a general prevalence of well-being, enjoyment, vital development of the powers, activity, emulation, enterprise, and aspiration ; all that is

inherent in man should freely develop itself; every gift should be cultivated, every faculty advanced and brought into action.

Love! creative, benignant, shaping power! mother of all existence! how my heart beats, whilst I enter upon the broad, rich sphere of thy dominion, where the warm breath of life waves, like the mild air of spring! where the sunbeams lie brooding upon the fruitful fields! where the flowers show beauty and fragrance all around! where the groves invite to their lovely shades, and orchards display their rich fruits! where song and jubilee resound, and the lamentation of sorrow melts into sweet notes of consolation! where friends and lovers walk arm in arm, children sport under the eyes of their parents, youths wrestle and race before the shouting multitudes, artists exhibit their brilliant works, and poets sing with the lyre the deeds of heroes! where, universally, in larger and smaller spheres, labor, play, enterprise, are displayed in rich variety, and in lovely harmony! Whither, midst this immeasurable wealth, shall I first turn my eye? What, of all this beauty, nobleness, grandeur, shall I first celebrate? A thousand lives would not suffice to go over the whole, — to enjoy, to observe, to appropriate it. Each century, each nation, has its infinite sphere, each sex and age its career. Alas! I will pluck but a single garland from the infinitude of floral plenty, a garland of consecration and remembrance; I can sketch but a feeble picture of the rich landscape. But whence have I the magic colors to imitate the beauty and fragrance that are shed over it? Can I dip my pencil in the glowing sun, to paint that

ruddy dawn? Who guides the feeble hand, that it may throw those bold, light touches upon the tablet? Almighty Love! breathe thy warm breath into my soul! shed upon me a ray of inspiration! impart to my language the quiet energy of warm and clear conviction, and open to it the hearts around me, that they may receive the influence of thy spirit! None can speak of thee, without thine own inspiration! Thou thyself art thy only worthy image, and only that which thou makest bears witness of thee!

Love, in its nature, is manifold, and is divided into different relations; and still it is universal. So, also, the vital energy, which is every where diffused, but every where brings forth variety and peculiarity. The first power, as it were, — the first germ of love, — from which every other springs, is universal philanthropy. The pious feeling of inspiration, which the moral man bears in his heart, will, as often as he comes in contact with a man, sound accordance in the feeling of respect; and thus he will not only leave his rights unimpaired, but, in every way, will show him kindness in will and deed; he will regard him not only under the point of view of civil society, but in reference to the concerns of humanity in general; not merely respect and spare his dignity, but feel and show, in general, a certain sympathy for his human nature and his human worth.

There are cases in which we stand to men in merely cold relations of business, as if only their place in civil society, but not their personal character, came into consideration, and we had nothing personal to share with them. This relation is exhibited most decidedly between those who transact business together by letter,

without ever seeing and becoming acquainted with each other. But, even with personal acquaintance, such a cold relation may exist, especially in case of certain distinctions of rank and education. The more intricate and artificial the relations of society are, the more readily such a purely business relation ensues. In large cities, men pass by one another, and deal together, without ever showing any mutual interest; indeed, it would not be possible to come into personal contact with all. This coldness and indifference rightly take place, if one is not especially fitted to attract another, and to awaken sympathy, — if he can neither impart any thing to him, nor receive any thing from him, — if he lack the opportunity to interchange mutual proprieties, to offer points of contact, and in any way form an intimacy. The feeling of love is not willingly idle, and will at least be expressed in words. If my neighbor allows me no occasion to do something for him, or to show him my disposition, it is entirely natural that the sentiment of human love for him should remain dormant within me, and that I should rather turn elsewhere, where I can express it.

Upon a closer intercourse of men with men, the feeling of humanity becomes awakened and vivid in two cases; in the first place, when another, by his condition and personal appearance, excites our compassion, and a wish to help him, and where, therefore, we discover a lack of accomplishment, and our heart is painfully moved by it; secondly, when he, by the accomplishment of his appearance, by the happiness he enjoys, by the grace of his person, by the excellences of his mind and heart, awakens in us the feeling of

cheerful satisfaction. If our heart be not hardened and closed by selfishness,—if what is human have value for us, not merely in reference to ourselves, to our weal and woe, but in itself, and for the sake of itself, and of all mankind,—we shall regard it with love in each of its manifestations. This humanity should be universal. But its humanity consists not so much in its all-embracing extent, as in our showing it, without distinction, towards all with whom we live in close, vital contact. We ought, indeed, to bear mankind and their universal welfare ever in our hearts, and keep awake within us the love of all that is purely human; but yet this is not universal humanity; we can feel and manifest this only when we come into closer intercourse with men. But, then, we ought certainly to feel and manifest it towards all. We owe it even to our enemies. With them, we stand by no means in a remote, indifferent relation; we know them, we see their actions and efforts, we see their personal character before us; and, however hostile and adverse it may be to us, it is a human manifestation, to which we owe a debt of love.

The command to love our enemies is one of the sublimest precepts of Christianity, but actually not impracticable for noble men. It is no more than the duty to be placable and peaceable, and free from revenge towards enemies. If the injured party for once attain this placid, passionless state, the transition to love is easy. He loves his enemy, whilst, recognizing his otherwise good qualities, he regrets the delusion under which he acts, and makes every effort to soften and undeceive him. He loves him, whilst, on account

of the immoral, degrading disposition which he shows in his conduct, he feels for him a moral sense of pain. He loves him, while he pities him on account of a misfortune which innocently befalls him. He loves him, too, while he pities him on account of the misery which he brings upon himself by his passionate aggression. If the placable man does not put out of sight the respect which he owes to the person of his enemy, how should he suppress towards him the feeling of love? He is, and still remains, a man, even if he be ever so perverted and intractable; he will on that account excite our compassion the most vividly. That we ought to love our enemies with the same feeling as our friends, is not the sense of the Christian precept; that would be an unnatural and overstrained requisition. The perfection and amiability, which respond to our heart, we love otherwise than what is imperfect, and wounds our heart. Even the mother loves the misguided, erring child otherwise than the child who gives her joy; the brother ever loves the brother alienated from him and virtue, but with wounded heart, whilst he embraces the trusty, virtuous one with joyful fondness.

The love of enemies is easiest when enmity is not personal, but is grounded only upon party connections, above which the noble, well-disposed man is elevated. The ally of a hostile nation, the hostile warrior, I can, with all my zeal for my country's cause, deem amiable on account of his good personal qualities; at least the hostile relation will not prevent my recognizing in him the man, and showing him kindness and magnanimity at every opportunity. The same is true of the members of another church, even if it show hatred and the spirit

of persecution towards ours. The noble man distinguishes the cause from the person, and, whilst he contends against the former with all his might, takes the latter under the protection of justice and love. He wishes for the opportunity to show his enemy humanity, sympathy, and aid, — to win him, in the tenderest manner, from the prejudice which he has formed, and to prove to him that he is not the enemy of his person, but of his cause.

Humanity is in itself, as already said, a feeling resting in the heart, which is brought out by particular occasions; but then it expresses itself first in sympathy and interest.

The sympathy of man with man, like every other moral feeling, by which one inclines towards another, rests upon a recognition of equality and community. If I acknowledge and respect the right and dignity of another, I do it especially because mentally I put myself in the other's place, and hence make his case my own from sympathy. But this sympathy has reference merely to the place which the neighbor in general maintains in the moral commonwealth, and it is this principally for which I feel respect. On the contrary, the sympathy of love refers to the personal character of the man, and to his peculiar condition in life. In this consists the equality and community of men with one another; in this they are companions and brothers. What can a man bear, experience, enjoy, suffer in himself, something of which does not happen to me, or may not happen to me? Every one, however strange he may be, bears a human countenance, in which the expression of his feelings is painted; every one has human voice and

language, which, with marvellous power, seize and touch my heart; each bears in his breast a human heart, in which all sensibilities and feelings dwell, with which mine is filled. He feels, as I do, pleasure and pain, fear and hope, even if different objects awaken in him these sensibilities. And he has wholly the same feelings of love as I; he has, as a child, hung upon a mother's bosom, and perhaps he loves her still with childlike reverence and gratitude; he has brothers and sisters, a wife and children, kindred and friends. The persons whom he loves are strangers to me; but is not the love which he entertains towards them, the same all-warming, all-animating power which streams through my bosom, every human heart, all mankind? Springs it not from the same fountain of eternal love? Every man, however strange he may be, belongs to some nation, some civil and religious community; he recognizes certain fundamental laws of truth and morality, which are sacred also to me; he looks in adoration towards heaven, and lisps, in whatever language it may be, his gratitude and reverence to the Giver of all good, the Arbiter of all destiny; he walks, like myself, his earthly way, without knowing whither it leads, and goes hopefully and trustingly towards the dark future. Is he not my brother? are not those brethren, who share the same blood, the same feeling, the same thoughts, the same relations, and the same fate?

Sympathy is still more decided whenever men meet us in any especial manner. A stranger comes to us from afar. We are not particularly acquainted with him; but the sadness and longing painted upon his countenance betray to us that he has reluctantly left

his own country; wife and children weep for him, lose in him a friend and guardian, and his heart is wasted with grief. Alas! it may happen to us to be torn from a circle of friends, to be obliged to desert our children, and to intrust them to strangers. How our heart is moved by sympathy! how vividly we place ourselves in the circumstances of the unfortunate! how entirely we feel with him as a brother and companion! We see one sick and wretched. Ah, how his wound may pain him! how the crushing feeling of inactivity, the uncertain prospect of the future, may burden and trouble him! We, also, are frail mortals, and our health is subject to accident. How would it be with our courage, were we confined to the sick-bed, and could no longer work? The sense of sorrow seizes us, as a fellow-feeling, and tears fill the eyes that are turned towards the image of grief. We behold a widow, with her children, pining in want and wretchedness. The mother would gladly suffer need herself, if she could only maintain and educate her children. Ah, how many fair gifts and powers slumber in those little ones! and should all this goodness be pressed down by the burden of misery? Had they yet their father, they would, to the joy of mankind, become useful, noble men; now they pine and languish, like plants that lack sun, air, and nutriment. Do you not think that your child may meet a like fate? and does not a pang of sorrow shoot through your heart? O, harden it not! be not ashamed of a tear for human wretchedness, to which you also, to which even thine own, are exposed! Step here to this coffin, which contains the father of a family, around which wife and children stand weeping! Behold the blooming maiden

upon the bier, whose beauty even in death vies with the roses which wreath her head! Before her stands the youth to whom she was betrothed, in deep sorrow, with hand convulsively clinched, eyes without tears. In her the star of his life had risen; it has gone down, and for him the night of death veils heaven and earth. Alas! what fair bonds are here sundered, what noble hopes deceived, what a lovely flower cut down! Look hither, and try to remain insensible! The afflicted are strangers to you, and you know not the mourners; but are grief and mourning strange to you? Have you no beloved ones, of whom Death can rob you? and are they secure from his all-ravelling power? O, shed a tear for the universal lot of man! mourn over the perishableness of the loveliest of the earth! bow down in sense of human frailty! Alas! how much pain, misery, sorrow, want, and distress, earth, that great house of mourning, embraces! Open thyself, my heart, towards all brothers in suffering; offer to them all a warm, hearty sympathy.

But joy and happiness also demand our sympathy. The blessing of God is universally shed upon mankind, and the sun smiles here, while dark clouds lower there. I see the happy infant upon the mother's lap, who bends over it in rapture, and tries to win the first smile. Thus have I rested upon a mother's lap; thus I saw my now grown son repose, and I share the mother's joy. O, sympathize with the blessed affection of a mother's heart; it is a purely human sentiment, the intimation of the noblest, the most disinterested joy, which the unfolding of human nature in children reveals to us. There the youth leads the myrtle-crowned bride to the altar; tears of sweet sensibility tremble in her eyes, and the mother

follows her with heart overflowing with joy and sorrow. Beheld in the happiness of the fond pair the brightness of young life; the blossom-time of human hopes, and rejoice with them. Rejoice in the goodly fruits which the tree of humanity will bear from these precious blossoms; remember thine own former happiness, even if it be with a tear of sadness. In the house which long has stood desolate, the voice of jubilee resounds. The son, whose name was read on the list of the perished, whom parents bewailed, has unexpectedly returned; kindred and friends welcome the restored one, and wish joy to the parents, whom joy makes young again. You cannot mingle with the congratulatory throng, but sympathize, although remote, with the fairest joy which cannot be a stranger to the human heart. Is not their happiness a gain to humanity, a gift of the All-good, from whom I also have all that gladdens and blesses me? Do not our hearts share the rapture which He, with bountiful hand, sheds upon the earth?

Sympathy should be learned from women. They stand in the midst of a circle of humanity, and all that touches their hearts, as wives, mothers, sisters, friends, and their occupations themselves, lead them back to it; since their care is always devoted to the simple concerns of domestic life, and in all these the heart has the sway. On the contrary, men, by their occupation, are always drawn to an especial aim of life, in which they do not embrace humanity in itself, but only in some particular respect; their heart is filled with violent zeal, and often by party spirit, and at the same time the understanding or the imagination in a manner rules, since all their occupations belong, especially, to one or the

other of these faculties. A certain onésidedness and coldness thence attaches to them, which hardens them against sympathy. They are like travellers, who, hastening to their journey's end, observe nothing agreeable and remarkable on the way, whilst women, like travellers for pleasure, who are ever animated and observing, stop to notice every thing. The society of ladies has been rightly recommended to men, as one of the principal means of culture, but especially in reference to mildness and delicacy of manners; its good influence upon the heart has not been sufficiently taken into the account. In conversation with ladies, men must appear men, and for the sake of entertainment present that only which generally attracts and interests. No wonder that many cannot do this, and hence not only avoid female society, but even despise and disparage it. But let every man of sentiment, who would rise above his own narrow sphere, associate with these feeling souls, and in their circle recover the lost centre of humanity. Their gentleness will melt and soften the cold harshness of professional and party zeal; their susceptibility to every thing truly human will banish onésidedness from society into workshops and places of business.

But even sympathy has its limits. Nothing human should be utterly strange to man, and every touch of feeling should find response in him; but he should not give way too much to sympathy, nor spend uselessly the energy of the heart. Sympathy should express itself in interest, and its kindly tokens, and move us to benevolent and beneficent actions: where neither of the two is possible, and sympathy is idle, we should at least be moderate and reserved in it. There are persons, especially

women, who give way, with suffering spirit, to every impression which the sight of human pain produces upon them, and thus torment themselves without its being possible for them to alleviate it by consolation and aid; nay, even when it is commanded by necessity, as a sanative medicine. If a criminal must suffer a painful death, the noble, rational man will not be indifferent to it; but, moved by sympathy, will exert the influence which he has upon legislation to mitigate the barbarous severity of capital punishment; but with the pain, which the sight of the horrible spectacle excites, he will not torment himself, but rather turn away his eyes. It helps the sick man for the physician to show sympathy for his pain; but he should not give up to it with effeminate weakness, if he would not lose the discretion and composure which his office demands. Between cold insensibility and idle effeminacy lies the true medium of benevolent, active sympathy.

Idle, effeminate sympathy is often merely sensuous, and, as it were, corporeal, and hence selfish. The pain of others excites in some men a nervous sympathy, in which they feel merely themselves, and fear for themselves. They are not, on that account, any more than the unsusceptible, inclined to active interest, to consolation, to assistance; and, if a demand is made upon them, they turn away. They are usually disposed only to commiseration, but not to joyous sympathy, because, in its nature, the latter can be little selfish, and the sight of others' happiness rather excites wishes and desires, than interest, in selfish minds. Nay, — should it be believed? — commiseration serves many persons as a mere means of excitement and satisfaction. The taste which

the Roman people had for fearful theatrical combats, and which our people have for executions and funerals, serves as a proof of this. The inward conflict of fear at pain and suffering, and the satisfaction that is felt in being free from it, afford a sort of pleasure, which, however, is wholly sensuous and selfish.

Genuine moral sympathy is connected with benevolence, by virtue of which we feel, in whatever another suffers or enjoys, not merely the sensuous emotion, but the sentiment of human worth and human perfection, pain at its diminution or joy at its increase; by virtue of which in a human character we behold a manifestation of the human mind, — accord to this our love, — consider its weal and woe as our own, — wish it success and blessing. Sympathy is directed to the condition of the man, benevolence to his person; the condition has worth and significance, however, only inasmuch as we refer to the person; benevolence cannot be without sympathy; the latter is the means of exciting the former; but the latter is the pure expression of humanity. Benevolence is the most universal humane feeling, and in itself only the first commencement of life, but yet its necessary beginning, and, as it were, its elementary material. The heart in which there is no benevolence, knows nothing of true love, and is incapable of all noble and exalted sentiments. He who is not benevolent towards others, will feel towards his own no true love, but only towards himself in them. Alas! that often men, who deserve the praise of many a virtue, lack this first, indispensable ornament of the human heart! that whole classes of men, ranks, families, civil communities, of whom much otherwise can be boasted, are strangers to

this spirit of universal love! Its enemy is found in the spirit of caste, rank, guild, family, and a contracted public spirit. Benevolence must, on the whole, be always lacking in the rank of the nobility, because this is so exclusive. It is very easily lost by those families who associate exclusively with each other, and who separate themselves from others in society; and by a civil community, which has an exclusive citizenship, and perhaps forms for that purpose a little state by itself. A stranger, who enters such an exclusive circle, will find himself coldly received, and find it difficult to win for himself attention and interest. But a native, who is a stranger to this particular circle, is never admitted, lest the prescribed limits be overstepped. This coldness is associated with the spirit of etiquette, so as wholly to harden and to close the heart. Such a life must accordingly lack all freshness, vitality, grace, and cheerfulness; on such cold soil perhaps useful vegetables for domestic use may grow, but not the fair flowers of love, which make earth a heaven.

Insensibility, indifference, hardness of heart, want of kindness, are odious faults, but yet only defects; but, on the contrary, malicious joy at the misfortune and envy at the happiness of others dwell in evil hearts, filled with hate. If these dispositions have their source in revenge, and there are enemies against whom they are directed, they are then not so execrable, as if, without any provocation or exasperation, they regarded the misfortune of another only to rejoice in it, and took severe account of every trifling fault in order to see a judgment in what has befallen him; or as if we grudged every one any good, and considered every felicity and every delight,

which we do not enjoy ourselves, as our own hurt and loss. Envy has in self-love a single root, not in itself bad ; but malicious pleasure at others' misfortune springs from the poisoned fountain of hatred.

Benevolent sympathy expresses itself in the interest which we show in the promotion of the joy of the happy, and in the consolation and relief of the suffering, by friendly, cordial words ; and every one knows what a precious gift in joy and sorrow such kindly interest is, — how it enhances happiness and alleviates misfortune. Such, indeed, as do not participate in this interest, often civilly send back this gift, merely in order not to be drawn into relations which may not be compatible with their exclusiveness. Let us leave them in their desert waste, into which they have banished themselves, and pass through this rich, blooming life, hand in hand, with human joys, giving and receiving sympathy, sharing joy and grief with one another, rejoicing with those who rejoice, and weeping with those who weep, — putting far from us nothing that is truly human ! Then all blooms more beautifully, and sends forth sweeter fragrance, — every enjoyment is doubled, and every affliction is more easily borne.

Often we can do nothing for the suffering but show an interest ; and even for the deepest grief there is no other balsam than the tear of sympathy. Even the address of consolation is often burdensome, and manifests only a cold heart, which cannot feel the depth of another's grief, and the arrogance of a weak understanding, ignorant of the needs of the heart. But happy for us and the afflicted, if their unhappiness is of such kind, that it craves and can receive aid, or at least can be al-

leviated by our presence and assistance. With joy we shall then show our benevolence in beneficence, and in action verify the feeling of the heart. Beneficence consists in the active furtherance of the welfare, and the alleviation of the woe, of our neighbor. It is most usually directed to the outward, material weal and woe, and takes the part of poverty, sickness, bodily misery.

There is a sphere of beneficence which falls, however, entirely within the province of duty. If poverty is a consequence of unjust civil institutions, by which agriculture and trade are cramped, and a great part of the people given a prey to want, then those who are favored by such institutions, are in duty bound, not only to help the temporary need, but also to stop the source of wretchedness. Poor rates, and such means of alleviation, do not suffice; the evil must be rooted up. We have already spoken of this. But, even if the prosperous man can take to himself no part of the guilt of his neighbor's poverty, — if want be brought on by mishap, by the wickedness of individuals, by the failure of crops and the rise of prices, — if the need is only so great that man succumbs beneath its weight, and is without the necessities of life, — then the duty of beneficence ensues. It is founded upon the original equality of men, and the equal claim which all have to life and its necessary conditions. The sympathy which here moves to beneficence, is, indeed, nothing but that of respect for the dignity of man, which cannot be maintained in such need. Who, that has a single human feeling in his bosom, can, while revelling in superfluity, see a fellow-man die in his neighborhood? Whose heart is not cut by the cry of hungry children

for bread? Who can behold the pale, emaciated mother remove the moaning suckling from the breast whose fountain is dried up, and place it upon the pallet of straw, and not share with her the last morsel of bread? Who could find an unhappy traveller plundered by robbers, and mortally wounded, and, like the priest and the Levite, pass by hard-hearted, and leave him weltering in blood? Be not puffed up, man of wealth, by thy charity to pining poverty! you do no more than your duty! and you do it but half, because you do not heal the evil from the foundation! because you extend to the hungry only as much as is necessary to prolong his troubled existence! because you do not lift up the downcast, nor secure him a free, independent place in society, that he may feel himself one of its substantial members!

There is a kind of beneficence, which is as objectionable in its source as hurtful in its influence; I mean alms-giving to beggars. The individual may, in compassion, give something to these wretched beings, who follow this occupation, and whom he cannot permanently relieve; but, if this kind of charity be continued, and regularly produce and support mendicity, as has been the case with the Catholics, in regard to their convents, it is but perverting good into evil. The condition of the beggar is utterly dishonorable, because it excludes all independence, and all sense of honor, and makes man a burden upon society; because it suppresses all love of action, all effort towards improvement, and favors all immorality; nay, beggary is a sort of theft and pocket-picking.

The duty of removing the causes of pauperism, of

obviating, and, above all, of healing, the evils of beggary, which press with crushing force upon the civil condition of the poor, is most securely exercised by the community; and in this, the public spirit of all good citizens will distinctly show itself; they will join in active union, and, with united force, seek to stop the source of this evil. Where this care devolves upon the government, and it is not, at least, sustained by public opinion, the evil will not be fundamentally healed, because there is lack of vital, comprehensive energy.

Where want is not crushing and degrading, beneficence proper begins, — that demonstration of kind humanity, that free generosity, which no positive duty enjoins. If it is the object to revive a sick man, to help up an impoverished citizen, to support a widow who maintains herself with difficulty, to aid an unfortunate person, it is then the object merely to improve their outward condition, to restore and promote their prosperity; and such is the office of benevolence, which consists in making all men as happy as possible, and in seeking to diffuse universal satisfaction and well-being. But this beneficence begins only where our own wants cease, and our own abundance begins. As benevolence flows from the abundance of an affectionate heart, so the beneficence, which subserves this, proceeds from the abundance of earthly goods. But abundance exists where we have not to struggle with pressing necessities, and no cares disquiet us. Benevolence is associated, in noble men, with contentment and frugality — with the frugality which is generous to the poor, and sparing towards self.

As the spiritual welfare of man is more important than his physical, that beneficence, which has for its object a healing, improving influence, is above that which merely relieves poverty and wretchedness. Both kinds of beneficence are in the fairest manner united, in the giving such assistance as puts the poor man in a situation to earn his own living, and recover the lost sense of independence. Activity, industry, is the root of all perfection; and, in the conscious feeling of the active, useful man, the first spark of the higher moral sense of honor appears; only restore this to man, and he is raised to the first step of improvement. The fairest sphere of action for the spiritual good of our fellow-men is the education of the young. Adults are, in a measure, so deeply sunk in moral wretchedness, — so very much accustomed to disorder, negligence, and impurity, and other worse vices, — that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reform them, and we must often rest content merely with superficial remedies. But children are susceptible to goodness, and are, like tender plants, to be educated to a mightier and nobler growth. Let them be removed from the barren soil, and planted in a better; let them have air, sun, and water; support and tend them, and they will requite the noble care. What a fair office, to educate good citizens for the nation! for mankind and for the church, moral and religious men! to save souls from corruption, vice, reprobacy! This is a truly Christian office; this is treading in the footsteps of Christ, who came to seek that which is lost. But this educational beneficence can be rational and wholesome only when it does not raise children of the lower class above their sphere, their calling, and

wants, nor pervert and accustom them to unsuitable habits, but educates them to be useful and contented members of society, in their own appropriate place.

Benevolence is directed towards the person, and so, also, beneficence should be. We ought to be beneficent, not merely to give aid, and to remove the evil, but to show the needy our sympathy and love; we should enter into personal acquaintance with him, form a personal attachment to him. Beneficence, without benevolence, is as a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. "And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not love, I am nothing."

Most benefactors wish to treat with the poor merely by bestowing gifts, and then get rid of them. They purchase, thereby, their peace and comfort, which would be disturbed by the sight of misery. A gift which is thus, as it were, merely thrown down, has no value, and must depress, instead of cheering the poor. Therefore, giving alms to beggars amounts to nothing, since it is done merely to be rid of their importunity, and can show them no benevolent interest. It is worse, if alms be given with anger or reproaches: this may be done from well-grounded displeasure and indignation, and with the purpose of morally improving the poor; but the end is not gained in this flighty and off-hand way. If you feel a real interest for the neglected and erring, then regularly and permanently concern yourself in his welfare, and take him by the arm with firm hand.

A very frequent, and, in fact, very necessary and wholesome, mode of beneficence, is shown in light taxes for alms-houses, poor-funds, and religious institu-

tions, whereby the giver knows not who receives his bounty, since its distribution devolves upon another. But, without denying this benefaction its worth, we must still assign it the inferior rank, since no personal kindness can be shown by it, and this may even be lacking, since the motive proceeds from another, fictitious source. A pious prejudice is prevalent respecting charities, by which the gift is regarded, apart from the mode and manner, as meritorious in itself, and as a sacrifice acceptable to God; and a pious expectation of reward is mingled with the feeling: it is believed, as it were, that alms are placed upon the account for eternity, and a thousand-fold return is hoped for in another life for what has been given away here. Such benefactors have their reward there! Only what love scatters bears fruit for eternity; for love is eternal.

Another very common prejudice is, that it is nobler to be charitable in secret, than to let the receiver know from whom the gift came. There may be cases where magnanimity requires this, but, perhaps, never, except where there is lack of confidence and friendship. Would I make a present to my friend, who finds himself embarrassed, I must select this way, because false pride would otherwise deter him from receiving it. But, were he noble, and placably disposed,* he must receive this proof of my good-will, as a pledge of reconciliation, with joy. To a superior, who has fallen from his dignity, a benefit from a former inferior will be oppressive, but yet only because he knows not the true pride. Many men, in point of pecuniary matters, are much too punctilious, and show thereby, that they place a false value upon them.

Every one should be independent in respect to his maintenance; and it is a shame to become dependent upon others by laziness and negligence; but, by misfortune, and even by lack of prudence, to fall into need and want, is not against true honor; and it just as little conflicts with honor to receive aid from such as wish us well and have means. Frugality and strictness towards self, by which independence is maintained, is worthy of respect; but the pride which is reluctant to receive a benefit is to be blamed; it is as if there were a reluctance to receive any token of kindness, and a wish to avoid the duty of gratitude.

As sometimes the false pride of the needy constrains the benefactor to cover his charity with the veil of mystery, so it is sometimes the false pride of the giver which adopts the same way. He wishes thus to withdraw himself from the gratitude of the receiver, which is burdensome to him, to enter into no acquaintance with him, and hold no communion. Woe to the unloving disposition, which is ashamed of that fairest requital of charity — gratitude! which selfishly would enjoy the pleasure of well-doing by itself alone, and share it with no one! For the well-disposed recipient, such a gift has something oppressive and humiliating, because he cannot express the gratitude with which his heart overflows, — because he cannot convince the benefactor that his benefit has been conferred worthily. To receive and to be grateful for benefits, is one of the relations of human reciprocity; and in all moral intercourse the same relation ensues. He who withdraws himself from gratitude, quits this relation, and deprives his act of its fairest moral value. Gratitude is the return by which

the recipient of the benefit discharges, as it were, his debt towards the giver, and puts himself upon an equality with him. If I deprive him of the opportunity to thank me, I raise myself above him, and sink him beneath me.

Towards friends we shall not be beneficent in this way, but freely give them what they need, and whatever the heart commands to be devoted to them; friend will also gladly receive the thanks of friend, whose fairest and peculiar property is the acknowledgment of love; and thus love will be interchanged with love, whilst the benefit is but its outward seal and bond. But, if we exercise that haughty kind of beneficence which shuns thanks, we show that we do not number the recipient among our friends, and we injure him while we benefit him. Beneficence should spring from benevolence towards the person, and commence and carry out a reciprocity of love; hence it should always lead to a relation of personal friendship. This very truth is recognized in common language, when it is said that the benefactor binds the recipient to himself. If beneficence does not bear this fruit of friendship, it lacks its fairest blessing, and it is but a passing phantom.

It is therefore that begging is so odious, because, between the receiver and giver of the benefit, no relation of benevolence and gratitude can arise, even if it be, that an honorable man sees himself obliged to ply the dishonorable occupation, and the benefactor is not in a situation to help him, otherwise than with an oft-repeated gift. And, therefore, the beneficence which provides for spiritual and moral good, is the fairest, because it necessarily implies benevolence and grati-

tude, and because it is not to be thought of without a lasting solicitude and personal interest.

Beneficent, sympathizing men, who see themselves restricted by their narrow fortunes, often dream of the rapture they should feel, if, like a fairy, they could enter the hovels of poverty, and pour out the horn of plenty; how they would feed upon the joyful surprise of the befriended,—upon the rapture glancing from their eyes. The wish does honor to their heart, but contains an error. The poor should not be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the benefit, nor the difference between them and their benefactors be made so great as to make them honor in the benefactor almost a divinity; because the formation of a personal friendship is thus hindered; since this always presupposes a certain equality, at least not too great an inequality. Princes sometimes exercise such fairy-like beneficence; but I do not envy them it, nor the sad prerogative of mercy. The gratitude of a free man, of noble sense of honor, cannot respond to mercy; homage alone responds to it; it remains without that loveliest reward—friendly gratitude; it is a lofty, proud tree, which stands upon a bleak height, in the breath of cold breezes, and bears no blossoms and fruits. Would any man, who has abundance at command, help a poor man with extraordinary generosity, let him at least not overwhelm him, and, at first, win his confidence by small favors, in order that he may be able to bear the larger ones.

It cannot be sufficiently taken to heart, that not the gifts and their magnitude, but the kindness with which they are given, and the design to aid the needy person, constitute the value of the benefit. That is the richest

benefit, which is richest in love. But, although properly a personal relation should always arise between the benefactor and the recipient, this does not prevent beneficence being exercised jointly; but this aim is the better attained thereby. How lovely, when the gifts of kindly feeling proceed from the circle of a well-disposed society, which is connected together by the noblest friendship! when the individual members are sent as messengers of charity to the poor, to ascertain their needs, to win their confidence, and to carry gifts where they are most necessary and proper! and thus the bond of love, which union has joined, intertwines in various ways with the people. Associate forces can do more than individual; and the work of beneficence is so manifold, that not only money, but also the different gifts of mind and heart, must be united in it. A fair proof that our age has made progress, not only in moral sentiment, but also in insight into the laws and conditions of moral life, is found in the beneficent associations which have sprung up in almost all the cities of Germany, and in this city, so distinguished for its benefactions. Every friend of humanity must wish them progress, increase, success, blessing; and their influence can be no otherwise than blessed, since in them genuine love is united with genuine prudence.

To beneficence corresponds gratitude—the return of kindness by affectionate, cordial acknowledgment, and by taking the first opportunity to return the benefit. But as, in the latter case, the kind feeling is the valid element, so, also, in gratitude; and, if it be sincere, it will prove itself by deeds. As beneficence should be accompanied by a relation of personal friendship, so

the fairest indication of gratitude is personal regard and attachment. In the gratitude of the recipient, the benefactor may and should receive his reward; to wish for love, to win love, is the impulse of a noble heart; and to seek in love the reward of love, is not desecrating morality by mercenary selfishness. But we should seek no more than the gratitude of love; no requital, in any form of service, should be made the price of the benefit; that would be ignoble, vulgar selfishness; the personal dependence of one obligated to us by benefits, should not be claimed, nor his dependence in opinion, in business, in mode of life, for that would be the most oppressive of all forms of tyranny. Free, in noble, proudly-conscious sense of honor, the man under obligation for favors should stand towards his benefactor, and feel nothing lost to him but the inclination of his heart. Benefactors often, by such tyranny, induce apparent ingratitude; and the person obligated, can save his freedom only by rending the bond which unworthily binds him. No noble man could desire to be placed under this mournful necessity; with bleeding heart, he will break away from him who has perverted this fairest of relations to the service of selfishness. Ingratitude is in its very semblance odious, and woe to the heart that is capable of it! for it is incapable of love, and all insensible to the blessings in its train. The ingrate knows not friendship, whose tie is always woven by benefit and gratitude, by giving and receiving, and returning; and who is more to be pitied than he who is destitute of this happiness?

What would life be without kindness and gratitude? They are the first angels, whom the spirit of love sent

among men, to make them friends to each other. Kind deeds are the first warm rays of vernal sunshine, with which love breaks through the frosty crust of the earth; they are the gifts, with which the divine friend of man invites to herself the timid children of earth, as many teachers bestow presents upon their scholars, at their entrance, in order to win their confidence. Kindness draws the child to the mother's bosom; in the father, it first loves the benefactor, the guardian, and fosterer. Kindness attaches the foster-child to its foster-parents, often, with a fairer tie than that of blood; it binds the pupil to his teacher, and establishes between them a friendship and attachment that lasts unto the grave; it weaves the first threads of that fair bond, that binds us to country; and gratitude to the mother and nurse of all the good which we enjoy, is the seed of the noblest inspiration which fills the citizen's breast. Benefactors, guardians, instructors, were the heroes who first accustomed the wild tribes to order and civilization; and the forms of beneficent masters of the feast, as of a Melchisedec, who refreshed the warriors with bread and wine, shine out with mild splendor from the obscurity of ancient tradition: nay, our Saviour himself attracted men to himself by personal benefits; he fed the hungry, supplied wine for the cheerful festival, healed the sick and maimed. O, whoever possesses the goods of earth, let him scatter them, as seeds of love, and reap the rich, golden harvest of gratitude! let him extend a helping hand to the needy, and draw him, as a friend, to his breast! How happy are the rich, in possession of that which can be the easiest, surest token of love,—which chains hearts with un-

failing attraction! Alas! many a heart, rich in love, has nothing but the fulness of love, whose pure light, devoid of earthly, warming energy, sheds unfruitful rays. O, why are so many ignorant of the use of wealth, and deny themselves the fairest blessing it can bring? There is nothing more profitable than beneficence; for there is no lovelier reward than gratitude and love. As the father of a large family, the benefactor lives among those intrusted to his care; as a shady, sheltering tree, he stretches his branches over them; as around a fountain, those languishing for refreshment gather around him. Every joy of life, which they have, he enjoys with them in purer sympathy; every happy look smiles ecstasy upon him; their life intertwines by a thousand delicate fibres with his own; their hearts beat for him; their prayer is for him. What anxiety, what tender concern, when any grief comes upon him! when sickness lays him upon his bed! and, alas! when it steals him away, how many tears flow for him! how the bereaved follow his coffin in dejection! how many an invalid mourns in the silent chamber! And fairer yet, because more disinterested, are the tears of those who, long since having outgrown his protection, raised by him to the independence of thriving citizens, mourn in him nothing but the loss of the paternal friend, by whose benignant presence they felt their self-respect doubled. And he who received nothing from him, laments the philanthropist, the pattern of a good citizen, the adviser and promoter of every good and public-spirited enterprise. But let the fair recompense of human gratitude be the only one which beneficence seeks. God, however, is its recom-

penser, as he is the recompenser of all good; but he rewards and blesses goodness only by goodness, love by love; consequently, beneficence by gratitude: he fertilizes the scattered seed by the power of love, opens the heart to its beams, and kindles the spark within it to a flame; he effects good, and rewards it by good men, and the good spirit which he pours into their minds. And, as the love of the benefactor is associated with physical gifts, so is the blessing of gratitude with earthly reward. A benevolent soul will not want; an impoverished benefactor is rich by the countenance of all whom he has befriended, and of all the magnanimous who know his nobleness; the charitable man will be blest in all he undertakes; since love and confidence ever come to his aid. But, as the soul builds for itself a body; as energy of will, like a creative spark, strikes upon the outward world, and brings forth the deed; and as, in doing good, it is the spirit of kindness only that has value;—so should the material reward pass only as the outward manifestation of gratitude of heart,—as the earthly fruit, which falls from this heavenly blossom.

LECTURE XV.

FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE.

JUSTICE, and respect for the dignity of man, may maintain the equality and peaceful order of reciprocity, and prevent hostile conflict and injury. Sympathy, benevolence, infuses into these fixed, quiet relations the spirit of love, which strives to attract and to bind all more closely to each other, and to warm and animate the otherwise frigid peace of society. But whilst, through benevolence, all are kindly disposed towards each other, love draws together those who are more closely related by nature, intimacy, and disposition, with a stronger attractive energy, and unites them by the inner bond of friendship. Thus the great multitude of men, who otherwise move only in the path of citizenship, or are brought together more or less intimately by general benevolence, is divided, as it were, into various groups: here are two friends; there two lovers walk arm in arm; there a larger circle of friends is formed for a common work, either grave or gay; there the members of a family gather around their head in sweet confidence; there many such groups are united by professional association, or by the more general tie of public spirit. Friendship, in general, unites every free combination of men by a narrower bond

than that of peace and benevolence; but, in the stricter sense, we understand those affectionate alliances of individuals with individuals, of which we shall treat to-day.

Friendship, like benevolence, has reference to the peculiar perfection which a man bears in himself; to that which our heart recognizes in him beyond the dignity of person and its rights; that which wins our favor and approbation, which imparts to us satisfaction, or promises us the elevation, enlargement, refinement of our being.

There is a lower kind of friendship, which does not subserve the object of perfection, but merely of companionship. Companionship in itself is nothing but an instinctive animal want, which we share with the beasts, and which is early awakened in children. It is connected with that natural sympathy, which draws the creature towards his like, just as like bodies attract each other. Man seeks communion, interchange, entertainment, exhilaration; he wishes, not only in seriousness and business, but also in mirth and recreation, society and sympathy; he wishes to share his enjoyment with others, in order to double it. Companionship is first noble and worthy of men when benevolence and love join in it—when they enter into intercourse and contact with each other, not only as animal beings, and from animal wants, but when they bring into it all that should characterize man as man. But we need not, on that account, wholly object to union for the sake of company and entertainment; such has its good. It unites men, at least outwardly; and there is so

much to divide them, that we must welcome every thing that promotes peace.

A friendship, whose aim is merely entertainment, may be formed partly by natural inclination, partly by habit. Men feel themselves attracted to men by certain external graces of person and bearing, just as, on the other hand, certain external peculiarities are repulsive. There are persons, who, at first sight, win favor for themselves: beauty of form, — the soft, friendly, animated eye, — charm of voice and conversation, of air and movement, — delicacy and refinement of manner, — the affability, brightness, and cheerfulness, with which they appear, — the vivacity and richness of their minds, — their wit and power of entertainment; — in fine, all that constitutes their social character, — attract and enchain. Beauty of person and grace of manner make an agreeable impression upon all, and their charms serve not merely as a fascination between the sexes, but they also lead to companionship; and many a youth loves, in his friend, nothing but the attraction of his address; and by this many a companion maintains his place in a family, and makes himself indispensable. If nothing higher enter into such a connection, — if in a friend his heart and character be not equally loved, — if in his company no higher excitement and nutriment be sought, — then no true value attaches to this connection; meanwhile, it is very well if merely nothing bad enter into it, — if the external grace and the brilliant gifts of conversation do not sweeten the poison of vice and bad sentiment, — if the innocent youth, enticed by such fascinations, do not

enter into the society of vice, nor allow his warm heart to be chilled by the brilliant jugglery of an unbelieving, unloving, satirical wit.

Others become associates merely through habit. No graceful charm draws them together; the pleasure of their society consists solely in the adaptation caused by long acquaintance, in the gratification of a want that has arisen by length of time, and in the multitude of points of contact which long association has brought with it. The one knows all the relations of the other; both have many common experiences, whose remembrance seasons conversation, and is a source of attachment in view of new events that arise. There is a youthful friendship, which springs neither from the impulse of inclination nor the congeniality of heart, but from habit alone, and often lasts through life; such a one has no high worth, but yet may contribute to the pleasure of life.

But inclination and habit, as sources of attachment, may still subserve a higher friendship or union of hearts; and, since man is a physical, sensuous being, it is evidently better, if with the inward union the external, sensuous attraction coöperate, and if habit, which fixes every thing, make the free choice of the heart enduring, and, as it were, a necessity. A bond of friendship which inclination and habit help to form, is indissoluble, and defies all the vicissitudes of life. If, by the external attractions of beauty and grace, love wins love,—if steadfast congeniality of disposition and views of life concur with the agreeable routine of habit,—the fairest tie is formed; the inner and outer, freedom and necessity, have organically combined with

and pervaded each other. Such a friendship lasts through life; holds good in all relations, conditions, and circumstances; has a cheering, soothing, strengthening influence, in all respects; and is an inexhaustible source of happiness. Hence the friendship of youth is so lovely, if it does not arise merely from natural inclination and habit, but from congeniality of heart, from like views of life, and similarity of purpose. Hearts early united can no more be severed from each other; no relation of life, no distinction of rank, can easily tear them asunder. And, as youthful remembrances become more vivid in old age, — as the aged look back longingly to the play-grounds of their youth, to the vales of their home, — so youthful friendship, if it has grown cold, often revives in later years. After many other connections have been dissolved, many illusions have vanished, many losses been regretted, the bereaved and deserted longingly seek each other; the hopes of youth, which they shared together, and which they re-awaken in confiding conversation, assuage the wounds which bitter experience has inflicted; the intimation of a higher, better existence mingles the rosy rays of their evening twilight with the ruddy dawn of their youthful dreams; and, thus reunited, they cheerfully walk with each other towards the grave. Fraternal love is therefore so unchangeable, because it springs from the mysterious fountain of natural kindred and inclination, and is fixed by early habit and the most confiding intimacy; if congeniality of heart be only added to this, then it is the most indissoluble, intimate, holiest friendship. They who, beneath the same maternal heart, rested upon the same bosom, saw the first

light together, attempted the first stammering lip, — who have shared the first plays, — whose hearts have been moved by the same impressions of joy and grief, nurtured by the same feelings of love, — these seek and find each other again, when they have been long and far removed from each other; they have turned their choice and destiny towards different aims, which they perhaps have not reached; they return, disappointed, to the quiet path of nature; they flee to one another's arms, to weep tears of sadness upon a trusty heart; and they never more leave this steadfast asylum.

Well for us, therefore, if the external bonds of inclination and habit attach us to our friends; but true friendship craves still a deeper, a more intimate bond — congeniality of heart. Its fundamental condition is esteem or respect. This respect is different from that which we have acknowledged upon the ground of justice, and which we owe to every man, as a rational being and as a member of the moral commonwealth. General respect for man has reference to the dignity of person, alike in all, and is the same towards all; but this respect or esteem, and higher estimation, has reference to the peculiar perfection which a man maintains, and which may be greater or less, and differs according to circumstance. That respect of justice I owe even to the criminal and villain; but this respect or esteem I can show only to the virtuous and noble. Again, it is of two kinds. It has respect partly to the moral worth of the man, and values in him his disposition and his good-will, and as such is most valid: it has reference again partly to the excellence and culture of his mind, to gifts, knowledge, capability, to activity and conse-

quence in life, and prizes what we call desert; but as such it takes but the second place. In connection with the former, it will contribute much to the establishment of friendship; since, in him with whom a near connection is desired, accomplishments are sought in addition to moral goodness; but, apart from moral respect, these cannot be the foundation of friendship. They who do not hold to the eternal laws of virtue cannot be firmly connected to each other; selfishness may connect them for a while, or a natural inclination draw them together, but there is lack of true union of heart between those who do not agree as to the main aims of life: hence they cannot, on the whole, be congenial. All true love is grounded upon the love of virtue, and all inclination of souls towards each other must steadfastly tend towards virtue, as the magnet ever points towards the pole.

Esteem, of whatever kind, is a clear, placid sentiment, of which we are made conscious by the understanding. According to our convictions, we estimate the moral character and accomplishment of another, and come to a more or less decided conclusion; we apply, as it were, a rule to the worth of others, and the more or less favorable the result of this measurement is, the more or less favorable is the verdict of our estimation. But, essential as esteem is to friendship, it does not depend solely upon this. We esteem many persons highly without being their friends; we gladly enter into business relations with men of moral worth and desert, because we expect from them security and aid; but some obstacle stands between our heart and theirs which we cannot surmount, or they leave us cold and indifferent, and we cannot enter upon that nearer, intimate connec-

tion with them which constitutes the essence of friendship.

With esteem, love must concur, in order that friendship may arise. But shall we more closely describe and define this mysterious something, which we all feel, but which is so difficult to represent? It may, perhaps, be said, what we love. It is nothing more than moral goodness and peculiar worth, yet with this distinction, that we love the heart more than strength and firmness of will, moral perfection more than talents and excellence of intellect, understanding, wit, knowledge, and capability. The firm, straightforward, matter-of-fact man will have a claim upon our respect; on the contrary, the feeling, spiritual, enthusiastic, magnanimous man, whose noble heart shines out from his deeds, will win our heart. The scholar, the thinker, the poet, the artist, we shall respect only as such, and first love them when we discover, in connection with their intellectual gifts and excellences, an enthusiastic love of truth and beauty, a heart of sensibility. As we love that which belongs to the heart, and touches and wins the heart, so also we love with the heart. Esteem, although it springs from a sentiment, expresses itself in a clear, more or less decided verdict of the understanding; on the contrary, love belongs wholly to sentiment, and cannot in its grounds be fully conceived by the understanding. Thus much may be said, that we recognize in love a worth and perfection peculiar, and peculiarly responsive with ourselves; that we, by an especial sympathy, and a peculiar congeniality, feel ourselves drawn to the beloved object; that we find in our friend that which helps and furthers our own inner life, and by

which we are strengthened, cheered, and elevated. But this especial congeniality, while it has reference to the concerns of moral life, and of human perfection, must always be founded upon an harmonious enthusiasm for goodness. Without enthusiasm, there is no true friendship; and what is called by that name is either merely a connection by inclination and habit, or a partnership of gain, or the cold relation of respect. Virtue supplies the threads of the bond of friendship, but enthusiasm weaves the bright colors and gleaming gold into the fair web; that unites souls in equal, firm fidelity to the laws of the moral world; this exalts them to equal, free aspiration towards the higher aims and patterns of perfection. By enthusiasm, let me not be understood to mean fanaticism; this will form no ties, or else but transient ones; true enthusiasm is indeed a warm, but not an always sparkling flame, and can survive to calm old age. Enthusiasm is, as we have already seen, inspiration—the exalted direction of the mind towards the highest sacred aim of life, the goods of truth, justice, and beauty; and this direction is indispensable to true love—nay, is one with it.

There are different steps and circles of friendship. All those who coincide with each other in views of life,—who share the same purpose,—who are connected by an employment carried on with zeal and enthusiasm,—who are devoted to the same favorite taste,—may be called friends. Thus it is with fervent associates in the same faith, enthusiastic patriots, the patrons of science and art prompted by true love for truth and beauty; intimately coinciding in their dearest pursuits, they love each other. By the same friend-

ship, teachers and scholars, masters and pupils, are united; love of truth, beauty, unites them as professional associates, and gratitude and personal attachment come in to join the bond more firmly. Others become united by some relation in life—as master and servant, superior and subordinate, employer and employed; both feel mutual respect, both have formed an inner connection for life, chosen the same aim; and in this union persons are bound by attachment and fidelity to each other, and a certain congeniality of heart is formed, which, however, has its ground in the common relation. Persons who, by the public nature of their destiny and their office, have manifested to all eyes their good disposition, and the estimable qualities of their heart, and drawn universal attention to themselves,—find, among many, an admiring, affectionate regard, and behold themselves surrounded by a large circle of friends, who offer them touching tokens of good-will; they cannot know all these as they are known by them, and therefore do not love them in the same way; but gratitude makes up the lack of love, the love manifested wins back love; and we may certainly call such a connection friendship, since it is a relation of respect and love.

Friendship, in the proper and highest sense, is a personal connection, not merely by some common interest, but through personal qualities themselves. Certainly, friends should always have a common love and inspiration, and elevate their souls to the same high aims; but, at the same time, they should find what they love, each in the other's heart. They should love each other for the sake of something higher, but still

for each other's sake. They should find the idea with which they are inspired, realized and rooted in each other's heart. If it is truth which especially inspires them, then they should love one another for the sake of the pure, vital love of truth; if they are especially ardent for the restoration of justice in society, let it be the sacred, steadfast courage to dare all for right, which binds their hearts firmly to each other; if it is the love of art which unites them, let each one love, in the living work of art, the beauty pervading his whole life, the inward proportion, the purity and loveliness of his mind. And, if there is no one especial aim, nor particular taste, but only love in general for goodness, in which they coincide, then let each be the other's pattern, guide, and support, in the path of virtue; let one love in the other the pure, free spirit of humanity, the noble, affectionate heart, the firm, strong will. In the strictest sense, this personal friendship will take place only between equals; between companions of the same age, class, profession, education, and tendency of life. A certain difference will be beneficial, and present more points of contact; scholars of different departments will be, perhaps, more closely united than those of the same department, and the same will be the case with artists; since, in the general similarity of profession, individual variety excites a more manifold interest, whilst the unavoidable one-sidedness, which every profession induces, may be repulsive. But too great differences are not favorable to friendship; they must be levelled down by equality in general human culture. Friendship is the most complete relation of communion and reciprocity which can

take place between men. Now, the fundamental law of all reciprocity is equality; that of civil reciprocity is equality of human dignity in the equal relations of civil intercourse; that of universal philanthropy is the equality of men in the various relations of human perfection; in order that the most complete communion and reciprocity may arise, equality of relations, perfection, concerns and condition, culture and effort, must be added to equality of human dignity. The nobler friendship is, the less the disproportion of outward condition, poverty and wealth, high and low station, will cause disturbance; but much freedom and elevation of soul are requisite to level down these disproportions, and the happiness of friendship is always more secure upon the even ground of equality.

* For what should friendship serve, or what is its object? This question is not so easily considered, as if friendship were to be sought for the sake of profit, since this would be desecrating it. Love has no price: it is its own price, reward, and object. Do you ask why the mother loves the child, the child the mother? Do you ask why heart inclines to heart, and gives and receives love? It must love, and seek love, as it beats, and draws in and sends out the blood. When two persons have become acquainted and attached to each other, a purely human object is attained; they love each other, and love is the law of the universe. But there is a subordination of aims among each other, and thus friendship, surely,—although no empty means, but in itself an aim,—may subserve a higher object: it is but one, although one of the fairest forms of life, and hence may be contemplated in its beneficial influence upon the

whole life. That higher object is no other than the higher love of purely spiritual, eternal good: Upon the bosom of a friend the heart should beat warmly, for truth, justice, beauty; since it is strengthened by communion and sympathy, and draws nutriment from a friendly heart. That which often moves the heart but as an indefinite longing, which hovers before the mind as a wavering ideal, comes to us from a friend's heart as a definite, living form, — is found in his mind as clear, steady insight, — and he is thus a gainer in firmness of soul. The higher, spiritual love finds in friendship an earthly hold and support. Suppose one friend is in danger of being enticed by earthly allurements, and of being faithless to higher love; then the warning voice of the other will lead him back again — the strong bands of love, which bind him to that true, exalted heart, will redeem him. Does the fervor of one cool, then the other will pour through him the fire of love, and rekindle the feeble flame. However much life presents that is dangerous to higher love, — however much that is degrading, wearying, overwhelming, — the spirit of friendship, like a guardian genius, will turn it all aside, and conquer by the power of love. How many a fair hope is frustrated! how many a painful disappointment casts down the affectionate heart! then the stronger friend is a source of strength, who, with broad vision, rises above the illusion of the moment. How often our faith in the triumph of goodness in the world is shaken! how often it appears as if only wickedness and falsity could triumph in this world! then our firmer friend strengthens us by his unchangeable faith, and, even if we cannot believe his consoling assurances,

we yet feel that goodness dwells in his heart, and faith returns to us; the whole earth may sink into night, yet, in the eye of a friend, the light of the higher world beams upon us. Thus friendship supports, cherishes, and animates our higher love; it helps on our efforts towards its exalted aims; it unites the powers of friends, and thereby strengthens them, and makes them victorious. If both share the same work of life, the same calling, then they immediately support each other; if they work in different spheres, there is still many a point of contact, in which they can meet to help and advance each other; if one tires upon his way, the other hastens to his relief; if he finds himself in perplexity, then he stands by him with his counsel. Even this single service, which friend affords to friend, as an adviser, is of inestimable value. Where should we find better counsel, than in him who knows and shares our feelings, and to whom we can confidently open our heart? Into the bosom of friendship we pour our troubles, and are consoled by the act of imparting them.

Yet friends, however intimate they may be, should be independent of each other; each should maintain his own place, and his own sphere of action in life, and neither degrade the other into subservience to himself. He who annoys his friend needlessly in his private affairs, and claims his attention now for every object of self-interest, desecrates the fair relation of pure love by base selfishness. Friendship should subserve a higher aim; both friends should devote their united powers to an object which transcends their mutual worldly interest. Of course, one friend should be of advantage

to another, and use every opportunity to render him service; but in this the proper object of friendship does not lie. These courtesies should not lead to partiality, so that the advantage of a friend shall be promoted at the expense of the common good, or, indeed, at the expense of justice and truth. The noble man will not thrust his friend into an office which he is incapable of discharging; he will not seek to free him from deserved punishment; and, for his sake, will not swerve a hair from truth. Only in conflict for the concerns of mankind, friends should stand by each other, and one always be ready for the other's service; but otherwise, every one should take care of himself, and try to be efficient in his own affairs. On the contrary, in extraordinary cases, when a friend falls into danger and need, and his fortune is at hazard, — or if he is found in some pressing embarrassment, and cannot get through without aid and support, — then the other should hasten to his aid with all he has in his power, and then the distressed one should have a claim upon the helper. In case of need, every thing should be common between friends, which otherwise is separate; they should sacrifice property and blood for each other, and abide by one another to the last.

Confidence is the soul of friendship. No community, not even the civil commonwealth, can exist without it; how much less the communion of hearts! Friendship can arise only by one party representing himself as he truly is, and exhibiting his mind without any veil; since it should be a union of hearts. No hypocrisy is more odious than that which deceives friendship, and thereby breeds treachery. If friends have joined each other in

mutual interchange of hearts, their union can continue only by continued confidence. To confiding, open communication, sincere, hearty response corresponds; heart pours itself into heart; eye is mirrored in eye; and thus souls blend with each other. This life of vicissitude brings many a change of view and feeling. In order, then, that congeniality may be maintained, let friend freely commune with friend, and freely disclose the changes of feeling that may occur. Even if a friend may blame a new view, or determination, — may be indignant at a weak fear to which we have given way, or a fault which we have incurred, — this blame, this displeasure, we will fondly receive, as a gift of love, as wholesome medicine. This frankness is one of the holiest duties of friendship, which cease as soon as the mouth counterfeits approval, while the heart entertains displeasure. A friend should be our warning guardian genius, and our guide in the path of virtue; and, if all lie, deceive, and flatter, let truth stand forth to the bewildered mind, in the form of friendship, and scatter the phantoms of deadly delusion.

Besides openness and veracity in communication, confidence is shown in the reliance which one places upon the love and fidelity of the other. However confounding and deceptive appearances may be between friends, neither doubts the other, nor believes him guilty of any baseness, nor gives room for a suspicion. If soul has acknowledged soul, and found each other in the eternal harmony of love, no discord can arise between them without being quickly removed. Friend shows confidence to friend in need; he calls him to his aid, and is certain that he will appear; he reckons as

securely upon him as upon himself; since he himself would not stay behind if the other called him.

And this confidence is answered by unchangeable fidelity. The faithful breast, as a sanctuary, keeps a friend's secret; frankness finds in secrecy its safe asylum; and no third person may intrude into the communion of hearts. Unwavering constancy to that for which both associated, is expected by friend, and the expectation does not deceive him. Although calumny may seek to cast the shadow of suspicion between two friends, and the complex relations may place the conduct of one in an enigmatical light, — ever true, he comes forth safely from the deceptive appearance, shows himself in the old, trusty form, and falls into the arms of his friend. "Could you doubt me? No; you wavered not; and I remain firmly yours, and will remain so forever." And both close anew, and more firmly, the eternal covenant, and join their souls in intimate embrace. The fidelity of friends is preserved in need, and in death; they stand and fall together. Shame upon him who deserts his friend in danger! to whom his own happiness and life are dearer than his friend's! who can venture no sacrifice for him in time of need! The true friend does not wait until his companion, hard pressed, calls upon him; with wakeful eye, he spies out the danger from afar, fronts it with brazen breast, and has turned it aside, or, falling, breathed out his loving spirit, before the other has any intimation of peril. Glorious conflict, in a friend's behalf! beautiful triumph, which is won for him! sweet sacrifice, to die for a heart beloved!

It is a great, inestimable happiness to have a friend!

to call a soul wholly one's own! to live, in a beloved, trusty heart, a second, exalted existence! Joy to him whom Heaven has granted many friends! who is united by an inspired love, by a noble purpose, with many congenial, noble minds! who sees himself followed in his pilgrimage of life by a numerous host of ardent, vigilant companions! To him a cheerful heart is secured; he goes triumphant towards the goal; and, if he attains it not, yet his friends will, and through them he succeeds. But joy above all to him who presses one among his companions more closely to his heart, embraces him with a brother's arms, and in him recovers himself twofold! All the rays of love, as to a focus, stream in unison into such a covenant of heart, to kindle the mighty flame of inspiration; and every energy of courage, confidence, hope, and consolation, dwells in minds so intimately united, so as to make them victorious and invincible.

If we have designated friendship as the bond of associate enterprise, this holds good especially between men. Female friendship is not that of earnest action, but that of quiet congeniality of feeling; since, generally, feminine life appertains more to sensibility of feeling than to energy of action. The office of women is limited to domestic life, which, in its nature, excludes all participation on the part of others. Only in extraordinary cases of need, can female friends assist each other; and then they will manifest entirely the same fidelity as appears in the other sex. The delicacy of domestic relations does not always permit female friends to ask advice of each other, unless they both belong to

the same household. On account of this seclusion of feminine relations, friendship between women is chiefly restricted to sympathy; kindred hearts will incline towards each other, to share joy and grief, and to seek consolation in each other, even should it be permitted to find utterance only in silent tears; they will cherish in each other a love which the domestic circle does not embrace and impart, and interchange their feelings upon the general affairs of life; they will refresh, strengthen, cheer each other, to return with renewed energy to their private spheres. But, on account of this its nature, feminine friendship is rare in mature years, and is most intimate in youth, where the seclusion of domestic life has not yet entered. The maiden stands free by her friend's side; both go to meet the future with the same hopeful anticipations; both hearts beat with the same emotions, and crave sympathy. An intimate, confidential league is there formed, with no other aim than mutual love and communion; and this youthful friendship continues, if both become mistresses of a household. Again they seek each other's society, to find in each other that which the love of husband and children cannot and need not impart, to delight in sweet remembrances of their youth, to enjoy, in confiding fondness, a happy hour. Female friendship has not the grandeur of the manly; it has no glow of bright inspiration, is not maintained in heroic conflict; it is a tender, sweet-scented flower in the quiet garden, but a precious ornament, an inestimable blessing of life.

To friendship, love between man and woman is

closely related, or sexual love. Without friendship, it is a dark, rude instinct, unworthy of man; but yet it is very different from friendship.

In the first place, inclination, the attraction of personal charms, is essential to love, but to friendship, on the contrary, merely incidental. We do not confine that which awakens inclination, and attracts man towards woman, to the fascination of personal symmetry, beauty, and grace; the mind has, also, its sensuous attractions, which are shown in the gait, mien, speech, in the play of thoughts and feelings; but, where every attraction of this sort fails, not love, but merely friendship, takes place. The inclination of man towards woman is different from that of man towards man, of woman towards woman; for it excites the desire of possession, which is foreign to friendship. The different sexes are made for each other; it is the duty and wish of man to be with woman, of woman to be with man; a deep, powerful yearning draws the one to the other; the manly nature wishes to be made complete by the feminine, and the converse. As, in nature, one substance, one force seeks and attracts another, so the different sexes attract each other; as the earth is attracted by the sun, and this sheds its attractive power upon all the planets, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the universe, so woman will, and must, depend upon man, and man will, and must, draw woman into his orbit of existence. This decided inclination of man towards woman, which we call the sexual instinct, appears in every instance of affection between the sexes; and this is founded upon the peculiar charms which are presented to a peculiar suscepti-

bility. In regard to inclination, we must take elective affinity or idiosyncrasy into the account, since one feels himself attracted where another remains cold, and the mingling of temperament, which in each one is peculiar, may have great influence. Wherever this peculiar attraction of one by another takes place, Nature, by the strongest of her physical instincts, demands the union; arm in arm, heart to heart, the lovers would share life with each other; the vital warmth in each heart kindles into a flame, which seeks to blend with that in the other's heart.

What inclination is to the sensuous life, is found for the spiritual in love, which, again, is different from the love of friends, and is founded upon the difference of sexes. Man is principally active, woman passive: the former acts upon society by an intellect penetrating, comprehensive, regulating; in an energy formative and productive, he goes forth to the conflict, seeks an aim to strive for, takes a place in civil life, and presses after distinction; but woman is passive in regard to public life, and receives external impressions without reacting force, but with a sensibility, by the side of which the intellect stands merely docile and defensive. Man and woman present, by themselves singly, an incomplete form of life — are like separate halves of a whole human soul; hence the mutual wish to complete their being. The man, given up to outward affairs, returns to himself by pouring his soul into a feminine heart; whilst life, thus variously agitated, draws him hither and thither, and distracts him, he will recover his whole, undivided being in feminine affection; for his ardor, dissipated in action, he will derive fresh nutri-

ment and vigor from the ever-copious, full fountain of a woman's heart; he will repose from turmoil and strife upon the gentle bosom of his wife, where peace dwells; by her side, and with her sympathy, he will celebrate his victories, enjoy his good fortune in two-fold consciousness, and behold his whole existence mirrored in a beloved heart. Woman, on the contrary, feels herself drawn by the most opposite yearning towards man; removed from public life, or contemplating it only from afar, she will at least, through a heart beloved, feel its creative movement in her own; in herself void unless she receives, she thirsts after the fulness which flows from a manly breast; she wishes to love, admire, confide, hope, and therefore craves an object and excitement. Thus, by an interchange of affection, by giving and receiving, life first is made perfect; each finds in the other what he lacks in himself; each returns to the other his own with addition.

Mysterious harmony of affection! intimate pervasion of hearts formed for each other! enchanting play of harmonious chords, whose tones melt into each other! Such a unison does not take place in the friendship of man with man, nor of woman with woman; here like parts of the soul are related to each other,—manly enterprise to manly enterprise, feminine sensibility to feminine sensibility,—and the other parts are more or less averse to each other. In friendly league, two souls stand by each other; on the contrary, in love, both souls melt into one, and interchange with each other all that they bear in themselves.

As the inner life, and the knowledge of the outward, are completed for lovers by their covenant of hearts,

they need one another also for outward life and its affairs. Man, who is called abroad by his civil and professional duties, needs domestic quiet, which can be afforded him only by the quiet, trusty care of woman; as his heart finds in her peace and the inner joy of life after the turmoil, so she receives him, when he returns home, with the refreshment and attention which his frame and whole physical condition need. On the other hand, woman needs manly protection; life's labor would overwhelm, could she not depend upon maintenance and defence from man. He builds the house of which she has the care; he prepares for her the quiet sphere of action, without which she could be of no consequence in life. Here, also, the entire distinction of the sexes repeats itself; and the different position of man and woman in regard to life conditions and promotes that interchange of hearts. Woman respects, admires, loves the striving energy of man, to whom she owes every thing, and man finds his reward in her sympathy, satisfaction, and gratitude; she cheers and consoles him when business vexes him, whenever his undertakings fail; and, in the cheerful quiet of home, which he owes to her, he forgets all that presses and agitates him. And, if Heaven blesses their union with children,—whom the mother tends in the stillness of home,—for whom the father toils abroad, and for whose education he labors with skilful hand,—then the mutual office is shared, and in the fond offspring of love the fair joy of life blooms, in whose fruition the hearts of the parents meet and melt together anew.

In outward respects, the lovers thus seek also a

union of entire existence; they would share with each other one and the same being; — whilst friends take each his own place in life, each his own sphere of action, and unite as helpers only in extraordinary cases. In this respect, love is exclusive. One can have several friends, although he loves them in different degrees; but love exists only between two. For, since it wishes entire union for life, — the union of sense, soul, and interest, — a third person cannot participate in it without disturbance and alienation.

The distinction between friendship and love goes still further. Both are founded upon mutual esteem and respect, which, as we have seen, attain consciousness through the understanding. But this decision of the understanding will prevail in friendship, and be subordinate in love. Since the former is not a union for entire life, but for especial objects and tendencies, the value of a friend will be estimated intellectually, if not entirely measured by the scale of these objects, and of that which promotes them, and the sentiment of friendship will mostly express itself in clear, placid opinion and disposition. Often, friendship is founded upon a long probation of the friend, and hence must be entirely the result of rational reflection. In love, on the contrary, feeling not only prevails over understanding, but unites with force of imagination, and makes itself known in an enthusiastic, poetical frame of mind.

Lovers seek and find in each other all that they need in life in order to a complete consciousness of themselves. As every one for himself bears within him in anticipation an ideal of his life, — the completion

of all his efforts, wishes, and fears, — and, at the outset of his career, views the whole path of life to be travelled, outstretched before him; so each finds in the other the completion of all that is necessary to carry out this ideal, so that it may comprehend every thing which constitutes a perfect human existence. The youth, whose breast swells with an ardent desire of action, finds in his beloved that fulness of sentiment by which he hopes to nurture his own heart, and to be made truly conscious of himself, — the peace, the happiness, from which he may derive repose and consolation, — a susceptibility of interest in all that he prizes and strives after in life, — the harmonious echo of all that moves his own soul, — the softened and glorified reflection of the varied light and coloring of his own mind; he beholds in the heart beloved a clear, feminine reflection of his whole manly existence; he recognizes himself in his beloved, and there feels wholly his worth and his destiny. The maiden, on the other hand, finds in her beloved all the fulness of energy that is proper to develop and form the life in its richness and energy, and from which she hopes incitement and satisfaction for her heart. Her observant eye, turned towards the world, comprehends and understands not the infinite spectacle, and yet longing fills her breast: then a youth meets her, who, full of energy and spirit, hastens forward into life to begin his work, and in him her light rises, which casts its radiance upon the world, — in him she recognizes life and its significance; the ardent, active participator in its conflicts and labors becomes her ideal of the whole, and at once the guide and steadfast pillar on

which she leans; and thus she has found life itself, and her place therein.

Now, how could all this be conceived and measured by the calculating understanding? It is an inexhaustible fulness, which only the experience of an entire life can fathom, — an extensive prospect, whose broad distances can be unfolded but gradually to the observant eye. Rational esteem is a necessary condition of noble love. The youth esteems in the beloved maiden the feeling heart, which reveals itself to him upon many an occasion, — the moral, chaste deportment, — the cultivated understanding and taste, — the domestic industry; and she esteems in him a nobleness, — a heart glowing with enthusiasm, — pure morals, — his horror of vice, — his character, — his industry and acquirements; but all this is not sufficient to be the basis of love — this does not draw souls with such magic power together.

In respect to external living, also, lovers find in each other every amiable and useful quality. The youth finds in his beloved the qualities of a good housewife and mother, — the mildness and serenity, the cheerful patience under suffering, the moderation in prosperity, which insure to him peace and comfort, and keep up his equanimity. She finds in him the qualities of an active citizen and professional man, and a good husband, — the strength and perseverance in active effort, the clearness of intellect, the firmness of character, the affectionate mildness, which must secure the common prosperity.

But how is it possible to comprehend and measure all this by the calculating eye of the understanding?

All these qualities are first verified by actual life; many of them may be developed and moulded after the entrance upon life. Love is not founded upon what is seen and known; otherwise it would be the result of peculiarly cool understanding, and one could rightly love only at the end of life's career. Love here, as universally, comes in the train of faith and hope. Lovers behold in each other, with the eye of faith, what they love; hope paints to them, with every charm of coloring, the form of life towards which, hand in hand, they are going. But this faith and this hope are the children of sentiment and imagination. By sentiment, we can immediately, and almost instinctively, divine what is in a person; and imagination develops the germ discovered by sentiment, into a rich, brilliant form. Love is the poet of life, the inspired seer of the future, who veils her charming promises in splendid figures, and ravishes the heart with hopeful aspirations. Hence the wonderful fascination by which she draws soul to soul; hence the magic splendor in which she makes the world appear to lovers; hence the longing, the irresistible desire, which she kindles. And this desire of souls drawn to each other, attains overpowering sway by the inclination which is connected with love, and which opens the view to the blooming gardens of pleasure. Thus lovers find heaven and earth in each other: every charm and loveliness, — all grandeur, nobleness, beauty, — all pleasure, and all rapture, — the whole sum of existence, — is concentrated in the image of the beloved; it glitters in all the colors which the sunshine enfolds, and which imagination can mingle.

This poetical tendency does not, in the same degree,

attach to friendship. Friendship has a certain divining faith, by which it recognizes the value of a friend; but even this is a quiet feeling, and does not seize with such power the whole heart. This poetical tendency of lovers is attended also by passion, which is a stranger to friendship, or, at least, does not belong to it in such violence. In youthful, fiery dispositions, every thing may be impassioned, even the love of science, art, and poetry; hence, also, friendship; and this, in them, often takes the form of love: but, as a general rule, friendship is without passion. Love, on the contrary, is in itself, of necessity, impassioned; since it wishes possession of the beloved, or union for life; since the force with which it seizes the whole soul is attended with excitement of the senses; since the imagination, active in its service, uses sensuous colors for its imagery; and, finally, since inclination and consequent desire are in their nature sensuous. A love without the force of the senses, — without glowing desire, — without such dominion over the heart as to take all sensual powers, and the whole play of the imagination, into its service, — is surely no true love. Desire for exclusive possession brings with itself also jealousy, which is introduced into friendship only by distrustful, heroic selfishness, or by youthful violence, but is, in itself, a stranger to it. Friendship is not limited to merely two, although love is: to the former, a new connection cannot be dangerous, unless it be that it rests upon an illusion; but the latter is incompatible with any sharing of the heart. The lover is, therefore, to be pardoned, if he fears the loss of his happiness, if, at the same time, he is not yet assured of it.

But passion, in the proper sense, — that is, a sensuous excitement of feeling, which gains such preponderance as to take away the mind's freedom, — cannot be love. If it seizes upon the whole heart, and unites all its powers in violent desire for the possession of the beloved object, the will should still preserve the energy to withstand this desire, if it ought to be withstood. Love is exalted above all passion, if, like friendship, it is subject to the higher, inspired love, — if the heart does homage to the beloved object, not as to an idol, which draws us away from the true God and his worship, but loves in it but a created being, which, by its perfection, glorifies God, and in whose company his holy service is more easily and cheerfully performed. A fond pair should find, in higher, holy love, the inmost harmony of heart; while soul soars towards soul, both aspire to their eternal home. This is the true rapture of love — to meet the heart beloved in noble inspiration; this is the eternal covenant of souls — to be one in the eternal, and exalted above the world and time. In an inspired, virtuous love, the entire being is, for the first time, complete; immortal souls enter a covenant which unites sense and soul; heaven bends fondly to the earth, and the fulness of its blessing is shed upon the partners of the union.

Alas! why must such a love, which soars so high above the earth, find, in earthly connections, sundering partitions and limits? and why may it not use the heroic energy, which stands at its command, to overthrow them? Duty is sacred to love; and, with its violation, she would injure herself. A love which, through the enervating force of passion, makes the

mind incapable of renunciation, is not genuine; since this exalts and invigorates the mind. Talk not of an all-conquering necessity, which draws souls to each other, and ties a band which cannot be severed; for sensuality, only, there is necessity, but not for the spirit, which is free and all-prevailing. Two hearts are formed for each other: it is well. They would be happy in union, and thus only enjoy the whole fulness of life; but virtue is more than happiness in living, or, rather, without it there is none. "If you tear hearts from each other, they will bleed." Woe to him who wilfully tears them from each other! But, if destiny and duty order it, they must be separated, and really ought to bleed. The grief of Love is sweet; and she remains an angel of heaven, whether she weeps or smiles; the form of the beloved is alike fair, whether crowned with the myrtle or the cypress. But the inspiration which attends her, gives ardor and energy: a great heart is capable of every sacrifice, and does not succumb under the burden of duty. Up, then, noble souls! discharge the painful duty of renunciation! You renounce only earthly happiness, not love, which unites you still; you rend only the earthly band, but you remain united for eternity, and there you meet again. Thou, young man, lovest in the beloved the companion of thy inspiration: then offer this, the first, the heaviest sacrifice; and bring thy heart to it entirely and immediately; let science, art, country, and, above all, virtue, be henceforth thy-beloved, and have faith; life is to be borne with this love. Gustavus Adolphus sacrificed his youthful love to his exalted call as a king and a hero, and he became the deliverer of the Evangelical

church. Destiny will reward thee, also, for the triumph of duty, with a bright victory in thy career. And thou, young maiden, love, in thy lost beloved, his heroic greatness, his enthusiastic enterprise, his triumph, and his glory. In him, a higher life arises to thee, — the gain remains to thee; from afar, thou canst follow him in his career; in spirit, thou canst stand by his side, and share life with him; and, if he is wholly torn from thee, — if lands and seas divide thee from him, — if fame brings thee no tidings of him, — if the stream of time engulf his image, — then hold fast the faith that love is eternal, and what thou lovest in inmost soul is imperishable; what thou hast lost thou findest again; and thou hast not lost it, if thou hast gained it in its purest worth.

There is a friendship between persons of different sex, which is maintained independently of love, and partly related to friendship between persons of the same sex, and partly peculiar. As friends of the same sex, feeling mental congeniality, may be connected by inclination, so may persons of different sex be drawn together by personal agreeableness, without sexual love necessarily resulting from it. If the two are much in years, or of very different ages, or happily married, and thereby unsusceptible to every other intimate connection, then desire cannot intrude between them. Friendship between persons of different sex, if it ought not to pass into love, should be nothing but friendship, that is, as we have before stated, only a partial connection of minds, — agreement merely for certain aims of life, not for entire life, — interchange of views and feelings upon certain common concerns; and these can be,

between persons of different sex, scarcely any but those of religion and mental culture. Such a friendship will sometimes, if the woman possesses a masculine mind, resemble the friendship between men: independent enterprise, and penetration of intellect, poetic aspiration of sentiment, creative imagination, will, in both minds, meet together, and maintain an intellectual intercourse. But, for the most part, woman will maintain, in the friendship towards man, the relation of sensibility, and he that of activity; and feminine feeling will respond to free, manly thought. An intimate confidence, such as takes place between persons of the same, can but seldom ensue between those of different sex; since this difference, and other relations, draw certain limits. Those who will not admit any friendship between persons of the two sexes, and consider every relation of confidence and congeniality as the path to love, partly have a false idea of love, partly too little confidence in the human heart, by holding it incapable of any mental interchange, without an admixture of inclination and desire. For the culture of both sexes, a mingled social intercourse is necessary; and the noble manners of Europe favor, while those of the jealous, distrustful Orientals do not allow it. This intercourse will lead to certain nearer connections between congenial minds, in the uninterrupted maintenance of which, pure morality is preserved.

As, between persons of both sexes, friendship may take place without love and sexual inclination, so there is, between persons of different sex, a friendship approaching near to love, without being sexual love. The child is loved with a feeling different from that of

proper friendship, whilst the use of language does not designate it with the name of friendship. Indeed, we observe and estimate the value of a child, not with the understanding, but with divining, poetical feeling, just as the lover recognizes the perfection of his beloved. In a child, as in a bud, the worth of the man lies folded up: our imagination develops this bud into blossom and fruit, and sketches for us an image, to which we give ourselves up with entire complacency of soul; and this is love, although very far removed from sexual love. Thus the friendship of youths and maidens often passes into love, whilst their souls are bound together more by that poetical feeling, than by the clear verdict of the understanding; and, since the fire of youth flows into this feeling, and imagination mingles with it its brilliant colors, such a friendship, like love, will be attended by passion.

He who, walking through a richly-blooming garden of roses, has stopped to contemplate here the splendid centifolia, there the dark velvet, there the lovely white rose, and would undertake to portray their beauty of form and splendor of color, — would he succeed by words? Would not his descriptions remain tame and cold, and, at best, only awaken remembrances of what the eye itself has seen in full, fresh life? Fairer, lordlier, and more various, than the blooming of roses, are the flowers of friendship and love. Who can represent in words the glowing enamel of color, the delicate fragrance which lies within them? Who can comprehend — to say nothing of describing — the manifold forms which creative Love ever brings forth anew, the infinite blendings, the play of colors melting into each

other, and the features peculiar to every one of her creations? But I attempt only feeble hints, desultory sketches; and I am content, if I have only touched some chords in feeling hearts, cast a ray of clearer consciousness upon a happy reality, or awakened the slumbering images of sweet remembrance, or of yearning aspiration.



LECTURE XVI.

MARRIAGE.

Love between persons of different sex, of which we treated in the last lecture, has for its object marriage. It is the complete inclination of man and woman for each other, both in soul and sense, — the most intimate congeniality of hearts; with impassioned violence it demands possession, complete union, for life; and this union, if it be recognized and consecrated by church and state, we denominate marriage. A love which manifests itself not in the desire for matrimonial union is not love, and either mere friendship or else something unworthy a pure, noble heart. Among men there are adventurers, who carry on love as a sport of fancy, and, quickly attracted by female beauty, know how to attract as quickly; but who, as soon as the transient caprice is satisfied, turn away again, faithless. Such persons know as little of life and its true purport as of love, which for them exists only in the senses and imagination, not in the heart. Those maidens are to be pitied, whose hearts are captivated and deceived by this faithless sport. Even if the intimacy goes no further than confiding communion of heart, the delicate enamel on the flower of virginity is brushed away, ease of mind is lost, and innocence at least endangered.

The first and only love is the fairest, since it exists most purely in the poetical sentiment that constitutes the essence of love. Second love gives more opportunity for prudential comparisons. If the inclination of the youth to the maiden is genuine love, and it demands matrimonial union, but circumstances and relatives, with imperative necessity, prevent this, then it is the sacred duty of lovers to break off such a connection before it becomes too intimate, and to insure each other mutual freedom and innocence of heart.

Marriage, as the actual union of those who long for union, is either the happy consummation or the mournful frustration of the fair hopes of love. From the enchanting distance, which in delicious haze lies extended before the enraptured eyes of lovers, a land, fair, broad, lovely, fertile in blossoms and flowers, presents itself to the view: if the married actually realize all that they hoped of each other, not only in one another's heart, but also in character and conduct, — if in unison the common work of life, especially the education of children, has succeeded satisfactorily, — if the various unpleasant incidents of life, disappointments, and anxieties, have not marred their harmony, — if, in one another's disposition, disagreeable peculiarities, angry, impatient temper, rudeness, harshness, bitterness, have not been developed, — in short, if congeniality of heart is preserved in an harmonious, united life, — then marriage is happy. Alas! but too often it is not so; but too often it has disappointed the ardor of hope and anticipation. Either love is disturbed by sensual desire, and the heart bribed by outward charms and dazzling qualities of intellect, — and hence congeniality of mind

has been only dreamed of, or, if it has actually taken place, it may, by the faults in either party, which destroy the harmonious communion of life, be shaken and dissolved. } There are, in fact, amiable persons, who are unfitted for happy marriage, who cannot put up with another's peculiarities, who can sacrifice nothing of their own, nor preserve peace. Such faults do not appear in lovers, — partly because the other party's eye lacks sharpness of observation, and takes a more favorable view than the reality, — partly because each, although unconsciously, makes a better appearance than ordinarily, and, to win the beloved object, shows the best side of the character. But, if the desired possession is attained, then man resigns himself wholly to his disposition, no more checks his passions and emotions, and appears without disguise, in all his faults and defects.

But, while love thus sinks by marriage from its dreamy enchantment into the sphere of experience and reality, even in the most fortunate cases, when all hopes are met, it ceases to be love, and becomes serene, quiet friendship. Not only does passion cease in the quiet possession of its object, but even that poetic frame cannot and need not continue, since discreet experience takes its place, and faith and hope, which were in its train, are transformed into a secure, clear conviction. Moreover, the work of life, which must now be carried on, domestic life, and especially the education of children, make demands upon the couple, and divide the love of their hearts. The mother loves in her husband less her lover than the father of her children. Indeed, the friendship of the

married pair, since they live in the closest union, must be always more intimate and warm than common friendship; even the depth of a beautiful affection will not be exhausted by experience, and hence room will always be left for the play of sentiment and imagination; — but the tone of feeling between husband and wife will and should differ from that between lovers; the community of living, which demands calm discretion, requires this. Therefore the relation of affectionate married people is no less beautiful than that of lovers — nay, perhaps more beautiful, because hearts are intertwined in more intimate and truthful union; it is also no less happy, since it sweetens and beautifies all which life develops, and the happiness of having children, and seeing each other blended in them, transcends every happiness of life. But we must always avoid the delusion that love, as it was before marriage, will always last. This delusion disturbs the happiness of many a marriage, whilst the exaggerated demands, which one makes upon the other, bring with them disappointment and chagrin.

Marriage, as a complete union for life, can be but single, or monogamy, as it exists among us through ancient usage and Christianity. Between one man and several women, no such union can take place; neither possesses the whole man, and he resigns himself wholly to neither woman; none shares with him equally the government of the household and the work of education; the woman is more the slave than wife of the man; and, instead of confidence and devotion, distrust and jealousy ensue. Polygamy is a recent corruption, and has come in the train of despot-

ism and pride; from the beginning, as Christ says, and the earliest Scripture teaches, it has not existed.

Marriage is true marriage only when it is for life, and indissoluble: since it is complete union for life, it excludes not only every other at present, but also in prospect. It stands under the sacred protection of fidelity — that virtue which gives permanence to moral life, and stamps upon every moral union the seal of inviolability.

Marriage is genuine only when single and permanent; it is then also the first and most important institution of human existence, — the foundation of all civilization and culture, — the root of church and state. It is the most intimate covenant of heart formed among mankind; and thousands are first made aware by it that they have within them a nobler impulse, and a nobler want, than to labor, to acquire, and to enjoy. It is the union of manly strength with feminine gentleness, — the tempering of masculine rudeness by female delicacy, — and, for innumerable persons, the only relation in which they feel the true sentiments of humanity: it gives scope for every human virtue, since each of these is developed from the love and confidence which here predominate; it unites all which ennobles and beautifies life — sympathy, kindness of will and deed, gratitude, devotion, and every delicate, intimate feeling. But especially, as the only asylum for true education, it is the first and last sanctuary of human culture. As husband and wife, through each other, become conscious of complete humanity, — of every humane feeling and every humane virtue, — so children, at their first awakening

in the fond covenant of love between parents, both of whom are tenderly concerned for the same object, find an image of complete humanity, leagued in free love; the spirit of love, which prevails between them, acts with creative power upon the young mind, and awakens every germ of goodness within it. This invisible, uncalculated, and incalculable influence of parental life, acts more upon the child than all the efforts of education by means of instruction, precept, and exhortation. In genuine family life, where true harmony, and its unfailing attendants, — all good and virtuous sentiments, — prevail, the child cannot be perverted and corrupted; his existence is developed within steadfast, protective limits, and under the influence of every vital incentive; every thing evil and rude, which he may observe out of the house, serves only to develop his sense of right and wrong; every false impression which life makes upon him, glides away from his firmly-sheltered breast; the heart, nourished and filled by all goodness, can give way to none of the allurements of evil. Good parents educate good children; but parents will be educated at the same time by children. In them they will first become conscious of entire humanity; they live over again, in exalted consciousness, the life of childlike innocence; they feel, whilst they would withstand rising faults in their children, the necessity of eradicating the same faults in themselves; they discover in themselves many chasms which they must fill up, if they would satisfy the mental wants which develop themselves in their children. Many a father has been first led, by the education of his children, from frivolity, in reference to religion, to severe

self-examination, and a more earnest and profound state of feeling; and the pious wife succeeds first, as a mother, in awakening in her husband the higher consciousness, or, at least, reverence for devotion and its sacred usages.

If we compare old bachelors and old maids with husbands and wives, it will be found that, with many honorable exceptions, as a general rule, the former may be justly accused of a lack of genuine human culture. The married man will be more sympathizing, warm, benevolent, public-spirited, and open to every good impression; the bachelor will be more absorbed in himself, more harsh and selfish. The unmarried woman is generally accused of a certain sourness of feeling, and an inclination to gossip and scandal. It requires a very good nature, or much culture, to keep free from these failings, without the warming, expanding, mitigating influence of marriage. Love for children, — joy in their lovely, playful, innocent nature, — seldom exist among the unmarried; and it is precisely in this that an affectionate, humane heart is most purely shown.

To enter into marriage is a demand which the love of perfection and the wisdom of life makes on every one, since in this state only can human nature be fully developed and perfected. The prejudice which the gloomy, monkish view of life has cherished against marriage, is among us no longer worth contradiction; the light of the gospel has scared it into the dark walls of the cloister, and these, whose downfall no human art can prevent, will soon bury it beneath their ruins.

But to enter into marriage is not a positive duty; duty, rather, may often forbid it. Honored be the youth who sacrifices his happiness to a mother or sister, or, rather, places it in fulfilling the duty of a guardian son and brother! Honored be the maiden who devotes to the sick-bed of her mother the fairest days of her life! and consolation will not fail her, if she remains single for life, and, for her whose bloom is over, the joy of life blooms no more. Honored be the maiden who only with her heart will give her hand, and wife, as long as he does not address himself to her whom she can love, remains single! None has touched her fair heart, because none knew it; she would be the best wife, since she has the worthiest idea of marriage. Alas! thus the noblest often remain misapprehended, and the fairest destiny unfulfilled. Far from her, thus lonely and misapprehended, he, perchance, who would be worthy of her, bewails a life of solitude: had they been able to seek each other upon wings of aspiration, the brightest covenant of hearts would have been formed; but earth, with its bands, kept them, and still keeps them, from each other. The most important choice of life is often made in so limited a circle, that scarcely any choice is possible. Rigid family relations, timid manners, a monotonous society, prevent congenial spirits from meeting, and prejudices and wilfulness often tear them asunder when they have met.

Is it now asked what precepts morality has to give upon this so important choice, on which the happiness of life depends? But the previous question is, Have all a free choice, and should such a one be given? An ancient and venerable custom allowed the parents a

powerful influence over the marriage of their children; and it is a question very difficult to be solved, how far this influence, and the obedience of children to parents in this respect, should go. The moralist must particularly refer parents and children to their conscience, and especially enjoin it upon the latter, that they should sacrifice something to their parents, to whom they owe every thing, rather than insist upon their strict rights, and that a marriage without the blessing of parents can never insure pure, undisturbed happiness. But, in general, morality, which acknowledges that marriage as alone true which springs from inclination and love, must demand freedom of choice. Where marriage exists in its first rudeness, and woman is nothing but a piece of merchandise, which is sold as in the East, it is the parents who close the business, and the bridegroom sees the bride for the first time on the wedding-day. But, the more marriage gains in moral significance, the more the freedom of the children is decisive against the will of parents; since more perfect marriage brings with it a more perfect education, and this a more free treatment of children. The history of domestic manners, therefore, already favors the freedom of choice in children. But, to come to the point directly, parents cannot possibly dictate to their children as to whom they should love, since the heart does not allow dictation, in fact, scarcely even any sort of guidance or inducement. To the loveliness of a partner to be chosen in marriage, the parental decision, whether command or prohibition, has no reference, but to property, rank, civil relations, or, at best, to moral character. But, for him who has a true idea of mar-

riage, the chief motive of choice does not lie in external excellences, nor even in moral goodness of character; for this is no connection in trade or business, nor even a connection in which moral worth turns the scale, as is the case in friendship; love, alone, has the decisive voice. On the contrary, such considerations might discountenance a union to which inclination and love tended. Marriage can exist only under certain conditions; and where these fail, it should not be contracted. If the means of establishing a household are not at hand, it would be folly to be married; if the person to be chosen, with all amiableness, insures no security in character, the tempting inclination must be resisted. Hence it would be the most just conclusion to allow parents a negative voice, whilst it is yet made their duty to exercise it with the greatest forbearance and mildness. It would be the least severe in them to try, by watching over the hearts of their children, to suppress dangerous inclinations in their origin, and, by keeping their confidence from youth upward, to exercise a genuine parental influence over them. On the contrary, only such parents as regard marriage as a merely external, heartless relation, can assume to choose for their children, and to compel them to enter upon a connection which is opposed to their hearts. Is such a care in parents for their children to be called love? Is not selfishness, rather, its source, which induces them to wish to see their children happy in their way? They love wealth, and wish their children to love it also, and place their happiness in it; they set a value upon rank and birth, and wish their children to think as they do. Alas! that parents should be so

often more hardhearted to their children than towards strangers! that they often prevent a connection which the whole community approves, and lead to the altar a sacrifice which all noble souls lament! Can they who bear a human heart in their bosom, be so cruel towards the hearts of beloved children? Can they so readily doom to misery those whom they wish to see happy? The child may, from obedience to parents, renounce an inclination displeasing to them; it is, perhaps, a severe sacrifice, but it may be made. On the contrary, to give oneself in marriage to a person who is not loved, but, perhaps, disliked, is doing violence to the inmost feeling, and contrary to noble morality; but to force from any one that which is against the heart, and against morality, is an immorality, and no child is bound to go thus far in obedience. If the parents do not approve the choice, let the child remain single, or wait until the heart has got over its wound, and prevailed upon itself to make a new choice. Parents should not, even so much as by advice and exhortation, induce their children to a choice; for who knows whether the heart, for a time yet undecided, may not soon find the object of its cordial preference? Alas! what a pang, to know that a false choice has been made! that, with another, the highest felicity might have been found in a relation which has been made so indifferent, cold, and even unhappy! Such mistakes can never be made up; eternal barriers shut out the happiness that is lost, and only painful renunciation can gradually heal and soothe the sad heart.

But, if the choice is free in the conclusion of marriage, the question occurs, Upon what grounds should

the choosers decide? If, as is our opinion, true marriage should be concluded only through inclination and love, the first precept of the moralist is therefore negative, not to choose without inclination and love. Those are ill-starred matches, which are made without inclination and love, no matter from whatever other motive. Such a marriage brings with itself an offence against the other party, and an offence against self. The offence against the other consists in deceit, by making pretence of inclination and love, or by perverting the other into a mere instrument of ambition and avarice. If a man marries a woman for her money, it is then certain that another, who might be equally rich, would be just as readily chosen; hence her person is considered as nought, or merely as a key to her coffers; and is not this an outrage against personal dignity? Is it not the most shameful falsehood, to enter into a personal relation, while the person is taken only as a burdensome appendage to the bargain? The offence against self, in marrying without inclination and love, consists in selling oneself, and happiness, and the most sacred and tender rights upon the person, to another, for a price other than that of mutual love, — for a price which comes into no comparison with it, and thereby throwing away and debasing oneself. Shame on the man who sets at nought that which first makes him a man! that wherein only he can find happiness and perfection — dominion over the heart of a loving wife! and who, for a paltry price, will give himself to a woman whom he does not love! Twofold shame on him who does the same from imbecility and convenience, and, instead of gaining a position for him-

self in society, property, office, and reputation, makes use of a wife as a support, in order to lead a lazy, comfortable life! If he enters into such a connection from mere compliance, he at least deserves censure for not knowing how to maintain his manly independence. With women, the base motives of avarice and love of distinction do not ordinarily prevail, although cases occur, where maidens, from free choice, give their hand to wealthy and distinguished men, whom they do not love. Less objectionable is the motive which induces many a needy female to seek a guardian in her husband: others are induced by the prejudice, that a woman need only be married, in order to pass well in society, or by the desire, in itself noble, to fulfil, as a mother, the destiny of the sex. All these act deceitfully upon the one hand, and violate, upon the other, the true delicacy of feminine feeling. A woman should never commit herself to a man, unless it be from love; if she does it from any other, even the noblest motive, she sells the jewel of her virgin honor for a false price, and violates her modesty. Every union between man and woman, which is not made with undivided devotion and intimate congeniality, lacks the moral consecration, which the blessing of the priest cannot make up. Honor to the maiden, who, in her delicacy of soul, cannot be prevailed upon to give herself to the arms of a man whom she does not love! Misapprehended, perhaps eyed askance by many a matron, ridiculed by coarse men, she remains single; no one appreciates in her the pearl of feminine delicacy; and the sacrifice which she brings to virtue is so much the greater, since no one is aware of it, save the All-seeing, who looks into the

heart. Our manners are severe against certain violations of feminine modesty, but yet very lacking in delicacy in respect to this forced or voluntary prostitution of self without love, under the legal form of marriage.

To enter into, or to exact, a matrimonial connection against the inclination of the heart, is an offence against the sacred laws of human nature. The Creator has ordained marriage for the propagation of the human race. Although this is not the single and highest aim of marriage, yet few enter into it without wishing and hoping for children; and it becomes rational persons to regard this aim, and the ordinance of nature, with religious respect. Creative Nature works only by the vivid instinct which she has implanted in mankind; and where this does not find place, — where the union of husband and wife is made with aversion, or from cold calculation, — nature, as well as modesty, is outraged; there the creative power cannot act in its fulness; there the germs of new life do not spring from the inmost, moving fountain of life.

In fine, how can children, the offspring of such a union, receive that true education whose vital spirit can come only from the mutual love of parents? The mother will perhaps devote the fulness of that love, which she must deny her husband, to her child, and in this seek the only joy of her life. But she will not, with love's keen vision, spy out in his countenance his father's features, and perhaps feels a secret shudder when she discovers them there. The child does not grow up under the benignant influence of parental sympathy — his education cannot be the work of affectionate congeniality; unconscious of it at first, he will not

fail to feel and recognize the unhappy discord which separates those who should love each other, and he must make the mournful choice of siding with one of the parties.

If we now demand that the matrimonial choice should be made from inclination and love, it then appears as if all the precepts and counsels of the moralist would be superfluous, since inclination and love are involuntary, and passion itself comes into play with it; consequently, calm discretion is usually wanting in the choice. But we may, at least in general, decide what belongs to a happy choice, and base upon this the warning, in certain cases, against making an unhappy choice, and cherishing a rising passion. Our prescriptions refer partly to the external relations, partly to the personal qualities of the partner to be chosen.

In respect to external relations, the prohibitions of the church and state, in reference to degree of affinity, are first to be considered and respected. These prohibitions have, indeed, a positive validity; but they may almost all be justified by the fact, apparent upon sufficient investigation, that the union of near kindred is departing from the natural and moral conditions which are requisite to a complete marriage. There is lack of that charm of mind and person, which springs from difference of natures, and which tends to form a strong, living union. It is only bodies that are dissimilar, yet having an elective affinity, which attract each other and form new combinations. A similar law prevails in organic nature. Certainly, plants degenerate if they are constantly cultivated upon the same soil; races of animals can be kept in their excellence only by constant

crossing. Experience teaches that families who intermarry among themselves only, gradually degenerate, and that corporeal, as well as mental, stupidity is the consequence of such uniformity. For many prohibited grades of affinity there is dispensation; but, if no powerful inclination urges, it is more advisable to defer to the wisdom of the lawgiver, and to select a partner in marriage who, by a fresh individuality, can insure fresh incentive and vital nurture.

Secondly, the age of a partner in marriage is to be considered. Since the marriage union rests upon equality and congeniality, one should avoid the too great difference of age, with which intimate congeniality of mind can hardly exist. But equality of age between both sexes does not depend upon equal number of years. Woman is developed, and grows old, sooner than man, and a maiden of eighteen stands upon a par with a young man of twenty-four years. If the wife is of the same age with the husband, or greater, she may easily, by her greater maturity and experience, attain a predominance over him hurtful to the relation; which would especially be the case if she had been married already before, whilst the husband now entered into matrimony for the first time. In this case, moreover, there is lack of the similarity of sentiment and of views of life which is necessary to a happy marriage; the widow can hardly be as youthful in her feelings as the young man. The prejudicial consequences of diversity of age commonly present themselves late in life, when the wife has grown old and the husband enjoys the fresh energy of manhood. The noble husband will miss the lacking charms of person in his withered wife

less than the youthful, fresh tone of feeling; he will find her cold and devoid of sympathy where he feels a vivid interest; the taste for enjoyments will be different, and now this, now that variance will ensue. Still the general rule may admit of exceptions on account of the temperament and culture of one or the other party, since in such matters nothing can be laid down with strict universality.

Thirdly, the rank is to be considered, first in reference to the parties themselves, and secondly in reference to their relatives. Difference of rank brings also a difference of feeling, taste, and culture, with itself, which, indeed, in many cases, may be removed by the personal qualities of individuals, but, perhaps, in one respect or another, still exists, and has a hurtful influence. If a misalliance, as it is called, imposes upon one party deprivations and sacrifices, much love is requisite to exercise renunciation through life with cheerfulness. If the first passion has grown cold, then the former habitual pretensions in life come forward and disturb content. Especially dangerous are those disturbances and hinderances which the husband, by a misalliance, incurs in his sphere of action. A man is not to be blamed if he finds in this sphere much of his happiness; if he sees himself put back on account of a matrimonial connection, which conflicts with prevalent usage, his love for his wife must be very strong, in order to overcome this chagrin, and she must feel much confidence in her husband's heart, in order not to be depressed by it. In general, it will be more fitting that the husband should elevate the wife to himself than the reverse, since his independence and predominance

need in no way be endangered, neither on account of his own, nor yet on account of his wife's happiness. However, love can smooth down all inequalities, and overcome all difficulties. But another source of influence, adverse to the peace and sympathy of the parties in what is termed a misalliance, lies in the family relatives. Even if the relatives have not declared themselves hostile to such a connection, yet one of the two may feel strange and ill at ease in the family of the other; and the daughter of a plain citizen will perhaps believe herself slighted by the relatives of her titled husband, and her relatives may deem themselves slighted by him: so there will be no lack of abundant occasion for chagrin and distrust. Marriage is the most important relation in life, but yet not the only one, and it is not well that other, also weighty and indispensable, relations should be impaired by it.

Fourthly, a warning must be given against selecting a wife from a foreign nation, or from a country opposite in manners and climate. The peculiarities of nation and country imply differences, which may be concealed by the passion of love, but not easily eradicated, and may subsequently, in the calm tenor of married life, have an annoying and alienating tendency. The wife, transplanted to a strange nation, — isolated, without the society of her relatives, and the friends of her youth, — may become the prey of despondency and homesickness, and, by her humors, disturb the domestic peace. The husband conforms more easily to the new relations of life, and, by his business, becomes naturalized sooner than the wife, who, abiding by youthful impressions, and confined to a more or less narrow domestic life, is

with difficulty reconciled to a new and strange situation.

Finally, it is not advisable to choose a wife or husband from a strange church. He who is not merely somewhat tolerant, but even indifferent, upon this point, will not trouble himself as to the religion of his wife; but it is a question, whether such a one is in a condition to form an intimate covenant of the heart; he lives, without that highest consciousness which religion gives, in a culpable levity; the most sacred feelings are to him indifferent: how can he now truly love in such a state of mind? He who does not live in this indifference, may, perhaps, in the first flame of passion, overlook the variance at which he stands with the object of his love, because he does not calculate consequences that extend to the whole life; but, subsequently, these consequences come upon him with injurious force, and gradually chill his heart. Even the fact that he is deprived of the highest bliss of love, the common outpouring of hearts in the loftiest sentiment of devotion, must exercise a prejudicial influence upon love. Finally, the education of children necessarily suffers by difference of faith in parents: whether they are divided, according to difference of sex, between the different churches, or are all attached to one church, they will always lack the beneficial influence which the congeniality of parents upon this weighty subject might have upon their mind. The mother must not be the first teacher of religion to her sons; the father must resign the mind of his daughters to clergy to whom he cannot give his confidence, and who expose them to a superstition which he dreads. How can affectionate

parents bear such a thing? Even this general remark may admit of its exceptions, but merits, certainly, the most earnest consideration.

As to personal qualities, the question is, Of what sort should they be, in order to awaken true inclination and love? The inclination has for its object in part physical, in part mental qualities. The latter are least subject to vicissitude, defy the ravages of disease, and outlast the years of youth; their charms, also, remain ever fresh, and are not dulled by custom: he, therefore, who feels himself attracted by such qualities, has made a better choice than he whom excellences of person attract to his beloved. These are partly physical charm, partly personal beauty, the latter of which consists in a certain completeness and proportion, and gratifies the intellectual sense of beauty, whilst the former is only something individual, and appeals merely to the senses. Beauty, therefore, has a higher worth, and, since it includes proportion, is also less perishable than that charm which is only the transient phantom of youth. To be a critic in physical charm and beauty, implies some departure from innocence; and a youth whose eye is sharpened for it, has certainly purchased this advantage at a dear rate; but the taste for genuine personal beauty can, without prejudice to innocence, be cultivated and ennobled by the plastic arts. The personal beauty of husband and wife is a portion not to be despised, especially since it is wont to descend to the children; for who would not rejoice in the angelic beauty of his own and others' children? But it is more important for a rational man to have regard to the health of one to be selected as a wife, without which,

moreover, no true beauty of person is conceivable. To unite his existence to a sickly being is folly; a person thus sacrifices his own comfort, and assumes a burden which is hardly borne with untroubled cheerfulness; for no mutual happiness can exist, and life is made irksome to each other. This consideration is enforced by the just apprehension that a sickly father and mother may communicate their nature to their children; and it is a culpable levity, it is a sin against human nature, to become knowingly the author of an unhappy, imperfect existence. Upon the choosing party, the duty, in this point, cannot be urged with the same strictness as upon the party chosen; a sickly woman should impose upon herself renunciation, and make the due sacrifice to the necessity of nature.

The mental properties, which deserve true love, can hardly be described; since it is the office of sentiment to recognize them. Where true congeniality of heart takes place, there true love will be; but that depends upon mutual peculiarities, whose mingling is of infinite variety. In general, it may be said, that perfection or spiritual beauty is the object of true love; but judgment as to the beautiful, especially the spiritual, differs; and no universal rule can be laid down. The moralist has only, in this respect, to insist that persons should never be led to the choice merely by the senses — a choice which cannot possibly lead to true happiness. If a man is so wholly lost in sensuality, as to recognize no craving of the heart, for him every precept of wisdom is in vain; such a one will be unable to enter into true marriage. If any one is even momentarily bribed and intoxicated by sensual charms, he will

awake to a sad disappointment, unless accident watches over his indiscretion, and has led to him a heart whose beauty subsequently unveils itself to him. The safest rule which can be given is, to beware of being attracted and led away by sensual charms; let no person be selected for whom respect is not felt. If respect may be decidedly entertained by the approbation of the understanding, — if certain virtues of the heart, certain excellences of culture, can be clearly recognized, — let especial heed be paid to the virtues of sociableness; patience, gentleness, modesty, and to the virtues necessary to domestic life — contentment, simplicity, industry, frugality, love of order; and let care be taken to avoid the faults of unsociality, impatience, violence, arrogance, and all that can be dangerous to domestic quiet, — the tendency to luxury and dissipation, vanity and passion for dress, love of extravagance.

But, necessary as respect is to love, as little can it supply its place, and as much should one be deterred from being guided by it alone. There is a respect connected with enthusiastic admiration, which attracts noble women to great men; and to choose such a man for a husband, is less dangerous than when young men do homage, in impassioned admiration, to elderly women, who are distinguished by talent and culture, and, confounding this feeling with love, enter into a connection, by which they sacrifice their manly independence. The man should always be man, and, in marriage, maintain a certain superiority; in the contrary case, only an unhappy misalliance can arise, in which even the wife is not happy.

There are certain noble motives for the choice of a

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husband or a wife, which, in themselves, deserve all respect, but yet must be rejected as wholly inadmissible, since they can lead only to an unhappy choice; I mean the motives of gratitude and charity. If one selects for a wife the daughter of his benefactor and teacher, or a female friend, who has nursed him in a dangerous sickness, — if another selects the helpless widow of a friend, or an otherwise estimable widow, who finds herself in pressing want, and is not in a situation to educate her children, — if these selections are made without love, from mere magnanimity, — all will surely praise such a disposition; but duty to self forbids making such a sacrifice. We can, and ought, in certain cases, to sacrifice goods and blood for others; we may even sacrifice the comfort of life, and what promotes our culture, by imposing upon ourselves certain renunciations; but here is more than renunciation; here we pledge ourselves to a performance, whose fulfilment is out of our power. On this account, also, regard for the person to whom we would show our gratitude and magnanimity, must deter from such a sacrifice: our intention is to make her happy, and the opposite is the result; the connection formed, of which love should be the soul, cannot prosper without this, and makes both parties unhappy.

The selection of a husband or wife is the most important act of life, and the entrance into an indissoluble connection a momentous step, upon which all the happiness of existence, all peace and satisfaction, depend. Who would be so frivolous as not to feel this, at least upon the approach to the altar, before which the sacred band is to be forever joined? Who will not sympathize

with a couple who make this approach, — especially with the bride, who, moved by deep intimations, by fear and hope, even while she follows the young man of her heart, lisps with trembling lips the decisive response? She has left father and mother, and, in a stranger's hands, whom she does not yet wholly know, whose being is still half veiled to her, goes to an uncertain future. If ever, faithlessly, he drops her hand, or is changed at once into an enemy, alas! then she must stand alone, — more than alone, — a prey to superior force. So many trials and adversities threaten the young pair, they should unitedly struggle through the waves of life; but if they are not truly united, if hearts are not firmly attached, and if, drawn together merely by a transient inclination, they afterwards repulse each other, if pain and chagrin, distrust and enmity, press between them; whence shall they derive the power to bear the burdens of life, on whom shall they lean, if they are not one another's support? No one is prudent enough in this choice; and even he who would choose entirely by prudence alone would therefore choose falsely, since his heart would thus have no voice in the election. Matches are made in heaven, says the proverb, and of happy ones it is true. It is a man's good guardian genius that leads him to the woman of his heart; and he beholds clearly, with the keen vision of a seer, what the heart but darkly and dreamingly feels, what the understanding recognizes by vague tokens, as if groping in uncertainty. Two angels join hands when a genuine, happy marriage is concluded; they embrace each other, and soar together to the altar of eternal love and fidelity, where, in presence of God, they vow

an everlasting covenant. And they remain united under the vicissitudes of life, and are still the same, when the blooming forms which stood by the altar are no longer recognized in the bent old man and his tottering companion; eternally young, love blooms in the heart, and from every outward, fading blossom of youth, the vital energy, purified, retires into the heart, to warm it evermore with love. Heavenly blessedness of a happy marriage! wherefore is it denied to so many? Fair garden, beaming with the warm sun of love, secure from the storms of life! wherefore are so many denied entrance, and left to wander in the rough, cold waste? Is there no reparation for this lost happiness? How may the craving heart be requited which vainly seeks a congenial one, and pours out the fulness of love, of friendship, with boundless yearning into infinity?

Whether it be more painful to perceive and not to obtain the happiness of marriage, or to enjoy and to lose it, would be a mournful question. It is a bitter destiny to mourn over the grave of a beloved husband, a beloved wife. As the existence of the married intertwines, by a thousand tender threads, with each other, the fatal grief convulses every fibre, and penetrates the inmost marrow, of him who is robbed of half his life. His whole being is shattered, all aims are thwarted, the brightness of life is quenched. He might throw aside all labor, give up every enterprise; for what is the use of success and profit if she does not share the pleasure and enjoyment? The house, which she beautified and enlivened, is desolate, as a garden over which the breath of the frost hath swept, and blighted every flower. But active life draws man, even against his will, with hands

of duty to itself; the calls of business he must obey, and he silences his grief by the earnestness of toil. On the contrary, the widow stands alone, and at leisure, in the desolate home; the domestic occupations, which were prized only for his sake, rest, or cannot fill her mind; and yet she is happy if cares, especially the sweet cares for her children, claim her activity without overwhelming her.

So great is the sanative power of nature, that even such wounds dry up and are scarred over. The heart's longing remains, but as a still, sad, sweetly-sorrowful feeling; the remembrance of the lost one is ineffaceably engraven on the heart, and the fair image is beautified and transfigured by fond memory. It is a beautiful trait of the human heart, that it forgets every thing adverse and imperfect, and holds fast only to the good and beautiful. All the shading blemishes, which the varying play of existence has cast upon the wife's or the husband's image, are covered in memory with the radiance of transfiguration; youthful love is reinvigorated with all the force of imagination, and the faded morning-star of love shines in immutable light, as the evening-star in the heaven of aspiration. In a deep soul, the healing will be long in taking place, and longer in the wife than the husband; since her existence, which is wholly chained to her husband's, will be more powerfully shaken by such a loss, and the heart more painfully wounded. But only morbid dispositions will be forever sick with sorrow, and abandon all active life, because the fairest part of it has been torn away. Healthy, vital force will not only make the mind susceptible of the consolation of faith, and of true resigna-

tion, but at last will awaken again to life the spirit of cheerfulness.

Against second marriage a prejudice prevailed in antiquity, and it was held especially meritorious for the widowed to pass their days in quiet renunciation and seclusion. The ground of this lay in a false idea of continence, which was acknowledged as something in itself perfect and holy ; but we prize it only as a means of purity of soul, which can well exist with a moderate, elevated enjoyment of the pleasures of life. We generally consider marriage, more than the ancients, as a spiritual union ; and if a noble heart is in a situation to attach itself a second time to another, second marriage is not to be blamed. The question now occurs, Can a noble man, can a noble woman, without being untrue to the heart, and to the memory of the departed, love for a second time ?

All earthly bonds of inclination and love are sun-dered by death, and there attaches to the survivor only the bond of a spiritual affection for the dead ; he is glorified into an angel, and hovers before the yearning soul in blissful perfection. He needs no more the surviving companion, and imposes no other duty than that of a faithful, honorable remembrance. Duties exist only where there is reciprocity ; but between the dead and the living there is no other communion than that of remembrance, to which the survivor will be as faithful as himself, since it is a part of their existence, which, however, can be nothing but an abstract and complete part of it, without increase and development. On the contrary, life goes on in continual development, and bears the living onward with itself ; it makes fresh claims

upon him, and awakens necessities which remembrance of the dead cannot satisfy. This will draw his mind upward, and thereby purify and sanctify it; but for the work of life it can grant him nothing, and the sainted one cannot share the feelings of the survivor's heart. But if the survivor feels the necessity of a new connection, then he has also the susceptibility for it, and consequently the right and duty to seek and form such a one. He is pointed by destiny to life; he should lead it; consequently, comply with all its conditions, and use all the means which are necessary to its happy and prosperous consummation. If an object presents itself to him, which meets his heart, and promises to afford that which is necessary to the fulfilment of life, then he will love for a second time.

But will memory of the lost one leave room for a second love? Not in a melancholy, enthusiastical heart, if the first love has entirely filled it; but we cannot wish that such a disposition should be universal. If memory of the lost one is such as we imagine,—if all earthly longing has departed from it,—then the warm feeling of a new love can well find place in the heart. But will not this erase the remembrance of the former partner? Then it was not such as ought to have place in a noble heart. True love cannot cause ingratitude; but it is ingratitude to forget a beloved one, who is taken away. Jealousy extends even to the dead; and there are examples of a second wife, disturbed by her husband's remembrance of the first, making it expressly or tacitly a law for him to suppress and erase it from his heart. To comply with this demand is surely a culpable disloyalty; but such a man has hardly made a

worthy choice. The second wife should regret the former one, and help her husband honor her, — should wish to be nothing but her substituted successor, which will certainly be the case, if she was her friend in life; but, if she has not known and loved her, then let her learn to honor and love her, by sympathy with the feelings of her husband.

Were the first love, in the full and entire sense of the word, love, and did it seize the mind with all the force of enthusiasm, then second love will cherish more the placid feeling of friendship. This will especially be the case, when marriage is entered upon a second time in riper years. On the contrary, the second may be the first real love, if, in the first, that full congeniality of heart did not take place; and the second choice, still made in the years of youth, is the happier. In the first case, the memory of the first wife will remain unobscured; in the second, the brilliant form of present, superior happiness, may outshine it; but, whatever in the former was worthy of respect and love, a noble heart will always loyally cherish. The sainted spirit will not envy the survivor his happiness, since she can lose nothing by it; for her, all disappointments are over, and she rejoices in the union of hearts that were formed for each other.

The more the heart belongs to the first husband or wife, the cooler it remains in the choice of the second; and the more this is the work of the quietly-calculating understanding, the less claims should be made upon the second marriage, and care should be taken not to apply to it the rule of the first. The object of a second choice is taken as it is, not as it is wished; and the

self-willed desire should not be entertained, of finding in the latter all that the former choice afforded. In the new union, if full satisfaction of heart is not found, at least let gratitude be felt, as well as acknowledgment for what actually is realized. To be sure, the unfair comparison which is instituted between the first and second husband or wife, may be dangerous to the happiness of the second marriage; on the contrary, also, many an experience, gained by the first marriage, may make persons milder and more cautious, and teach them to shun the faults which were before incurred.

Besides the needs of the heart, reference to the household and the education of children may make a second marriage necessary, and may excuse the hastening of this step, which always has a just prejudice against it, and excites the suspicion of levity. In this case, duty requires the most careful probation of the new wife in reference to the qualities which are requisite to the management of those affairs. If the widower gives his children an unloving step-mother, it is a great misfortune; and, if he has incurred the guilt, a heavy responsibility falls upon him. Such a second marriage rends, in a violent manner, the relation of fidelity, which, between the departed mother and the surviving father, continues in the children. She has left them to his faithful care, and he has frivolously abandoned them a prey to unkindness and envy. If, in human view, aught can trouble the bliss of the departed, it is grief for neglected, abused children; and it cuts the heart of every friend of humanity to see children, deprived of their mother, under the sway of hatred.

Violent is the grief with which death severs the

marriage covenant; but it cannot sunder hearts from each other, nor extinguish love, but merely take away its earthly happiness, and thus only spiritualize and transfigure it. Far otherwise, discord. O, need this hellish spirit intrude into this holiest, most intimate connection, and rend a bond which was made to be indissoluble? This alienation of marriage is a more lingering, more bitter death-struggle of the heart, — a rending and poisoning of the noblest feelings, — a weary, painful frustration of the fairest hope, by the worst of all disappointments; and, whilst the loss of a beloved one by death exalts and sanctifies the heart, it will here not seldom be a prey to misanthropy and unbelief. It is a mournful business to speak of divorce, but we cannot avoid it.

It is disputed between the Catholic and Protestant church, whether, on Christian principles, divorce is allowable; the former denies, the latter asserts it. For unprejudiced interpreters of Scripture, it is clear that Christ has permitted divorce, if he has not fully defined all the cases in which it should take place. The philosophical moralist, however, must decide upon the grounds for it which lie in the nature of things. The marriage bond should, indeed, be indissoluble in its idea and intention; and a connection, which should be formed with prospect of a future separation, would be no marriage. But experience teaches, alas! but too often, that marriage, notwithstanding the indissolubleness ordained by the laws, and directly had in view in its compact, is actually sundered by the faithlessness of one or the other party, or by discord, originating in unconquerable repugnance. The question now is, Should

marriage, actually sundered, really existing no longer, be sundered by the judicial sentence of the church or the state? And should it be so sundered, that one or the other party, or both, may form a new union? Properly the latter question only is disputed. Even the Catholic church separates irreconcilable married persons by divorce from bed and board, but it does not allow re-marriage.

In marriage, we must distinguish the outward form of consecration from the inward state of the relation. The former deserves all respect, but it must not be superstitiously overrated. No more than the priestly benediction can, by magic power, join hearts to each other, that are not already actually united, can the existing form maintain a marriage which does not exist by harmony in itself. The consecration of marriage by ecclesiastical and civil office sanctions the covenant of fidelity between the parties, by its recognition on the side of the moral and civil commonwealth; it concerns the church, as well as the state, that connubial fidelity stand fast; and the parties are publicly pledged to this. Hence the outward form is so important, and church and state are right, if they do not too easily give way to the fickleness of man, but call upon the married parties, as long as there is any hope, to be reconciled together, and hence allow the form of marriage to exist longer than the reality. Where divorce is too easily obtained, the thought of it immediately occurs to one or the other party, whenever one feels pressed by the marriage bond, and the duty of contributing as much as possible to reconciliation lacks all the outward enforcement, which is so necessary and wholesome, espe-

cially for coarse persons. But if the evil is incurable, and the alienation complete and decided, what can it avail the church and the state to maintain in form, and, as it were, to feign the continuance of a connection actually no longer existing? It can be of no avail — rather hurtful. If the discordant couple live on in external union, only moral corruption can spring from such a relation. If there is even nothing to be feared from the violence of passion in the one party, yet church and state ought not to continue a relation in itself immoral and nugatory. As much as it devolves upon them to recognize and sanction a relation of love and harmony, as much does care for justice and morality make it their duty to dissolve a connection of hatred, and cut away, as with surgical power, a diseased excrescence of the moral life. For the most part, but one party bears the guilt, and the innocent suffers by the injustice and infidelity of the guilty. But it is the duty of the state and church to take the innocent and oppressed under protection, and to punish the guilty. The danger is especially to be weighed, which accrues to the children from the discord of the parents; and, although it is always for them a misfortune if parents are separated, it is at least better if the broken connection is legally settled, and kept from eternal strife. If the couple have already separated, because they cannot endure to live together, — if the one party has purchased peace by a heavy sacrifice, and suffers continually by the injustice of the other, — it is in this case the duty of the church and state to settle the relation legally, and to lessen as much as possible the damage done. All this may be easily attained by separation for life from

bed and board; and it ever remains a question whether an entire dissolution of the marriage bond should be permitted, with the liberty of re-marriage, which the Catholic church denies.

This church, in this point, as in general, is guilty of a superstitious over-estimate of form and a self-willed severity. It holds fast to the idea that marriage should be indissoluble, without troubling itself whether this is practicable in reality, and whether, by its strictness, moral life, instead of being favored, is not rather harmed.

Even justice demands that to the innocent party, who has lost the happiness of life by the other's infidelity, a possibility should be afforded of regaining it by a new connection. Whatever destiny imposes upon a man should be borne patiently; but why should a perpetual unhappiness be created by human wilfulness and rigor, where the remedy is possible by a rational legislation? Why should church and state increase the amount of human evil? It is their duty to lessen it as much as possible. Both, moreover, are bound to take care of their members. Marriage is not only a protection from errors, but also a school of every perfection. Hence it should be again opened to those who have been excluded from it without their own guilt.

If re-marriage is forbidden to the guilty party, the purpose of punishment offers a rational ground for it, especially if the party has been guilty of actual crime. But clemency will often come in, if the matter is considered in the light of moral education. The separated husband will perhaps be bettered by a new connection, which is more to his mind; on the other hand, by living

unmarried, he may not only deteriorate in his own morals, but infect others by his vice. That the Catholic church makes no provision for this danger is as much to its reproach, as that it makes celibacy the duty of priests, without being assured of their moral purity. Demanding the utmost, which only perfection itself can perform, it calls out directly what is bad and corrupt, and those whom it would exalt to heaven, it casts into the pool of vice.

Morality advises the unhappy ones, who live in nuptial discord, and who are tempted to think of the hard step of divorce, to find the motives for it, not in selfishness, not in the wish to live more comfortably and agreeably, still less in an illicit inclination towards another person, but only in the utter impossibility of continuing marriage, as a relation of respect and love. If love is not only irrecoverably lost, but a pacific relation, founded on respect and equity, is not to be established; if all quiet and satisfaction are destroyed; if cheerfulness of mind suffers, and perhaps health; if the mind is unfitted for action, — then it is time to break off the connection. It is indeed then a question, whether the marriage bond should be wholly dissolved; and considerations may often present themselves, which allow the unhappy parties no other aid than that of a quiet, but joyless, single life. The entire dissolution of the marriage bond, and the formation of a new one, may be hurtful to the education, and perhaps, also, to the temporal advantage, of the children; and to them parents should sacrifice their own comfort. On the contrary, there may be cases where anxiety for children makes re-marriage advisable, if, for instance, they find in the

new party a guardian and instructor, whom they would not have had in their own father or mother, which actually takes place in case of a wicked desertion. The decision of single cases must be left to each one's conscience, and the moralist can only state the disposition which should be shown under all circumstances, which is respect free from selfishness, and love of all that which belongs to morality and perfection. Self-denial will keep the married person from all that can violate and destroy the sacred relation of marriage, and teach him a right and noble conduct, if a separation actually occurs without his guilt.

In re-marriage after separation, the perfect healing of the wounds inflicted on the heart by it, and entire dissolution from the former party, must be presupposed, so that this one is to be considered as if dead; else the new connection can hardly be undisturbed. To hasten from one marriage into another is as little permitted by delicacy, as to keep up an intercourse still with the former partner. By the sight of the latter, adverse feelings must be excited in the heart, which disturb the new relation. But if the previous marriage is wholly broken off, especially if a sufficient period has elapsed between the old and new connection, then this latter, if formed from love, may perhaps be still happier than a second marriage, after the death of the first wife. If here a comparison, perhaps invidious, may ensue, the separated one, by the side of an affectionate, peaceful partner, will be recompensed for earlier sorrows, and feel so much the happier; the second marriage will be a haven of peace and quiet after storms that have passed.

But woe to those who bear the guilt of a sundered marriage, who have broken the oath of fidelity, opened the heart to forbidden desires, destroyed peace by strife, and made the breach incurable by an implacable spirit ! They have torn asunder the holiest bond, deceived the holiest confidence, and prepared bitterest torments for the heart to which they owe love ; they have inflicted a deep wound upon moral life, and, by breaking the seal of indissolubility, which rests upon marriage, violated the holy awe with which this hallowed covenant, in which all the threads of moral life unite, should be regarded. What God, what sacred fidelity has joined, they have sundered by human faithlessness, selfishness, and passion.

LECTURE XVII.

MARRIED AND DOMESTIC LIFE.

IN the last lecture, we showed how the sacred bond of marriage should be joined, and, when sundered, reunited. In order that it may not be dissolved or loosened wickedly or indiscreetly, we must now earnestly and conscientiously consider the duties and obligations which it imposes; and these we now would set forth, together with the claims of domestic life.

Marriage is a relation of love and friendship, and infinitely more than a contract; but it is, at the same time, a contract, — a legal and moral contract of fidelity, — and includes both the legal and moral duties and claims of fidelity. To these, in the first place, sympathy, or participation in the common business of life, belongs. The married owe to each other solicitude and diligence in the care and administration of domestic affairs. The husband has undertaken to sustain against the world the household which he has founded, and to support his family by diligence in his professional business, and a careful administration of his property; and to the discharge of this duty he is even legally bound. The wife has also her legal share in the maintenance of the household; on her devolves the care of its internal economy — the frugal, suitable satisfaction of

domestic wants, either by immediate labor, or by careful superintendence. Those people are to be pitied, who enter into marriage without an independent, quiet home of their own, so that both husband and wife must provide for the necessities of life. The husband has not then the soothing feeling of being the supporter of his family; and the wife, since her paid labor must take off her attention from household duties, cannot, as the uninterrupted mistress of the household, insure to him the happy enjoyment of domestic quiet and comfort. But, if such married people are to be pitied, then is that husband to be blamed, who, by carelessness and indolence, compels the wife to be the supporter of the family, and, at least, to undertake the charge of the property. A man who marries upon such conditions, — who chooses a rich wife, in order to be supported by her, and does not so much as have the management of her estate, — acts contrary to his honor. In the mutual aids by which each party undertakes the duties devolving upon it according to the relation of sex, a main source of domestic happiness lies. The wife has more respect for the husband, if she sees in him the pillar of the house, than if he stands independent of it; respect is attended by gratitude, and gratitude is nearly related to love. So, also, the wife, as the housekeeper, wins the husband's respect and gratitude; and a precious tie between them is wanting, if the wife, be it even with her husband's consent, withdraws herself from household affairs. Even if wealth renders anxious frugality needless, the wife should still not only have the oversight of the household, but also should not fail to put her own hands to the work in many matters. Certain

services can, indeed, be as well performed by domestics as by the wife; but they have from her hand a higher value, and form between her and the husband a more intimate bond.

The noblest part of the common work of life is the education of children; and in this, especially, the married parties should remain faithful to each other. The wife has the heaviest part in this important concern, that is, the physical nurture, which, especially during the first years, demands the strictest attention. If she wishes to be wholly and truly a mother, and to intrust the child to no stranger's hands, she must deny herself all social enjoyment; and this is a severe sacrifice, whereby not only health and cheerfulness, but also what is more important, mental freedom, may suffer. But, then, it is a necessary sacrifice, if the mother, by the limits of economy, or from other grounds, can procure no worthy assistant in the care of her children. To commit children to frivolous, inexperienced maids, — to allow these to take them abroad, and to carry them about without oversight, — is unwarrantable, and betrays an unkind indifference on the mother's part. There is not only danger that the children may receive bodily hurt by the negligence of their attendants, but their minds will receive from them and their associates impressions of rude, vulgar manners, which are with difficulty erased. Our habits in this respect, especially in the higher classes, are very much in need of improvement. There are many distinguished ladies who carry their lap-dog, but none who carry their child, through the street. If the mother devotes herself to the care

of children, the father ought also to help her bear the burden, and actually share with her the renunciation of those social enjoyments which are incompatible with it. Let the mother never withdraw herself wholly from the personal care of her children, even if she can commit the charge of them to most approved attendants; partly for the sake of the children, whose love and attachment she will especially win by such benefits, partly for the sake of the husband, who, if he is not wholly devoid of domestic sensibility, will but the more respect and love her on this account. The later education of children, especially of boys, demands the active participation of the father; and, if he leaves the burden of this to the mother's feeble shoulders, then he acts faithlessly, and not only violates his duty towards the children, but also neglects the fairest opportunity of deserving the respect and gratitude of the wife.

The fidelity of the married must be shown in the common endurance of the destiny which falls to their lot. Their domestic prosperity may be shaken and overthrown by some fatal adversity; they may fall into poverty and wretchedness; the husband may, in an innocent manner, lose his honor and his freedom; persecution and exile may overtake him. A faithful wife will share all with him, and yield only to the necessity which separates her from him. Misfortune is often, for an affectionate husband, more difficult to bear, if his beloved wife shares it with him; and it perhaps soothes him to know of her being in security and peace; but, if destiny grants him the consolation that she, without yielding to it, helps him bear it with cheerful mind,

then he is rather to be envied, than pitied, in his misfortune; the tried fidelity of a noble heart is a precious gain, a rich reparation for every loss.

In this connubial reciprocity and communion, the legal duty of fidelity constitutes the firm foundation, which is not to be shaken; upon this rests the moral duty, which proceeds from the more tender, vital feeling, but yet always implies mutuality; over this, then, that free love bears sway, which, without any claim to requital, sacrifices itself, and, in noble self-forgetfulness and devotion, lives only for the other, and finds its own happiness in that of the one beloved. The Creator has wisely ordered that the union of hearts in wedded love should be connected with an intimate participation in the business and destiny of life: love is not only thereby sustained, but cherished, renewed, and exalted; gratitude weaves ever new and tender threads into the band of love, and makes it ever more indissoluble.

The relation of personal fidelity, also, is first defined legally; and conjugal infidelity is held a civil crime. The baseness of this kind of treachery is in every respect so great, that, before civilized people, it is superfluous to speak of it. But far higher are the requisitions from a moral point of view; these bring with them the obligation not merely to fidelity of person, but also of heart. This, in general, consists in the maintenance of that correspondence of feeling in which marriage was formed. But the degree of this correspondence, however, is different in different persons; hence, also, the claim which is made upon fidelity. Were the hearts of the lovers wholly blended, then fidelity should maintain this intimate relation; but it

cannot and should not prevent love's ceasing, as a poetical, passionate feeling, in marriage, and passing into more quiet, serene friendship. The party that claims the unaltered continuance of love from the other, and considers the calming of passion as infidelity, would be very unjust. Happy the marriage in which the passage from the first delirium to quiet, serene congeniality, takes place gently and securely! If the connection were not formed from love, but from respect and rational considerations, then, in married life, harmony and attachment are cultivated, but hardly true love; and to demand the latter would be evidently an unjust assumption. The fidelity of the heart, which is necessary in marriage, can, in every case, be but that of sincere, hearty friendship and attachment. The fast foundation of this will rest upon respect and gratitude. The more the parties maintain towards each other the virtues of good principle and kindly feeling, the higher mutual respect will ascend, and the more firmly will the band of friendship be united.

If the marriage were not formed from love, or if the love were not true, but a vague, sensuous feeling, there is then imminent danger that one of the parties may become acquainted with some person who may be deemed more worthy of love, or with whom there may be more congeniality than with the partner chosen. Married persons must avoid all acquaintance and all society, if they would wholly avoid this danger; but such seclusion would bring with it great disadvantage, and, by the emptiness and uniformity of life, perhaps open the heart to illicit desire. This danger must therefore be resolutely opposed. The recognition of the superior

loveliness of another person is involuntary, and cannot, in itself, be a reproach; but it may endanger conjugal fidelity, and this should be guarded against. The easiest expedient would be to avoid such society; and he who feels himself feeble, let him do it: yet virtue consists in conflict; and whoever would exercise it, must not shrink back. The due estimate of another's excellences, and the society of a person worthy of respect and love, can not only remain innocent in itself, but may also be an advantage to the intellect and heart, if it is possible to keep within the line of friendship. But desire of possession, and the attendant dissatisfaction with the present husband or wife, and with the conjugal relation, goes further, and becomes infidelity: fidelity, on the other hand, together with contentment, is maintained by the renunciation, which will not even entertain the thought of being happier with another. Pious resignation to unavoidable destiny, and respect for a relation once entered into, obligate to this renunciation; and love for the children will make it easier. But a single consideration, besides distrust of one's own weak heart, can make the rupture of friendly intimacy with a fascinating person advisable, nay, necessary; that is, forbearance to the jealousy of the husband or wife.

Jealousy is the worst foe of conjugal harmony; but, if it be advisable to forbear exciting it, it is impossible to avoid blaming it so much the more; it presents, at the very first, the selfish claim to more love than is actually deserved; amiability must be made good by itself; and, if it employs other means, — reproach, coercion, and the like, — then it gives up its own superiority. That is no true love, which is not actually deserved, but

a counterfeited, or merely imagined one; and, whilst violence is done to another's heart, self-deception takes place. Again, jealousy includes in itself suspicion of infidelity; since the jealous person does not confide in the other's ability to love what is worthy of love, without passion, without either entertaining illicit desires, or running into improper conduct. But suspicion is, in itself, infidelity; for it is founded on a want of respect, and loosens the band, while it fears its dissolution. Confidence, alone, forms a true moral union, and preserves it also. Jealousy, moreover, is not merely objectionable in itself, but also in its consequences; it often brings on the very thing which it fears, by anticipation; it carries guilt into a feeling which was guiltless, and would remain guiltless; it provokes, by suspicion, and by disrespectful forethought, the desire of what is forbidden, to which man is inclined by the inborn love of freedom; it exalts the worth of the object loved, since it excites longing; it cools the heart towards the party which indulges its passionate ebullitions. But, if it becomes completely irksome, annoying, and oppressive, then it destroys all love, and produces the very opposite of what it designs. Jealousy imposes upon the other party severe trials, and demands not only the renunciation of the free intercourse of social life, and the constant restraint of a bitter feeling excited by distrust, but also a continually-overstrained caution, with which love cannot possibly exist; but, what is worst, it dictates a sort of insincere reserve towards the jealous party.

Husband and wife should be as sincere towards each other as becomes persons so intimately connected.

Well for them who can open their hearts to each other! who, besides sharing the outward life with one another, have every feeling, every thought, also, in common, and are spiritually cherished, cultivated, and purified, with and by each other! One should know the disposition of the other, understand the impressions made upon his mind, and participate in every vicissitude of feeling. But jealousy destroys this confiding interchange, by exciting anxiety, suspicion. If the wife can hear the praise of no other woman from her husband's lips without being disturbed, then prudence and kindness demand reserve in speaking of the excellences of other women. Frankness of heart between the married parties is, in general, no unconditioned duty. Marriage is indeed the loveliest, when an unlimited confidence takes place; and the effort should be to bring about this; but harmony is the object to which every other should be subordinate. A communication which disturbs the other, is aimless, nay, hurtful; and it is not required that one should know all the other's thoughts, but that both live with one another in peace and harmony. The relation of the parties may be very different, according to their individual character, and the way in which they have formed the union, and may give occasion to various degrees of confidence. The moralist can decide only what belongs to a perfect relation, but not make it every one's duty to conduct himself as if he lived in most perfect relation; since, perhaps, without his own fault, he stands in a very imperfect one. Upon many married persons, a cautious reserve is enjoined; but they are indeed to be pitied for being compelled to this. It is worse, if, for the sake of

evading the vehémençe of jealousy, one must have recourse to falsehood ; and worst of all if he is betrayed by his own guilt into such embarrassment. Let him beware of such imprudent or unwarrantable steps in order not to entangle himself more deeply in untruth. But never should deceit, which abrogates even every civil relation, ensue between husband and wife. Deceit can be necessary only when something is wished for, which the other disapproves ; but if this were in itself innocent, then it would be objectionable through this disapproval and by the deceit ; and the thing desired should be renounced instead of casting a stain upon the common relation.

The husband, who yet stands in other relations of business and of civil life, may be often bound, by a further duty, to reserve and secrecy towards his wife, and she ought not to complain of it. Meanwhile he generally shows her confidence, where it can be done without danger, and thus honors her as his friend. Even the secrets of friendship should be kept sacred, and if the married couple have otherwise confidence in one another, such a secrecy will not destroy the good understanding. But such secrets should not concern conjugal affairs themselves, and should never, in one way or another, disparage either husband or wife.

The fidelity of the married is shown in general by their keeping and maintaining the personal relation, upon which they have entered. The most necessary and indispensable means of its maintenance is harmony, and this is the most general requisition which can be made of the married—to live in harmony. Many will find in harmony alone their happiness ; to others, who

desire more, it is, at least, the first foundation of their happiness. Harmony is preserved by peace, and hence this is the first conjugal virtue. But it cannot be exercised without a certain self-denial. If even in the civil relation many a sacrifice must be made to peace, how much more in marriage! In this let neither party insist upon exact rights; let each not only yield in every dispute, but, if possible, avoid all dispute. Let each avoid every thing that is displeasing to the other, and anticipate the other's wishes. They are chiefly trifles which disturb domestic peace; certain repugnant habits and manners, which are in themselves insignificant, but are important, because they are disagreeable to the other, and, if animadverted upon in vain, provoke attention and self-will. The security and confidence of the conjugal relation, wherein, indeed, there is much that is agreeable, misleads to a certain easy manner, so that one becomes negligent, and hardly heeds the presence of the other; negligences and indecorums of every kind, ill-humors, vehemence, passionate outbreaks, and the like, are indulged in, and weaknesses shown, which would be concealed from a stranger. But in this way the noble relation is abused, which is intended only to give free scope for love and its delicate expressions, and to remove every barrier that divides hearts, but not to dispense with every restraint of self-government. On the contrary, it is an infallible rule, that in marriage, before all things, the laws of respect, decorum, and courtesy should be observed, free from all heartless formality indeed, but with a strictness which guards against any overstepping the necessary limits of justice and good manners. In marriages, which, although without dis-

like, are yet formed without inclination and passion, the parties remain usually with each other upon the footing of courtesy and politeness, and thus harmony exists more easily than between those who love each other, and live together upon a footing of confidence, but do not sufficiently observe circumspection and forbearance towards one another. But both, the measured, decorous demeanor and hearty confidence, must be united, and the former will secure the latter from excess and misuse. But, since each party should be constantly upon guard, so as not to annoy and injure the other, each should be mild and forbearing. Often the party who indulges in every violence and recklessness, is the most intolerant and irritable towards the trifling faults which the other commits. If the one party is strict towards self and mild towards the other, then this other will be obligated to strictness towards self, and strife will always surely be avoided.

Married people must coöperate in many respects; and they, perhaps, have different principles as to their common concerns: if the husband would have them managed in this way, and the wife in that way, they fall into contention, and peace is disturbed. Ancient custom cuts away all occasion for strife, by making obedience to the husband the duty of the wife; and, in fact, when he rules and she submits, there can be no variance. But this thorough dependence of the wife upon the husband is not compatible with the idea of a perfect marriage, which should be a relation of friendship, and based upon personal equality. On the other hand, with the wife's perfect independence upon the husband, harmony cannot exist, unless it be that both coincide in every thing, which certainly seldom or never is the

case ; therefore a medium must be hit upon. First of all, let the concerns of married life be so separated, that in one department the husband, and in the other the wife, shall have the especial rule, yet so that each must have just regard to the wishes of the other. Every thing, which in domestic life is connected with the civil and business relations of the husband, and either stands under their influence, or exercises influence upon them, must be left to his decision. To this department belong the management of the house in the largest sense, the measure of expense to be made, the order of the day, certain social relations, etc. The management of the internal household economy, the superintendence of the female domestics, provision for social life, belongs to the wife ; here let the husband mingle as little as possible in particulars, and be satisfied if the main objects are attained. Certain affairs, however, must be carried on in common, as the education of children ; and these usually afford opportunity for contention. If possible, both should form a common opinion upon such affairs, and pursue a common plan. But, wherever the wife cannot follow the opinion of the husband, and contention ensues, the husband should decide, and determine the result ; since, in the difference of views, both wills do not unite, but all must be done according to one will, and the husband has, as a general rule, the better insight, it is therefore right that in such cases his word should decide. But let him beware of using this privilege where the wife is the party to execute the decision ; for without a living conviction of her own, she will not succeed in its execution. Be it, for example, the case that the husband has other and better ideas

of the physical education of children than the wife; if he does not succeed in bringing her to a hearty adoption of his opinions, it will be better for him to defer to her, and, at least, to strike out a middle course, in order that she may not lose her pleasure and peace, and do the thing merely by halves. If the man commands as little as possible, and the wife cheerfully obeys, even where she might well claim to have a voice, and thus both defer to each other, then harmony will certainly exist.

If the two love one another, and in this way study peace, love, although not as a passionate feeling, cannot fail to increase, and hearts are more firmly bound together. Peaceableness makes itself amiable; it commands respect; it makes an abiding, beneficent, agreeable impression, by its forbearing equanimity, and obligates to gratitude, which is very near love; but, even by its removal of all that can be prejudicial to love, it promotes its growth; for the feelings of the heart never remain fixed at the same height, but either fall or rise; and, if there be no fall, there must needs be a rise. But the married should do yet more for the maintenance and promotion of love, than merely avoid harming it; each should ever study to be more amiable, and show the other ever more love.

A spirited, feeling writer very well says, that the lover should play the husband, and the husband the lover; then marriages would be much more happy. This holds doubly true, both in reference to the mode of winning and of manifesting love. He who sues for love, seeks to make himself as worthy of love as possible, turns outward all the bright sides of his character,

and conceals his faults and infirmities. The lover is glad to show himself to his beloved in the most favorable exterior, and labors, also, to appear before her in inward grace and brilliancy. This deserves no censure, but rather shows a laudable striving for accomplishment. But he ought to continue thus in marriage; and it would be better for him to have appeared to less advantage before, and to have been constantly developing new excellences, than, as a husband, to give up all attention to himself, and to appear as he is, or happens to feel. Married people usually err, by becoming careless and negligent through possession, and consider the love of the other as a fixed, quiet property, whereas nothing is more mutable and fleeting than this; nay, it is more easily lost in marriage than out of it, because passion no longer stands at its side, and cooler frame of mind gives room for clearer consideration. Let husband and wife, therefore, continue the effort to appear always in the most favorable light, and let them not only conceal their faults, but abandon them, and seek ever to appropriate more excellences and virtues, which, indeed, is the duty of every one; let them ever cultivate themselves, extend their knowledge, purify their taste, and ennoble their heart. This work of self-improvement let them carry on, if possible, in unison; let them form those plans which are mutually most agreeable, favor each other's inclinations and wishes, and find the fairest satisfaction in each other's approval. The husband, in the department of intellectual culture, will take the lead, and give the tone; and it devolves upon the wife to join with him; but he should also favor her taste, and regard her wishes.

Love is most happily won by giving the loved object proofs of genuine love. The lover seeks to win the favor of the loved one by studious attention, readiness to serve, deference, whilst he seizes upon every opportunity to give her pleasure. The more delicacy of feeling he manifests to her in this endeavor; the more sharp-sighted he is in finding out her wishes, her tastes, and her wants; the more closely he knows how to unite his kindly offices with acknowledgments of her amiable qualities, — the more fortunate will his efforts be; and, if the opportunity presents itself to make a sacrifice for her, and to show his sincere devotion, he will not fail of the conquest of her heart; for nothing touches a woman's heart more than magnanimity, devotion, and sacrifice. All this the husband should continue; and, for the latter, married life will first give him true opportunities. It is, alas! often only passionate desire after possession that inflames the husband; and, in marriage, he becomes cold and negligent. But, sometimes, even those who actually love their wives fail, by a selfish, too careless, and easy demeanor. Husband and wife should live only for and in each other, and care only for the other's good; then what is sacrificed will be recovered with thousand-fold gain, and mutual happiness be promoted.

But, above this care and devotion to the happiness of another, yet rises the immediate sentiment of love itself, respect and affectionate recognition of inward, personal worth, the inclination of heart to heart, intimate sympathy, harmony of minds. The possession of the loved one, the uniform routine of life, and perhaps, also, the disclosure of many a failing, gradually deadens

the feeling for the recognition of excellences perhaps heretofore passionately admired; and often, alas! a multitude of virtues are forgotten in a trifling defect. Many a husband, at the grave of his lost wife, whose spiritual image rises before his soul in all its splendor, repents the many hours of indifference in which he has lived with her. The thought of death is a protection from this dulness, and, perhaps, induces mildness towards all faults, and strikes down all false demands; it teaches us to estimate the happiness which is so fleeting, and, as if to hold it fast in its flight, it gives us, by the contrast of possible loss, the feeling of happy possession. We are, moreover, lifted by it above the dull routine of custom, and imagine ourselves to have gained first, at that moment, what we quietly possess; we refresh the charm that has faded, and enjoy anew, in remembrance, the rapture of first possession. By a little force of imagination, and the easy art of viewing life in the mirror of contemplation, all that is possessed and enjoyed may be placed in a transfiguring light, and the happiness of life be infinitely enhanced. If the married remain in this frame of mind towards each other, they will not only maintain the first love, but always discover new traits of amiability, and, in their affectionate recognition, will find motives for the tenderest gratitude.

The perfection of conjugal love consists in intimate congeniality of minds, not merely in regard to the common household affairs, but all life. This congeniality is conditioned by hearty sympathy, and the most confiding communion. Husband and wife should show the most intimate interest in each other, and mutually communicate all that touches and moves their

heart; let each feel self in the other, feel every joy and every sorrow only on the other's account, take upon self what oppresses the other, or, at least, help the other bear it, and enjoy whatever happiness life brings, only in its reflection from the heart beloved. The vicissitude of happiness and misfortune is a wholesome school of discipline for the married, and, by suffering, true love is proved. The husband can suffer misfortune, misapprehension, and persecution, — perhaps may fall into need and embarrassment by his own fault; and he has, perhaps, no friend but his wife; yet, in her, if she truly loves him, he will find the sweetest consolation. Alas for him, if he must seek it among strangers! if she pains him with unkind reproaches, and judges him more strictly than the world! But, if the wife can so far forget herself, then the conjugal harmony must be wholly broken, and hate and distrust take the place of love and confidence. In the wife, a certain partial preference for the husband is becoming, rather than too cold a criticism of his conduct; she must know how to turn every thing to the best account, and to keep up his self-respect; and even the gentle censure which she expresses towards him must contain a recognition of his worth.

Every true love and friendship has its hold in a common, higher love, — in the love of truth, of virtue, of beauty, and all spiritual good: hence no true congeniality of hearts can exist between husband and wife, if they do not meet in the consciousness of such higher love, and in a certain spiritual communion with each other. No couple is so uneducated, and so very much absorbed in worldly cares, that they cannot, at least on

Sunday, devote a quiet hour to the common reading of some edifying book, or, in a retired walk, hold serious conversation upon human life. Those who have more time and means of spiritual culture at their command, should keep up with each other a regular, uninterrupted intellectual intercourse; the husband should seek recreation from his labors, the wife elevation of mind above the monotonous, trifling affairs of the household, in a common intellectual occupation, in communion upon the higher concerns of life. In this intercourse, both may become acquainted with each other's deepest spiritual nature, whilst many a bright aspect of the character, before concealed, will be disclosed; mutual respect will be more firmly established, and, in the contact of heart, in the elevation of mind, the fire of love will glow more strongly and purely. In such interchanges and contemplations, all other often disturbing considerations sink into the background; business and cares are forgotten; one finds himself in the free, bright realm of pure humanity, and the perhaps before veiled and obscured form of the loved one comes forth again in its true light. The husband will be generally the guiding and superintending party in this intercourse; but let him beware of abusing his preponderance, or falsely arrogating it to himself; let him recognize the excellence of the wife, the simple, truthful feeling, and enter into a social interchange, so as both to give and to receive; let him not obtrude his own views and tastes upon her, but honor her individualities, spare her imperfections, and not assume to have attained in all things the true and perfect.

If husband and wife, by the unerring intimations of

the heart, have recognized and chosen each other as congenial, and if they confirm, enlarge, and complete this congeniality by such a communion of life, by such an intimate sympathy, by such an interchange of heart and mind, then there is no fairer connection upon this earth; it is the blending of two personalities into one—soul and sense—in all the affairs, endeavors, and conditions of life—in joy and grief, in happiness and misfortune; both have become one flesh and one spirit; the whole compass of human being, of masculine intellect with feminine sensibility, struggle and conflict with calmness and peace, boldness and strength with patience and mildness,—all is united in the intimate reciprocity and communion between husband and wife; every defect is made up, and every excess brought down; every work prospers better, every burden is more easily borne, happiness is enhanced and doubled, misfortune changed into blessing; and, whatever side life may present to the united, it finds them prepared, and in readiness,—ready for opposition and suffering, susceptible of every favor of destiny.

A marriage is truly happy and complete only when it is blessed with children; but if the relation of parents to children, and *vice versa*, is not right, then the blessing is changed into a curse. To shape and regulate this relation lies entirely in the power of the parents; and the nature of children must be very corrupt and wicked (which, however, may have its ground in the nature of the parents) if they cannot form them, by good education, into worthy members of the family and of society. It is not here the place fully to present the problem of education, and the conditions and means of

its happy solution; we here take into view merely the personal relation of parents and children, and express the demands which we have to make upon this, in which, however, the main rules of education are contained.

Parents should exert upon their children a formative, guiding, instructive influence: by age, experience, and mental superiority, they are raised above them, and should use this preponderance for their best good: hence they ought to educate them in reverence and obedience, which are the indispensable virtues of a good education. Reverence is nothing but the recognition of a superior dignity, and the free product of living moral influence: where true moral dignity is wanting, only awe and fear can take place. Hence proceeds the demand upon the parents, to appear before their children in the true dignity of virtue and of character, and thereby to command their reverence. A certain external seriousness and decorum, in which parents clothe themselves before children, and the awe thereby excited, may prepare the way for reverence, but cannot produce it. The moral impression, which parents make upon children, is generally very important for education, and all prudence and art will not supply its place. Like the vivifying sunbeams, which fertilize the earth, the spirit of love breaks forth from the hearts of parents, and opens and fertilizes the heart of children. The working of spiritual power is mysterious, and sets at nought all calculation and foresight; the heart of children is much more susceptible of spiritual impressions than it appears, and it stretches out its feelers when we believe it wholly imprisoned in the senses.

Obedience is in part produced by reverence, and is

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then a free emotion; in part, and at first, it must be drawn forth by habit and order,—if need be, also by restraint and severity,—and then it contributes again to the promotion of reverence. By habit the sensuality of children must be subdued, that they may submit to a rule; and this rule may be, in the beginning, only the will of parents, until the child's own reason is developed. But, therefore, let the parental will be regular and consistent, and no capricious humor. At first, children do not yet understand from what grounds parents restrain them in any thing; but, unconsciously, they may be moulded into regularity. As much, even, as from wilfulness, a parent should refrain from premature reasoning with children, and should make up their want of insight and conviction by firmness and emphasis of will. It is good for them to obey, even where they do not understand; and if they truly honor the parents, they will obey them with a certain faith and cheerfulness. We all learn by faith sooner than by insight, and he who would immediately understand every thing will only be superficial.

But obedience should not suppress freedom, but rather help it; by the guiding will of the parents, the children's own will should be raised to independence. It is love which acknowledges the individuality of others: hence love will teach parents to respect and spare the individuality of their children, and warn them not to stretch their power so far as to injure and suppress any peculiar bias or disposition in their minds. Nor should parents force their children to a profession for which they feel no inclination; still, deep minds, timid natures, they should never confine to tasks and exer-

cises which require vivacity of mind and forwardness. Parents should not despise and violently censure children, if these do not succeed in what they would gladly see done by them. In this fond recognition and indulgence of childish characteristics, mothers are patterns for fathers: many a misapprehended and despised child, who does not satisfy the father's vanity or self-will, finds consolation and shelter only in the mother's heart. But love should teach parents to leave children gradually to their independence, and to free them from subjection. A child grown up is child no longer, and need no longer stand under the rod of discipline. But many children, even in earlier years, at least in many respects, may be left free; and the knowledge which parents have gained of their nature must tell them when this period has come.

Parents should educate friends in their children: friendship, yet hallowed by reverence and pious gratitude on the part of children, is the relation which should take place between them, when grown up, and their parents. They will always gratefully honor, in these, the authors of their existence, the guardians and instructors of their childhood, and avail themselves of their experience and maturity with respect and confidence; but they should move independently and freely in this relation; no fear, no coercion, should prevent the development of their proper character. If this is the object for which parents strive in the education of their children, then they will prepare for themselves the brightest reward. The true attachment of children, their affectionate confidence, their unaffected reverence and esteem, will shed a beauty upon age; in their

children, parents live their youth over again, and each of their virtues and merits, as the developed blossom of buds and germs tended by them, will insure the fulfilment of sweet hopes. In education, nothing is more difficult than the proper blending of strictness and mildness, and the just medium between restraint and freedom. The ancient mode of education was too strict; the modern is often too mild. Formerly parents, especially fathers, avoided showing love to their children; now they often fail through excessive tenderness. This excites a self-importance in children, and a false love of freedom, which may lead to disobedience; on the other hand, cold severity intimidates them, and prevents the free development of their individuality of character. But, if we often err by too great fondness for our children, yet we would not quit this lovely path. Modern education already bears fine fruit, and will bear yet finer. The spirit of freedom and of love, with the freer management of children, has been shed abroad upon life; love for what is purely human, forbearance and respect for every individual characteristic, has supplanted many stiff, empty forms, but produced free movement and activity in their stead; all germinates and shoots up in full life, and is developed in powerful individual form; and we can hardly divine what a rich harvest is to be expected from this sowing.

Excessive love is pernicious, but yet it is not so fatal as the false love, which, springing from low, selfish gratification, loves in children merely the idols of vanity, their personal symmetry and grace, their talents, and sets them up for show; it flatters their self-will and love of pleasure, excites their vanity, and educates

them to become selfish, vicious men. True love has for its object the moral worth and moral welfare of children, and flows from a pure satisfaction and benevolence; if it is also associated with a certain weakness, still it does not lack its wholesome influence upon the dispositions of childhood.

The transition from the full exercise of parental control to friendly, fatherly guidance and advice, and from this to entire freedom, is difficult. In adult years, the choice of profession, and of wife or husband, becomes a point of contention, which often disturbs the good understanding of parents and children. Since to both these choices inclination is a main condition, the moralist must make it the duty of parents to show the most conscientious forbearance towards the individual tastes of their children. Of the choice in marriage we have already spoken, and of the choice of profession we treat hereafter. But even a mistake in either choice will not be so fatal as coercion: by the former, happiness, perhaps, may suffer, but knowledge of self, and of the world, and character, may gain by it. Man must go through certain experiences; and, however bitter they may be, he will know how to turn them to his advantage, if he has character, and can comprehend life in its inner worth.

For the conduct of children towards parents, the duties of reverence, love, and gratitude, are prescribed. Children are often, in riper years, superior to their parents in intellect and culture; and age not seldom brings with it feebleness of mind; but there should not be, on that account, any decay of filial reverence. Parents always stand above their children; since these owe

to them their existence, bodily care, and, at least, the beginnings of education; and these gifts are inestimable. Have children gone further than parents, still it is not their merit, but the gift of nature or of destiny. Indeed, age claims for itself reverence, not only on account of greater experience and maturity, but because youth should acknowledge its dependence upon the elders; but this dependence finds most decided place in relation to parents. Sometimes children rise above their parents in point of rank and consequence in society; but no worthy son will maintain this external distinction in regard to father and mother, and be ashamed of his lowly origin. No glory and splendor will shed so much honor upon the son of humble parents as filial deference to them, by means of which he respects the holy order of nature more than all civil relations of rank.

By reverence, children acknowledge their dependence upon parents; but love places them both on an equality, and binds heart to heart; they belong to one another; intimate sympathy unites them; parents rejoice in the welfare of their children, and these rejoice in their happiness, because those are made happy by it, and exert themselves to cause them ever more joy; a noble emulation of love exists between them; but children find it difficult to prevail in this, nay, even to avoid being too far surpassed. Parents have nothing which they love more than their children; all the worth of life for them has passed into the life of their children; as a dying tree in its shoots, they live on in their children. These, on the contrary, love their husbands or wives, and their children, are actively engaged in life,

and much attracts them which has lost its charm for the parents. So much the more ought they to exert themselves to keep their hearts warm towards their parents, and, whilst they go forward in life, to turn backwards, also, to the source of their existence.

With reverence and love towards parents, filial gratitude will immediately manifest itself. If the child has opportunity to requite his poor, unhappy parents with benefit and assistance, to adorn the latter days of their life, to withdraw them from embarrassments, to save them from wretchedness and disgrace, he will do this with joy, and share all the means and power he has with them to whom he owes all. Which is the happier feeling, that of the parents, who receive benefits from a child, or of the child, who bestows them, it is difficult to say. It is not merely the benefit which is bestowed and received; it is, on the part of the child, the joy to express in deeds the noblest feeling of gratitude and love by which his heart is filled, — the noble pride to be able to do something for them to whom every thing is owing; and, on the side of the parents, the joy of having brought up a good, noble child, of reaping the fairest fruits of their efforts, — the noble pride that their child has some importance and power in the world; it is, on both sides, the beneficent feeling of reciprocity, and the reversal of the beautiful relation, whereby the former love is maintained outwardly otherwise, but inwardly the same.

“Thou shalt honor father and mother:” this was one of the few commandments which Moses gave his rude people, and, in fact, it is one of the first foundations of moral life: family life is the first school of

mankind; but, without respect for parents, it cannot exist. This commandment is the first that is attended by a promise; and truly its fulfilment brings a great blessing. No virtue is more universally respected than that of childhood; and nothing is so much abhorred as rude ingratitude to parents. A bad son is certainly a bad man; every one distrusts him, and shrinks from him: but, without the respect of men, no comfort can exist, and not even any uninterrupted self-respect. A bad son will also be a bad father; for this disposition will be manifest in the same relation, only reversed, and will bring forth the same evil fruits. He who shows no reverence to his parents, will receive none from his son, since he is wanting in inward dignity; and, if he does not love his parents, he will not love his son, or will love him in a false manner, and consequently receive from him no true love; and thus he lacks the brightest happiness of life, and prepares the punishment for his transgression. Many parents, who were bad children, eagerly covet the love of their children, indulge them, give them their own way, and yet can gain nothing from them but to be ruled and abused by them, and, at last, reap only ingratitude. They love only themselves in their children; but a selfish love engenders only selfishness, and this is the root of ingratitude.

Love is as the warmth which continues equable, and pervades all that it touches. Whilst children, in the circle of love, stand around their parents, the fair band of brotherly love should also unite them with each other. Brothers and sisters should be friends to each other, united by respect and love; and their friendship

will be the more intimate, since inclination and habit attach them one to another with indissoluble bands. Their harmonious, friendly relation is one of the loveliest fruits of good education; and, as a general rule, brotherly love is attended by true filial love; indeed, the same holy feeling which children share with each other towards their parents, must unite their hearts. If two love a third, and the jealous desire of possession does not come between to sunder them, they must be friends. But love towards parents is a pious, disinterested feeling, which drives all hatred and envy from the heart. Alas for the parents, who, by culpable partiality, sow the seeds of discord between their children, and are not attached with equal love to those who should be equally near to their heart! Instances of an innate aversion of brothers and sisters to each other are rare, and excite a certain shudder; nature necessarily unites those who have sprung from the same blood, sucked the same mother's milk, enjoyed the same care and education. Hence it may be regarded as a rule, that parents are to be blamed for the variance of their children. Love cannot be taught, and thus parents cannot teach their children love one to another; but they can awaken it by the love which they impartially show them; they can resist and repress the bad manners which are wont to stifle germinating love, — the envy, sensitiveness, contention, — and thus educate their young minds in the love of peace. The moralist cannot do more than to make the tenderest regard for peace, the duty of brothers and sisters, since love cannot be commanded; only amiableness itself commands it.

Brothers and sisters should, first of all, manifest to

each other that deportment which well-bred persons owe each other, and not be misled, by confiding familiarity, and the security of their relation, to put out of sight the laws of courtesy, temperance, and justice. They often, like married people, indulge in too great familiarities and liberties with each other, without making up the want of courtesy, like the former, by warm love. If important concerns of self-interest are at stake, let the strictest justice, the most delicate equity, be the rule of their conduct; and, if it is the wish to preserve peace, let no sacrifice be spared to prevent the outbreak of discord; and brothers and sisters should behave more equitably towards each other than general Christian duty dictates. If harmony prevails between them, then much is gained, and room is opened for love; if one is so unfortunate as to have brothers or sisters whom he cannot love, towards whom he cannot feel any pure respect, let him at least honor the relation in which he stands to them by tender forbearance; let him guard against the harsh expression of his dislike, and avoid an open rupture, which, to a noble heart, can cause nothing but woe.

Brotherly love is one of the fairest forms of friendship; since it is so secure by inborn inclination and long habit, and, by community of education, by participation in the same destiny and relations of life, it is so intimate and confiding. If congeniality of minds, also, concurs with it, then all joins to establish a complete friendship, and only a happy marriage surpasses the beautiful union of affectionate brothers and sisters. Man makes so many mistakes in friendship and love, and prepares for himself, by his false choice, so much

bitter disappointment and corroding anguish; that it seems as if Heaven would secure to us the happiness of love without its dangers, by a relation which is not founded by human caprice and passion, but by nature and providence. The fraternal relation is, in unhappy instances, cold and indifferent, but very seldom hostile; and only between rough persons; on the contrary, it is often the source of the sweetest consolation, and the firmest support in suffering; nay, it insures rich indemnification for the disappointments of conjugal love, for the infidelity of false friends. Beautiful gift, which, never harmful, can be only wholesome and refreshing! Benignant care of nature, which places us, immediately at the entrance of life, in the arms of love, puts friendly playmates at our side, and associates us with trusty companions upon the long, toilsome way of life!

What holds true of deportment between brothers and sisters, may be applied to demeanor towards other members of the family and relations. Before all things, let the conduct be governed by strict rules of courtesy, justice, and equity, and let the relation, so worthy of respect, towards them be honored. Happy the person who can esteem and love in them human worth, noble disposition! and pitiable is he who feels himself a stranger in the circle of his kindred! who shuts his feelings up in his own breast, and must restrict himself to a merely formal intercourse! This is the common lot of distinguished men, who find their equals only among the distinguished, and are often not only not well known by their relatives, but are even mistaken and misunderstood. To such let the society of their relatives be a disciplinary school of patience and for-

bearance. Those who, not only in views and dispositions, but also in station and profession, have risen above the sphere of their relatives, must guard against wounding them by the appearance of pride and contempt. It is hard to keep up intercourse with those with whom there is no sympathy, either in sentiment or affairs; but a noble man will, above all else, prevail upon himself to avoid injuring those to whom he owes at least delicate forbearance. Vulgar men, who cannot make themselves pass by their own worth, lay too much stress upon relationship; men of intellect and heart often prize it too little. Let the family connections be respected, even in the remotest branches; and, even if the vital spirit of love pervades these in less and less degrees, and finally wholly disappears, so that only the bare forms are left, then let these be honored, since with them the fairest, holiest relations are connected.

Even those domestic associates, who are not connected by the ties of blood with the family, — servants and assistants, — should have their share, in domestic life, in the all-pervading blessing of harmony, kindness, and love. If they deserve the respect of the members of the family, by fidelity and integrity, — if these have accordingly treated them with cordial respect, — then they will soon manifest attachment and love; and these should always be returned. It is one of the surest indications of the goodness of human nature, that domestics so cheerfully submit to control, and that they, especially to the children of the house, show such strong attachment. Nurses often love their foster-children more heartily than the mothers themselves do; servants often resign their lives for the masters whom they have served

from youth. Surely such attachment deserves the noble name of friendship, and is worthy the highest respect and heartiest return. There is usually, in such a relation, lack of interchange of thought and sentiment, since the culture, mode of life, and circumstances of the parties, are so different; on that account, heart is attached to heart immediately from love, and pure human worth is valued independently of outward appendages and trappings. A noble family should consider its domestic life as a nursery of noble domestic manners, in which it educates the strangers whom it adopts. Servants have usually had a rude, coarse education, and know not the happiness of a well-bred, affectionate, domestic life. Let them, then, be taught to know it, in order that they may become one day good masters and mistresses of a family, and may diffuse nobler manners among the lower classes; let them be not only accustomed to order and cleanliness, but educated also to domestic virtue, in part by an affectionate, forbearing treatment, and by benevolent interest in their affairs — in part by the example which is set to them, and by the impression which the daily sight of a noble mode of living must make upon them; and, when they establish a household, noble masters and mistresses will still consider them as theirs, advise and protect them, and, at least, treat them with friendly interest; and thus a noble household will be like a mother church of noble domestic manners for many befriended families, and will diffuse the spirit of love all around.

There are pictures of the holy family, where, around the radiant child in the mother's lap, different persons stand nearer or more remote, partly in inward reverence

and love, partly with vague anticipation and eager curiosity; the light which proceeds from the child extends in diminishing degrees to all countenances; the impression which the sight of its beauty makes upon the bystanders is stronger or weaker, as they are nearer or further off; but all are seized by the divine spell, and charmed within its circle: thus, also, a noble family life, which keeps in its midst the heavenly light of love, will shed a splendor upon all who come within its sphere, and awaken, even in the most remote, an intimation of the higher beauty of life.

LECTURE XVIII.

SOCIALITY AND PUBLIC SPIRIT.

THE large, rich province of love, in its extreme confines, is filled up by sociality and public spirit, of which we will treat to-day. Sympathy, benevolence, and beneficence, form, as it were, the porch to the sanctuary of friendship and domestic life: attached to this, as a pleasure-garden, is social life, which is resorted to for recreation and refreshment, — in which old friends are found, and new ones are made, — where, in cheerful amusements, congenial minds meet together, become acquainted, and associate for the serious business of life. Further along, the circles of professional fraternity are formed, and those of citizenship; the whole is surrounded by the larger circles of national society and of church communion; and the background, losing itself in the far prospect, is formed by the wide circle of human brotherhood, or world-citizenship.

Sociality is a band which is intertwined with all life, and approximates and endears men to each other in the most diverse relations. We have already remarked that we share the social instinct with the animals, and that it has its source in the natural sympathy of like creatures for like. Already child will play with child, and no luxury will make up to him the want of playmates.

Boy seeks boy upon the play-ground, girl likes to play with her doll with girl, youth and maiden seek society appropriate to them; and the same want continues in mature years and old age. The old man, dead to all other enjoyment, will at least participate, with his aged companions, in the remembrance of past life, and delight in confiding conversation. But individual seeks not merely individual, but feels himself yet more cheered in a whole circle; nay, the family, rich as it may be in itself, opens itself cheerfully to social intercourse, and receives the nurture and incitement which can spring only thence; and, in domestic life, by the fireside, sociality develops its fairest pleasures and graces.

Now, what is it that we seek in society, what is its aim, and in what sense and spirit should we cultivate it?

The social instinct is sensuous, and so, also, is its nearest aim, that is to say, the charm of pleasure. The company of those is sought, who attract by their fascination, vivacity, and cheerfulness; inclination, therefore, a sensuous bond, unites companions together. As soon as love enters, friendship arises; and this may be developed from sociality, and even connected with it; but it is something higher, and must not be confounded with it. There is an intellectual sociality in reading, conversation, the enjoyment of art; but we know that there is also an intellectual sensuality, and an intellectual charm, in what is merely pleasurable; and, even in intellectual society, as such, mere pleasure in what is agreeable is the chief element. That is agreeable which advances and elevates our sensuous life; but organic life has its highest development and manifestation in activity; action is as necessary to us as

eating and drinking, and the instinct of activity is roused and gratified by society. But action subserves, in part, the understanding and its earnest aims, in part the free, bright play of the fancy; and it is the activity of this which is peculiarly called into exercise by society. The play of this power is entirely sensuous, and yet it consists in the freest movement. The understanding goes its definite way, and measures its circle definitely; but fancy roves from place to place, and is bound by no rule but the charm of vivacity, fascination, variety: hence seriousness is banished from the social circle, and sportiveness, merriment, varied excitement, apparent aimlessness, prevail there. This holds true, generally, from the plays of childhood, which are almost entirely the work of fancy, to the most intellectual conversation, which men of education carry on together, and in which fancy must wholly prevail. Even the understanding subserves, in conversation, only cheerful amusement; it can employ its acuteness only as a rare, difficult charm, as strong seasoning; but it is most welcome in the form of wit, lightly moving, with many-colored play, whose only law is the free sport of fancy. Yet more rarely may serious remembrances of business relations enter, and even these pass merely as means of entertainment. Men look forth from the cheerful circle of amusement to the sphere of business or profession, not in order to banish the mind thither, but to allow it to hover freely over that sphere. Seriousness, when predominant, is the bane of ordinary sociality; not only the seriousness of the understanding, and of business, but even the earnestness of strong feeling. Would we enter deeply into that which is sacred and venerable

to the heart, for instance, somewhat into the concerns of religion, the ease of feeling and thought throughout the company would immediately cease. Even the enjoyment of art, the fairest and most excellent means of social entertainment, cannot extend to serious criticism without missing its aim. Moreover, entering into serious occupation and frame of mind presupposes a congeniality of disposition, which should be the case in friendship, but not necessarily in ordinary sociality. Society should not be made up of too diverse materials; nor should it be too uniform and monotonous; variety must prevail in conversation, as in society itself.

But is an aim so sensuous worthy the moral man? and may we seek any thing sensuous for its own sake? In general, the sensuous is but the means to something higher; and so, also, sociality. It should, in the first place, serve as a means of relaxation from the earnestness of busy life, and refreshment in order to the prosecution of our business, as bodily repose and recreation after labor are necessary to the health. The mind becomes overstrained by constant attention to the same object, by use of the same faculty, be it the understanding, memory, or imagination: now, in society, it should be directed to other objects, and other faculties should be set in action, in order that it may be refreshed and rested. Indeed, the mind does not repose so well in idleness, where it is haunted by the remembrance of labor, as in a new and varied activity, which we call diversion. In the various play which the magic wand of fancy calls forth, its powers are refreshed, the lost balance is restored, while the wearied faculties rest, and others, therefore, come into play, and the light, free

movement in which it has rocked for a season recalls the desire for the earnest, steady occupation of business.

But sociality should also serve as a means of intellectual nurture and incitement. As the mind, by constant application to business, becomes overstrained and weary, so it is usually made onesided and sluggish thereby. The geometer exercises principally but a single faculty, that is, the understanding, and his occupation does not awaken the heart or the sentiments; it is natural that he should become dry and cold thereby, and perhaps lose his taste for other employments in hours of recreation. To read an entertaining book, a poem, demands, again, a certain effort, from which his weary mind shrinks; but society easily affords means of rousing his spirits; by recreation and diversion, he receives nourishment for his languishing powers; and, as food, by the charm of taste, promotes enjoyment, so new thoughts and feelings, by the charm of wit and geniality, find their way to his closed mind. It is, indeed, incalculable what impressions may be made upon the disposition in social life; a spark will often be thrown into it, which is first kindled after a long time, and warms and animates it anew; unconsciously we receive, in social communion, a thought, a feeling, which we subsequently develop and cultivate, and bring to mind.

But, preëminently, sociality opposes the onesidedness of existence, by bringing together persons otherwise separated, by giving opportunity for new acquaintances, and for learning the characteristics of different persons. Even the impression which a new face or a new voice makes upon us may be very important; for what is

there which is not portrayed upon the face! how wonderfully a voice once in a while excites us! The prospect of an entirely new existence is unfolded in the gaze of an eye; and what fulness, what depth, what life, in an intellectual, feeling eye! By conversational intercourse, we become acquainted with the views and sentiments of a stranger; and even if he throws out only cursory suggestions, these may awaken much within us—a new life may come to us from him, an entirely new province be unveiled. Many men, although living in the same city, do not become acquainted with each other, unless society brings them together; or they are acquainted only in business, and, of course, but partially;—they entertain prejudices against each other, and one hates in the other the phantom of his own delusion. Let them come together in society, where man meets man: what an effect! prejudices vanish—the look of the eye, the living voice, the innocent freedom of conversation, the cheerfulness of the entertainment, scatters them, and opens the heart to kindly feelings. How often enemies become reconciled by social intercourse! how many a one has found his friend, his beloved, and wife, in this way!

Sociality should, in general, like beneficence, subserve friendship; it is, like that, a sensible means, an outward pathway, towards communion. In social intercourse, sympathy and benevolence receive external incitements; one becomes acquainted with men, and their circumstances and qualities, and takes an interest in them. And if we do not see themselves in society, yet we see their friends and acquaintances, and learn this and that of their affairs, whereby sympathy and in-

terest are, at least, prepared. But sociality should also promote the intercourse of those who are already friends; if they cannot see and speak to each other, except in the hours of recreation, it is only there that a free, hearty interchange takes place. Would they be glad to have a confidential *tête-à-tête*, the opportunity may not always offer; and, besides, even meeting in presence of others has its peculiar charms and advantages. By this service, which sociality lends to friendship, it appears in its greatest importance. Friendship ennobles and beautifies life, awakens and nurtures enthusiasm for all that is grand and beautiful; then, honored be its noble, friendly companion and mediator, sociality!

But, finally, social life, like every thing which serves as a means, — like every sensible enjoyment, — should have in itself a moral aim; and this is cheerfulness. Cheerfulness we should value not merely as a means of recreation and refreshment, but on its own account; we ought to acknowledge the pleasure experienced, with gratitude, as a gift of the Creator. As we taste the precious wine not only as a means of invigorating the body, but should acknowledge it immediately, with cheerful but pure heart, as a gift of the Creator's goodness, so ought we also to be cheerful in society, for the sake of being cheerful, and to enjoy life on its happy side immediately, as a gift of the Creator. But we can be, in the strict sense, cheerful only in society; and social cheerfulness is purified from selfish sensuality by companionship, and exalted to a higher sphere. Pious gratitude towards the Creator cannot always be expressed in society, unless a cheerful, pious song give

higher utterance and play to the general feeling of joy ; but a pure cheerfulness is already, in itself, a pious sentiment, and an offering acceptable to the Creator.

From these aims of sociality the rules of our conduct in regard to it follow of themselves.

In the first place, — as to the persons with whom we seek intercourse, and the circles which we form, and into which we should enter, — a natural impulse generally draws us towards our like. Child seeks child, youth youth, man man, woman woman, for company. As in friendship, it is likeness, connected with a certain difference, which unites society. Interchange can be made only between equals, but they must bring something different to the exchange. Social enjoyment, social play, every entertainment, presupposes an equal receptivity or similarity of taste ; but to this similarity of taste variety must be offered, else charm and incitement fail. One, therefore, should seek out, among his equals, such for society as, by vivacity of mind, force of invention, wit, and intellectual entertainment, know how to draw attention and confer pleasure.

Sociality between like and like has certainly its value ; nature leads to it, and who may oppose it ? All the aims, also, of social life may be, in a certain degree, attained by it — recreation, refreshment, intellectual nurture, incitement, encouragement. Such intercourse will form and sustain friendship ; for friends are usually found among those of the same age, sex, rank, and calling. One will often, among his equals, make the most important, fruitful acquaintances, and in their intercourse gain new thoughts and views ; which will

gain entrance so much the more, as they refer immediately to our business, and other relations of life. But sociality should by no means be limited to the company of equals, for onesidedness would not thus be sufficiently guarded against. Not only should persons of one age, sex, and calling, meet in life, but all should come into a certain contact with each other, as they actually share life. It is always a mark of want of mental culture, if persons confine themselves to a narrow circle of society; they are lacking in taste for any other sphere of life but their own. The youth takes no interest in the man, and feels embarrassed and impatient in his company; the man cannot feel at home in female society; the merchant may know nothing of the scholar, and the latter nothing of him, and of the man of business. Partial society not only promotes onesidedness, but also rudeness, in life. Youths confined to themselves readily addict themselves to coarse gratifications; in the society of men, conversation is indulged in which would offend the ears of women;—and in the female circle empty commonplace insinuates itself, if men do not give point and significance to conversation. Therefore sociality is loveliest in the family. Here, at least, the mistress of the household will lend grace and refinement to the social tone, even if sons, daughters, and kindred, do not contribute to the variety and vivacity of intercourse. It is a rude custom in England, for the women to retire after the dessert, in order to give free course to the licentiousness of conversation heated by wine; thus to exclude women is to rob society of its finest ornament.

The family is the loveliest asylum of social life. A

happy family hides in its bosom not only the external pleasures and comforts, which are its conditions, but also the fulness of cheerfulness and joy, which pours itself out, as if in overflow of hospitality, in the circle of guests. It is happy for the guest, if he enter a house where harmony and love prevail; it is as if he had entered a shady, fragrant grove. As many a one, in the circle of a noble family, is made to realize his own condition in respect to domestic life, he is seized with a longing for similar society, and he turns back from his wild life. Youths and maidens find here their patterns, and married people discover many excellences which they may appropriate to themselves. A noble family exercises a beautiful and highly-agreeable kind of beneficence, if it is hospitable, and is open to social life; it tends to instruct and cultivate others, it sheds its light and warmth around, it softens and ennobles manners; but it needs sociality, also, for itself. It is bad, if married people seek to make up by society for dislike and discord at home; the evil is thereby only alleviated, not radically cured. But, generally, even harmonious couples need social relaxation; and, even if they afford each other all that love can grant, yet by and by there will be lack of fresh incitement; the more they have lived together, the more they will need outward excitement, in order to escape monotony; sociality will afford them what mutual reading, and study of art, or enjoyment of nature, cannot impart. Man needs the company of men, woman of women, in reference to the intellectual wants of sex and calling; and both are alike benefited by promiscuous society, in which life moves before them in manifold display. The social circle is generally

greater, which related families form with each other, parents with their married children, brothers and sisters with each other; but this company cannot satisfy all wants; since relatives, especially if the circle of affinity is too narrowly limited merely to the paternal city, or merely to certain distinguished families, become soon too much assimilated in views, sentiment, and way of life, and become dull towards each other, so that there is lack of living, varied interchange. If there are, for example, families who keep up among themselves a certain spirit of caste, or have certain other advantages in common, then, into their company, if others are excluded, no excitement can enter, to elevate them above such limitation; they will rather confirm one another in narrowness. The main advantage of social intercourse, the free play of imagination, will be wanting to such a limited circle; uniformity will prevail, and, indeed, not that of the understanding, but the baser uniformity of routine. Relatives should, of course, associate together; this promotes harmony and confidence; but this intercourse should be, first of all, free; for that which is forced does not answer the aim of society. Business should have its restrictions; but, in society, we should breathe freely, and follow free inclination. Secondly, intercourse with relations should not be exclusive towards strangers, through whom only freshness and variety can enter into society. By this exclusiveness, one does a wrong towards self, by depriving oneself of the noblest and most beneficial gratification, and a wrong towards others, to whom participation in the enjoyments of the domestic circle is invidiously refused. The want of benevolence is punished, by its

closing the heart more and more towards gentle emotions; and moral culture thus retrogrades, instead of constantly advancing, by intercourse with mankind.

"Be not forgetful to entertain strangers; for thereby some have entertained angels unawares." What truth lies in these sacred words! Abraham, Lot, entertained and harbored angels, messengers of salvation and peace, who brought joy to their dwellings, and showed them the way of preservation from death. The angel of salvation and peace to a family that lives in narrowness, vulgarity, and prejudice, may be a stranger, who, with higher views, with free spirit, enters their midst, and awakens their dormant hearts. The pool of stagnation may be moved by a flash of thought, which, from the heaven of inspiration, falls upon an obdurate mind. In the free play of imagination, which prevails in social life, there is something divine; since it soars above human wilfulness and routine, and bears people along with it often contrary to their thoughts and anticipations: the higher is thus presented to us, without our immediately apprehending and recognizing it, as Abraham and Lot were not immediately aware that angels had come in to them. And, even if sociality had no further wholesome consequences than to open our heart to sympathy, participation, benevolence, and to prepare the way for friendship, then that beautiful and sublime saying of Scripture is justified. Is not love the angel of peace and salvation, who is sent to us in order to warm and clear up our cold, darkling life? And who can be so rich in love, as to need to close his heart against all increase? What family can be so happy, as not to be made happier by a sympathizing friend? O,

let not the heavenly messengers, whom God sends to you, stand without! open to them your gates! meet them with friendly cordiality! open to them your heart! They will not go away without leaving a precious gift behind.

Sociality should also extend beyond domestic life. Different families and individuals should meet in larger assemblies, in public places, in order that contact and interchange may become broad and liberal; for no house can afford a point of union for all the inhabitants of a city; there will always be distinctions and obstacles by which many are excluded. In this general circle, the distinctions should, as far as possible, be set aside, and good-breeding and cultivation give access to every one. By the removal of those limits, the many-sidedness of life, as the main end of sociality, is promoted; a universal kindness is diffused between the different classes of society, and hostile prejudices of one against another can no longer be maintained.

In the second place, as to the means of social enjoyment and entertainment, they may be, indeed, no other than sensuous charms, wherein the intellectual means of reading, conversation, music, and the like, are included; but let all be considered and used only as means towards higher aims, and the noble be preferred to the ignoble. The most usual and natural means of enjoyment are eating and drinking. Hospitable entertainment is, in part, charitable towards the poor and strangers, and constitutes a province of beneficence, in part social towards friends and acquaintance, in order to promote mutual enjoyment and cheerfulness. The time of meals serves for corporeal recreation and re-

freshment, and people are thereby led very naturally to cheerfulness, since they feel stimulated in senses, and well. Bread strengthens the heart of man, and wine makes him glad. This gladness is enhanced by social enjoyment, and therefore cheerful company at table is sought with alacrity. Friend with friend will cheerfully put up with the daily meal, which the charm of infrequency, and, still more, entertaining conversation, makes festive; but hospitality would gladly enhance the charm by a rare dish, and a greater abundance; and the guest is pleased at the sight of abundance, even if he sets no value upon luxury. As it does us good to enter a well-regulated household, and the image of peace and comfort there smiles upon us, so the abundance observed there makes a grateful impression. On the other hand, the hosts feel their prosperity anew, if they can offer to the guest the abundance of the household; they enjoy the gift of God with higher consciousness. But let not abundance be affected or forced, nor purchased by painful or ruinous privations, so that domestic comfort suffers in consequence of the effort made; nor let luxury in self or others be ministered to, so that, by sacrificing to the god of the belly, the true aim of sociality is mistaken and lost. Regard and anxiety for the pleasures of the table should be guided merely by the effort to promote social enjoyment; but this suffers, and takes a lower direction, if the palate is too much taken into the account. Before all things, sociality should not be oppressed by the weight which is falsely attached to a merely outward ceremony. The less the preparations for company cost, the freer and easier it will be. If cheerfulness and benevolence sea-

son the meal, it will be precious; good cheer, as the proverb says, is the best dish which can be set forth. Even beyond the domestic circle, a social meal-time forms a natural centre of sociality, although the higher charm which domestic life gives may be wanting; but, even there, let not eating and drinking be the object, but the means, and let the abundance only enhance the cheerfulness or festivity of the day, but not minister to ignoble gluttony or daintiness.

By a certain contracted, gloomy view of life, many disapprove every unusual expense in behalf of social enjoyment, and would devote to the poor all that transcends their own wants. They mistake the high worth and wholesome influences of sociality, without which men would not be susceptible of much good, and, in their gloomy disposition, have no sense of the pious, grateful joy which a pure heart can feel, even amid the enjoyments of the senses. The poor should not starve, but the joys of sociality should not be destroyed by an exaggerated, anxious charitableness.

If possible, let other, nobler means of sociality be used than the pleasures of the table. The most natural, rich, and fruitful means of entertainment will ever be conversation, in which thoughts and sentiments are interchanged, by which new acquaintances are made, and new incitements received. The nobler and more cultivated the people, the richer, the more attractive, and awakening, the conversation; and to promote such is to promote nobleness of mind and culture. But it is easier to feel the want of good intercourse, and to care for its satisfaction, than it is to satisfy it. Let the company of those persons be chosen, who, by

their gifts and education, are in a situation to give conversation a higher turn and richer value. Alas for a society which knows no better entertainment than communicating the city news! although even this topic, if treated in good sense, may give rise to fruitful and instructive remark. Since matter of conversation may sometimes fail, let the entertainment be refreshed by amusements, which are the nobler the more they promote union, and produce livelier feeling. Better than cards, which serve no purpose but to keep off ennui, are plays of the understanding or of wit, which, by the participation of elder persons, attain a nobler significance, and should not be left entirely to the young. Music and dancing may mingle with these; and, at a festive meal, a joyous song should never be wanting, by which cheerfulness is not only promoted, but also purified and ennobled. In smaller circles, those persons who stand nearer each other in education and taste should alternate conversation with the reading of a good book, whereby conversation is renewed with fresh life and material. Finally, let not the fairest and most fruitful means of sociality be neglected, — I mean the enjoyment of nature. A company in the open air, beneath verdant shades, a fair landscape before them, the blue heaven above them, — can they want cheerfulness? Must not every heart expand? must not every eye gleam with joy? must not every spirit take wing? Into such a circle can gossiping commonplace and base slander enter? This dark demon does not endure the all-seeing, cheerful eye of the sun; morbid envy is cured by the sight of the blue heaven, the green wood; and the sourness and bitterness of the

disposition is assuaged by the mild, balsamic breezes. O nature! to thine inexhaustible fount of healing let us flee, whenever the poison of vice and folly enters our heart. In its pure, strengthening floods we would bathe: let its drink of the gods pour new vigor into the weary soul.

Finally, let us be impressed with the idea that the spirit of benevolence should prevail in sociality, and that friendship is the end which should be aimed at: in this, sociality follows beneficence, nay, is its sister; both care for the welfare of fellow-men, enhance the happiness of life, and establish friendly connections. As the gifts of assistance, which succor pressing necessities, — as the gifts of advice, instruction, and education, — should be imparted with benevolence, so let the cheerful gifts of hospitality, which quicken and refresh the sense, and the fairer gifts of conversation, wit, talent for art, which cheer the mind, be offered with that kindness which alone can give joy to others. Far from us be that vain ostentation, with which some persons, by lavish prodigality and display of personal excellences, seek to dazzle and to excite envy, or to win applause; such gifts cause no joy, and do not bear the fair fruits of general gladness. Far from us be every malicious disposition and ill-natured sentiment, jest, contempt, arrogance, and, above all, slander, which but too often, merely for the charm of novelty and wit, pours its sweetened poison into social intercourse. Far away be all that promotes luxury, voluptuousness, and insolence: Bacchus and Ceres may preside as gods with cheerful temperance; and, if Amor glides in, let it be the lovely son of the heavenly Venus, by whose

arrows innocent hearts are unconsciously stricken. Let no one turn away from a social circle but with more cheerful, easier, more elevated soul, with fresh ardor for action. And happy he who bears away yet more with him! into whose soul a higher spark of light has fallen! to whom a noble mind has been introduced, and a lovely spirit unveiled!

From sociality and its cheerful play, we now turn to that even more universal, but serious, connection of men, which public spirit establishes and maintains. Friendship and love unite individuals by participation in the common aims of perfection, and by personal congeniality. Public spirit unites entire classes of the people, and the whole nation itself, by zeal and love for the common affairs of general and public life; but personal love, directed towards personal excellence, formed by personal congeniality, does not lie at the foundation of this further connection; here all love one another, and all merely for the sake of the common weal. However, pure humane love should every where prevail, and selfishness, both of the individual and the community, should be suppressed. Between both departments, that of personal friendship and that of public spirit, sociality has cheerful sway; it binds and maintains many a personal band, and animates, by its cheerful play, the intercourse of the multitude, which would otherwise have only the earnestness of business.

Public spirit, according to the common concerns to which it ministers, is in part especial, in part universal. Upon the lowest step stands the public spirit of classes and corporations, whose common affairs fill a narrower circle. The distinction of classes is decided partly by

profession, partly by civil rights. If these rights are pernicious prerogatives, as is the case with those of a nobility which, by birth, maintains an exclusive claim to take part in the government, and to which the freedom of the nation is sold, then, in such a class, no true public spirit can prevail, but only the spirit of selfishness and injustice. If there is, on the contrary, a nobility to whom certain privileges, such as the right of peerage, are granted, for the preservation of the common weal, then the healthy public spirit of this class will consist in united zeal for the public welfare, and its good influence will be shown by its members' seeking to maintain among each other noble, magnanimous virtues and dispositions; it will coincide with true patriotism. The natural and permanent distinction of classes lies in profession or calling; and every calling should be pursued, in the spirit of love, to the general good, so, however, that the advantage of each individual may not suffer thereby. But even professional public spirit may become selfish and unjust, if the associates of a calling, united in privileged guilds, make these privileges their object more than the happy, and, generally, useful, pursuit of their business, and make their union an occasion of oppressing the people. If corporations, and a certain restriction upon trade, are deemed necessary and useful, it will be hard to guard against the inroads of selfishness, which will mate with indolence, and cripple industry. The old system of corporate guilds is to be praised for upholding a certain honor in the craft, and care for strangers, the sick and needy; and the place which guilds held in the civil commonwealth was certainly worthy all honor and re-

spect. We here require a free, purely moral corporate and professional spirit, which is independent of all prerogatives. As each one should love his calling not merely as a matter of gain, but as a means of activity, and as a hold upon the common life, or, if it is a higher calling, as a participation in the common effort for human improvement, so should he also love every other who shares with him the same vocation, and enter into friendly intercourse and coöperation with him, in order that the common interest may be furthered. The more selfishness is kept in the background in a calling, as in that of scholars and artists, the purer and more vital such a public spirit becomes, and exalts itself to a common enthusiasm; it needs no other union than sociality, which here, however, appears as a very weighty and necessary band. In hours of recreation, in the cheerful circle, at a joyous meal, scholars and artists will interchange views and thoughts, cheer one another in their efforts, mutually criticise works, and afford each other manifold incitements; but the absent will at least correspond by letter with each other, and make friendly communications. Active support and assistance, also, will be brought about by such a public spirit, and many a personal friendship, wholesome for science and art, will be formed. All higher efforts succeed best in association; and, if this is animated by true love and inspiration, the greatest perfection will be the result, and grand, majestic works will be the fruit of the development of associate energy. The fellow-feeling of the students of the German universities, so false, jealous of distinction and privilege, disposed to uproar, would be easily cured of its disease, by taking away

their distinctive badge of rank, which favors the prejudice that they are somewhat better than other young people, and if no other restriction were placed upon their love of freedom and association than that of obedience to the civil laws, but if, at the same time, however, these laws were not brought into needless conflict with their notions of honor and freedom.

The more closely the calling is connected with the commonwealth, like that of magistrates and soldiers, the more must the spirit of class be subordinate to patriotic public spirit. The members of such a class may meet in social intercourse, and uphold the honor of their rank; but they should never set themselves at variance and hostility with the genuine spirit of citizenship; and the best citizen will always be the best magistrate and soldier. A magisterial and military rank, which becomes burdensome to the people by its preponderance, and opposes reforms in the commonwealth because its prerogatives may thereby suffer, is a morbid excrescence upon national life, which must be cut off.

In a commonwealth, if there are corporations to whom the care of certain concerns, for instance, the culture of the sciences, is intrusted, then their members should, of course, have a certain public spirit, and provide for the subsistence and prosperity of their institutions, also for the maintenance of their necessary rights; but the supreme aim which they subserve should be the rule by which they measure every thing; and hurtful, cramping prerogatives, and ancient usages, should not only be willingly given up when their repeal is demanded, but should be purposely sur-

rendered. A false public spirit will obstinately hold on to these, and sacrifice the end to the means.

A higher step is taken, by the spirit of association, for common civil and humane concerns, which are best carried on in company, as charity, industry, education, culture of the arts and sciences. In a city without public spirit, such affairs will be left to the care of government, which must carry them on by force, and at great cost, and often not without great mistakes, only through its officers, who often lack impulse and insight, and who must be remunerated; and, even then, the affairs are not made the cause of the people. But, if public spirit unite those, to whose hearts such matters are peculiarly dear, into an associate prosecution of them from free impulse and their own resources, then every thing will succeed better, and the people receive the beneficent gift with grateful hearts, as a free boon. This spirit of association makes the English nation so great; and it is lacking only in the higher, ardent regard for the concerns of national education and mental culture. The fairest pattern of such association is presented by this city, in the Society for the Promotion of Virtue and the Public Good, which cannot be enough praised, and whose noble founder deserves the first civic crown. This society, which can only be named, has that higher reference to national education and mental culture; and Basle gratefully acknowledges what it has done for the improvement of its schools, for the promotion of science and art. To this noble spirit we owe, still further, salutary institutions, salutary for city and country, salutary even for brethren in other parts

of the earth, who turn a grateful eye towards the distant city whence the light of the gospel has come to them. But, since charity begins where one's own necessity ends, and the circle of its cares, small in its beginnings, extends constantly further, the public associate activity should first take care of fellow-citizens, before thinking of others, and first meet the most pressing lower wants, before satisfying the higher.

A broader circle than the spirit of class and corporation is held by the civil public spirit of a city or village, which unites the interest of the different classes in various public concerns, and which is removed by the entrance of selfishness. In a measure, this public spirit, in its genuine, vital development, stands even higher than the spirit of association; since it excludes a narrow, onesided zeal for any particular aim of life. But a higher kind of selfishness and narrowness may pass into it, and induce citizens of particular communes to separate themselves from the entire state and nation, and forget that their welfare is inseparable from the general good.

First, in nationality, or in patriotism, all these different kinds of public spirit find their centre, and, as it were, their heart, from which they receive nutriment, and apart from which they sicken and die. Without patriotism, the public spirit of profession, rank, citizenship, becomes contracted and selfish, and serves rather to suppress, than to promote, the general interest in the common welfare. But, by this, which directs and refers every thing to the common centre, the spirit of every particular community is ennobled, and preserved from decay, as, in a sound organism, by the universal

circulation, the whole is kept in equilibrium, and all superfluous and noxious juices are separated and removed.

Love of country is more than love of home, or attachment to the soil and the city of one's birth and education. We love not the dead, but the living; we love the people of which we are a part, in which we live as a limb upon the body, — the national life, from whose energy and fulness we have received spiritual life, — nationality, or the sum of all public aids, institutions, regulations, manners, and customs, which minister to the concerns of human life, of all effort, activity, care, inspiration for human welfare, morality, and improvement, — the maternal lap of all culture and education, the asylum of every virtue, the shrine of every sanctity, the universal parental home, in which all are formed into men. All love, by which a nearer connection between men is established, has human worth, human perfection, for its object. Now, in country and national life, every thing is united which belongs to human perfection, and promotes its development; all which settles and promotes the material, corporeal good, which ministers to necessary want and abundance, produces comfort and cheerfulness, — agriculture, mechanical industry, trade; all that secures justice and peace, and constitutes the necessary foundations of moral life; all that belongs to mental culture, — education, science, art, religion. We love our country purely and vividly, if we love it for the sake of all these goods; we are grateful towards it, if we acknowledge that we owe it a participation in these goods, and have received from it, as a benefaction, all that we possess:

we have patriotic public spirit, if we regard all these affairs as common, which can succeed only by the union of all powers and efforts: we show gratitude towards country, by devoting the energies developed with its aid to the elevation, enlargement, and beautifying of general life, and bringing to it, as an offering, every mental gift, knowledge, and talent, every effort and pains: we love our fellow-citizens, if we see in them the sharers in the general advantages, fellow-laborers in the public work of life, children of the universal mother, brethren and kindred in spirit, — if we feel happy in their company, find ourselves strengthened, cheered, elevated, — if we draw from general intercourse and reciprocity nurture, incitement, energy, inspiration, give back all that we can do in ourselves, as our contribution, and find our brightest reward in our usefulness to the whole: we live for country, if we breathe, move, and feel, as it were, with the general life, — if, with every pulse, the universal sense of life thrills through the breast, and the general weal and woe move the heart like our own: and, as friend does for friend, in extraordinary cases, extraordinary things, and makes every sacrifice, nay, even devotes his life for him, so, also, the true son of his country sacrifices, for the preservation of his brethren, all that he has, cheerfully sheds his blood, and breathes out his life in love. Citizen loves citizen immediately for his country's sake, and the personal worth of the individual is not taken into the account; but friends love one another more strongly, and with added enthusiasm, on account of common love for country, for the sake of what both have done for it; and, whilst they press each other to

the heart, they embrace country: the heart of every good citizen beats fondly towards the heroes, chiefs, benefactors of the commonwealth; in them he loves the spirit of his country in personal manifestation: and thus patriotism returns to friendship, intertwines with it, and in it gains personal existence.

The love of country should dwell in the heart of every citizen, since each owes this to it; especially should it animate those who devote to it their professional activity — magistrates. They should devote their powers to the common welfare, to the best good of all, labor for public justice and honor, and subordinate their private comfort to the happiness of the nation. Woe to the state whose officers are hirelings, or robbers and thieves, who sell themselves to the highest bidder! who, as a caste, conspire against the people, and minister to the humors of a despot! The public welfare will prosper only where the rulers are the best citizens, and citizens receive public offices from disinterested patriotism, and faithfully administer them.

Like love for father and mother, for brother and sister, patriotism must be inborn and instilled, and be unconscious of itself, before it finds free recognition in the free spirit of the mature man; nay, in the great mass, which cannot pass free and elevated judgment upon the benefits which they receive from country, patriotism must always be rather an unconscious sentiment, than a clearly-defined principle. The people must love their laws, customs, and manners, because they are theirs, because they have grown up under them, because they cannot live without them. Those who control life with free mind, and go before the

people as leaders, should know what they love, and why they love it, and also recognize the defects of national life, in order to remedy them; their patriotism is true love, because it is free and living; and from them a noble enthusiasm will strike, like lightning-flashes, upon the people, and inflame them to resist the foe, as well as reform and improve the state. But the mass should stand firm in trusty attachment to existing institutions, and combine in faithful harmony. Hence custom is so important for the steadfastness of national being; it is the nurse which suckles the children of the country, and filial love flows into them with the milk; it knits the band of concord, since it binds all to the same manners and usages. Concord is the primary condition of all public spirit, as of all love; to concord every free effort should tend, whose aim should be only the common welfare; but it will rest most safely on the firm ground of custom.

Patriotism, especially that which is free, conscious, vital, cannot prosper without publicity; since otherwise no interest is awakened and nourished for the common concerns, and each one is limited merely to that which bears immediately upon himself. To publicity belongs, in the first place, the public administration of law. If the citizen perceives only that part of the judicial administration which relates immediately to himself, and, perhaps, not even this satisfactorily, — if he sees his fellow-citizens condemned and acquitted, without understanding the grounds, — how can he then attain the conviction that law is well administered, and learn to love the jurisdiction under which he lives? Secondly, the administration of government should be public, and

render a public account, in order that the citizen may be convinced that the state economy is faithfully administered, and what he contributes to the general need is well applied, and that he may cheerfully contribute more. Finally, the public judgment upon national affairs should be free, and each one should be able to state his mind regarding them, either with pen or voice, in order that a free public opinion may be formed. The freedom of the press will not be dangerous, where a just and mild government has won the confidence of the people; and, if it is accused by the public voice of the commission of a fault, it will yet receive and act upon the information with gratitude; since it can but be its interest to promote the welfare of the whole. Uproar and intrigue will be excited, by the free, open treatment of public concerns, only where, by the government's fault, the leaven of dissatisfaction has accumulated; and silence does not suppress, but smothers this, only until it bursts forth the more violently. A gathered multitude, which does not loudly express itself, but stands in moody dumbness, is like a thundercloud, which, dark and threatening, sweeps overhead in sultry calmness: such is a city in which freedom of thought and of the press is put down, and only a vague murmur is uttered. Finally, as, to the cultivation of friendship, social intercourse is requisite, so, as a necessary stimulant of public spirit to public life, a public sociality is requisite, which is maintained by national festivals. The people must assemble as a nation; and, whilst this is the case in serious business only in purely democratic states, it may take place elsewhere in cheerful festivity, in public games and amusements. Every

village, every city, should have its popular festival, and, if possible, the whole nation also, as the Greeks had their Olympic games. In public festivals, all the partitions which otherwise divide different ages, sexes, and ranks, fall; all are equal in the universal joy, in the common holiday of patriotism. Patriotic festivals should maintain and quicken the remembrance of country and its history, and be devoted to the commemoration of the great deeds and heroes whom it has produced; but, at the same time, the eye should be turned towards the future, and to the hope of the country, which is blooming in its youth. The brightest ornaments of national festivals are the sports of the youth, the competition and emulations of the young men, the heroes of future victories, and the merry plays of the children. All sociality should be cheerful, and especially that which is public, in which each should delight in the general joy; but what can give more delight than the sight of gladsome youth, — sympathy with their merry sports? What can, at the same time, produce more union and friendliness than joy in the young, among whom every one recognizes a son or a daughter, or a brother or sister, or relative? A like band of glad hopes encircles all who are gathered upon the play-ground, and more gently, amid the general delight, will flow the tears of those who have lost their own young hopes. As a bright token of the revival of a more living public spirit, let us hail the attempt to restore youthful festivals in this city, and let us thank, for this effort, that noble society which is fosterer of all public good. It will succeed, as it has succeeded in so much else; it sows its seed upon a fruitful soil; a young, susceptible

generation, indebted to it for a reform in education, sustains its efforts; such a youth will never be led in vain to the field of St. James, nor vainly will the remembrance of that heroic day be stamped upon their memory. Fair hope of the country! golden dawn of a better age! When the sun rises in victorious splendor, and all is brilliant and blooming, we shall be no more; but let the short morning dream of life vanish away, if only its hopes reach their fulfilment! let this heart be still, if but the ardor that streams through it is richly shed upon the world! Cheerfully the fathers die, if they know that heroic sons will defend the consecrated soil in which their bones repose; and they resign with joy the work of their life, if these can carry it on with better energy.

Patriotism is the strongest, nay, the only safeguard of public freedom and security. No citadels and hosts of troops, no arts of negotiation, give protection from the press of danger; that is light chaff, which the storm scatters: only the heroic courage of the enthusiastic children of their country, steadfast concord, the unyielding firmness of high-minded citizens and counselors, who shrink from no sacrifice which honor dictates, and prefer honorable defeat to a shameful peace, can form a dam which no waves break through. Though small the host of defenders of their country; though feeble the energies of the state; though mighty the foe; though inexhaustible his resources; — invincible is the enthusiastic courage, the heroic steadfastness of a patriotic, united nation; the enemy itself will honor their virtue, and would have them for friends instead of implacable foes. History loudly declares this truth; the

fields of victory among the Alpine valleys bear witness of it, and especially the battle-field of St. James, where the sacrifice of a few heroes commanded the respect of the enemy and the cessation of hostilities. And, if a high-souled nation is defeated in battle, it yet lives in undying glory, and the flames of destruction, in which it falls a sacrifice, shine on and on in glorified splendor.

But patriotism is also a protection against the worse internal foe of freedom. A nation, animated by a powerful public spirit, will never bow to the tyranny of one or many; it will defend its freedom, and all the blessings of its legislation and constitution, against fraud and violence, against enticement and flattery. A nation has always been its own oppressor, or a part the oppressor of the whole. Whence can tyranny derive its power, but from the forces of the nation? And is it not its own guilt, if it gives these up for its own oppression? Though the tyrant be surrounded by his mercenaries, it is only the discord of the people which allows them to be in the country. All tyranny falls powerless together, if the people do not hold it up. Concord is a defence against internal, as well as outward, foes; and the motto of every despot is, "Divide and conquer." In fine, public spirit is also security against torpor of government, and all the corruptions which result from it; it rouses government, by the living reaction of public opinion, to watchfulness, to energetic administration, to the maintenance and reform of the laws, to the punishment of crimes and vices, and to the reward of virtue. People and government must stand in living reciprocity, and bear up and hold, awaken and animate, one another; and, if a prince or ruler is willing to pre-

sent himself to the people in passive inactivity, then he will rock himself into a sluggish repose, from which the storm of fate must fearfully arouse him.

But patriotism does not merely sustain and protect; it is the creative spirit of all that is good, grand, and beautiful, in national existence; it awakens every effort towards improvement, excites invention, ardor for action, and transforms public life into a theatre of inspired emulation for the general welfare and perfection; for love not only loves the perfect, but would also make still more perfect what it loves. This creative and perfecting patriotism rises above the sphere of custom, and maintains the quiet, conservative public spirit, the child of custom, from torpor; it is connected with the free spirit of morality, which demands movement and progress, and with enthusiasm for every good and fair ideal: exalted by this, it will, with the narrow sphere of custom, abandon the marshy ground of selfishness; for there is, indeed, a selfish nationality, whose aim is only wealth and power, and which regards justice and mental culture as mere delusion; and, almost always, patriotism has appeared rapacious and oppressive towards foreign nations. If, to the English, the praise of public spirit cannot be denied, yet they must bear the reproach of greediness and selfishness. The German people have often been reproached with want of public spirit, and not entirely without reason: on that account, since, by its disintegration, there is lack of attachment to a uniform constitution and manner, the freedom of the mind, and the higher tendency towards mental culture, is the more vital. The Swiss share this tendency with the Germans, since they share their lan-

guage and literature; at the same time, they enjoy a happy constitution, founded by heroic enthusiasm, and their relation to other states is that of just, peaceful neutrality; and thus their patriotism should, and may, rise to the highest aim which can be set for a nation.

The active spirit of patriotism is shown in ardor of love for the public honor and glory, by virtue of which every individual seeks activity and importance in public existence, and submits what he does and contributes, with childlike devotion, to the public decision, and strives for the public approbation. As friend honors the judgment of friend, and strives for his approbation, — as the industrious son feels himself rewarded by his father's praise, — so the true son of his country lays open his deeds and works to the sentence of the public; and high feeling swells his breast, when the voice of the wisest and best of his fellow-citizens awards him approbation: as he, in general, lives as a part of the whole, so he finds his enjoyment only in the enjoyment of all. In a healthful, living national life, desert towards country must be rewarded, and a noble zeal and emulation kindled, that enterprise may not slumber. The Greeks and Romans were so great, because public merit was so nobly rewarded. To be acknowledged as victor in public games, to be praised in the songs of bards, immortalized in statues, borne on the waves of universal renown, — this was worthy the highest endeavor; such a moment outweighs the pleasure of a whole existence. What a proud, godlike feeling, to proceed to the Capitol in the triumphal car, and, at the moment, to be first of a whole, high-souled nation, the object of universal admiration and gratitude! The ancients rewarded merit

by noble tokens, by a crown, a song, a monument: an ambition for such distinctions is exalted above the base thirst for gold, which public requital should not encourage. If merit should not be left to starve, yet it should not be rewarded with gold, which cannot be its price. All which belongs to the perfecting of national existence finds its reward in public gratitude; not merely the virtue of the warrior and the statesman, but also the merit of the discoverer, the scholar, the poet, and artist. But let not the caprice of a ruler, or of a populace beguiled by flattery, lavish praise, but let it be bestowed by the impartial, discriminating judgment of the best of the nation, whose approbation alone is a reward, apart from any badge of honor.

According to a view taught by Montesquieu, honor should be especially prevalent in monarchical states; but an honor which springs merely from the decision of the despot, and does not rest immediately upon public opinion, is hardly genuine. The honor of the feudal system — chivalrous honor — is without patriotism, and is stained by the spirit of caste. Our monarchical civil life is conscious of scarcely any other honor than that of courtly and official rank, distinctions of order and title: beyond this, private life draws all efforts into its narrow sphere; and most persons have regard merely to domestic comfort, satisfied if, in this respect, the state is favorable to them. Even those who, by profession, live in public activity, — officials and soldiers, — chiefly enter the public service for the pay, in order to spend the proceeds comfortably at home. We are lacking in institutions and points of public union, such as the games and festivals of the ancients, where merit found

its worthy acknowledgment; we do not live in the free, sunny air of public life, which exalts and strengthens the mind. Therefore it is, that so rarely, with us, public virtue flourishes; therefore there is want of the great deeds of inspiration and self-sacrifice for the common good; therefore, in times of public danger, citizens seek to save their own fortune, instead of sacrificing it to country; therefore all so readily bend beneath the yoke of public ignominy, in order to prolong their pitiable existence. The spirit of community is awakened from its slumber, and roused, although first in small circles; from beneath, it will, step by step, work upward, and finally pervade the whole nation. Let this great hope fill our breast! The bare thought of it exalts the soul; but the courage to believe in it gives wings to inspiration, and courageous faith brings on its fulfilment. In our inner soul, let us plant the germ of a brighter future; then it will develop itself, burst forth with mighty increase, and, like a vast tree, fill the world.

Patriotism is limited to one's own nation, and hence may always subserve selfishness, although of a higher kind, as was the case with the patriotism of the Greeks and Romans, whom national hate and passion for conquest polluted; it is purified by the ecclesiastical public spirit, and the religious zeal, which unites all Christian nations in a universal brotherhood. Sacred truth, religious virtue and devotion, are the common property of all Christians, and all should strive and contend for them in harmonious love, and live as brethren in common zeal and endeavor. This Christian brotherly love will animate the love of fellow-citizens towards one

another with a higher, holier warmth, and dispose nations to peace and clemency towards each other. If it were truly living, and governed the hearts of princes and potentates, there would be no more war, and no triumphs would be celebrated but those of magnanimous love and emulous virtue. But, even if this pious wish remains for a long while, and even forever, unsatisfied upon earth, yet Christian love should, at least, mitigate the ferocity of war, and make its wild forces obedient to justice. Never let the sword be drawn but in defence, and let it return to the scabbard whenever the foe offers a just peace.

In its own sphere, ecclesiastical public spirit will manifest itself as zeal for the faith, and as moral and religious enthusiasm, by protecting and sustaining the life of the church in its sacred creeds, usages, and forms, and by always diffusing, purifying, and perfecting them. Custom, faithful attachment to the tradition of the fathers, will be the conservative principle; but free inspiration will lead towards perfection, and the former should never cramp the latter. Nothing human is perfect, and can do without reform; it is so with the church, as an outward, human institution. The creed must be ever purified from human opinions; the exercise of devotion must ever be animated and beautified. To this effort towards perfection, all should unite their influence, and every individual should devote to the common work the peculiar gifts and powers which Heaven has granted him. Let the seeker for truth bear the light of better science into public theology; let the educator and teacher labor for a reform in the religious instruction of youth; let the poet and

artist beautify the religious services and sacred architecture; and let him whom God has blessed with the goods of this world, bestow them upon religious establishments, and take the arts into the service of the church. Beautiful age, when a pious zeal reared those majestic cathedrals, before which we stand awed by the crushing sense of our own littleness! Noble enthusiasm, which set those gigantic masses in motion, and creatively animated them with the spirit of beauty and grace! O faith, which moves and heaps up mountains, in order to climb to heaven upon them!

But ecclesiastical public spirit should especially animate those whose profession makes the church their sphere: with ardent devotion to eternal truth, and all the patterns of pious life, forgetting themselves, and every selfish privilege of their rank, they should seek and strive only for that which leads to perfection, and lend their hand to every reform. Alas for the church whose clergy jealously guard their power, and, with the contracted, selfish spirit of caste, suppress every free effort, in order to keep the people under minority! A living public spirit in the church will cheerfully respond to the desire for reform in enlightened and fervent men; but, if habit and prejudice blind the great mass, and spiritual despotism provokes them to resistance, so that the funeral pile is made ready for those who would enlighten them, then the enthusiast for the church, as for country, will not fear death. The martyr-death—death for truth—is the brightest death; for the love of truth is the purest; it is the heavenly, eternal love itself. By this death, the soul is purified from all earthly inclination, which enters even into patriotism, and stands the

highest test of fidelity — fidelity to self and to God. This death is always victorious and saving; for, in true love, truth prevails over the fear of death, and thereby proves its divine power, which, sooner or later, conquers error; the sacrificial flame of martyrdom shines, as the torch of truth, through the night of time, and no darkness can quench its beams.

Eccelesiastical public spirit is not merely that of a single communion, or of any sectional or national church; it strives against all schism, and removes the narrow limits of sectarianism, whilst it extends its interest and love over the whole church of Christ. The fervent Christian sympathizes with his foreign brethren, and shares their spiritual weal and woe. If a church in the remotest parts of the earth is persecuted and oppressed on account of faith, every other church should make the case its own, and, if possible, afford succor to its wronged sister. The fervor of the Christian wishes to see the Christian church ever more widely extended, and strives to impart to the unbelieving the blessings of the gospel; hence missionary enterprises, and the holy zeal in which those called to them encounter all dangers and difficulties.

Herein Christian public spirit joins the sentiment of world-citizenship, which regards all nations as brethren, and all human concerns upon earth as those of every man and every nation. This sentiment springs chiefly from interest in the national life of the Europeans and their colonies in other parts of the earth, under whose influence the life of their natives stands, and then it rises into interest in the life of other nations. Would that it might see all the sons of mother earth, who bear

a human countenance, united in a kingdom of love! As over all the sun sheds its beams, and God his paternal love, so should the vital warmth of human brotherhood be poured upon the whole earth, from nation to nation, that each may stand by the other, and give and receive benefits. It is this universal love, to which we owe the abolition of slavery, and the recognition of negroes as human brethren; and it is promoted, moreover, by the enterprising spirit of navigators and discoverers, who are in search of gain and conquest: it follows the traces of their often devastating and ruinous activity, in order to heal the wounds inflicted, to make peace and friendship by beneficence; it transforms the conquests of the sword into those of love; it casts off fetters, in order to join the band of peace. And thus the love which proceeds from universal philanthropy, whilst it oversteps the circle of family, national, and church life, returns to the sphere of pure humanity.

LECTURE XIX.

HONOR. SUICIDE.

Now that we have considered the duty of justice and love towards man in their various degrees, and thus taken a general view of all the relations in which man stands to man, we will proceed to the duty of man towards himself, or to the duty of honor, which is, as it were, the reverse side of justice, or justice in man towards himself.

Now, what are we to understand by the term honor? The common use of language, as the interpreter of the moral notions prevalent among the mass, designates, by the term, especially external honor, or the mere reflection of that which we would commend as an inward sentiment. Honor is usually understood to be that for which man passes in society;—the reputation which public opinion accords to him in the community. We hear of a civil honor, which is lost by disgraceful practices and punishments, for instance, by theft and the pillory. But the subtle thief, who knows how to deceive the public vigilance, not only escapes punishment, but also maintains his honor in society. The disposition and conduct of such a man are called dishonorable, but of him, on the contrary, to whom no fraud, no over-reaching, are attributed, honorable; and thus we arrive

at what we would here regard as the sentiment of honor. But the prevalent idea of honor is very narrow, and the virtue which is designated by this term takes a very low place. We hear of an honorable servant and official, of an honorable business; but he who is no more than honorable in the usual sense, deserves no high respect. Shame, that this fair word is so degraded! The terms honorable and honorableness are applied particularly to chastity and modesty, and to good repute in this respect. Ambition and sense of honor designate, generally, the disposition of the man who maintains honor; but the question is, What is understood by honor? He is called ambitious, or desirous of honor, who will not allow himself to be surpassed by the magnanimity, generosity, and brilliant deportment of his compeers; and yet this does not designate the inner germ of true ambition, although it is compatible with it. Most frequently, the word honor is used in reference to a man's reputation in society and the state; but this is not the immediate object of what we call moral ambition, and does not belong to the sphere of duty, but of personal accomplishment.

We distinguish honor into two kinds: the one is the same as the moral dignity, which we have to maintain in our disposition and conduct; the other is the personal accomplishment, which we indeed use for our outward advantage, but which we should pursue, with pure self-love, chiefly for its own sake; the one is matter of strict duty, the other of free love and enthusiasm; the violation of the one degrades man, and robs him of moral respect; the neglect of the other merely lessens

his worth, and withdraws from him, more or less, the esteem and love of his fellow-men.

We treat first of the strict duty of honor.

We call honor the converse of justice. The latter refers, as we are aware, to moral reciprocity; and to be just towards a fellow-man, is to recognize and respect him in the position which morally he holds, not to thrust him from it, not to treat him as if he were not there, and as if he were to be used merely as a favorable instrument and means. Honor, as that which corresponds to justice, is, on the contrary, self-respect, or the maintenance of the position which we also hold in moral reciprocity; and to maintain honor, is to be, in sentiment and in conduct, worthy of this position, and to be acknowledged as such by others.

Hence honor is, first of all, one with justice; for he who would maintain his position in the moral commonwealth, or his honor, must, first of all, maintain it by conducting himself worthily of it: whilst he respects his neighbor, as a member of this commonwealth, he will himself find the same respect. But this respect, which he gains by just actions, does not alone constitute honor; this can be won by hypocrisy. By the sentiment of justice, man respects himself, and maintains in himself the sense of human dignity; and this is the true honor which is valid with conscience.

In fact, the term honor, in the customary sense, is wont to designate, at least, a part of justice, that is, fidelity in the disinterested, fair management of the property of others, the fidelity of the administrator, the servant, the merchant, and laborer, — the finder,

who restores what is found to its owner — the citizen, who pays his taxes without fraud — the attorney, who does not deceive his clients by false hopes, and who deals with veracity. Honor is almost always opposed to deceit. An injury by open violence, as the robbery or seizure of another's property, by the tyranny of a prince or a grandee, is not marked with the stigma of dishonor; and this is right, inasmuch as deceit is more shameful than violence. This allows courageous defence, as is generally the case in robbery: thus he who exercises violence, in a manner places him who suffers it upon a footing of equality; and his deed is not connected with contempt of all moral reciprocity, like deceit, which wins confidence in order to betray it. The robber has placed himself without the pale of the civil commonwealth, and therefore acts openly; but the deceiver pretends to respect the laws and contracts, thereby awakens confidence, and abuses it, to indulge his shameful selfishness. Hence he disparages the moral commonwealth more than the robber, who hostily opposes himself to it; he makes use of it as a tool, and treads it under foot. He who, under the protection of a feeble and imperfect jurisdiction, uses his civil power contrary to justice, acts certainly contrary to honor; but, since he openly defies public opinion, he has the appearance of acting from conviction, or, at least, from passionate delusion, and as if he did not despise all laws of the moral commonwealth; and his conduct does not appear so contemptible as the deceiver's. The latter disgraces himself especially by the cowardice with which he acts; since he lurks in the

dark, whilst the robber and man of force call forth resistance, or, if this is impossible, defy its power.

Other kinds of injustice are designated by prevalent opinion as baseness; but this, as the fruit of a low disposition, and of a want of high-mindedness and true pride, is, in general, the opposite of what we understand by moral honor. By baseness, we understand, first of all, the most shameful degree of dishonesty, whereby moral respect for fellow-men is made mockery of. An impostor is called base, if he manages his fraud so badly that it is made obvious to all, and thereby draws universal contempt upon himself, or, at least, if discovered, is branded with the stigma of public disgrace. The liar is called base, who so insolently perverts the truth, that every body recognizes the lie, yet without being able, perchance, to bring it to light. Slander is base, because it murders in secret the good name of him who cannot defend himself. The faithlessness is base, with which a promise, on which the other party depends for his necessities, is broken, and he is thereby brought to pressing embarrassment. Base is the denial of a debt, for which the creditor either has not the usual security, or the legal proof has been lost. Base is treachery, because one of the most shameful kinds of faithlessness, especially the betrayal of a friend who has artlessly confided. It is base to sacrifice a companion and friend to one's own security and welfare, to abandon him in need, and give him a prey to danger, to violate faith to a loved one, in order to win a richer bride, or surely, like the Englishman in Gellert's narrative, to sell mother and child for slaves. Base is the trade of a spy,

especially of him who, in the service of the secret police, lies in wait for peaceful citizens; since he undermines public confidence.

Besides fraud, all those injuries are called base, by which, from low disposition, interest, or selfishness, the duty of sacred respect is violated, or the laws of justice are rudely transgressed. Base is ingratitude towards a benefactor, whose good is requited with evil, or who is deserted in need. Base is ingratitude towards parents, and rude overreaching of brothers or sisters, to whom magnanimity is due. It is base to lessen, in an oppressive manner, the wages of the poor laborer; and surely so to withhold them.

Haughtiness and arrogance, also, in the contemptuous and injurious treatment of others, bears the stigma of baseness, if cowardice is connected with it, or the duty of respect for man is thereby greatly violated. If a distinguished and powerful man outrageously injures and maltreats an inferior and humble man, who cannot resist him, then the base disposition, which regards merely outward force, but not inward dignity, is revolting to us. Such arrogance will straightway change into fawning, if a more powerful person comes along, and the baseness of the disposition will be revealed even in outward degradation. Base is every attack upon another's honor, the motive to which does not lie in violent excitement, but in unsparing contempt, and which is carried on with regularly-contrived villany. Base is every excess in revenge, which is exercised in cold blood towards an enemy, because such is not palliated by the ebullition of passion.

In general, it may be considered that every injury

which is done from evil disposition, from wickedness, and contempt for man, and which has not the palliation of precipitancy, delusion, and excitement, should be regarded as base and dishonorable; hence want of respect for others is looked upon as a mark of want of self respect, and is punished by public opinion. But the weakness and cowardice which actuate faithless and undutiful conduct are also held to be dishonorable. The warrior who, from fear, deserts his post, is despised not only by his comrades, but by all citizens. The official who, from cowardice, gives up the property intrusted to his charge, or violates the laws, will not be able to maintain his reputation; since, as a man, he has not justified confidence, and has proved himself faithless. Here, also, dishonesty is one with injustice. Honor, on the contrary, consists in the justice which recognizes the right and honor of every one, which oversteps no limits, and no rule, and adjusts every thing by the delicate sense of respect for mankind; it consists in veracity, certainty, and fidelity, and the firm purpose which continues therein. The just is the honorable man, who honors himself, and also meets with honor every where.

Secondly, and peculiarly, honor consists in the true pride which maintains one's personal dignity towards others, and preserves it from degradation. We are aware of the relations of dependence in which men stand towards one another, and have found a duty of justice in the principle, that such relations should not extend beyond business, to the person, — that subordinates should not be treated with arrogance, nor be regarded as personally inferiors. Honor consists in not

surrendering personal dignity and independence in the dependent relations of business, and in not selling oneself as a slave, nor in any way degrading self. The servant, the subordinate, must, indeed, obey his master and superior, and this is not contrary to honor; but the servant, from a sense of honor, will soon leave the master who is capricious, and would have every thing done according to his humor, not by plan and method. Still less will he, like a shameful slave, give himself up as the tool of his vice and injustice. The official should never carry his obedience towards his prince so far as to act contrary to the laws and his conscience. Many excuse themselves for this by throwing the responsibility upon their ruler or superior; but no man should act as a machine, and it is a bad constitution under which officers have such a position. A servant should never allow himself to do wrong; and though he should, perhaps, endure the humors of a good-hearted, well-disposed master, yet never the injuries and mortifications of arrogance. Attachment and devotion, in a subordinate to his master, are beautiful virtues; but he can carry them too far, and even to baseness, if he idolatrously honors him, and even does homage to his vices, which is often the case with the servants of princes. Thus even their reverence and assiduity often degenerate into fawning, by which noble, manly pride is debased. Every relation in which a freeman cannot maintain his dignity is contrary to honor. But false personal subordination is especially shameful and degrading, whenever not attachment and the zeal of office, but self-interest, lies at its foundation, and persons fawn before the powerful, in order to gain from them wealth

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and places of honor. Wretched beings! they give up true honor, to catch at an empty phantom; they would encircle themselves with the splendor of earth, and for that quench the brightness of their moral dignity. Flattery is the associate of fawning, and shares its dishonor. We have already considered it as a sin against veracity, and one of the most odious falsities; but it also conflicts against honor, because it is a kind of fraud, and has base self-interest at its source, and because it basely subserves vanity and pride. Sadly is the relation of friendship often desecrated by hypocritical flattery. Many a parasite belies the name and conduct of friend: whilst he pretends to seek the pleasures of society, he wishes only to fill his belly, and to tickle his palate, and he pays for the pitiful enjoyment by personal degradation.

Man must be dependent in business, so as to receive wages for his labor; but he must earn what he receives, and upon the favor, generosity, and mercy, of the other party, he should not make himself dependent, unless compelled by unavoidable necessity. To receive benefits, and to be indebted to them for a livelihood, is dishonorable, since one thereby loses personal independence. This is the case with the beggar; with him who abuses his friend's generosity; with the courtier, who spends in haughty idleness the bounty of his prince. It is, in general, against the honor of a free-man, to depend for his livelihood upon another, even if it be his own wife, or nearest relative. Scholars, artists, poets, may receive support from the powerful and wealthy, without returning them any compensation but the free productions of leisure; but they must be

ware of prostituting inspiration to the mercenary service of flattery.

The relation between man and woman, in reference to sexual love, touches honor upon its tenderest side. Only from love an honorable woman gives herself to man: but love demands marriage; hence she can live with him only as wife. The maiden sacrifices her honor if she enters into any connection with man without marriage, and not merely civil, but inward, honor; because, forgetful of self-respect, she makes herself the prey of base wilfulness. The seducer of honor is himself dishonorable, because he violates the most sacred duty of respect. But if a man forms an illicit connection with a woman, who resigns her honor not merely from the weakness of impassioned love, but from frivolity, or for some base advantage, then he degrades himself most deeply. The society of the dishonorable is a disgrace, but especially such an intercourse with them as should take place only between companions of the most intimate, sacred connection. In general, man degrades himself whenever he serves sensual impulse, without connecting therewith a higher aim, without being able to maintain thereby a purely moral tone of mind. It is, indeed, ignoble to seek a merely animal pleasure in eating and drinking; but here the sin is against self alone. In voluptuousness, on the contrary, both parties sin; and one degrades the other into an instrument of bestial desire; and, in regard to both, debases human dignity. Moreover, the gratification of the sexual impulse without marriage is almost always connected with shameful deceit, since fidelity towards

the actual or future husband or wife is broken. Since, according to our moral code, man and woman should live together only in marriage, and, of every one who is married, it is expected that he has kept himself pure from every illioit connection, — if he has not done this, he is guilty of deceit of the most mournful kind. A sincere confession cannot make up for the wrong committed, and can hardly obtain forgiveness; for an impression is readily left which disturbs conjugal peace, since distrust and jealousy are awakened; and thus a single false step is often expiated by loss of the fairest joy of existence. The innocence of the young man is the brightest jewel in the crown of his honor; and, if this is dimmed, the splendor of the others fades also away. If he has brought upon himself the guilt of deceit, and if the pride of ingenuous sincerity has vanished, his eye gazes no more freely and clearly into the eye of father, teacher, friend; a deadly poison has touched his soul; his imagination is stained, and the aspiration of his soul lamed; he feels not the high sense of deserving the confidence of the bride who resigns herself to him, and of pressing her pure heart innocently to his own; the harmony of love is marred by a discordant note. But the innocence of the maiden is the jewel of her honor; in it alone consists her self-respect; by it alone she enters, as a worthy member, into the moral commonwealth; and with it every blossom of spiritual beauty in her soul fades away.

The man studious of honor does not debase himself in the eyes of others, nor does he allow himself to be debased by any one; he endures no outrage of arro-

gance and insolence against his personal dignity, and sustains himself with firm mind towards every one who would thrust aside or oppress him.

Assaults upon real rights, upon possession and property, do not go immediately against honor; and, in these, the assailed party may be as forbearing as possible; only he must be so from magnanimity and placability, not from cowardice. If he allows himself to be defrauded and plundered by a powerful man, without calling him to account or accusing him, merely because he is afraid of suffering something worse from him, then such cowardice is a disgrace, since it is a betrayal of the cause of right. In himself, justice itself is attacked; and, for the sake of the civil community, he is in duty bound to defend it, in order that tyranny may be restrained. If the jurisdiction of the community is so disturbed and lamed, that the oppressed is certain of not obtaining justice, then he cannot surely remain quiet; and, if he is otherwise known on account of his courage and free spirit, then the expression of his despair of public justice will increase the general indignation, which will finally break forth in revolt. The rights of business and activity, by which man is serviceable in society, concern personal dignity more nearly than real rights; and of these the man of honor will not allow himself to be so easily robbed, since thus personally he loses more than in matters of property. Yet, even here, magnanimity can prompt to forbearance; nay, there are cases in which the man of honor, from a true sense of honor, retires from the scene of activity, because he can no longer act there with honor. It is self-evident that man, from duty to

himself, must ward off all attacks upon his personal rights, upon body, life, and freedom, as much as stands in his power; and, if he neglects this from cowardice, he will harm his honor. Meanwhile, the individual, in this respect, is seldom in a state of defence, and the public justice steps protectively before him.

Here the question especially arises, How has the man of honor to conduct himself in regard to attacks upon his personal dignity? Every act and expression of another, by which he gives me to understand that he does not regard me as a worthy member of society, is an attack upon my honor, which rests upon the respect which I maintain in the sight of others and of myself. The respect of others and self-respect are most intimately connected. If I lived by myself, then self-respect would be sufficient for me; but I live in society, and need the respect of associates, so as not to be repulsed by them. Not every individual, indeed, expresses the general respect or contempt in a valid manner. The voice of a man who is himself despised, goes for nought, and I can boldly despise his insolence; a child cannot insult a man, and he will be forbearing towards the expressions of a woman; what a lunatic says and does is as if not said and done; and the same holds more or less true of a drunken and passionate man. Injuries to honor have reference to the respect of respectable men, upon which our self-respect, in a degree, depends; and by this rule we will define the conduct of an honorable man in regard to personal insults.

These are of two kinds. Either another charges me with actions and dispositions which are not compatible

with moral dignity, or he manifests, by acts and expressions, that he despises me, by offering a personal insult.

As to the imputations of guilt, the question relates to the degree of probability which they have, and the faith which they meet with among the people. An imputation wholly improbable, and formed from the air, especially if the originator deserves no respect, I can laugh at as foolish and nonsensical; on the contrary, where a suspicion may fall upon me, I must call the accuser to account, demand his proof, and compel him to retract. There may be cases in which we must quietly bear a probable suspicion, until time discloses our innocence; but great strength of soul is requisite to endure, in proud self-respect, universal contempt, and not succumb under the burden.

Strictly personal insults, by abusive words and contemptuous expressions, or by actual assaults, attain their significance partly through the respectability of the insulter, partly by the prevalent ideas of honor, which are, in a degree, founded upon precedent. Actual attacks, such as blows of the cane or fist, we here consider merely as marks of contempt, not as bodily injuries; since, as such, they belong in the same class with assaults upon health and life. When an honorable man attacks the honor of another, it can be done only through a misunderstanding, and in momentary excitement; and the mistake, by a degree of placability on both sides, may be very soon removed: the man of honor will always be pacific, because he is just. If the injury is committed from outrageous insolence, from natural or affected strife or contentiousness, conse-

quently from unjust, and, therefore, dishonorable, feeling, then the man of honor can easily withdraw; for, by so doing, he can neither lose the respect of other rational beings, nor feel degraded in his own eyes. But care for his safety and peace compels him to show to the peace-breaker his limits, who otherwise would be encouraged to fresh assaults; and then prevalent opinion obliges him to seek satisfaction, in order that no stigma may attach to his honor. This opinion is especially coercive and despotic in the nobility and the military class in monarchical states; and here it does not once allow resort to law, but demands satisfaction by duel.

The honor of the nobility would be something better than the honor of the citizen, and therefore it is something worse; it rests upon the delusion of an excellence of caste, and has no genuine moral foundation. What is a disgrace to the citizen, to defraud creditors, to seduce innocence, to fawn before the powerful, is no stain upon chivalrous honor. On this account, its distinction to decide cases of honor by duelling is, in itself, void, and to be regarded with forbearance only as a relic of the old feudal age of nobility. Honor can always be established only in the opinion of those with whom we stand in community; if we are separated from the public civil community, we then need a peculiar tribunal of honor. On this ground, the students of the German universities have peculiar ideas of honor, and of the necessity of duelling; for they separate themselves, by a kind of badge, from the civil community, and ape the nobility, whom they would equal, as a sort of scholastic nobility. In palliation of the pe-

cular sense of honor which demands the duel, it may be alleged, that the mode of treating affairs of honor in court, and the punishment of violations of honor, are very rude, and not satisfactory to a delicate sense of honor. But honorable citizens get along very well without duelling, and so may nobles and students, especially as they are often, in other respects, in essential points of honor, so very delicate.

Duelling is forbidden by the civil laws; and those who resort to it act contrary to public fidelity, and break the peace. A monarchical state is certainly at variance with itself, if it expressly or tacitly favors the pretensions of the nobility, and yet forbids and punishes duelling. It should either seek to reform the public spirit of honor, or spare those prejudices; and, if duelling lacked the charm of being forbidden, and took place under the inspection of judges of honor, it would take place much more rarely; nay, by especial courts of honor, it would soon be extirpated. But it is always an odious, pernicious war, which duellists wage with the public jurisdiction.

If, now, the question is, how the individual, in a state of society which requires duelling, has to conduct himself in reference to it, then the moralist cannot make that to be his duty which reason in general forbids; but he must mark out for him a conduct, such as it is possible to observe under the given conditions. Two points are here concerned — whether duelling is to be justified, first in reference to legal prohibition, and then in itself.

To a just and honorable man, it must be indeed painful to defraud the state; but it stands hardly within the

power of a single nobleman, officer, and student, in defiance of the opinion of his order, to obey the laws, and to abandon duelling; he is, in this respect, not free, hence not morally culpable, if he does what he cannot omit without losing his position in society. The officer is, perhaps, the most bound, who has only the choice of renouncing his profession, or complying with existing prejudices; no one can exact the former of him without something more. It is even hard for students to bid defiance to the opinions of their associates, if they would not renounce all sociality, and set their peace at stake. He who, from obedience to the state, refuses to fight a duel, and would seek the protection of the laws, would by no means be made secure from the prejudicial consequences of his conduct; nay, he might, by being obliged to become the informer against his opponent, be severe and unjust towards him, and bring upon himself the censure of the candid. At the same time, the moralist must make it the duty of every one to use every endeavor to avoid breach of peace and fidelity towards the state.

As to the custom of duelling in itself, it is falsely considered as a remnant of the ordeal; for the matter in question is not the disclosure of secret innocence, and the victor is not regarded as more just than the vanquished; nor is it a work of private revenge, since it takes place under the eye of witnesses, and by decided rules, and is correct only in so far as another jurisdiction is set up in place of the public jurisdiction, which is evaded. Duelling is nothing but a warlike form of pacification, which takes place when, according to the prevalent ideas of honor, no other mode of ad-

justment remains. A duel may take place, without any other design than to restore the peace. Indeed, revenge may mingle with it, especially if the combat is one of life and death; but, even then, it is possible that only the sense of honor, not revenge, is the motive. But it will be said, Is not health, is not life, brought into peril? and can we lose a single word in excuse of so barbarous a usage? If, according to sound ideas of honor, cases may occur where there is no other means of expiation and adjustment but duelling, then the moralist must reply, Honor is more than health and life. But that can hardly be thought; duelling is the offspring of a morbid, irritable, quarrelsome sense of honor, and therefore to be rebuked. The ancients were acquainted with single combat only as a means of deciding national war; and, as such, it is humane, since it spares bloodshed; but that irritable, sensitive, chivalrous honor was a stranger to them; they lived in the public existence, and, in its healthy, free air, their sense of honor strengthened into pride of citizenship. If, therefore, we cannot bid the individual unconditionally to rise above this prejudice, we must demand that all should labor to eradicate it. Upon the individual, we would inculcate the duty of peace, which will preserve him, in a thousand cases, from strife, and insure his repose. Were all inspired by the true spirit of peace, duelling would surely never take place; for, at best, it is but a mere means of reconciliation, and removes the outward, but not the inward, enmity.

Among the first and most weighty violations of duty to self, many moralists designate suicide; but others deem it less a crime than a folly. No act is usually so

falsely judged as this; since the outward deed is not sufficiently distinguished from the motives. We will, if possible, give a candid opinion upon the subject; hence we will avoid the usual term, self-murder, since it implies a condemnation. Murder is a crime; but causing death, as in war or in self-defence, may be justifiable and venial.

Man alone, among all living beings, has received from the Creator the power to take his own life; now, ought he to make no use of this? What stands within a man's power, what he can, belongs to the means of his conduct; now, should he leave this single means unemployed? No means are, in themselves, unallowable; should this single one be so? Thus those argue who defend suicide, or yet justify it. We must certainly choose the point of view, from which we may distinguish, in suicide, the means from the disposition thereby expressed, and seek to establish our judgment regarding the two.

There are, if we consider the motives, very many and various kinds of suicide, and it is deemed very difficult to bring them into a definite survey. Two main classes are easily distinguished: those of the first class, which are most numerous, occur from reference to self, from tedium of life, from wounded self-love, from injured pride and sense of honor; those of the other class take place from reference to others, from hatred or love.

Among the suicides of the first class, those are to be excepted from all moral condemnation which are brought on by a disease of the mind. In this the main condition of all accountability is wanting — free

consciousness; and it is unkind severity, in such cases, to pass a contemptuous, condemnatory sentence. As a nervous attack may affect the brain, and suddenly put an end to life, it is also the case that a disorder of the brain so very much perverts the reason, that the hand reaches for a deadly weapon, and cuts the thread of life. Whether the death-blow is inflicted externally by the hand, or internally by a nerve, or any other organ, is the same thing. The man sick of fever, who does violence to himself, or springs out of the window, no one brands with the name self-murderer; but is it necessary for one to bluster and rage, in order to be considered beside himself? We should, like the English, have a coroner's inquest, which may decide whether the suicide was committed from disease of the mind, in order that the otherwise troubled relatives may be spared the crushing grief of beholding the dear departed exposed to public obloquy, and that the occasion for unreasonable zealots and moral censors, for making the wounds still more painful by their exhortations and censures, may be cut off. But such a tribunal must exercise its office with veracity, in order actually to control public opinion. The disease of the mind may, indeed, have its fountain in previous immorality, by which the power of the mind has become enfeebled: then this immorality is truly blamable; but the suicide, in itself, is to be judged only as its outward consequence, and to be ranked with every other natural kind of death brought on by immorality.

Another kind of suicide is committed from momentary desperation, when a man, by a sudden blow of destiny, loses his mind, and, in a state of uncon-

sciousness, ends his hated existence. Here, also, the balance of the mind is disturbed, not by corporeal action, but a mental impression, to which the inward strength succumbs; and, since consciousness fails, moral retribution cannot ensue. A virtuous maiden loves her betrothed with her whole soul; all her hope reposes upon him, for she is an orphan, and alone in the world; her whole existence has grown in this hope; her heart beats only for him; she awaits his coming, in order to be married to him; then she hears the tidings that he is false to her. The blow is too heavy for her tender mind; she sinks into deep despondency; as in a dream, she wanders by the river, and looks wistfully into its waves; a single step, and all is over.

The greater the misfortune, and the more heart-rending the sorrow, the more it is to be pardoned, if the mind gives way beneath the sudden shock, and loses self-dominion and consciousness. If a man, by sudden tidings of the entire loss of his property, sinks into a state of reckless desperation, and lays hands upon himself, this would not only be a mark of unmanly weakness and cowardice, but that anxious love of earthly goods, which is unworthy a noble man, would be also blamable; and we should certainly grant him no such sympathy as that unfortunate maiden. Meanwhile, the unconsciousness in which the deed was done, would remove the retribution, and our censure would rather relate to the state of mind, than to the act itself, which sprang from it.

If suicide is committed not in a moment of mental alienation, which is induced by a sudden impression, but from continual tedium of life, in consequence of

quiet reflection and intentional preparation, then retribution may indeed ensue; for, the more time a man has to overcome adverse impressions, and to use the aids of faith and reason for the restoration of his mind, the greater the moral weakness and perversity of mind through which he yields, and the more culpable is his conduct. We must now try the different causes which may induce such a suicidal tedium of life, and see whether, in any case, such a deed can be justified. In order to gain the just rule for this trial, we must, in the first place, bring up the grounds which we have for respecting, loving, and preserving life.

There is a natural love of life, which is a fruit of sensuous instinct, and is common to us with the brutes. But there are sensuous impressions, which entirely overcome the love of life, and, in its place, call forth the longing for death. Here sensuous impulse stands in opposition to sensuous impulse, and the one is as natural as the other; the one is inborn, the other developed by life, and one is as right as the other. From sensuous instinct, therefore, we can derive no rule for the judgment of suicide; since, in this instinct, no moral rules inhere: this rule we can seek only in the moral and spiritual nature of man.

All that man prizes and loves, all worth, all good, is for him concentrated in life; the persons with whom, as a friend and relative, he stands in confidential relations, — to whom his heart beats with tender love, — share life with him. All concerns and enterprises, for which a noble heart glows, — truth, justice, virtue, piety, art, and culture, — belong to life; with and in it all noble sentiments have been awakened and constantly

cherished; in it are found all objects of business, all spheres of activity: hence it is not merely the sum of all earthly goods, of all that offers us charm and attraction, and of all the means and occasions of action, but also the manifestation of the higher, spiritual life. If we love this, as it is the object of all true love, so we must also love the former; all love, all effort, all desire for action, must be extinguished in the soul, if love of life expires.

From mistaken views of faith in immortality, one may say that earthly existence is but the preparation for eternal life, and, since our highest love belongs to the latter, the former may be rejected as insignificant. But faith in immortality should only serve to elevate us above impure, earthly love, but not to destroy our warm interest in earthly affairs. Besides, earthly existence is not merely an object of love, but also of most sacred respect; and every one is, in a manner, bound to it. Either he owes to his parents, or to his wife and his children, fidelity, trusty care, faithful assistance, or he stands in league of confidence and fidelity with friends, or he has undertaken obligations towards associates in business and the commonwealth. It is scarcely credible that a man should not have excited certain expectations in others; no one can give up life without certain bands being rent; and, if one actually stands wholly free and independent, this would be a mark of culpable sloth and indifference; he must already morally and spiritually have slain himself; and the suicide of the body would be but the consequence of that of the soul.

Let us now see what that can be which can overcome not only the animal, but the spiritual love of life; and

the sense of duty which binds us to it. Very often, the tedium of life is the consequence of torpor and of surfeit; by pleasure and dissipation. If a man abandons his whole existence to sensual enjoyment, and knows no spiritual love, no enterprise, and no activity, then, at last, his power and desire of enjoyment will be exhausted, and with it also the desire of life, and suicide is a natural consequence. The wealthy and distinguished, at whose command stand all the pleasures of the world, — in whom the power of the mind has been rather crushed, than awakened, by such an education, — who fall into the hands of debauchees and panders to vice, — often meet such an end. But what a wretched, null existence, which is brought to such a close! The latter is no more blamable than the former, which was already a murder of the mind, a moral self-annihilation. If such a wreck of self, which destroys the desire of life, is not caused by voluptuousness, it is usually suffering, grief, fear, the sense either of present or of future suffering, which oppresses the soul, and makes life a burden. But suffering may be either sensuous, — the loss of earthly good; the limitation and restriction of outward existence, — or moral, — the violation of moral feeling, the loss of a moral good, the limitation of moral activity; and the question is, whether either of these is a justification of suicide.

As to sensuous, external suffering, the mind should be raised above this at the command of virtue, and, by fortitude and patience, maintain its independence. If any one has irrecoverably lost his health, and sees a painful, inactive future before him, this is, indeed, a great evil; but let him use it as a means of exercising

patience and gentleness, and life for him has not lost its worth, even if he exercises only these virtues; he lives also not in vain for others, to whom he serves as a pattern. If any one has lost all his estate, let him spur himself to activity, and show himself an independent man, who bears in himself all sources of aid; if he is aged and feeble, and can earn nothing, let him overcome, by inward strength of soul, what he cannot overcome externally; let him not distrust divine Providence, and the nobleness of mankind, and let him deem it a gain, if his need brings him into a connection of love and gratitude with a noble benefactor. It is painful not to be able to provide for one's own, and to see them in want; but patience and courage will certainly, in the end, find relief. There is no external suffering, above which man should not and may not elevate himself; the will should be ever greater and stronger than fortune, and herein alone its moral excellence is shown. Accordingly, to abandon life on account of an outward misfortune is cowardice, want of courage and of patience, hence contrary to duty, and also to honor, which is one and the same with virtue. Fortitude and patience are supported and upheld by piety, by resignation and confidence towards God. Suicide from cowardice is hence the fruit of an impious spirit, which quarrels with God, will not yield to his dispensations, nor confide in his power and goodness, and is hence a sin against God; but it is also the fruit of an unloving, undutiful spirit, and is a sin against men. Have you none whom you love, no friends to whom you owe love and fidelity, that life is worth nothing to you after the loss of health and estate? O fools, who regard the

shell more than the kernel, and throw this away, because that has been taken from you! forgetful of duty, you who desert the post which God has assigned you in society, and who rend the sacred bond of fidelity!

The loss of outward estate is often attended with disgrace, the external with a moral suffering. A person cannot pay his debts, and is branded as a defrauder; and he escapes this disgrace by suicide. But one scarcely falls into this painful situation without guilt; they are most frequently gamblers, spendthrifts, swindlers, fraudulent, unprincipled merchants, who come to such an end, and whose suicide is the final consequence of a course of immorality. The just censure which overtakes these, does not refer merely to this mode of exit from life, but every other exit would be equally disgraceful; and the dishonor is incurred by the previous wasteful and faithless life. Such a suicide is the murder of duty and honor, therefore more odious than in itself. That such men have no courage to continue existence is natural; the reproaches of their conscience are awakened only by the outward consequences of their deeds; they have no true repentance, hence no mind to reform, no love, and no faith; for otherwise they would prolong life in order to make good what they owe. But so much the more objectionable is their conduct; it opens the fearful view into the abyss of moral perdition.

The same holds true of the criminals who, by their shameful conduct, draw upon themselves public disgrace, and flee from it by suicide. They have no moral power to endure life longer, because they have already thrown it away to some ignominious passion.

Here, also, suicide is but the final consequence of a course of immoralities.

Suicide from remorse on account of previous transgressions, is to be judged much more mildly, since here a genuine moral sentiment is awakened, which is not excited merely by outward causes; but there is lack of healthy strength of mind to have confidence in self and divine mercy; and thus the mind gives way beneath its own burden. Such a state of feeling is to be considered as a moral disease; and it is, alas! often brought about by religion, which, in the mouth of heartless preachers of expiation, assumes the form of a terrific law, and brings despair instead of consolation. Not the unfortunate ones, who flee from the terrors of conscience, should be denounced, but those who transform the balsam of faith into poison, and destroy the souls which they should save. Suicide, as an outward act, is here but the consequence of a much worse spiritual murder, which has been induced by unbelief. It is a mistake, when tragic poets avail themselves of suicide from moral desperation, as a solution of the tragic knot. In this there is nothing propitiating; the mind is rather wounded by it; for the self-murderer does not lift himself above destiny, as the tragic hero should, but both outwardly and inwardly falls beneath it. A gross offender, above all, should not be chosen for the hero of a tragedy; he who ought to die upon the gallows, cannot claim poetical sympathy.

Not seldom, unfortunate lovers, whose inclination has been thwarted; or else found no return, have come to an end by suicide; they cast life from them as a useless burden, because they cannot share it with the

beloved of their heart. It was a spiritual good — love — whose loss they could not bear; but sensuality and fancy alloyed the noble sentiment; the freedom of the mind was lost, and they felt that they valued the object of their love higher than existence with all its goods. But they first failed, not when they laid hands upon themselves, but long before; since they nourished passion with self-willed obduracy, and gradually deadened themselves towards life; they were mentally diseased long previously, until the disease finally became fatal. This is the case with Werter, described with such masterly skill, but yet with too much fascination, by Goethe, — Werter, who purposely and resolutely fed his fine mind upon the poison of a noble passion, until every energy, every desire of life, was dissipated.

Those motives to suicide which flow from moral prejudices, — by force of which it is deemed a duty to put an end to life, because the conditions of its worthy continuance seem to have ceased, — deserve forbearance, and even respect. Among us, perhaps, an officer, in an innocent manner, or without any fault but improvidence, may be disparaged in his honor, so that, repulsed from the company of his equals, and from all honorable society, he must regard life as a useless burden. If he is superstitiously attached to the prevalent notions of honor, his inmost sense may be wounded; but, even were this not the case, he might still regard himself so externally restricted and cut off from all influence, that he would prefer to abandon existence entirely. In the first case, the sin would lie in the overestimate of outward honor, and in the second case in the overestimate of influence, and in both cases in

the fact, that the unfortunate know not how to rise above fortune by a self-respect, and by faith, noble and pious, though difficult of attainment, indeed.

Lucretia's voluntary death is ever beautiful, although the Christian moralist must blame it. Her pure, proud soul could not live without unspotted honor; indeed, the stain which shameful violence inflicted upon her person did not attach to her soul; but she could not bear the pollution even of the veil, and she cast it aside, as pure women lay aside a soiled garment. The possible suspicion was intolerable to her, that she might have voluntarily yielded to shame: although her husband and relatives freed her from this, yet others might judge less benignantly, and a woman depends more upon public opinion than a man. In antiquity, moreover, public opinion was more coercive than with us, and moral condemnation more dependent upon outward appearance. Besides, revenge in the proud Roman rose up against the violator; for, whilst she plunged the dagger into her heart, she called upon the by-standers to avenge her death. According to the ideas of antiquity, especially of Rome, this death is not only no crime, but a bright deed; and it was the origin of Roman freedom. Brutus drew the dagger from the wound, and conjured all present to avenge the death of Lucretia; they took the oath, and broke the yoke of royalty. But the Christian moralist cannot wholly approve these ideas, although he may let them pass, as the rule of retribution, in this particular case. Feminine innocence, like every virtue, is inward; and, as the outward is worth nothing without the inward, so, also, the latter is independent of the former, and, by consciousness of it, one

can rise above every insult inflicted, especially if faith in God, the All-seeing, and resignation to his will, come in to strengthen the mind. This deed, great and illustrious as it is, lacks the sublime moral freedom of Christianity, which knows how to rise above outward destiny. The spirit should find an impassable limit in nothing external; it should be greater than every outward allotment, than every suffering, even were it the heart-rending sorrow of disturbed moral peace.

Cato put himself to death, because he loved the freedom of his country so dearly that he would not survive its fall, and because he was too proud to receive mercy from Cæsar, the victor. In his soul, pervaded by Roman liberty and stoical wisdom, this deed was perfectly moral, because it proceeded from firm conviction, and from entire harmony of conscience. This firm, unbending, proud spirit could act no otherwise. The freedom of Rome was his vital air; when this was taken away, the lamp must go out. But his conduct is not, therefore, to be made an example. He could, without debasing himself, yield to the empire of Cæsar, since he would thus yield only to Heaven, who permitted Cæsar's ascendancy; he need not sue for mercy, but only endure what he decreed regarding him. Had he been condemned to death, then, he could yield to necessity; but, were he pardoned, then he could, perhaps, essentially serve his country. He loved more its nominal freedom, than its true welfare; and he faithlessly abandoned it, since he left it to its fate. In this disposition there is a certain narrowness, by which he could not elevate himself above his prejudices; and he was lacking, above all, in the pious resignation of the

Christian. Indeed, this resignation, in weak, impure minds, easily degenerates into imbecile, cowardly pliability, and often, something of that stern, unbending Roman pride were to be desired; but the moralist must insist upon the union of both bold fortitude and pious resignation. As long as the contest is possible, let firmness be exercised; but, if destiny has already decided, let resignation come forward; and, with both, let that indefatigable love be united, which is eager to help a brother as long as the least force and the smallest scope remain.

We have, accordingly, found, that no, not even the noblest, reference to self affords just ground for suicide. It is, for the most part, the work of a blamable cowardice, which dares not continue existence, or, at best, of moral prejudice, and of a moral pride, without spiritual freedom and piety. Moreover, selfishness generally comes in, which quenches the sense of duty and love towards the survivors, who are, at least, left a prey to grief, if not to want and wretchedness. Suicide is most shameful, whenever accompanied by injustice, fraud, falsity towards the living. But the sentence of condemnation always concerns the disposition, not the outward form of the action; and upon this we have still to establish our opinion.

We are thus led to the consideration of the second class of suicides, whose motive lies in a reference to others, who are meant to be thereby harmed or helped. If one destroys his life in order to vex another by the act, as Don Carlos, of Spain, (the historical, not the tragical personage,) swallowed diamonds, from malice and hatred to his father, this is a most shameful mode

of quitting the world. Death is, in its nature, conciliatory; since the thought of eternity should purify and exalt the mind; and noble suicides have always departed with hearts conciliated; but to die in hatred and revenge, is to carry the evil into eternity, and to immortalize it. Every pious heart shudders at such a death; it is the abyss of moral annihilation, into which no glimmer of hope falls. Revenge sometimes mingles with suicide, from despair of the fidelity of a beloved person, although love still prevails; the wish is, to touch, by death, the proud heart, which could not be touched in life, and to leave a share of grief to the one with whom happiness cannot be enjoyed.

To the honor of mankind, suicide is most rarely committed from revenge and hatred. But a self-inflicted death of love and sacrifice is also very rare. If here the disposition and aim are to be praised, it yet remains a question, whether the means merit justification, and whether it is permitted to men not merely to seek death, but also to inflict it upon themselves; and the answer to this question is here especially our problem.

Frederick II., in the seven years' war, would have poisoned himself, in case of being defeated or taken prisoner in battle. He would then have put an end to his life, not merely from noble pride, but in order not to be coerced to conditions of peace, by which his royal house might be degraded; hence he would have died from duty. The Roman emperor Otho, when he saw his army defeated by that of his enemy, chose death, in order to put an end to civil war and bloodshed, and thus sacrificed himself to the public welfare. Arms

plunged the dagger into her breast, in order to make the doomed death of her husband more easy, and to follow him; her death was the work of the fairest, most devoted love. Cæcilia, in a recent tragedy, takes poison, in order to cure her lover's passion for her, which was not compatible with the will of the parents, and of his princely destiny. Such deeds have a certain poetical beauty, since, by the ardent, devoted love which beams from them, they seize upon the feelings and imagination, and excite admiration; but the moralist cannot condemn the feeling, which, in tender minds, despite all admiration, is displeased that these victims of love should sacrifice themselves with the hand of violence. The approval of deeds of sacrifice is wholly pure in cases where another's hand performs the hostile office of the death-angel, and love does but meet dissolution. If the danger of death is even so imminent that it cannot be doubtful, and it is all the same whether death is met or voluntarily inflicted, it is still not the same to the moral sense. Does it not appear to be the same, whether one presses to his breast his own, or, like Arnold von Winkelried, his enemies' spear? Yet this bright, sacrificial death would not so entirely accord with our feelings, unless hostile hands had pierced the hero's breast. To poison oneself from devotion to another, is not wholly commendable; on the other hand, to drink the poison prepared for a beloved one, in order that he might not drink it, in case there were no other way of saving him, would, in motive and act, correspond to every pure sentiment, since a foreign hostile power aimed the death-blow. Now, wherein lies the ground of disapprobation which we feel towards

suicide, in its outward form, even if the deed, in its motive, deserves our entire approval?

The life of a man is not, indeed, the highest good; but it is the compass of all moral conditions and means, and is rightly deemed sacred. We mourn when the Lord of creation recalls it, before it has finished its course; but we resign ourselves to the inexorable will of supreme Power and Wisdom. We deny to human wilfulness the right of lording it over the life of another; and it is deemed an abominable crime to sacrifice a life, wilfully, to passion, or to any selfish design. It is only allowed to the might of justice, bound by necessary laws, to demand life as an offering of retribution. Murderous war wounds our feelings; but there life does not give way to the wilfulness of the individual, but to the destructive and unfettered passions of whole nations, between whom reason can be no longer umpire; and the unjust cause of war wounds us more than the sight of single victims. Here, also, the necessity of destiny bears sway, before which we bow in resignation. If individuals, for the sake of a noble object, meet deadly danger, and fall, then they yield only to the destructive force of nature, or of human passion and wickedness, which would have swept away others if they had not given themselves victims. They do not call forth the destructive power, but only ward it off from others; they act at the same time from love to the brotherhood, and from resignation to destiny. On the contrary, he who sacrifices himself, with his own hand, acts, perhaps, from love, but he sins, through violent wilfulness, against Providence; and, forestalling its designs, chooses the victim which it is its office to select.

A self-inflicted death is always calculated by human prudence, and human calculation may prove fallacious. Perhaps such a sacrifice was unnecessary, and the aim could have been reached in another way; perhaps it was to no purpose, and a fair life has been spent in vain, which might still have borne many fair fruits of love. A wound has been inflicted on humanity for nought, if it does not heal the breach which it would heal; the grief which we feel at the deed finds no consolation in pious resignation, and provokes us to censure human presumption. It is not weak horror of death which induces us to decide thus, since man should, in general, suffer death for truth and justice, and for the good of his brethren, whenever Providence demands it; but he should not seek martyrdom voluntarily and impatiently, but follow the call of God.

According to this view, indirect self-destruction, even if it becomes apparent, always meets a more charitable sentence than direct suicide. Indirect self-destruction consists partly in voluntary exposure to the fatal influences of nature, partly in neglecting the means of sustaining life. Aurelia, in the novel of "Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship," after a violent heat, walked slowly through the cold night air, and brought on a fatal chill. For a long time weary of life, and vividly reminded of her own unhappiness by the performance of the part of Ophelia, she was painfully grieved by her brother; and in this frame she neglected the necessary care which regard for health demands. She sought death, but she only abandoned herself to the arrows aimed at her; she did not act, but suffered; she was passive, since she sank under the burden of sorrow,

and the energy of her soul was broken. Blamable as this abandonment to passionate emotion may be, yet violent wilfulness does not wound us in her death. Ottilia, in the novel of "Elective Affinities," gives herself to death by avoiding food. This could not be done without firm will, and it was an action, not a suffering: but she seems as an invalid, who, from nausea, declines food; she abandoned only what the desire of life, which was already extinct in her heart, demanded; she gave way to the force of nature, since she yielded to her moral sense of grief. Hence, in her death, we rather censure the disposition which led to it, than the means which she selected; at least, we are very willing to be deceived upon this point.

Suicide is in most cases the consequence of mental disease, tedium of life, and desperation, and, as such, is most wounding. By it death not only suddenly ensues, but also appears in its most frightful form, and inflicts wounds which have a double smart, as well by the bereavement itself, as by the cause of it. It is a twofold death,—the mental, which precedes, and the bodily, which is the consequence. Nothing excites such universal sorrow or displeasure, as such misfortunes; and there are different opinions as to their causes and prevention. Without aiming to exhaust the subject, I make the following remarks upon it:—

The cause of suicide is generally want of due love of life; since he who loves life will not take it from himself. The desire of life lies in the mind, and if corporeal disease acts prejudicially upon this, it is only its weakness which gives way. To love life is part of life itself, or rather one with it. All in which life con-

sists, — to enjoy and labor, to think, feel, and act, — all is done from and with love of life. For to live is nothing more than to be active; but one is active for an object, or at least for the sake of being active. Hence it follows that the desire of life is greater, the richer and more comprehensive existence is, the more resources it commands, the more objects it comprises. The fish, that can live only in water, out of it loses the power as well as the desire of life. He who lives only in pleasure, loses the desire of life if the charm of enjoyment palls. The miser, for whom the light of life beams only from gold, may no longer live if this is lost. He who finds his only comfort in outward honor and splendor, falls into despair if he sinks from his elevation. He who has chosen a profession, or a wife, without love, and without the resources of mental cultivation, nay, who, without any strong inclination and love, leads an indifferent life, which lacks all movement, variety, excitement, and elevation, — he will have no sufficient strength to oppose to a disease of mind, which may very easily arise in a monotonous existence without bodily activity. Even pious faith loses its power, if a strong, living spirit does not invigorate it. A man, on the contrary, who, with warm love, is attached to wife and children, who zealously carries on his business, who finds in activity his pleasure, and in mental occupation, and fresh, exciting society, his recreation, whose mind can rise in inspiration and devotion above life, will hardly sink into a morbid state, and will at least know how to withstand it. He who is wedded to a narrow routine, will, if torn from it, feel himself a stranger in life; he who can live only with

certain persons, will, upon the loss of them, be weary of existence. He, on the contrary, who freely controls life, and maintains a broad sensibility and activity, will not give it up on account of any loss. In short, the more life, the more vital power and desire; the more dead and torpid life is, on the contrary, the more easily the desire of life is extinguished. The best prevention of suicide consists, therefore, in preventing monotony, vacuity, torpor, and coldness of life, by animating, enriching, and moving it by vital piety, morality, and mental culture. The poisonous miasma of tedium of life belongs to the damp dungeon of routine, the narrow path of monotony. Let us, then, confide in the fresh, free air of the free mind, which heals and quickens the breast; so shall we be healthy, and with sound power and love abide and act in life, until God calls us away. ✓

LECTURE XX.

PERSONAL PERFECTION.

Of the duty of honor, or self-respect, by virtue of which man, with noble pride, keeps his uprightness, guards against degradation, and maintains himself as an object of respect in the moral commonwealth, we have already treated. We must now see how he may and should love himself. There is, certainly, a permitted, noble self-love, which consummates the strict love of honor; just as love towards other men perfects justice. As he who would only fulfil the strict rule of justice towards others, but would not love them, could not, surely, be perfectly just, so that love of honor which is not connected with noble self-love, cannot be genuine. Love brings, as we are aware, warmth and motion into life; it awakens the effort for perfection, after greater and greater nobleness and beauty; it creates anew, forms, refines, and glorifies. Noble self-love is the striving after personal perfection, for complete culture. Ambition, or love of honor, holds up the dignity of man; self-love would exalt and enlarge it; its wish is, that the human mind, outwardly, as well as inwardly, should be as completely and perfectly developed as possible. The essence of the human mind is self-reliance, activity,—in the highest sense, life. By ambition, in-

deed, its independence and value in the moral commonwealth are maintained; but self-love wishes this independence to prevail in all respects, to give the mind dominion over all that opposes it, so that it may stamp upon nature its form, pervade, animate, and glorify individual character with its creative, plastic power, and be reflected thence in its divinity.

The perfection after which self-love strives, is partly outward, partly inward,—partly dominion over nature and influence in human society, partly self-culture, or personal perfection in the proper sense. In each of these aims, it is the independence or supremacy of the mind which is availing, and should be attained; and the self-love which awakens and sustains the effort after these aims, must be free from that selfishness which loves merely the sensual self. Noble self-love is nothing but the love of the purely human, in one's own personal being; only differing in direction, it is the same, in its essence, with humanity, benevolence, friendship, and all love towards others. As it is said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," so here the converse is said, Thou shalt love thyself as thy neighbor, with pure, humane love. A striving after perfection, of which not this love, but selfishness, or egotism, is the soul, leads not to true perfection; only in the faithful service of love for mankind can an exhibition of a genuine human perfection be successfully made.

This is the first and most important rule, by which we have here to estimate every thing—What does not belong to pure human love is unworthy of man.

A second rule, to which, in the effort for perfection, all which can become an aim of effort must be subject-

ed, is that of a just medium. Nothing which passes in this department as valuable, amiable, and as an object of endeavor, has an unconditional value, such as attaches to what belongs to personal dignity, and, as it were, constitutes the inner, fixed kernel of its being. Personal culture is not, like virtue, something in itself necessary; much belongs to it which may be wanting in some, and which is possible, only, in others; none, therefore, need strive after this, as after an unconditional good, but each should observe due measure. Property, reputation, and outward honor, surely belong to a perfect human life; but he who places too much value upon them, and strives after them with too much zeal, thereby fails of the just aim. Perfection consists in a union of varieties; it comprises various excellences, of various value, and it consists in placing each of these excellences in due proportion towards others: now, just as soon as one or another is over-estimated, and exaggerated, it is disturbed and lost. The culture of the understanding belongs to personal perfection; but he who would merely develop his understanding, and neglect other mental faculties, would, by that very fact, become imperfect. It is with perfection as with the human form, the most perfect of all forms; if there is any disproportion in it, one limb too large, another too small, its perfection is impaired. The proportion of perfection consists, universally, in the just medium between two extremes, in avoiding the too little and the too much, or, as the phrase is, in the golden mean; and this proportion we must here thoroughly regard. Virtue has falsely been placed in mediocrity, or avoiding extremes; for virtue is the discharge of a duty, which

barely commands what ought to be done, and not merely warns of too little or too much. Respect for man is something in itself, not valuable merely by a just medium between too much and too little. An unconditional aim, an irrefragable law, is thereby expressed; and failure, through exaggeration, is here impossible, except in outward token of respect; but an exaggerated respect — excess in the demonstration of that which respect dictates — is no more true respect, but passion or weakness: a sense of honor which becomes unjust or injurious towards others, is no true sense of honor, but arrogance. On the contrary, whatever appertains to perfection, as industry, has value only by due measure: excessive industry is still industry, but as such it is objectionable, since it lacks the just proportion. True perfection is always inward, the inward affluence and harmony of mind, whose essence consists in unity; and even outward excellences have value only in so far as they enrich the mind's life: this law of the just medium must hence be considered as an inner one, and this is the moderation which maintains the inward proportion, and avoids every excess and partiality. And thus the second rule for striving towards perfection amounts to this — Strive for all that is perfect, with moderation.

We now, in the first place, consider the effort after outward personal perfection, which is the dominion of the mind, partly over nature, partly in human society.

The human mind stands in contact with nature through the body, and is thereby either dependent upon it, or else exercises dominion over it. The first object of self-love, and effort for perfection, is hence life and health. By life, the mind comes forth, as a phenom-

enon in nature ; it is the compass of all powers and means, by which mind acts upon nature ; hence the mind must prize and seek to sustain it. By the inspiration springing from the sentiment of immortality, man elevates himself above his earthly manifestation, and sacrifices it for the higher goods of the spirit ; but he who throws life away for a vain, trifling object, acts irrationally. In the conflict for justice and honor, men should boldly meet death ; on the other hand, none but a fool will undertake a break-neck adventure, and sacrifice his life to the applause of the foolish. But love of life should not spring from selfishness, but from noble self-love ; it should not be feebly timorous, but united with courage and energy.

The preservation of life is conditioned by the preservation of health. By disease, the body, and with it the mind, yields to the destructive, hostile powers of nature. Although the mind may elevate itself above the disease of the body, yet it will be ever more or less limited and impeded by it ; its activity is lamed, its dominion over the outward world diminished : hence rational self-love demands that health should be valued and preserved. Even prudence demands it : if we wish the end, we must also will the means ; if we wish to be active, we must also preserve the instrument of all activity, the body, in useful, energetic condition. But love of perfection, noble self-love, regards health, also, immediately, as a good ; by it only has man the full, energetic self-respect which belongs to his dignity ; by it the mind feels itself more healthy and powerful ; it is not only more ardent, cheerful, and disposed to activity, but generally more happy in life ; in the perfection of phys-

ical life, it finds its more complete manifestation, and, as it were, the splendor of its being more brightly mirrored in the material world. As in the beauty and decoration of a house, the mind of him who has built and inhabited it is made known, so in a sound, energetic body, a sound, energetic mind is also manifested. By health, moreover, length of days is conditioned. "The glory of young men is their strength; and the beauty of old men is the gray head." These words of the sacred poet declare, in nervous brevity, that to the perfection of man, corporeal strength, and, as a consequence of an energetic youth, an advanced old age belong. Advanced age not only implies long activity and maturity of mind, but also reveals an inward solidity of power, and gives to the human character, by its stability amidst the changes of fortune, an honorable appearance of steadfastness and independence. Even an old tree, which has bidden defiance to time for centuries, we regard with a sort of veneration; but unconsciously it has experienced all that has befallen it: an aged man, on the contrary, by the mental activity which in him resists the outward world, has lived through an infinity — perceived, thought, felt, striven, and suffered, in manifold ways; and, after so many struggles, he still stands upright, and maintains his position; his hair has whitened, but his mind is still fresh and vigorous.

The means of preserving health and prolonging life are partly merely prudential means, whose observance in itself has no moral influence upon the mind, in part those whose observance is of immediate significance for the delicate sense of honor. These are cleanliness

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and temperance. The first promotes not only health, but also enhances noble self-respect; by cleanliness, one feels as if more free and independent, and in nobler neighborhood; moreover, one appears more agreeable and worthy before others. The second, apart from its reference to health, is also enjoined by self-control, and constitutes a part of inward perfection.

But we should not provide merely for health, but also for strength and activity of body, by which we can for the first time really maintain our independence of nature. Strength of body is first shown in suffering and endurance. We should harden the body, that we may not be slaves of our wants, and that cold and heat, privation and difficulty, may not hinder our undertakings. Not merely the warrior, the sailor, the traveller, needs this strength; every other person may be so situated, that he can reach his aim only by corporeal strength; and even a tender mother's love needs this at the sick-bed of her child. Strength of body is shown, secondly, and indeed in its free activity, by capacity for labor and exertion, which every one likewise needs, although it does not devolve upon all to acquire an extraordinary muscular power, such as is necessary to the calling of the warrior. Moreover, hardiness and strength are mutual supports; and he who can endure much will be also capable of great exertion, and the reverse. But strengthening the body must keep pace with its exercise in motion and agility. Motion preserves and promotes health; by it the limbs are strengthened, and all the powers are set in full play. Bodily accomplishments, such as running, jumping, riding, swimming, and so forth, are of manifold utility in life, and by

their means many a one has saved himself and others from deadly danger. Prudence, therefore, demands the acquisition of them in order to enlarge the powers of action. It is an humiliating feeling not to be able, from ignorance of swimming, to help a man whom the stream is carrying away ; one thus feels fettered and overcome by nature. But even if use may not thus be made of bodily agility, still the mere possession of it enhances the ardent, energetic consciousness which befits the perfect man ; and this feeling reacts upon the mind, and exalts its vigor and cheerfulness. The ancients reckoned bodily exercises among the essential parts of a liberal education ; and certainly they thereby contributed towards awakening and cherishing a fresh, ardent spirit of honor and freedom. A people in whom manly energy, readiness, and agility, are of any account, will not brook slavery. Finally, in bodily exercises, grace and beauty should be regarded, since it befits the complete man to go forth, even externally, as perfect as possible, and to win favor by his advantageous appearance. Those movements which, like the dance, promote social satisfaction, are on that account also to be recommended, since one may thus make himself acceptable in society, whereby his outward importance is enhanced. It is especially proper for women to improve their native charm by personal grace and elegance ; but they also need physical strength, especially for their maternal destination, and both aims may be attained together. Hardening, strengthening, exercising the body, should hold a more important place in our education than heretofore ; then we should bring up stronger youths and maidens, and keep them most

easily from the many vices which have their ground only in torpor and feebleness; indeed, our whole mode of life, with fresh bodily energy, would have new force.

Outward perfection consists, secondly, in the value and influence of man in society. He should not merely, by ambition, keep his position as a member of the moral commonwealth, but also prove himself an independent, active, useful, distinguished member of society, and acquire influence, worth, reputation, honor.

Here, also, first of all, dominion over nature comes into consideration. Man must, by labor, force from it the supply of his needs, else he would die of hunger and other adverse influences. But this labor is a common concern in society, and in its several branches shared among individuals, whilst the fruits of it are mutually interchanged. The part which each one undertakes in the common labor, is called his profession; and honor and self-love, as well as love of the common good, demand that he should choose such profession; neither he nor the community can exist without labor. Industry and activity are therefore necessary, since the nature of the mind is active, and life consists only in activity. Matter only is idle, and only the dead are at rest. But in reference to the outward world, industry is the only means of securing to man that independence of necessity which his honor requires. He should not give way to nature, and become a burden to other men; both are against his manly dignity. If a man is secured against necessity by inherited property, he should yet consider that all property is mutable, and destiny may oblige him to earn his daily bread. And even if this case does not occur, it still is the part of manhood to

be lord of his destiny, and to stand upon his own feet.

The strict demand of honor is fulfilled if a man can provide for himself and his own, and has as much as necessity requires. But the requisition of perfection goes further, and desires prosperity and wealth; and wisdom cannot condemn, but must rather praise, such an effort. By wealth, the dominion of man over the outward world is extended, and his influence enlarged; for gold and goods are but means of influence, and by them higher goods, such as mental culture, may be acquired. Wisdom only demands that earthly goods should be loved and sought not for their own sake, and she protests against the excess of avarice and acquisitiveness, by which exertion becomes onesided. Since it is of no use to acquire, if we know not how to keep what is acquired, morality therefore demands frugality, by which more can be often accomplished than by restless acquisition. Frugality is the golden mean between avarice and prodigality, both of which are adverse to their aim, and therefore irrational; the former does not employ the means at hand, the latter recklessly squanders them. Still, prodigality without sensuality, from noble contempt of wealth, is less blamable than avarice, which is usually attended with base love of money, with coldness and unkindness of heart. Frugality attains an especial, inner worth, by its not being able to exist without discretion and temperance, which are qualities of a virtuous disposition.

Independence and efficiency are the chief aim of property and wealth. But a cheerful enjoyment of abundance, to the promotion of the joy of existence,

belongs to perfection, if the mind can be elevated to it; and to prize and to seek wealth in this view, is justified by the true wisdom of life. Yet here we take account, especially, that our value in society is enhanced by the splendor of abundance, which we diffuse around us, and our outward character gains in weight and importance. In all nations and all ages this outward splendor has passed for something, and, according to a natural feeling, men wish always to see the noble and distinguished in noble circumstances. It is indeed vulgar and witless to lay too much weight upon the exterior, and to make it the measure of the inner man; and it is vanity to hang the heart upon what has no worth in itself, and to seek therein a personal worth; on the other hand, it would be gloomy severity to disparage all outward splendor. If no one would enjoy and show his abundance, all active industry and all the stir of life would stagnate, and even nobler enterprises could not be exhibited.

The application of wealth, in reference to sensual enjoyments, is made partly for the more copious enjoyment of eating and drinking, — a pleasure which is ennobled only by sociality, and is otherwise blamable, — partly for dress and habitation, — wants which more nearly concern personal perfection, since the sense of the agreeable, ornamental, and beautiful, may thereby be exercised. It exalts the outward dignity of man not only to be cleanly in dress and dwelling, but also to seek what is pleasing in these respects, and as if to extend around him the brightness of spiritual dignity and beauty. It is especially not only allowable, but a positive duty, for women to bestow a certain care upon dress. Nature

has given them attraction and beauty; by these, and by amiable qualities of mind, they have power in society, win and enchain the heart of man, and find and secure their position as mistress of the household. Noble self-love, therefore, permits what a natural impulse demands, enhancing the charms of their person by tasteful dress; but in this they must beware of the vice of vanity — of seeking their worth only in dress. Man need go no further in attention to dress than cleanliness and agreeableness demand; and there is nothing more offensive than dandyism. It is much more allowable for him to surround himself with splendor in his house and furniture. Here, also, what wisdom justifies, lies in the middle ground, and the most objectionable extremes are, on the one side, negligence, indifference, parsimony; and on the other side, vain love of show and dress, and arrogance. The noble mind of either sex will, besides, seek, by taste and the sense of beauty, to impress a worthy stamp upon abundance and splendor, and, even in what seems only to subserve luxury, will seek a higher aim.

The prevalent custom, which the rational man observes in all unessential matters, has a very decisive voice in determining the outward mode of life; and if it is generally folly to enter into an aimless conflict with it, this would be especially the case in reference to so unessential a matter. Besides, piety forbids us to become untrue to the customs of our fathers, especially if they are simple and temperate, and subserve sobriety and frugality. But, alas! ancestral and national custom governs us less than fashion, which, indeed, keeps taste astir, and formative, but often pushes it so far that

it lacks all character. It is constantly engaged in seeking and inventing, and throws away the best it has found, in order to bring something new, even if worse, upon the carpet. Propriety and beauty should be its aim, but it knows none but novelty. This disease of our manners is very much to be lamented; since a constant excitement is thereby afforded to vanity and arrogance, and attention is directed to what is only a secondary affair. Besides, there is the unworthy, absurd dependence, which enslaves us to Paris, the metropolis of this folly, and by which all individuality of manner and of taste falls to the ground. Nevertheless, the individual must yield to the inconvenience, if he would not bring upon himself the appearance of oddity; and moderation and tasteful selection only are to be recommended to him. Only by association can a dam be built against the stream which carries away each individual; and it is to be regretted that certain attempts of this kind in Germany have been unsuccessful.

The higher aim of manly activity is efficiency in society, and the consequent reputation and distinction. One should not merely labor to acquire, and should not cease when enough has been acquired, but ought to work, to be useful, to make oneself valuable and indispensable. Therefore, ability, skill, utility, are requisite, and the man studious of honor will seek to exercise these; he will prefer the nobler calling, the higher efficiency, even if it is not the more lucrative. There are two inducements to this striving for influence. One is, the love of fame; and the moralist need not utterly reject that. He whose breast does not swell with the approbation of the better minds of his nation,

is not worthy of, and will not attain it. Indifference to fame and distinction is surely always associated with sloth and coldness. The second inducement is love; love for the cause which is carried on, and in which it is the desire to perform a distinguished part; love for the best public good, which is subserved, and public spirit, by which the approbation and fame acquired first win their right value. Ambition, without this love and public spirit, — striving after distinction, merely in order to be distinguished, not on account of the efficiency by which it is deserved, is vainglory and greediness for honor, — a fruit of self-seeking, which wishes merely to aggrandize self without any care for the common good, which it indeed often sacrifices, in order to serve the passions or selfishness of others. The man greedy for honor flatters the ambition and rapacity of ruler or people in order to give himself consequence; he lends himself to the despot as an instrument in the oppression of the people, or in the gratification of base lusts. By selfishness, this greediness for honor becomes a passion, which governs the whole disposition, which can never be the case with genuine love of fame. It is vanity merely to seek the tokens of distinction and honor without the actual worth; and hence the passion for rank and titles, the vice of new monarchies, where the will of the monarch stamps distinctions, like false coin, and distributes them among the crowd of mendicants for honor.

The man of merit, in cases where his own personal consequence is concerned, will modestly retire, and not obtrude himself; but if the cause, the reputation of the good or useful undertaking, which he prosecutes, is in

question, then he will employ all his energy and influence against the spirit of malicious detraction. The immodest man, on the other hand, arrogates to himself a merit which does not belong to him, or, in degree, more than belongs to him, and asserts it by boasting and ostentation. The meritorious, and, at the same time, modest, man cheerfully acknowledges the desert of others, because his aim is to act for the cause, and not merely for himself; but the proud and arrogant despise the merit of others, and exalt themselves by disparaging others.

Striving for efficiency is attended by striving for superiority or independence; since one can thereby act with greater energy and freer spirit, and on a larger scale, than in a dependent situation. Rational self-love may find, in superiority, a grade of personal perfection; since one, by this, appears more independent and substantial than in the relation of service and obedience. It is wholly natural that the youth should strive for the mastership, the inferior magistrate for a higher office, the subordinate officer for the rank of commander; and what would life be without this effort? It is only by striving beyond his position that each incumbent fills it; he is wholly what he ought to be, only by wishing to be more than he is. He who is indifferent as to the relation of command and obedience, lacks surely just zeal; and, to such a one, the cause which he engages in will be likewise indifferent. But it is blamable domination to strive for superiority and independence, not in order to effect more good, but from pride and arrogance, for the sake of seeing oneself glorified; or from haughtiness, in order to put down and capriciously

treat others; or from self-will, in order to carry out certain favorite opinions, and to give currency to certain prejudices. The domineering spirit is the most dangerous passion for the peace of society; it has excited all civil tumults, all wars; it leaves no constitution nor government undisturbed, and undermines the wisest legislation; to it even the sanctuary is not sacred, and pious faith must yield to it no less than justice. Fatal is the domination of individuals, like storms and tempests, which lay waste the land; but the domination of whole races and classes is like a poison, that consumes the marrow of life. The desire of rule is foolish in those who have not the power and talent for it, but merely the good will; and such will seldom attain dominion, unless it be by way of birth. Between these two extreme faults, the disposition of the active, zealous man holds the just medium. Efficiency and the promotion of good is his aim; and he will cheerfully take the lead, if his own gifts and the confidence of others call him there; but just as cheerfully, if he lacks the gifts and means for ruling, he will take a subordinate station.

Finally, efficiency is somewhat affected by the independence or dependence of the agent upon plan in business, and upon method. Not only must every occupation have, in itself, a regular plan, to which the employer and employed are bound, in order that the associate forces may work harmoniously, and, as if upon one path, to one end, but regard must be paid to the outward arrangements of life, so as to avoid giving or receiving disturbance. But, in this way, the independence of a man need not be lost. Many are slaves

of method; confound the form with the thing, the means with the end, and dare not abrogate or alter a single existing arrangement and form; or they allow themselves, with supine compliance, to fall in with every form and restriction, glad to be rid of the trouble of breaking a new path: opposed to them stand the friends of license and wilfulness, who, exaggerating the natural love of independence, and confounding this with licentiousness, see, in all method, a fetter upon freedom, and therefore partly wage needless war with the existing external arrangements of life, partly refrain from binding themselves in any business to a regular plan, and precipitate and overturn every thing, but for that very reason can bring nothing to pass, or, at least, accomplish nothing lasting. This is not merely the fault of the young, in which a rude love of freedom ferments, but also in those styled strong and free minds, who lack discretion and control, who are prompted by a false zeal for reform. Midway between both faults stands the love of order in the active man of free mind, but of discretion and control, who, indeed, wherever possible, keeps his independence, does not slavishly bind himself to forms and means, and, wherever it is useful, strikes out new ways of influence, but also, on the other hand, cheerfully sacrifices his independence to the aim, which he keeps ever in sight, and prizes and uses every thing which, according to time or circumstance, can serve for its attainment.

These are the main features of a character of personal significance in the outward world, in regard to bodily qualities and capabilities, in regard to external position towards nature and society, personal

independence, possession of the means of enjoyment and action, a certain station and splendor, and, finally, in reference to efficiency, value, and distinction by these, dependence or independence in the community, and in the arrangement of business. But, since we must, throughout, presuppose the love of pure humanity and control, we acknowledge that outward, without inward, perfection is an empty shadow. As, in itself, it consists partly in bodily excellences, all else which belongs to it is only body and outward circumstance, without inward perfection; it is dead and cold without the quickening spirit, without the warm, beating heart. Inward perfection will, however, form from itself outward perfection, in so far as this is not merely the gift of nature, and procure for it worth and acknowledgment in the world, just as the spiritual power of vitality shapes and sustains every body and every outward manifestation. We hence turn our attention to a much more important subject — inward perfection.

But it is with trembling that I undertake to portray this form, which comprises in itself all mental fulness, ornament, grace, and perfection, or, in a word, spiritual beauty. The richer and more comprehensive it should be, the more it must remain only a cold sketch and outline. Were it required to paint the form of beauty of soul, such as experience or imagination presents, the problem were to be solved by some art of portraiture; then the picture might be obvious and striking by vivid particularity. But here the thing is to draw a form without individuality, with which every individuality may concur; and, since we undertake the problem, we

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must disclaim every other purpose but that of teaching and convincing.

Inward or spiritual perfection is so much the more difficult to indicate, as it is entirely spiritual life, moving in free, waving lines of creative fulness and graceful proportion, in rich, various, and yet full, harmony. The sense of honor, or true pride, which constitutes its foundation, allows itself, at least, to be indicated by what it is not, and what it avoids; but here, in respect to perfection, we are required to say what it positively is; and there the difficulty lies. Can the fleeting spirit, speaking from the bright countenance, the animated eye of a man, be comprehended and described? Can we give ourselves sufficient account of what attracts us to an amiable person, what enchains us and fills us with fond admiration? The teacher of drawing can give the outlines of which a regular human form must be composed; these outlines exclude all faults and defects, and convey the conditions of perfect beauty. But who, without the creative spirit of art, forms from these lines the godlike form of an Apollo Belvidere? Who breathes into the skeleton such fulness and power with such grace and victorious majesty? The true pride of honor is that regular form; spiritual perfection is this living, godlike image, the perfect form of beauty.

A proud, worthy sense of honor, whilst it maintains self-respect, commands respect and just awe. Spiritual perfection, however, or beauty of soul, the fruit of a noble self-love, commands love; it exists entirely in the love of pure humanity, in earnest pursuit of all spiritual excellence and good, and therefore, also, wins love;

the warm breath of love sweeps over its heavenly form, and draws to it every loving heart: since the perfect man strives after every thing worthy of love, he is himself most worthy of love. What is it, then, that we ever love, which we do not love on account of its perfection and beauty? wherein we do not recognize a perfect manifestation of pure humanity? Beauty and loveliness are one.

All beauty consists in free proportion in a rich and living variety. Thus the flower is beautiful through the lovely form which unites leaves and colors; the human form, by the proportion in which all the limbs and parts of the body concur; the landscape, by the unutterable harmony which melts meadow, wood, and mountain, outlines and colors, into a whole. What, now, is the variety, copiousness, material, in spiritual beauty, and what is its symmetry? Spiritual life consists in the expression of all spiritual energies, in the development of all endowments of the mind, in the full play of impulses and emotions; this is the material; and the self-conscious freedom of mind, with which we regulate this play, and bring it into harmony, constitutes proportion. Self-control, self-direction, is the fundamental law of virtue; but this consists in conformity to the necessary law of duty: here, on the contrary, we speak of the free coincidence of spiritual life with the free law of love, which not only does not neglect, but perfects and glorifies it. The conscious freedom, which gives the proportion of spiritual beauty, is the highest bloom and perfection of virtuous self-control; it is the inspired artist, who forms the godlike statue of the inner man; it is the power of self-culture, which is

active in the service of noble self-love, or of striving for perfection. The law which it follows is that of unity, the elementary law of the mind; the coincidence of all the energies of the mind in one whole, in which every disproportion and every excess are avoided, and all blossoms, as it were, are united in the crown of perfection. Proportion and moderation we have already made requisite to outward perfection, which, however, is but the reflection of the inward; but this consists wholly in harmony. By self-culture, the second constituent of spiritual beauty is gained, namely, the development of all talents, the complete unfolding of the whole scope of mental life; for we call him the most cultivated, who, by exercise, has got under his control, increased, and exalted, the gifts granted him by nature, and who knows how to turn his mind in all directions; who, in a word, possesses affluence of mind. Hence we have to consider spiritual beauty, throughout, as the work of self-culture. There is, also, a natural, inborn grace of mind; but it has not the worth of that acquired and maintained by free culture: the moralist recognizes this as the only true, and it devolves upon him to teach how we should attain and cultivate that which nature has denied us, or granted us merely in the germ.

Accordingly, self-culture is the means, and, at the same time, the end, of spiritual perfection or beauty of soul; it is a daughter of free power of mind, born and cherished of this. Physical beauty is denied to many; this is attainable by all, and the former has a substitute in this, nay, is quickened and glorified by it. A beautiful person, without a lovely soul, is a rude piece of

marble, over which the first chisel of the sculptor has gone, in order to give it the shape of a man. Still the finer shaping and rounding are wanting; the delicate, waving lines of form and drapery, the tender, swelling fulness of the flesh, the breath of grace, which should animate the whole, are still lacking. This breath of grace is poured upon a beautiful form, upon a beautiful face, from the fulness of spiritual beauty; but even a form which cannot pass for beautiful, is glorified by the mind, and an eye from which a lovely soul speaks out, is loveliest of all. Physical beauty is the fleeting heritage of youth, but the spiritual remains even to advanced age; and even if the fire of intellect in it has gone down; so much the more mildly its pure light beams forth. Beauty is loveliness; and who might not be lovely? To will is to be so; if we love what is lovely, if we strive after what adorns and ennobles man, we become ourselves worthy of love; for we attain what we strive for. Mental gifts, which nature imparts, are, indeed, a necessary condition of perfect spiritual beauty; but a lovely, feeling heart is its brightest constituent, the root, as it were, of this flower of heaven. And goodness of heart can be attained by culture,—nay, the true goodness of heart is not innate, but acquired, not weak good nature, but free, pure love of goodness.

The power of self-culture is self-conscious freedom. But self-consciousness is quickened and sustained by self-knowledge and self-examination. In order to form myself, I must be aware of my defects, wherein I can help them, what advances and improves me; and before all things must I be conscious of a law, an ideal, to which I must conform myself. Virtue is nothing

without conscientiousness, without the clear, secure feeling of the moral law, without holy horror of all wrong; and thus self-culture, which rests upon virtue, and is its perfection, requires a delicate kind of conscientiousness, a clear self-consciousness, a tender, vivid feeling, by which every thing noble and lovely, which should be striven for, every thing hateful and ignoble, which should be avoided, is recognized and felt. This tendency and frame of mind, the first elementary condition of all spiritual culture, consequently of all perfection and beauty of soul, we call transparency. It is like the pure, clear fountain, which is disturbed by no foreign substance,—the diamond of pure water, the bright crystal, through which the sunbeam passes undimmed: in this quality, purity and clearness are united, and constitute a character, in which that finer conscientiousness lives. It is the tender blossom of that clearness of mind and purity of heart, which we have reckoned among the elementary virtues. By the one, we recognize the laws to which we are subject, the ends for which we should strive; by the other, we subject ourselves, with faithful obedience, to the recognized laws, and give ourselves wholly up to the pursuit of good. Now, the frame of mind we have indicated consists in clearness of mind and purity of heart directed towards ourselves, in self-contemplation with the light of a clear mind, in self-examination with the humility of a pure heart. He who has this double virtue, recognizes himself as he is, what he wills, and to what he tends, and examines himself, whether he is and wills what he should; he maintains a constant communion with himself, and, in this inward self-inter-

course, as friend to friend, is upright and true, strict and just.

To moral transparency, accordingly, in the first place, belongs veracity towards self, which, by the light of a clear mind, expels from the soul all self-deception and self-delusion. Every effort presupposes that an end has been recognized, and a way been stricken out; one must be sincere with self in respect to one's purpose, and never pretend to a purpose which is not actually followed. In self-culture, this clear self-consciousness is indispensably necessary; for here we should thoroughly guide ourselves, and seek for ourselves the aim, whilst, in outward endeavors, we may be pushed and drawn onward by others. Self-delusion as to the direction entered upon, is the common fault of men, and there is, perhaps, no one who is wholly free from it. All, more or less, delude themselves; all palliate this or that false direction which they have taken. Selfishness mingles in all endeavors, but no one will confess it; vanity, false ambition, sullies all zeal, but no one takes clear account of it. But it is worse, if we are deceived as to our entire direction, and chase an empty phantom, whilst we think ourselves pursuing a true object. Nothing is more customary than to be wholly deceived as to the object and significance of mental culture, of science, and art. It is considered as a noble mental occupation, as a means of recreation; and this is, indeed, something; but the true fruits should flow over life, enlighten, purify, animate it; and many know nothing of this. If the object is to apply the results of scientific inquiry to life, according to acknowledged truths to reform laws, con-

stitutions, and establishments, to root out errors and superstitions, then, apparently, the most zealous friends and promoters of science are alarmed, and raise a hue and cry about innovation and presumption. The love of art should awaken inspiration, give the soul a higher range, and exalt it above all vulgar selfishness and petty passion; but, if men enter into life with such dispositions, people are alarmed at their determined ardor, and at the pride with which they despise all the enticements of wealth and power, and call them hot-heads, unruly and dangerous fanatics. Most persons would give value to grandeur and beauty of character only in poetry and painting; but, if it meets them in real life, then they feel themselves hostilely touched, or, at least, very much disturbed. Many rulers and potentates favor the arts and sciences, and public education: now, since their natural result is illumination, freedom of mind, and enthusiasm, it should be thought that they intended to promote these among their people; but, nevertheless, they rather suppress them, and show that they contradict themselves, and wish mental culture merely as a fruitless decoration, or as a sport of their vanity. Napoleon's love for art and science had such an impure motive; he sought to dazzle by it, to glorify himself, or, at the utmost, to gratify his inclination for the grand and gigantic by magnificent enterprises. Nothing is more frequent than this conduct of vanity towards science and art, and nothing more rare than the true, pure love and enthusiasm for them. Many would merely shine by them in society, and maintain their personal superiority. Many surround themselves with books and works of art as with handsome furniture; and, to them,

music has value only as a means of exciting the appetite, or filling up the emptiness of card-playing. Others desecrate art into the service of their lust, and use it only to minister to sensuality. In religion, inconsistency is a prevalent disease; and it would be a prolix business to indicate all its shades. Why are those who glory in the true faith so intolerant, and ready to brand with heresy every differing opinion? Because they are wholly deceived as to the nature of holy truth, and are devoid of all love of truth, and of all freedom of thought, from which it springs, and hence are disingenuous. They idolize their Savior, and believe him alone worthy of adoration; and, if he now should appear in living form, and should wave the torch of truth, they would surely regard him as a dangerous innovator, test his doctrine by the words of the Augsburg Confession or Heidelberg Catechism, and, if he did not speak like them, would damn him as an errorist. To many, devotion and edification are only a means of killing ennui, of busying imagination, or even of ministering to sensuality. The ardor of pious emotions, pious play with tasteless images, is often nothing but indirect voluptuousness; and, if people cannot satiate themselves with the honey of lust, they feed upon the bitter-sweet of penitence and grace. One would never be done, who should undertake to mention and describe all the kinds of disingenuousness. Their forms are as manifold as the phantoms which light joined with night produces, as the different degrees of *chiaro oscuro*, as the blendings of truth and error. Each one, for himself, alone can recognize the want of transparency in which he lives; another person easily wrongs him, by esti-

mating him according to the universal rule of truth; for the rule by which each one should estimate himself is his own conviction.

This disingenuousness is resisted only by a constant attention to self, and uninterrupted self-examination. By comparing the wish with the deed and conduct, self-deceit is removed, and, in good time, the way from the false to the true is found. A pure heart, in which humility, the sense of weakness, is vivid, will never allow itself to be deluded in this work of self-examination by the pretensions of haughtiness and self-complacency, and will resist the levity which shuns reflection. Humility is the mother of perfection. He who deems himself perfect and faultless, will never advance in his culture, but remain fixed, else go back; and he who lives on frivolously day by day, and never attains reflection, is distant heaven-wide from all self-culture. But one may also be too anxious in self-examination, if there is fear of erring at each step taken, and timorous turning back, and, consequently, no progress. Here, also, perfection lies in the medium between the two extremes — genuine, discreet strictness between frivolity and anxiety. Humility gives the impulse to self-examination, and is, in turn, awakened and cherished by it; since it discovers and points out actual failings and errors. Sincere repentance will be the result, and will bring with it the living impulse to reformation, which then will keep itself active in avoiding former faults, and in the acquisition of wanting virtues and excellences. Here, again, a frequent form of disingenuousness meets us; it is unfruitful, morbid penitence, without actual amendment. Many deceive themselves by

an empty play of penitence, purposes of improvement, and fresh sins, or continuance in the old; their repentance is not sincere; they unconsciously love the faults which seem to displease them, and dread the exertion necessary to root them out. But such persons sink deeper and deeper into their moral malady; they live in continual discord with themselves, and sin consciously, because they continue in the sins of which they repent; they entirely destroy the little power at their command, since they do not use it; they succeed in no moral work, and all their joy of mind is lost.

To all moral activity, and so, also, to the work of self-culture, — to the pursuit of perfection, — power is requisite. Now, no one can give himself power, but it is enhanced by ardent confidence; and every expression of it is possible only by this. In many exercises of body, the thing is only to have courage to exercise one's power; this is seen in children, in their first attempts to walk. Confidence effects yet more in mental activity. Let one only confide in the truth which he advances, and speak it out with confidence, and conviction follows; let him confide in his power to make a sacrifice, and the fulfilment will be easy. Without confidence, nothing is undertaken; and he who undertakes nothing effects nothing. As a second elementary condition of self-culture, we therefore demand self-reliance, confidence in one's own energy. This self-confidence is partly the universal confidence in the moral power of freedom in general, which dwells in men, and coincides with the inspiration, or the joyous religious feeling, by which we call ourselves to the highest, and believe ourselves capable of the attainment of every grand

and lovely object; it is partly the confidence in individual powers, gifts, and dispositions, which are granted to each one in particular. That universal self-confidence is necessary to the happy attainment of universal human perfection; this individual confidence is necessary to the happy development of especial gifts, and to the pursuit of a particular calling; but the second is inseparable from the first, and, as it were, only a particular branch of it, as of the main trunk. Confidence in moral power, or the sense of freedom, is directed partly towards the external world, which opposes our undertakings, towards the obstacles of nature, and the opposition of men, partly against our own inclinations, habits, and passions, which disturb and restrict us in the work of self-culture: by this confidence, we shall resolutely begin the struggle, and the hope of victory will lead us to victory. With the aid of confidence in our particular gifts and powers, we likewise conquer partly the outward hinderances which oppose their development, the choice of a profession, or any other undertaking, partly certain defects in ourselves, with which we have to contend. Many a scholar, many a poet and artist, would never have risen without this confidence; without it many a grand undertaking would have remained unachieved. Desire, and love, and confidence in inborn gifts, it was, by which Demosthenes overcame those defects of articulation, that seemed to unfit him for the orator's vocation.

But confidence not only secures to us the victorious result of our efforts, but also preserves the individuality of our mind, the original stamp of our character, the free vitality of our force. He who has no confidence

in himself, will either begin nothing, and live in slothful inaction, or anxiously bind himself to others' advice, to others' example, follow the great multitude, or some distinguished examples, and be nothing but an imitator and follower. But every imitation is without intrinsic worth, since it has no life of its own; for only the outward form and mien, but not the mind, can be imitated. Mind is always its own, and springs from its own fountain. Every man has his own peculiar nature and gifts, since, in nature, no creature is like another: now, in him who has confidence, this individuality will, of itself, enter into all things, into thought, feeling, action; and, since he thus gives scope to Nature, he serves her in pious sense, since, throughout, she wills individuality.

But every human power is limited, dependent, and vincible, by other powers, and can be led from its aim, or guided to a false one. Man can effect nothing without foreign aid, and must always build upon previous labor. Every peculiarity has a faulty side, and may degenerate into a fault. The acknowledgment of this teaches us humility, and tempers our confidence into genuine modesty. Modesty preserves us not only from vanity and conceit, by which we attribute to ourselves powers and gifts which we either possess not at all, or not in that degree, and from presumption and pomposity, by which we swell, with vain self-confidence, towards others, without any ground for it, but also from rashness and arrogance, which induce us to undertake more than we can accomplish, to despise hinderances and foes, to slight foreign advice and assistance, instruction and admonition, and to take all upon our own

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shoulders, whereby nothing can succeed. In the presumptuous self-reliance, by force of which the examples of others are disparaged in the work of self-culture, and one's own way is wilfully followed; individuality is strongly marked, but will appear with rudeness and harshness, so as not to attract, but repulse, since it does not chime in with the general harmony of culture. And thus excessive confidence, like distrust and exaggerated humility, although in an opposite manner, will hinder the success of every work of self-culture; and only in genuine, earnest, and yet modest, self-confidence, lies the condition of every happy result, every joyful prosperity.

But genuine self-reliance is not only a fundamental condition of personal perfection, but also, in itself, a constituent of it, an essential feature in the form of mental beauty. Self-reliance announces power; power is the expression and condition of life; life, in full perfection, is beauty. By self-reliance, what one can effect is expressed; in it is the germ of all future manifestations of power and life; it is the reflection of the inmost, mental life, and, therefore, the foundation, as it were, the gravitating centre of beauty. Indeed, in natural beauty, an unconscious confidence, or sense of power, is expressed in silent figures—in the mighty, towering tree, in the proud elevation of the mountain, in the bold fall of the cataract. The quiet grandeur of the temple, the lightness of the slender columns, the boldness of the heaven-aspiring tower, all declare confidence. With consciousness, self-confidence is expressed in powerful animals—in the spirited horse, who, impatient to be free, stamps the ground; in the

mighty lion, who lies ready to spring upon his prey ; in the quietly-reposing, ruminating ox. But, with clear consciousness, self-reliance is mirrored in manly beauty, which by it alone is what it is. The masterpiece of manly beauty, the victorious Apollo, is entirely the symbol of manly sense of power. From a manly countenance, if it is handsome, self-reliance speaks forth, whether in the ardent, onward glance of the hero, or in the penetrating, keen gaze of the thinker, or in the inspired vision of poet and saint. Even in the light, mild grace of woman, in the movement of the dance, in the lovely posture of repose, a power is expressed, freely developed, filling its limits, resting upon its own centre ; and the mild moderation, the slight restraint, cannot please without a certain measure of fulness and power. Yet more significantly self-reliance is expressed in all poetical, spiritual beauty. Every character whom the poet produces, attracts by the expectation which he excites, and gratifies more by what he leaves to be anticipated from the mental fulness in him, than what he actually develops. In a great deed, the courage and spirit of enterprise always please more than what is actually achieved ; and the greatest heroic poem, the Iliad, shows a grand, energetic effort for a trifling aim. The height of poetic art, the lyric poem, the ode and hymn, exalt by the aspiration of mind, which strives for an infinite aim, and leaves more to be anticipated than is actually attained. Sense of power, courage, spirit of enterprise, aspiration, are also the expression of confidence, and also awaken confidence ; and therein a main source of the satisfaction which we feel in view of mighty, grand phenomena, lies.

On the contrary, arrogance and presumption, and every force that oversteps its limit, and thereby defeats itself, excites displeasure. A leaper, who starts forth, and cannot finish the leap, is, like the braggart, ridiculous and contemptible. A countenance which seeks to express all the energy which dwells in the character, and still more, and makes vain pretensions, cannot please. A poet who awakens great expectations of his hero, which he does not fulfil, — who vexes himself with empty roar of words, to seek the height of inspiration, but does not actually mount, — makes an adverse impression, or none. Beauty consists in proportion, and this lies in the relation of power and confidence to limit and result, in effort, free, yet regulated, not cramped, but only gently circumscribed.

There are pictures of humility and self-forgetfulness, which attract by a wonderful charm, like that of Mary at the Annunciation, or when she is absorbed in the contemplation of the child on her lap; these seem to contradict our position, that self-reliance is the basis of all beauty of character. But the contradiction is only apparent. These pictures express pious susceptibility and resignation, consequently repose; but we are here speaking of effort and activity. In a state of susceptibility, a higher power is received, and one's own power, consequently, self-confidence, retires; self is not so much maintained, as blended with a higher influence. But, even in receptivity, there must be a certain self-reliance, since slothfulness, inward death, can receive nothing; and where self-reliance is, self-confidence cannot be wanting. In those pictures there is no expression of dissolving feebleness, as in a Francis of

Assisi; pious resignation is a firm, but delicately-folded bud, which opens in higher light; a holy fervor to imbibe the higher influence, a pious trust to submit to its power, is supported and strengthened by childlike humility.

Self-reliance is always united with self-respect. The former looks forward to what is to be performed, the latter backwards to what has been done; the former is the sentiment of power, first to be developed, the latter of power developed; and both are united in the self-consciousness of personal worth. Self-respect preserves and strengthens self-reliance, and is necessary as the latter to energetic, successful effort. People must be aware of what they have achieved, in order to know what remains to be done; and thus ardor for further effort is refreshed and raised, as well as the delusion dispelled, that enough has been accomplished. The traveller sometimes pauses, and measures the path traversed; if he has not yet gone far forward, this will prompt him to hasten his pace; if he finds the end so much nearer, he will so much the more cheerfully traverse the remainder of the way. He who cultivates a talent for any art, will compare his work with acknowledged masterpieces; if he now finds that he is in the right way of culture, his ardor and confidence will increase; but if, on the contrary, he perceives mistakes and defects, he will labor to correct them. So is it with every endeavor, and especially in that of self-culture. Two opposite faults are here equally pernicious. The most frequent is that of over-estimate of self, with such follies and vices as these springing from it; — self-complacency, which, with comfortable satis-

faction, regards what has been achieved, without sufficiently proving it; vanity, which looks upon unimportant excellences as important, and reckons the gifts of fortune, as birth, wealth, beauty, as merit; conceit, which sees excellences where there are none, or magnifies those which are trifling; presumption and pomposity, which, with inward vacuity, assume importance towards others, and cause annoyance; pride and arrogance, which boast of actual merits, to the disparagement and oppression of others. Much more rarely, contempt and under-estimate of self, the consequence of excessive humility, appear. Both extremes hinder progressive culture: in the former, wholesome strictness towards self is wanting; in the latter, cheerful encouragement; and only in the middle path of true modesty a happy result is secured.

The self-consciousness springing from self-respect is, in itself, a main feature of mental beauty — indeed, of every kind of beauty. What is lifeless and unconscious, at least in its forms, declares itself what it is, discloses, in outward manifestation, the power resting in it, and hence expresses a sort of self-consciousness. In manly beauty, the independent, conscious mind, and, therefore, self-consciousness, also, must be expressed most strongly and decidedly; and thus a lofty, triumphant feeling, with a tincture of youthful scorn, is the expression upon the face of the Apollo Belvidere. In feminine beauty, pious resignation and humble self-forgetfulness prevail; since active energy retires, consequently self-consciousness is not so decidedly expressed; but humility need never degenerate into self-annihilation. On the other hand, every excess of self-conscious-

ness is the bane of all beauty. Vanity destroys the magic of the loveliest form, the most blooming charm, and, at best, excites the approbation of sensuality. But spiritual beauty rests entirely upon modesty, as upon its centre, and, by pompous presumption, is dissipated into empty vapor; yet pride and arrogance, because they have some basis, still attract, and admit of being reduced to a poetical whole, but only in order to bend them beneath a higher symmetry. It is the tragic character, which, because it oversteps its limit, is judged by Nemesis, the avenger of all unfitness.

LECTURE XXI.

PERSONAL PERFECTION CONCLUDED.

OF inward, or strictly personal perfection, we have already, in general, set forth the main principles and conditions, and have shown that it consists in beauty of mind, and is attained by self-culture, and that the success of this work of self-culture requires truthfulness towards self, and attention to self, self-reliance, and self-respect, united with true modesty. But it yet remains for us to determine more closely wherein the inward perfection, or mental beauty, consists, which should be the aim of self-culture.

The perfect or beautiful must correspond to certain laws, else it is not perfect and beautiful. These rules are recognized in part by the understanding, or sense of truth, in part by taste, or the sense of the beautiful. They are partly such as, by opposition to error and perversity, may hence be designated as negative, and yet constitute necessary foundations, partly such as immediately express the perfect and beautiful, and can hence be more felt than apprehended, and, therefore, not expressed with strict, necessary adequacy and universality.

Perfection, or beauty, is the rich and symmetrical life of the mind, which is furnished with all spiritual

goods in harmonious completeness. The understanding may decide what the mental life may not be, what cannot pass as mental good. Sensual life, as such, property and pleasure, do not belong to the mind, and the goods which appertain to them are not true, but specious goods. Hence the understanding may give a caution against being disappointed in the pursuit of specious goods, by seeking perfection in wealth and pleasure. Mental life consists not in passive quiet, but in activity; and all boasted perfection, which does not belong to activity of mind, is at once acknowledged by the understanding to be false: it accordingly not only rejects luxury, in so far as this makes the mind sluggish, but also every attribute of it, every science and sentiment in which activity is not shown. The mind strives universally after worth and an aim; it wishes only that which reaches, helps, and furthers, the universal life of the mind; and all that is aimless and worthless, idle and fruitless, does not belong to it: such the understanding can recognize and banish from the province of true perfection. An ability, skill, and science, which have no aim, or overstep their aim, it designates as vain and foolish; but vanity and folly do not belong to perfection; they are the very opposite. But the life of the mind should not only be spiritual in its purport, but should also bear a symmetry and proportion in itself; and the understanding can recognize whether this proportion exists or not. If any one strives after any spiritual good with passionate violence and onesidedness, and educates only a single disposition, a single faculty of the mind, to the neglect of all others, then the understanding recognizes the folly and odium of a

beginning which so strongly violates the rule of inward symmetry. Moreover, truth, of whatsoever kind, throws a holy light upon the mind and its efforts. There is nothing in human life which does not correspond with the world and the laws of its existence, no single human event which does not, in a measure, correspond with the whole of human life. Now, he who understands the world will better understand human life; and he who comprehends this as a whole, will also better judge of its individual events. But the cultivation of the intellect is especially useful to the work of self-culture in a double view; in the first place, in reference to prudence, which is necessary in every thing we strive after and pursue, hence also in self-culture, since it weighs means and aims one with another, and teaches the choice of the best; but prudence consists in knowledge of nature and the world, and he is most prudent who best knows how every thing in the world hangs together, and one thing conditions, supports, and promotes another; secondly, self-knowledge is an indispensable condition of self-culture, since this cannot be prosecuted without knowing our own characteristic dispositions and faults. But self-knowledge is promoted not only by the investigation of human nature, but also by all living, profound knowledge of outward things around us; since, in these, in a manner, the mind's life is mirrored, but especially since the understanding, exercised in observation, is preserved in self-knowledge, and the light gained from without is used for inward illumination. Finally, the culture of the understanding is an immediate part of perfection. A clear, living understanding is like an eye to the inner

man; as no face is beautiful without a clear, animated, intellectual eye, so there is no beauty of soul without a cultivated understanding.

The culture of the intellect, the pursuit of truth, cannot succeed, however, without upright, pure love of truth. He who enriches himself with knowledge, only in order to busy himself pleasantly, or make himself brilliant,—he who piles it up in memory, as dead riches, without any vital connection,—whose work it is not to learn the laws and worth of things, the order which the Creator has every where established in nature,—whose aim is not truth,—will, in spite of all his acquirements, know nothing, and neither be of use to the world nor to himself. On the contrary, he who is inspired by genuine love of truth,—who finds truth, even without the artificial, troublesome apparatus of scholarship,—with clear eye perceives things as if at a glance, since he beholds them in their real bearings, and seeks the just point of view. But the love of truth especially teaches the knowledge of the inner self, which lies open to each, if he will only turn his eye towards it. He who possesses the love of truth, already possesses truth, even before he actually perceives it; the sentiments of a pure heart guide him safely; he walks in the radiance of his inner light, and cannot go astray, or every trifling error which he meets serves to lead him to the truth.

Pure love of truth, the property of a pure heart, is united with the sense of the beautiful; by which, secondly, we recognize in what perfection, or mental beauty, consists, and, indeed, what constitutes its peculiar, inmost essence. The sense of beauty selects, among

the attributes of mental life, of mental goods and aims, of spiritual beauty, the nobler and more lovely. It is already made the part of perfection to prefer activity to pleasure, but in action there is again a great difference; and it is nobler to be occupied with science and art than to till a field and garden, or to carry on a mechanical business; it is nobler to seek recreation in intellectual, free conversation, than to pass the time in play. Since self-culture is promoted by nothing more than by others' example, and the society of other accomplished men, this sense of beauty will be observed in the choice of better examples and of nobler friends. The man of pure sense of the beautiful will attach himself to men who are distinguished not by outward excellences, not by dazzling qualities of mind, but by purity of heart, and earnestness of aim, and in such will find nurture for the mind and heart. As nature teaches the beast to seek in the pasture the herbs which are wholesome for him, and to leave those untouched which are pernicious, so the sense of beauty, noble taste, seeks the beautiful and noble, and leaves aside the hateful and vulgar. But this feeling is especially proved by the establishment and maintenance of proportion and harmony; it avoids every excess, every discord; it hates all violent exaggeration, impropriety, and onesidedness; it seeks, in all things, balance, correspondence, roundness. In a mind governed by a sense of the beautiful, no unruly passion, no morbid desire, will take root, and every stormy emotion will settle down to a smooth surface. Such a mind feels itself painfully wounded by every passionate ebullition, every disturbance of inward equilibrium, and quickly seeks to find a cure by its restoration. If the

understanding can recognize faults and perversities only by opposition to acknowledged rules, and can withstand them only by awakening a dissension, and a feeling of penitence, then the taste immediately feels the hateful-ness of these, and, without long-conflicting and choos- ing, seeks their cure in the perfect and the beautiful. Every movement of the soul soars of itself, as by inner magic, into the beautiful and harmonious.

But the sense of beauty is not only a means and in- strument of self-culture, and for the attainment of spirit- ual beauty, but also an essential part, nay, the germ of it. A heart in which a vital sense of the beautiful lies, is itself beautiful; only because it loves and seeks the beau- tiful, it can contain within itself nothing but what is fair. It is the bud, from which the flower of beauty comes forth, and already the rose in its bud is fair; since in swelling fulness it infolds all beauty, which will open in the sunlight.

Love of truth, and sense of beauty, can and should be cultivated and cherished, and their nurture is a main object of education and self-culture. The means of culture lie in science and art, and their quickening and formative power should be directed to the youthful mind; in them the adult, nay, the aged man, should refresh, support, and strengthen himself. A natural love of knowledge is inherent in man, and it appears even in the child. First, it is directed outward, and strives for acquaintance with nature and history; but one thus becomes gradually conscious of himself. If, then, he gratifies this impulse by information and in- struction, he will soon turn his attention inward. How far intellect may be cultivated is less important than

in what way it is done, whether the mind is vitally awakened, and a vivid love of truth is excited; and herein the zeal and skill of the teacher are especially shown. Although the profession chosen does not lead to a peculiarly learned and scientific culture, yet every well-educated youth should be so far mentally awakened, and lay such a foundation, that he can afterwards build upon it, and in his leisure hours acquire whatever is needed by a thinking man to enlighten him regarding the world and life. The development of the sense of the beautiful may be awakened very early in children by stories, in which examples of a noble, magnanimous life are contained. Tales of fancy are better suited to this than dry, cold, moral narrations; and history, presented in a suitable garb, affords the best nutriment. The deeds of great men, the traits of magnanimous courage, self-sacrifice, address every childlike mind, and so much the more, when they have the warranty of truth. The sense for art awakens later, and the child must long busy himself with the dry rudiments of music and drawing, before a taste for them is acquired; but the fruits of these labors will appear in youth. The exercise of an art, or at least the sense for it, should be wanting in no cultivated man, whether his desires lead him to music especially, or to the plastic arts; but poetry, in which the moral life is most purely and vividly represented, should be for all the fountain of higher spiritual nurture. Culture of the intellect, and the sense of the noble and beautiful, are at the same time attained by classic culture, the study of ancient languages, the most perfect of all, and the ancient masterpieces, so matchless, of poetry and eloquence. Even

those youth, who are destined to learned professions, but by their prosperous circumstances are in a situation to devote the fairest years of youthful energy to a universal culture, should be led to this ever-fresh fountain, in order to draw immediately from it the divine draught of inspiration. But for youth and age, a still higher, purer fountain of truth flows from our holy faith, in religious education, in church life, and its means of incitement. In the doctrines of Christianity, the child receives the germ of all truth at the same time with the heavenly light of love, whereby all good and lovely is developed; and in biblical history, the youthful mind sees unfolded the rich image of a higher life, glorified by communion with God, by his revelation and incarnation; in it the forms of pious inspiration and resignation, and the sublime pattern of perfect humanity, — of God in man, — appear. And this fountain is never exhausted; affords power and nurture to every mind according to its individual measure. The word of truth awakens and enlightens the simple and the learned, the rude and the cultivated; in social devotion, in prayer and sacred song, all feel themselves exalted and strengthened. Science and contemplation of the world, poetry and art, receive first from piety their true consecration, and their purifying and formative power. All investigation should proceed from faith, and return thither; all artistical and poetical inspiration should be elevated and glorified by it. Hence the highest means of culture is the science of faith and of morality, — the pious contemplation of nature and history, sacred art and poetry; and happy the people whose mental culture has taken this course and

gained this end ; happy the individual who can attach himself to such a course of life, and move in such paths, and develop himself to perfection !

We will now approach nearer to the task of setting forth the laws of mental culture, or drawing the image of beauty of soul. We have, in general, designated it, as play of mental powers and affections, living and rich in its compass, and, as to form, kept in symmetry by self-conscious freedom. In both regards, health is requisite to beauty, just as bodily beauty cannot exist without bodily health : these are as if two steps of mental perfection.

The play of mental life, which constitutes the material of inward beauty, consists in the efficiency of all mental and moral faculties, — in the expression and development of impulses and inclinations, — in the alternation of emotions, sensations, feelings, desires, and affections, — in the play of thoughts excited by, and intervening between, these, — in the active and vital effort of advancing activity. There is nothing more living, rich, and various, than the life of the mind, and hence this manifests the highest beauty ; and poetry, which represents it, is the first of all arts. Sculpture has merely the relations of space ; painting has light and colors ; music has motion, and the different sounds of instruments, to work with as the material of its variety ; but in a human mind an infinity of different capabilities is revealed, and the whole outward world, as it were, is mirrored in it. Now, if the creative, formative spirit of harmony enters into this manifold play, it forms a beauty, of which all other beauty, and that of nature itself, is merely the outward reflection. But, before all

things, this play must be living and rich. It must be living through fresh power and movement; torpor, sloth, cessation, stagnation — these life removes: fresh force is the promoter of mental as of bodily health.

The life of the mind is first sensuously excitable; and thus for its health we first demand fresh, living force of the senses. The healthy man turns to the external world sound, susceptible senses, and takes the impressions which they receive with a fresh inner sense, and with a vivid, active imagination. He is an unsound man upon whom the manifold charm, which streams upon him from every quarter, makes no impression, — who takes no lively interest in the many-colored play of the light, in the cheerful dance and music of vital emotions, and who does not inwardly elaborate, newly form, and unite, all that he receives. A child who is not attracted by all that he sees, does not rejoice in every brilliant color, every quick movement, every clear sound, is hardly healthy and strong. This child-like vivacity should, however, remain with the grown man, and in him should be enhanced by imagination. It is the condition of attention and curiosity; for he who is of vivacious senses, is destitute of the first inducement to investigation: this is the introduction and incitement to a higher religious and poetical view of the world, and to the contemplation of art, since even the arts first attract by their external charm, before they unfold to the mental sense their spiritual beauty.

From the incitement of the senses the desire springs up for the enjoyment of the agreeable and charming, and we therefore number the strong capacity for enjoyment among the qualities of a healthy mental life. We

deem that view of life as in itself morbid, which considers enjoyment as not allowable, and abstinence as in itself meritorious, and which hence promotes unsoundness and disease in mental life. On the contrary, we require for health of soul, that man should love the enjoyment in which his mind is passive and at rest, not for its own sake, but should seek therein only a recreation and renewal of mental activity, and not sensual desire, but a higher, mental joy, and that he should give entire preference to mental activity over sensual excitement and gratification. The mind is morbid if it passively sinks into luxury; its inner life, which consists in activity, is thereby cramped, as the body, by torpor and stagnation, is put into an unhealthy state. Unhealthy is the moral frame of the merely luxurious, inactive man of leisure, of the glutton, the voluptuary; apart from the violations of duty, justice, and honor, of which he makes himself guilty, he is inwardly diseased by sloth of mind. On the contrary, the man of sound, active mind enjoys a happy existence; then his mind soars above mere enjoyment, his inward eye remains undimmed, the heart swells with joyous gratitude towards the Creator; yet with fleet step he hastens to his daily work over the flowery carpet of pleasure to his path of labor; and, if the occasion demands it, then he turns his back to all the joys of society, and falls into conflict for that which he loves more than earthly desire, and bears deprivation and trouble with the same cheerfulness with which he enjoys the blessings of Providence.

Even sorrow maintains its right, and desires its share in life, as clouds obscure the sunlight, and storms in-

interrupt the mild, cheerful repose of nature. A sound mind feels strong in grief, as in joy, but, at the same time, has the energy to rise above it, and withstands the crushing, deadening impressions under which the spirit might else give way and sicken.

The spiritual life is not only moved sensuously from without, but has also its inward sensible impressions and emotions. The imagination weaves from external images those which are new and more brilliant, paints with them the empty spaces of past and future, and awakens longing and hope, which fill the mind with sweet desire. Even the mental feelings, which spring from the moral instinct, the sense of right and wrong, of noble pride, love of freedom, enthusiasm for truth and beauty, friendship and love, and even piety, enter the mind with sensible strength, and must do so, if they would move it powerfully. He who looks with indifference upon the past and future, regrets no loss, raises no wish nor hope, stands always indifferent to the present, and takes no warm interest in life. He whose blood is not made to rush more quickly through his veins, whose heart is not made to beat faster, by the indignation of moral disapprobation, the glow of enthusiasm, the flash of a great purpose, will not accomplish any thing great in life; he who does not go with ardent curiosity to the perusal of a book, to the solution of a scientific problem, does not love science; he who does not stand with enraptured eye before a beautiful work of art, has no true love of art; he who does not, at least at certain moments, press his friend with warmer affection to his heart, knows not how to love; he whom the feeling of devotion does not move to tears, is not as

yet thoroughly moved by its sacred power. This sensible force of spiritual affections, this warmth of the heart, united with an energetic will, produces zeal, and this is essential to an energetic life; it inflames to every great enterprise, prompts the hero to battle, animates the artist, the poet in the design and execution of his work; it claims the sensuous energy of the body for the service of the mind, so that, conflicting and formative, it seizes upon nature, makes it insensible to pain and deprivation, and gives it perseverance and constancy. Without this sensuous power, the mind would go forth into nature as powerless thought, as inactive longing, like the departed souls, which, as superstition fables, linger with vain wishes still upon earth, without accomplishing what they have left unfinished, and without enjoying what they still love.

There are cold men, who, from inward sluggishness, from want of sensibility, can be set in motion and on fire by no higher influences, and actually know no higher pursuit, than gain or pleasure: them we call vulgar. In others, the understanding is predominant over the heart, and they make every thing a matter of cold calculation: such persons are found among scholars, and are called pedants; but even these will embrace their favorite science with zeal. In others, the understanding is also predominant, but not as the consequence of a onesided development, but by a natural coldness of heart and prevalent selfishness; these ridicule the zeal of others, and, with subtle, worldly prudence, take advantage of it, whilst they affect interest in what moves and inflames the others: these are men of the world, and their disposition excites a kind of

shudder. A man who is ardent in nothing, and subjects every thing to his selfish calculation, is like the snake, who lurks by the way-side, and insidiously attacks the passers by.

Needful as this strength of the senses is to mental emotions, yet the health of the soul must not be allowed to suffer thereby, which is the case if the spiritual yields to the sensuous, or is dimmed and perverted by it. As the health of the body suffers, if the excitement of wine, taken in excess and to inebriation, sets the blood in motion and cripples the limbs, — so the sound, free activity of the mind gives way, if the power of the senses acts more potently than a mere incitement or lever should do. Many men are excitable in regard to goodness, but it disturbs them like an affair of passion; the spark of a noble feeling is kindled in them as to a ravaging flame. They hate wrong, and a noble wrath burns in them, so that they pursue the injurer, and take the part of the oppressed; but, again, they harm the cause of right by revenge and harshness. Others embrace science and art with great zeal; but it is not the pure love of truth and of beauty which inspires them, but the violence of their nature, by which they rush with vehemence upon every thing in which they feel an interest. Such persons are just as violent in love and friendship, but the sensual fire does not allow the pure flame of love to come forth; they are powerfully seized by these emotions, but these are dissipated in idle, superficial feelings, and lack the right influence upon the disposition. Very often, such persons as are denominated enthusiasts and fanatics, are very fickle and changeable in their tendencies; their

enthusiasm is a flame of straw, which suddenly blazes up, but is soon consumed; they lay hold of a matter quickly and violently, but they soon let it go, since they do not enter into its true, inner essence. But if a strong will is united with their violent excitability, then they follow with passionate partiality a single aim of life, and thereby give up life, as a whole, as pious fanatics and other eccentric characters do; if they are of an enterprising spirit, they will then be violent, destructive; domineering, as Mohammed, by a sensual, impassioned enthusiasm, became the victorious founder of a religion. In common life, this sensuous tendency is most frequently shown in the mode in which men carry on their profession and their favorite pursuits. Many love their profession with impassioned heat, and thereby miss the aim, like the scholar, who, prompted by too vehement curiosity, with excessive greediness fills his mind with more knowledge than he can digest; like the man of business, who, from too great desire of achievement, burdens himself with business to which he is unused; or like the official, who, from excessive zeal of office, oversteps the limits of his sphere. Others, through momentary rashness, allow themselves to be hurried to steps which lead them from their end, and pursue with heat a phantom which passion conjures up for them; like the merchant who plunges into enterprises from which he promises profit to himself, but which bring him to the ground; like the landlord, the master-manufacturer, the ruler, who easily adopt plans of reform, and by precipitate zeal ruin themselves and others. Many hurry with impatient fickleness from one favorite pursuit to another, — are now admirers of gar-

dening, now ardent for building, now collectors of specimens of art and nature, and surrender themselves to every momentary impression, to every charm of novelty and fashion. Others lay hold of one favorite pursuit with violence, so as to sacrifice their time and means to it.

This violence, this rashness and heat, generally have their foundation in a too vivacious temperament, in a native preponderance of the senses and imagination; but false discipline and lack of culture magnify natural faults, which, on the contrary, can be eradicated by good discipline and self-culture. Besides, by the temperance and discretion which we require for health of soul, this false, vehement heat is immediately withstood by awakening and cherishing love in the heart — love of the good, noble, and fair, the pure daughter of the soul, whose gentle fire, indeed, warms the heart, but never blazes into a devouring flame, and rejects all fuel which passion offers. He who purely loves justice, can never stray towards revenge; pure enthusiasm for art, pure love of truth, is not compatible with passionate violence; and thus with all true love. Even in the lower efforts of life, a decided tendency towards the aim pursued preserves from passionate excess and restless enterprise; he who has learned to love the cause for which he is active, and activity as such, and has accustomed himself to pursue with energy and emphasis what he undertakes, and to labor constantly for an actual object, will never indulge in adventurous, vain undertakings; for it is chiefly the want of energetic, persevering activity, and a mere itch for bustle, which

moves schemers, or project-makers, as they are called, hither and thither.

But, wholly opposed to this violence, there is a morbid tendency and frame of mind in respect to mental emotions and feelings; it is that predominance of sensuality, by which mental activity gives way to passive luxury and voluptuousness. We may abuse even the nobler impulses and their gratification, since a certain pleasure is associated with them, as a mere object of luxury. This is the case with personal love, if it is desecrated by weak, lustful sensibility, and prompts an idle play of mutual flattery, idolatry, and devotion; with the love and culture of art, if one revels in its luxurious feelings, or finds it a delicate titillation of the senses; with curiosity, if one seeks its gratification merely for the sake of pleasure; with reading, if it is abused into an empty pastime, and the nurture of a lustful imagination; and even with religion, when, as in many fanatics and Pietists, it is but a capricious voluptuousness of the imagination and the heart. Persons of weakly sensibility, without energy of will, with predominant imagination, are naturally inclined to this spiritual voluptuousness; others have been spoiled by education, by being abandoned to a luxurious mode of life, and incited by every mental allurements, without being sufficiently kept to action; others indemnify themselves for the sensual pleasure denied them by exhaustion or age, through the voluptuous play of imagination. The awakening and nurture of a pure love also opposes this disease, and especially the excitement and decided direction of activity. The active,

striving mind despises every sluggish enjoyment, and all easy quiet, uses every allurements as a spur to activity, and finds its pleasure only in unceasing progress in the pursuit of a higher aim.

Much is already won for spiritual perfection by this preponderance of mental activity over sensual excitement, or by this healthy energy of soul, even if activity has taken no higher direction, and the aims chosen lie in the lower departments of life. If activity only moves freshly, then, by and by, it can develop a higher mental power. Every labor, be it merely corporeal and mechanical, is better than idleness. The earnest, industrious artisan lives a healthier life than the sluggish consumer, and even than he who, with mental occupation, with art and science, pursues nothing but dignified ease, — nay, even than the fanatic, who squanders his vital power in inactive musing. A nation whose nobles and rulers seek distinction in slothful luxury and gluttony, finds itself on the direct road to ruin; a religious life, whose perfection is found in monasticism, is in the highest degree morbid. The soundness of fresh, active mental power appears most freely where, not the promptings of necessity, but of spontaneous, inner desire, excite to action, — that is, in the choice of recreations, pleasures, and favorite pursuits. It is better to take satisfaction in bodily exercises and in hunting, than to riot in the luxurious joys of the seraglio. It is better to seek social entertainment in dance and amusement, and even cards, than such as is based merely upon sluggish luxury. It is better to till the garden and raise rare fruits, than to decorate the table with them and tickle the palate. It is better to

train hounds and horses, than to pursue with them an idle play or vain show.

But, in order to beauty of soul, more than mere activity, — its direction to nobler, higher aims, which concern more nearly the spiritual life, — is requisite. But it is something nobler in degree, and more closely allied to the mind, the more its activity is thus directed, and the more the feeling for the good and true is thereby awakened: It is nobler to be busied with natural researches, than to till the soil, since mental activity is more set in motion, and, instead of mere curiosity, a purpose of utility is pursued. It is nobler to follow one of the fine arts, than a mechanical occupation, since free imagination and disinterested love of the beautiful prevail in the former over self-interest and empirical understanding. The nobler, higher tendency of the mind is shown first in the choice of profession, if it is freely made, by preferring the nobler, freer, more spiritual vocation. Those professions are nobler which subserve moral wants and the pursuit of perfection, than those which minister to material necessities. The nobler sense is further shown in the choice of pleasures and favorite pursuits. It is nobler to find recreation in reading a book, in the enjoyment of art, than in hunting, dancing, and play. It is a nobler amusement to draw, than to turn on a lathe, to collect matters of art, than weapons, seals, and so forth. The nobler tendency of the mind is wont to be revealed most freely and efficiently in what each one does for his own self-culture, wherein he seeks mental nurture, cheerfulness, and elevation. If one is busy with the sciences, it is nobler to choose those branches which occupy the

mind and heart, than those which make claims merely upon the memory. Employment in an art from love of beauty is nobler than historical investigation into the antiquity of a branch of art, whereby curiosity, more than the sense of beauty, is gratified.

But it is not enough to seek the noble and beautiful; in all that is done, richness and depth should be striven for. Only in rich, full variety beauty appears; what is poor and defective cannot be beautiful. One may, indeed, have a noble direction, but may be too cramped and contracted in it. Many have sense and taste only for a single science, a single art; many love but one kind of poetry, one mode of representation; nay, many confine themselves to a single writer and artist. Others are, indeed, full of susceptibility to art, but natural scenery leaves them cold, and they recognize no other beauty than that which is painted, and hewn in stone; and, again, others cannot find any thing in history, and the rich life, which is infolded within it, does not speak to them. Poverty of purpose is shown in being contented with mediocrity in any pursuit, and hardly recognizing, to say nothing of attaining, the higher excellence. One feels already satisfied with a little, because he has not sufficient impulse or sensibility to strive for more, because his mental activity is not sufficiently vivid. Such an activity, vivid and constant, striving after greater copiousness and enlargement, is, hence, one of the first requisites to mental perfection. He who possesses it will, with ever-wakeful, insatiable curiosity, seek to acquire knowledge and insight, and to lay aside indifferently nothing which presents itself to him, but to draw from all light and nurture; he will,

with pious, earnest sensibility, with pure love for every thing good and beautiful, with a devoted, open heart, contemplate, embrace, and appropriate every thing which meets him in nature, history, and art, — the infinitely rich, various play of life, which reveals itself to him there, — and turn away with contracted mind from nothing which has a human worth, and which represents a single side of human life; finally, he will strive with zeal and industry for every thing which instinct and love teach him to seek, and will be indefatigable in enriching his mind and heart.

But by virtue of this instinct and this love, this zeal and assiduity, the noble man, whose aim is perfection, will not strive merely for extent, but also for depth; since it is only in depth that true richness consists, and superficiality or shallowness has only its appearance. Spiritual striving has depth, if it goes into the true import and essence of things, in knowledge to truth, in art to beauty, in religion to inspired, divine sentiment; and it has depth, whenever it proceeds from the depth of vivid sentiment, of rich love, of energetic enthusiasm. As frequent as the afore-mentioned narrowness is that superficiality by which one satisfies himself with a mere varnish of culture, with half, fragmentary knowledge, with fleeting emotions, with dainty feasting, with fickle resolutions, — who knows something of every thing, and nothing thoroughly, — who deems this and that beautiful, and admires it, but is truly struck and engrossed with nothing. Such superficiality is lacking in just impulse and true love; at best, it is a weakly sensibility, with which one inclines to every thing that attracts; often, alas! vanity comes into play. The lat-

ter is the case with people of the world, who consider mental culture merely as a refined external breeding, for the purpose of gaining consequence. Many men pursue science and art with the same love and the same aim as others do bodily exercises and games, which merely promote social entertainment; and many ladies carry delicate sentiments and intellectual thoughts merely for show, like artificial flowers in the hair, or rouge upon the cheeks.

This is a brief sketch of the spiritual life, set into play in its living force, and developed in rich, deep variety, in which health and beauty appear. But yet to both, the proportion, or the correspondence, of the richness and variety belong, as the form and figure, which bind and unite all into a whole.

Indeed, to health a certain proportion and symmetry belong. An organic body is diseased which suffers by fulness of blood, or too great irritability of nerves, or by any excess and defect; so, also, the mental life is morbid, in which any part has attained an undue preponderance. But the symmetry is restored by temperance and self-control, by which freedom and unity of mind in the manifold play of inward life are established, and maintain the equilibrium. Temperance is the sustaining band of health, and, as it were, the forming energy of beauty of soul. We have already recognized temperance as one of the elementary virtues, which defends the freedom of the will against the passions in the practice of duty. Here, also, is the power which withstands and conquers the passions, but not merely in so far as they bend the will and force it to evil, but in so far as they are hurtful to perfection and to health of

soul. Gross vices, by which one's own and others' dignity is injured, and honor and justice are violated, do not come into consideration in this province of perfection. The passions can be so far held in check, that no necessary command is thereby broken: one may be voluptuous, avaricious, ambitious, without degrading himself, and doing wrong to others; but to have passions, is already in itself unsound and hateful; and in this view we oppose to them this refined kind of temperance, which we require for the maintenance of inward symmetry and equilibrium. It finishes the conflict of virtue with the passions, by eradicating them; it preserves the equilibrium of the soul, not only so far that the will, in the exercise of virtue, is not oppressed, but that no emotion ever disturbs inward peace, and oversteps the waving lines of beauty; it maintains the harmony of inward life, not only from violent interruption, but also from every discord, by which the law of beauty is violated.

By indulgence, passions become predominant, emotions oppressive and destructive to freedom of mind, discretion, tranquillity, whether it be that these spring from sensual impulse or from a nobler source. We have made strong, vivid emotions requisite for health of soul, but at the same time we have required that activity of mind should predominate over them; but now we demand that nothing, whereby the mind is excited and moved, — no impulse, no sensation, no inclination and effort, — should, by habit and indulgence, attain an undue strength, so as to sway the mind, and press it into a passive state. Since we not only do not blame sensuous vivacity of emotion, but even acknowledge its

necessity, and would only know how to avoid excess, we then refer all to the due medium, which we have already used as the rule for outward perfection.

The passions of the basest and most hateful kind are those which spring from the indulged and predominant desires of sensual enjoyment, and which we designate under the common name of love of pleasure. In general, every pleasure is allowed which a healthy organism requires for its preservation, nurture, refreshment, and continuance; only duty imposes upon us, especially in the last respect, certain limitations, since it bids us regard others' right and our own honor; even concern for physical health may demand a renunciation. In as far as pleasure is permitted, the dictates of temperance first demand that no pleasure should be carried further than is necessary for the preservation and refreshment of our sensuous life; that we should not overload ourselves with eating and drinking, nor surfeit ourselves with any sensual enjoyment, so as to frustrate the end of recreation and amusement. By temperance, the vices of gluttony, drunkenness, debauchery, luxuriousness, dissipation, are cut off. But not merely in the gratification of our desires should we be temperate, but we should not even indulge them, nor give them too conspicuous a place, and not seek the chief aim of life in their gratification. One may refrain from excess in eating and drinking, and thereby subserve daintiness, by setting a value upon the choice of dishes and drinks, which a noble mind never finds in them. One may be temperate and frugal in the enjoyment of pleasures, and still, after the fashion of refined epicures, may place the whole aim of life in

enjoyment, whereby one surrenders himself to the base service of sensual lust. Chastity consists, not only in temperance, but also, and, indeed, in its noblest form, in purity from all desires, especially the illicit and precocious, in spotlessness of imagination, in innocent unconsciousness of what should go forth only in the train of nobler feelings. Chastity of soul is the fairest ornament of youthful strength and beauty, and the triumph of a noble education. Weakly excitability of body, brought on and maintained through an unsound, unnatural, luxurious mode of life, through the almost entire want of all bodily exercise; and then the pernicious influence of an art and poetry unchaste, lustful, provoking the imagination; especially, also, too voluptuous music, — are the foes which public and domestic education has to resist in this respect. Temperance and simplicity in diet, hardihood and exercise of body, are the first, infallible means of invigorating the moral nature, and closing it against all hurtful, mental influences: parents and teachers cannot take this truth too closely to heart. A vigorous mind in a vigorous body despises all the enticement of lustfulness, just as an unvitiated palate despises the artificial luxuries of the gormand.

Other passions spring from the impulse and pursuit of perfection, whenever the line of moderation is overstepped by too great sensuous violence and onesidedness. We have already considered the pursuit of external perfection, and thereby indicated the faults of defect and excess. These faults, however, not only hinder man in his career in the world, cramp his steps, and lead him to miss his mark, but they also disturb

the equanimity and purity of the soul; hence we must once more turn to that point. Industry is a necessary part of perfection, not only because man advances by its means in the world, but also because it makes the mind active and healthy; but if by excess it degenerates into drudgery, then, not only the health of the body, but also that of the soul suffers, in which the contemplative activity of the mind is crushed. Many persons degrade themselves to beasts of labor, and renounce all joys of life, all participation in the nobler concerns of humanity, in science, art, civil and domestic life; they look, as if with staring eyes, merely to the end of their labor, and do not see what goes on around them. Acquisitiveness and frugality are necessary, in order to get along in life; but insatiable covetousness fixes the mind to a base aim, drags it into an excessive striving after goods, to which it should devote but a small part of its attention, and defiles the soul by the love of that which has no worth in itself; avarice or niggardliness, on the other hand, is blamable, through the folly of withdrawing from use the means which are valuable only by use, and through the anxious solicitude which cramps activity. The miser is satisfied with the mere possibility of enjoyment and efficiency, and, in order to escape want, is in want amid superfluity. If avarice is, as usual, connected with dishonesty and injustice, with want of charitableness and public spirit, then it is not merely folly and disease, but vice and sin. The passions that covet honor, fame, and power, are not only dangerous to virtue, to true ambition and justice, and prompt to crime, but they are also the fiercest enemies of peace of mind, which, like infernal spirits, possess

and plague souls, and allow no satisfaction, no desire and joy to attach to life, no pure love of noble goods. Wounded ambition finds no satisfaction in the bosom of family, no peace on the steps of the altar; unruly domination breaks through all limits, and never finds its goal, and even if it had subdued the earth, would still stretch out its hand to the moon; how, then, in a mind ruled by it, can clearness, peace, and tranquillity, prevail? Usually, these diseases of an immoderate striving, this straining of the powers, are attended with envy, which springs from the instinct of emulation, and is awakened and nurtured by a comparison of one's own with others' excellences, but is faulty in grudging to others their excellences, instead of spurring on to the attainment of the same, and in uniting want of activity with want of good-will. It is a disease of the soul, and it is aptly compared with jaundice of body. Malicious joy is still more hateful than envy, since sloth and dislike enter yet more strongly into its composition; it makes one rejoice that others lose any thing, or are put back in any thing, merely in order to spare exertion on one's own part, and it takes delight in another's woe. Anger and revenge spring partly from violated ambition, which beholds itself cramped by hostile opposition in its efforts after perfection, partly from wounded moral sense, which bursts into a passion at wrong, and breaks through the limits of temperance.

The gratification of our instincts, the furtherance and elevation of our activity in life, or the counterpart, the attainment, possession, and enjoyment of that which is agreeable to us, which we love and value, or the deprivation and loss of it, prosperity or misfortune,

success or failure, bring satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and, in stronger momentary or abiding impressions, joy and grief, pleasure and pain, gladness and mourning, with themselves; this waving to and fro, this rise and fall of emotions, this alternation of the cheerful and sad in the inward horizon, should be so controlled by temperance, that a violent, overwhelming transition, no more than a destructive, disturbing preponderance, shall have place; it should keep the mind from extravagance and arrogance in prosperity, and from despondency, dejection, and gloom in misfortune. We especially need temperance in the last respect, if we mourn the loss of a loved one, and our heart is ready to yield beneath the burden of grief; it is this, which, whilst it strikes down the power of violent emotion, gives entrance to the consoling sentiments of faith and hope, and directs the mind on high. Even regret for the lost, and hope for that which we wish to attain or recover, need the soothing, cheering, disinthralling power of temperance, that we may not lose ourselves in weak, melancholy, dreamy abandonment, nor withdraw from present duty the fresh, wakeful, active energy of the soul.

Thus, by damping all sensual excess, and all passionate violence and onesidedness, temperance maintains the health of the soul, so that the mind moves uncramped and free in the powerful, indeed, but well-balanced play of emotions and efforts. But to beauty of soul a yet higher kind of temperance is necessary, which introduces symmetry and harmony into the purely mental emotions and efforts, and removes all onesidedness.

Onesidedness is our lot; it is conditioned by the limitation of our nature, by the peculiarity of our dispositions, by the particularity of the profession to which every man must devote his best powers. Only human life in general appears as the rich, harmonious fulness, as the comprehensive concert, in which every power, every gift, every tendency, unites in universal concord; individuals, on the other hand, are the musicians, who play but a single instrument, or sing but one part; many, indeed, are to be compared to the Russian horn-blowers, who play but a single note. In regard to the culture of peculiar gifts, and the prosecution of a profession, morality must not only justify, but even require, onesidedness; for without this, no distinguished skill, which should be an aim of every one, can be attained. But for human development morality demands universality, or allsidedness, and symmetry; man, as man, should be a stringed instrument, which is fully strung, and capable of all the chords of harmony, an image of humanity, which unites in itself all features of human being. The moralist must be indulgent in the enforcement of this demand in cases where, to its fulfilment, active, formative effort, and the aid of outward means, are needful, and the latter are wanting; but strict in all cases where the conditions of a universal culture are at hand. He may demand that no faculty of mind, nor even science, should be partially cultivated, but that inward proportion and harmony should be the aim, that nothing should be sought with so partial a love as to close the mind to the other provinces of life. He who cannot appropriate to himself all excellences of culture, science, scholarship, art,

taste, should at least open his heart to all that is noble and fair ; let him seek to keep a watchful and vital love for all that adorns and ennobles man, and to take, if not an active, at least a contemplative and sympathetic interest in the wide realm of mental life. This general sensibility, this inner-proportion and harmony of feeling, is, above all, proper for women, since they are not hindered by the onesidedness of their life from turning the sensibility of their hearts in all directions, and their domestic vocation keeps them just in the centre of all that is human. Cultivated women carry grace and harmony in all things, soothe and soften every asperity, dispel every discord ; and, as rivals, incensed and engaged in conflict, drop their swords, if the honored form of their mistress intervenes, so the image of feminine beauty of soul appears, soothing, calming, pacifying, in the midst of the commotion, tumult, and frequent hostility of masculine life.

But temperance gives the higher consecration to inward beauty, chiefly by insuring to the love of what is nobler, fairer, higher, the preponderance over every other tendency in the mind, and by ever withdrawing from what is not properly its own, wherein its pure, free power, its pure love consists, to what is purely spiritual, in itself perfect. And it perfects its work by referring all emotions and efforts to the sacred medium of religion, and maintains this key-note of spiritual life in every vibration of the mind's chords. The beautiful spirit is awake to all that is beautiful, but she opens her pure eye wholly only to the heavenly light of beauty, purified from all that is earthy and sensual ; she seeks its veiled image in every phenomenon of life ; she bears

in all the thought of eternity, and seeks in all the revelation of the Creator. The highest concord of mind consists in the harmonious blending of all spiritual activity into the religious sense, which purifies all love, softens and glorifies every grief, carries every aspiration of soul up to the Fountain of all life; the light of highest spiritual beauty beams in the upward, enraptured eye of pious fervor, resignation, and devotion.

Beauty of soul consists in the inward harmony of mental life; but, since soul and body are so intimately connected, the self-moulding love for the beautiful strives also to draw the body into this harmony. Man also has an instinct to exhibit and impart that which in him lies, and thereby to enter into reciprocal relations with men; he wishes in every respect to give and receive. A beautiful spirit paints itself upon the expression of countenance, in the mien and motions, in the tone of voice; and as, in certain old pictures, figures defectively drawn yet attract by an unutterable charm, so such a spirit sheds upon external deformity the fulness of grace. But he whose aim is perfect culture, will seek to make his body more susceptible to inward beauty, and to mould it according to the laws of beauty. We have already demanded physical exercise as a means of health, strength, and agility, in furtherance of outward efficiency, and also the training of the person to grace and elegance, but merely in reference to appearance in society; now we demand it purely for the sake of love for beauty and harmony, since he who loves the beautiful can tolerate nothing hateful, rude, and vulgar about himself. He who possesses peculiar personal gifts, in whom the grace of intellect can manifest itself, should

without vanity cultivate it from pure love of the beautiful. But all possess the means of manifestation, by which mind reveals itself to mind, in which every inward emotion, every thought, every feeling, may be portrayed: it is speech, the marvellous gift of the Creator, by which man first becomes man, without which reason itself would remain a dead faculty. Every one should so cultivate this, that he can not only express himself with copiousness and propriety, but also with vivid power and grace. It is unpardonable, that so often, among the higher classes in our nation, the cultivation of the mother tongue is so neglected, and a foreign language is spoken with more purity and readiness. In consequence of this, German culture has long languished; and our language, despised by the distinguished, although it may have scientific and poetical, cannot attain the refined social cultivation. But its contemners harm themselves the most; since a foreign language, which is not as if sucked in with the mother's milk, in which the fancy cannot move with unconscious freedom, can seldom be learned so as to be spoken and written with original, living propriety; and thus people become mere imitators, although the French tongue, which is preferred to the German, allows far less individuality, and is much more fixed and abstract than this. In the human voice, in the intonation of words, in the delivery of speech, there is marvellous power of representing the inner being, and of acting upon minds. A beautiful voice attracts more, and enchains more, than all corporeal charm, except a fine eye. Hence the man solicitous for perfecting himself, will give all possible care to its cultivation; and how bright a re-

ward of this labor it is to act upon minds, to win and to lead hearts, to convince the mind of truth, to touch and inspire the soul with sense of the beautiful!

Beauty of soul, mental perfection, constitutes loveliness; for only the beautiful and perfect is loved. But the beautiful spirit will also best and most love; since it is beautiful only by love, by love for all, which adorns, ennobles, and exalts man, by love for what is purely human; and what can it love more than the beautiful and amiable, which is vividly presented to it among mankind? Where does the fond heart find more nurture than in a lovely heart, in a pure mind, in a noble character? No science, no art, cultivates and enriches more than life, and what therein is vividly revealed; and therefore a beautiful spirit inclines, desiring love and seeking nurture, to beautiful spirits, and closes with them the league of friendship. But its need of imparting is as great as that of receiving. What it possesses, it possesses not for self, although for the sake of self it has sought and striven; it possesses this only as a common blessing of mankind, as the common property of those who coincide with it in like love; and therefore it inclines fondly to the congenial, in order to pour into their hearts all the fulness of love and beauty: their life it seeks to beautify, to adorn and ennoble; their happiness it would promote, bring consolation and comfort to their adversity, pour inward harmony upon discordant life, dispel the dark cloud by the bright inner light. True beauty of soul enters into life in the lovely, charming form of friendship and good-will; it is the angel of love which binds heart to heart; it is the guardian genius of domestic life, which throws around

families the band of tender love, concord, and peace; it is the angel of love, which awakens in the people every great thought, every spark of enthusiasm, and unites these in the broad, fiery stream of patriotism; it is the angel of faith, hope, and love, which joins congenial hearts in a brotherhood in spirit and in truth; and, in its highest glory, it appears as fond devotion in the flames of martyrdom for friends, for loved ones, for country, for the kingdom of God.

LECTURE XXII.

PROFESSIONAL LIFE.

WE have considered all which the respect and love of man towards man and towards himself demand, — the whole province of virtue and perfection; it only remains for us now to consider what man owes to social life and its needs, — his participation in social labor, or his profession.

In order that the aims of life may be attained, and life itself may be freely developed upon all sides, prudence must provide the means, and take manifold precautions. It must make nature subservient to man, protect him from want and the weather, prepare the productions of nature for enjoyment and use, provide conveniences and comforts, or, in a word, care for the wants of the senses; it must, moreover, establish and administer the institutions of civil life, watch over the internal and external security, whilst it wields the sword of justice, and thus fix the first conditions under which moral life is possible; finally, it must promote both the higher culture of moral life, and mental culture and perfection, by a multitude of means, regulations, arrangements, modes of incitement, and nurture. All this requires an infinite labor, to which no individual is competent, and which, together with its fruits, must therefore be divided, so

that every one may undertake that part of it for which he has a calling, that is, for which nature has imparted him the gifts and the desire, and Providence the means and opportunity. Thus, in professional action, three classes of society may be distinguished, namely, the productive class, who have charge of agriculture, manufactures and commerce; the defensive class, or the class of public officers, ministers, judges, rulers, and warriors, and the learned class, which comprehends teachers, poets, artists, and the clergy.

Upon man, without any exception, it devolves to take upon himself a vocation, to join one of these classes. This is demanded, partly by honor, in order that he may not come to want, and be a burden to others; since he who does not work should neither eat; and if any one is wealthy by inheritance, he should then at least be independent of his wealth;—partly by noble self-love, in order that he may find respect and distinction, as an active, useful member of society;—in part, finally, by love for his fellow-men, and interest in the common welfare, which cannot exist unless every one, according to his ability, discharges his part in the common labor. As bees drive out and slay the lazy drones, so human life suffers no idle consumers; they are a useless burden upon society, and, although they may not be expelled, they are yet despised by a sound public opinion.

With woman, the case is different. Her vocation is domestic life, the care and comfort of her husband, the nurture and education of her children. As she cannot take immediate part in civil life, so neither in public labor, which likewise implies a certain exposure which

is not proper for woman. By nature, she cannot independently enter the circle of men, and share in their deliberations and labor; as wife, daughter, sister, relative, companion, she must be attached to a husband or a family. Besides, as a general rule, nature has denied to woman the active, forward energy of mind which belongs to professional labor; her endowment is the gentle sensibility of feeling, the mildly-governing sense of order, the solicitude of true love. Woman may be constrained by necessity to support herself and her own, sometimes in company with her husband, which is the common lot of wives in the poorer classes, sometimes independently for herself, which is not seldom the condition of widows and unmarried women in the middle classes. To these the position of servants and assistants in domestic life is most appropriate; for this is their own ground, and here they find the protection and peace which their tender, sensitive nature needs. But if they would and must take a more independent position, the question is, What particular professional sphere can they and may they enter?

The producing class, who labor for natural wants, require the least talent and mental energy; at the same time, there are so many branches of it which are attached to domestic life, and come into contact only with the female portion of the community, that it is wholly natural, and also common, for industrious women to seek their circle of activity in this province. As seamstresses, mantuamakers, and milliners, they are, in a manner, but the aids of domestic life. The defensive class is wholly foreign to them. Heroines, like the Maid of Orleans; national leaders, like Deborah,

the prophetess; queens who sway the sceptre with wisdom, — belong to extraordinary emergencies: the former by a higher inspiration and the splendor of a divine commission, the latter by birth and majesty, are raised above association with men; they rule and command, but do not deliberate, — stand not in terms of reciprocity, and, indeed, overstep the natural sphere of their sex; but they do not enter into that of the masculine, in which no woman can sustain herself. As to the learned class, a distinction must be made whether the office is attached to the person or not. This is the case with the peculiar vocation of teaching, where most is done in person, but not in the vocation of writer and artist, where the person remains, as it were, behind the scene, with the exception of actors, dancers, declaimers, musicians. If a woman feels herself qualified for a teacher, she can be so only for her own sex. In the congregation, that is, in the assembly of men and women, woman should be silent, and not go forward as teacher, as the apostle directs: for this she is lacking in the personal dignity of man, and, in respect to religious instruction, as a general rule, in proper insight and knowledge. The Scriptures state the examples of the prophetesses as rare exceptions; but the more religious life exists in the community, and needs the clear knowledge of the truth, the less suitable is the influence of feminine enthusiasm, so generally lacking in personal dignity, and more fanatical than enlightened. As teachers and educators of daughters, women take a worthy position, by which they again attach themselves to domestic life, and, in a manner, gain that maternal disposition which, in the usual way, destiny

may have denied them. They will do well, if, even in this profession, they prosecute publicly the business of teaching, to attach themselves as assistants, or as such to enter into domestic life, since they will not maintain dignity and independence without danger and severe struggle.

Against female authorship a prejudice is usually entertained. By their own sex authoresses are mostly regarded with jealous, envious eyes, and they are considered as persons who haughtily or presumptuously overstep the limits and destiny of their sex; among men, on the other hand, they find a cold, equivocal reception, and are seldom, as it is said, regarded as complete; and thus they have, in fact, a disagreeable position. Decided censure is deserved, if women press into authorship, to the neglect of their duties towards husband and children; if they do not stand in such relations, or are of an age at which they have fulfilled their feminine duties, or if, by the usages of their rank, they are released from domestic occupations, — then the question solely is, whether a woman, who has the desire of authorship, possesses the requisite gifts. Thus a detrimental influence upon female morality from this occupation is not, at least, a matter of course. Women of masculine mind, even if they are not authoresses, always overstep certain limits, and the effects of a peculiar nature are often ascribed to the unusual profession. The publicity of name, the praise or blame received, acquaintance with learned men, and whatsoever else, in the train of this profession, transcends the feminine sphere, may, perhaps, be detrimental to the domestic condition of woman, but not necessarily to female mod-

esty. But as to female endowments for authorship, these are neither the learned and scientific, nor the strictly poetical, for which a masculine, energetic mind is requisite; but such as correspond with feminine sensibility, the gifts of apt, agreeable apprehension of human manners and characteristics, of a feeling contemplation of the world and art, such as may be shown in romances, memoirs, travels. It were a shame if these gifts should remain fruitless for the world; and even if, with one successful attempt, we must take a hundred others that are unsuccessful, into the bargain, yet the case is not much better with masculine authorship. The profession of painting has been practised by many women with success, if not with the highest mastery; and certain studies, which may be dangerous to feminine modesty, are not necessary to all branches of painting. Those arts, on the contrary, which demand personal exhibition, necessarily bring such danger with them, although instances of their being successfully overcome are not wanting.

Now, if it devolves upon mankind, without distinction, to choose a profession, the question is, What choice should be made? All professions are necessary and useful, since they all contribute to the ease and improvement of human life, even if they serve to promote only pleasure and luxury. Life should be developed upon various sides, and whatever ministers to its smallest external part ministers to the whole. As the leaf is as necessary to the tree as the branch, so the humblest labor is as indispensable as the most important. In every profession, if it is honorable, (and there should be no other,) one may be an honorable man and

citizen, and maintain the dignity of a virtuous character. In this twofold view, all professions are alike. But, in another view, they are very different. One is nobler than another. The nobleness of a profession rests upon its degree of efficiency and influence upon general life, and upon the personal culture which it allows and demands. Both of these are mutual conditions, since the more intellectual professional activity, which penetrates more deeply into common life, also makes more demand upon personal mental culture and moral sentiment. In general, the professions of the productive class are less noble than those of the protective and learned classes, since they minister to sensuous life, and make demands chiefly upon bodily activity, partly upon prudence and the calculating understanding, but scarcely at all upon the higher energies of the soul, so that, in them, mental culture can receive more nurture and advance from leisure than from occupation. Indeed, the mathematical, physical, and political knowledge which the merchant and manufacturer have to acquire, may lead to a scientific culture, but yet only by overstepping its natural aim. The profession of politician takes most hold of public life, and the knowledge of what regulates public justice and promotes public life belongs to him, and hence not only the higher prudence, but also wisdom. The military profession requires, indeed, only mathematics, and the sciences of observation, and the sharp eye of prudence; but, on the moral side, it demands courage and character, upon which the respect, which this class generally enjoys, reposes; and civil virtue, patriotism, are as necessary to the warrior as to the civil functionary. Mo-

rality and mental culture are the important concerns which are confided to the learned class, and understanding, imagination, feeling, moral sentiment, indeed, entire human culture, are required for the prosecution of professions of this kind; hence these are the noblest, which most vitally and deeply take hold of the spiritual life of the people, and most promote personal dignity; but since they very often withdraw from immediate participation in active life, they again bring with them certain disadvantages to the character; and, since every especial proficiency in any one department leads to onesidedness, want of efficiency in real life has so much the worse effect.

Now, as to the question of the choice of profession, love and zeal for the common good, and the noble self-love which strives after personal perfection, naturally give the nobler vocations the preference over the less noble; and since it is wisdom which takes into protection all the aims of true love, so it justifies and demands such a choice. Still, the profitableness and outward advantage of profession are to be considered. By that which each one performs in his department, he secures to himself an independent position in life, and wins influence, reputation, distinction, fame. Thus rational self-love demands, and wisdom justifies the demand, that these merely external advantages should be valued and sought, and regard should be had to them in the choice of a profession.

But neither the inward nor outward preferableness of a profession alone should and can decide our choice. Talents and inclination are necessary to the happy prosecution of a profession, and without these neither

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can any thing distinguished be achieved, nor happiness be secured. To many professions certain general gifts of mind, understanding, and judgment, are fitted; but to others, especially to the mechanical and artistic, talents entirely peculiar belong. With the talent the desire is usually united, which is awakened by the ease and result of the labor. Finally, to the development of talents, and to the acquisition of the requisite knowledge and skill, certain outward means are indispensable, without which the best talents and the most fervent zeal do not succeed at all, or with the greatest difficulty. To consider all this, is the concern of prudence, which, in the choice of profession, has the second voice, after wisdom, but none the less decisive a voice.

This choice is not wholly free. At most, the grown-up youth can choose between kindred branches, for which he possesses the requisite general qualifications; between branches utterly differing, no choice can be made in later years. It is even a question, whether a youth has as yet the requisite power of judgment to make an entirely free choice. Usually, the choice devolves upon parents and instructors, and makes one of the most difficult problems of education. The destiny and happiness of the child depend upon it, and, except the choice of a wife, there is no more important decision in life. The choosers draw forth the white or dark lot, and exercise the office of dim fatality. Much power of observation, knowledge of mankind, and candor, are required, in order to judge correctly of the talents and taste of a child for a particular vocation. For this we can require nothing but simple candor, so as to

avoid mistaking what is merely desired as actually existing, and moreover the purpose of observing justly. But if a decided talent and taste are manifested in the child, it is then the duty of parents to follow the hint of nature. The want of the necessary means may, indeed, be an insuperable obstacle in the way; but if there be only sacrifice and exertion on the part of parents, true love will make them easily overcome it. It is abominable, if the father, from preference to his own branch of business, or from regard to outward advantages, forces the son to a profession contrary to his decided inclination. If the one which he would choose is nobler than that to which the son is inclined, the motive is less objectionable; but love for a profession is not genuine unless it is seen that the talents and taste are worthy of it; and it is always a sort of mental murder violently to oppose the nature of the mind. If there are talents, desire, and love, and the means only are lacking, then noble-minded parents will joyfully choose for their children the nobler calling. It is a base disposition to regard professional life only under the pecuniary point of view: it should minister to the common good; it should in joyful activity seek the fairer import of life, and thus at the same time regard personal perfection. He who has no estate, cannot, indeed, choose an unprofitable profession; but he who by inheritance is raised above the cares of life, and still grasps after gain, is a vulgar slave of covetousness. No great weight should be placed even upon outward honor. The man of influence and distinction in his profession finds true honor through his inner worth,

and the splendor which comes only from outward circumstances, does not enhance personal reputation.

Nothing is more customary than for parents, in the choice of a profession for their children, wholly to mistake, and to put out of sight, the high aims which lie within professional life. That the boor and vulgar citizen, who lie in conflict with want, should see in it nothing but earning bread, and are glad if they can bring up their children to this, is pardonable, since the lower callings do not awaken a sense of the higher view of life. If the rich man regards the increase of wealth as an object, it is, indeed, pardonable, since wealth, as it gives independence in living, ought also to elevate to a freer view of life; meanwhile, those who have passed their life in accumulating, are most wanting in human culture. That, in the distinguished classes, the outward honor and dignity, which a profession guaranties, should be held especially in view, is likewise natural. But if those who are the possessors and directors of mental culture, — officers, scholars, clergymen, — in the selection of a profession for their children, should think only of what is called an establishment, they thereby utter the condemnation of their own nothingness. It is, indeed, a necessary, or at least not culpable evil, that the higher professions should be sources of profit, and hence may be desecrated by base covetousness; and it is especially bad that a fixed situation, with a salary, independent of the degree and excellence of the performance, should favor the laziness of those whose aim is not activity, but the reward. In the choice of a profession, however, men are much

more accustomed to regard personal culture than to take the common welfare into account.

In the same false spirit the profession is usually carried on. If it is of the acquisitive sort, then self-interest, love of gain, with many, is the only motive, and it is very much to be commended, if honesty and justice keep men within proper limits. But the noble man does nothing merely for the sake of profit, but first from love for the cause which he prosecutes, and from love of action, and then from love for the common welfare, which usually coincides with it. He considers profit merely as a subordinate, although necessary, aim, whose attainment is a natural consequence of skilful pursuit of the higher aims. The noble agriculturist, manufacturer, merchant, will seek in his own business to attain the perfect, to furnish the best products, to give business the liveliest motion; he thus, at the same time, promotes the common good, increases the national wealth, provides food for the poorer citizens, and also aids himself; since all skilful effort is, as a general rule, rewarded by corresponding gain. But if this is directly sought, without love for the cause, from mere selfishness, then not only harm will be done, instead of good, but the aim will not often be reached. He who supplies bad products, will sooner or later be deprived of preëminence by skilful rivals. In the higher professions, the object of gain should be still more subordinate; and shame belongs to the hireling who, by base covetousness, desecrates science, art, influence in state and in church. Here disinterested ability will, with the reward of honorable, grateful acknowledgment, find also the reward of gain. Public spirit, pa-

triotism, earnestness for truth, morality, and religion, should animate the professional life of the protective and learned classes, and not only bury selfishness beneath the nobler motives, but also, if required, be ready to make sacrifices. Whatsoever position any one may assume in professional life, however high or low he may stand, he should always feel and show himself as a member of the whole; and, as he receives from it nurture, should also gratefully contribute his share to its preservation and improvement. Every one, in his professional life, should not cease to be man, nor lose his view and love of human life as a whole; and to this end parents and instructors should regard it as a sacred duty to educate their children and pupils to be men, that in mature years they may continue to cultivate themselves. Many parents are anxious merely to educate their children as beasts of labor, and beyond the necessary religious instruction which they allow to be given them, they estimate every thing else merely by its bearing upon business. With you, parents, whom God has blessed with goods, be it a sacred care to provide your children with a broad human culture, to awaken in them the love of the higher goods of life, to nourish their souls with the light of knowledge, with the holy fire of inspiration. And what, then, do you love in them, if you do not love the human — the human nobleness, perfection and beauty within them? But if you love them, as human beings, humanly, then you will strive to make them worthier of love, by enhancing their inner worth.

Since we have now marked out the general moral disposition and view with which a profession should be

chosen and pursued, it remains for us to show in what spirit every profession is in itself to be pursued, and what task is set for each.

Professional life, considered in respect to labor, belongs to prudence, and every professional branch helps to solve the great problem which consists in the realization of the aim of life by procuring means. The living, creative spirit of prudence is the spirit of freedom; and, in fact, also, all that it accomplishes comes back to this, to free the mind from the force of nature, and to give it dominion and influence over the outward world and in society. Hence it is a universal demand, in respect to all professional labor, that the free spirit of invention and progress should prevail in it. But in order that the results and fruits of earlier labors and institutions may not remain useless, and be wantonly destroyed, and that all advances may quietly and securely take place, free progress should be regulated by a rational regard for custom. With this demand the pursuit of perfection naturally unites itself, — the desire to attain, in every way, the perfect and excellent, and to solve every problem, as far as is possible for the human powers. These two general requisitions let us now apply to particular professions.

In the profession of the productive class, the aim falls wholly within the department of prudence, since here the whole object is to give the human mind dominion over nature, to make itself independent of it, and to make nature its servant. For food, clothing, dwelling, and all therewith connected, make the mind dependent upon nature, and these wants are supplied by the mind's knowledge of natural laws. To this

professional department also belong all the mechanical, chemical, and physical operations, which furnish means of aid and facility to certain mental faculties; as, for instance, the printing of scientific works; and here, also, the aim is the dominion of the mind over nature, and its freer movement in the outward world. The mark of perfection to be striven for in this department is, therefore, the greatest possible freedom and facility in the treatment and use of nature. This aim can be attained only by a free spirit of research and invention; and since this has freest scope in science, its results must be constantly reduced to practice. All inventions and discoveries of mathematics and mechanics, of natural science in all its branches, as mineralogy, botany, zoölogy, physics, chemistry, and geography, may be used, directly or indirectly, for the improvement of agriculture, raising of cattle, manufactures, and for the enlargement of commerce. A chief aim of the pursuit of perfection, in this department, must be to spare human and animal power by the application of machinery; for, aside from the cheapness of mechanical power, it is more worthy of man to work with the mind than with the hand; and it is the triumph of prudence to attain the greatest possible result with the least means. Accordingly, upon those who would enter this province of professional life, it is incumbent, not only to provide themselves with knowledge, and to keep pace with natural science, but also to work out, by genuine culture, the freedom and inventive power of the mind, which make constant progress possible. To the merchant various information and a broad survey of political relations are necessary, in order that he may quickly avail

himself of the coincidence of circumstances and events, and may constantly open new paths of trade.

In fact, a great problem which is set before the productive class, in part already solved, and in part still to be solved, is fully worthy of a free, reflective man. As the soul dwells in the body, the will moves the arm, and all mental emotion appears in bodily movement, — as thought represents itself in speech, and inspiration in forms of art, — so the enterprising, inventive spirit of the productive class moulds all earthly nature into a vast body around the human mind, in which every part is obedient to the slightest inward movement, and stamps upon the whole environment the traces of human activity; so that even the rough stone becomes the witness and herald of the mind, and of its shaping power; the dead receives life, and moves according to rational laws; and the unruly submits to be tamed and controlled. Enchanted gardens and fairy palaces are fabled, where every charm and abundance is gathered, and every wish fulfilled without labor, — where, by a word, every thing which imagination or caprice desires, may be summoned forth. But is not this realized amongst us, at least upon a large scale? If any one should have the command of the powers and wealth of a great nation, and know how to use it, what wonders he could accomplish! What works has Napoleon brought to pass in a period short and agitated by wars, and how much might he have brought to pass in the quiet of peace! Since the invention of the compass and the discovery of America, we have, in an extraordinary manner, extended our dominion over the earth, and its treasures and powers, and hardly a day passes

is which some new discovery or invention is not made. What advances have taken place in physics, chemistry, and mechanics! and an infinite path still lies before us, upon which thousands and thousands of ready competitors are hastening on. How wholly different it will be upon the earth in a single century, if so much, which we now scarcely venture to dream of, is realized! The first men lived in paradise, in plenty, without labor, want, and care, because they had few wants, and the earth readily supplied them with all they needed, and because they had to stand no conflict with nature. Mankind will return to paradise when they have learned to satisfy all their wants, and have triumphantly ended the battle with nature. May they then also return to the paradise of innocence, and conquer in the conflict with their own lusts! *

The protective class has its name from its affording protection against all unrighteous violence, which disturbs the peace. If it is the foreign power of hostile nations which is to be guarded against, this is first met by pacific civil policy, which is usually called diplomacy, or the art of negotiation. As it at present prevails, cultivated by the French, it has, indeed, the prudence of the serpent, but not the other quality, which should be united with it. A diplomacy frank and truthful, commanding respect by justice and moral greatness, winning the heart, belongs as yet to those pious wishes for whose fulfilment we must look to the future. If a government wishes nothing but what the people wish, and they wish but their right, then very little is requisite to make this known to neighboring states; and, if they will not understand and acknowl-

edge it, there is need only of a decided will, and not of any great eloquence and art, to convince them of it. If the state is too weak to vindicate its right by the sword, then it certainly finds allies, who, moved by their own advantage, make common cause with it. If a government would only once dare to despise all the snaky arts of political policy, and to conduct public communications honorably, all the others would be ashamed, and stand at loss, as one who prides himself upon a secret which all know already. As the art of negotiation is now carried on, it is unwholesome; and the moralist can only demand that this whole web should be torn away, in order that a nobler intercourse between states may commence. For the genuine diplomatic profession much is requisite—history and civil policy, in order to understand and to solve fully the previously controverted questions; knowledge of human nature, and eloquence, in order to convince of truth, and to win hearts over to it; and prudence, united with decision, firmness, strength of character, in order to seize upon and rightly use the proper moment of action.

The military class, or the protective class, in the most proper sense, has, again, like the productive class, to deal with blind natural force; since such the irrational, although artificially armed and conducted, body of human forces in war, appears; and here, in respect to knowledge, that prudence only is availing which knows how to overcome natural force by natural force. Hence the military art makes so much use of the aids of mathematics, mechanics, and natural science. Free mind, inventive power, are here indispensably necessary; and the enemy is most surely beaten by new weapons,

movements, and modes of attack, as thus, heretofore, all great generals, Alexander, Cæsar, Frederick II., the leaders of the French revolution, and Napoleon, have conquered. But, in addition to prudence, the virtues of strong will, heroic daring, resolution, and presence of mind, courage, and patience, constitute the great warrior; and by these qualities, especially by patriotism, the bloody work is ennobled.

Civil wisdom, or knowledge of the aims of civil life, and civil prudence, or insight into the conditions and means of realizing these, under given conditions, — a comprehensive knowledge of history, and of the present situation of states, — belong to the sublime vocation of the statesman, who stands at the helm.

The legislator and judge need a deep insight into the nature of legal relations and problems, and a fundamental knowledge of the jurisprudence of their own and other nations. The financier must have a view of all the industrial and commercial interests of the nation, and know its powers and necessities, in order to establish and maintain a good civil economy. All require the free mind, which, independent of mere experience, and yet prudently using it, and sparing existing institutions, strives to carry forward the people, and give them fresh youth. A mere man of experience is as little fit for a statesman, as a mere theorist, who would force the general principles of a theory upon the resisting actual world. In this department, regard for the existing, and for the usage attendant upon it, is especially important; since, without firmness and quiet, no order can be preserved. But justice, patriotism, ardent zeal for the public good, are the chief qualities of a statesman, by which

other wants may be supplied, or, at least, made harmless. In government, the intellect of national life unites with will in the governing power; but we know that good will has the most decisive influence upon the intellect, and leads it to good: if, therefore, a government only earnestly wishes what is good, then it will not lack in intellect either; light pours in upon it from all sides, if only it will not close its eyes.

To the learned class, the three great branches of mental culture — truth, beauty, and religion — are intrusted; in it the spirit of the nation comes forth in self-conscious manifestation. The class of proper teachers or scholars has, first of all, to deal with the investigation of truth: since this can be found only by reflection, and reflection is voluntary, freedom of mind is the soul of science. A gathering of observations, without thought, and from mere memory, is no more true knowledge than fantastic dream and fable. But observation is indispensable to free inquiry, in order that it may not break forth into inanity and impropriety; it should go before observation, but never remove from it. In Germany, speculation and theory have won a hurtful preponderance; but now, on the contrary, the tendency seems to be to trust too much to mere experience. In the investigation of nature, and in history, where the question is, What is the fact? experience should, indeed, prevail; but where the question is, What ought to be? — for instance, in the province of law, politics, morals, — it is folly to trust merely to that which can only say what has been and still is. Genuine love of truth will keep from both extremes — onesided tendency to speculation, and rigid attachment to experience; but love of

truth, like all love, can dwell only in a pure heart. Good disposition is requisite to every professional sphere, but especially for scholarship. Vanity, and the passion for brilliant, dazzling distinction, greedy ambition, and avarice, are the death of science. Good disposition will also give to all the frankness, which is as necessary to the scholar as speech and writing, in order to be able to communicate the results of his reflection. Shame upon him who models his doctrine according to the caprice of a ruler, or the passions of a party! who does homage to the prejudices of the mighty, and degrades Truth, the free-born daughter of Heaven, into a slave! He who has not the courage to speak the truth, is not worthy to think it: but she will not show herself to him in her pure light; for the mind of him who beholds her is wholly purified by her influence, and empowered to devote himself wholly to her service; he must speak as the spirit moves him to speak, and he cannot keep silent if he would.

The scholar can either occupy himself with the care and advancement of science, and put down the fruits of his industry in writing, whence others may draw them forth, and apply them to real life, or he can apply them himself, by connecting an active profession with his learned one, as the physician, and many statesmen and judges, do. Even a busy vocation, like agriculture, or manufacturing, may be associated with a learned profession. But the most natural and fruitful application of science to life is effected by instruction and education, or the proper office of teaching. Instruction refers to mere knowledge and talents; but education concerns also the disposition and morals. To instruc-

tion belong elementary knowledge, zeal, and love for science, and the gift of delivery; but to education, moreover, personal dignity, good disposition, love for virtue, knowledge of the world, and of mankind, also belong. Since religion is the foundation and end of all education, the profession of the teacher enters into that of the clergyman, with which it is so often actually connected, and should be always at least so connected that the teacher should not be destitute of the fundamental theological knowledge and insight. There is no more important and noble profession than this, and none is at the same time so rich in influence and results. The teacher forms a new generation, brings on a new age, and awakens the germ of a fairer spring in mental existence. The qualification of a free, progressive mind is here especially requisite; for who should advance, if not the rising generation? and how shall it do this without being led on? But at the same time there is very great danger of breaking away from experience, and giving way to the idle dreams of speculation and false enthusiasm. It was such a delusion to pursue, in popular education, the mere diffusion of light and of varied knowledge, and at the same time to misapprehend that the intellect must be cultivated only in balance with the other powers of the mind; and its onesided development, which, moreover, can be but superficial among the people, leads to perversion.

The profession of the artist and poet is usually considered as a luxuriant excrescence, or water-shoot of social life, since it bears no fruits for imperious want. But it should be considered as the lovely blossom of life; for thus the lovely blossoms bear no eatable, nour-

ishing fruits, yet they quicken and refresh by their sweet fragrance and beauty. The business of the artist and poet is the representation of beauty and sublimity. Beauty, under which we would also comprehend sublimity, is, first, that of nature, which the landscape and flower painter represents, and to which, also, gardening and architecture belong. Here beauty lies in the free, agreeable harmony of relations of space, with the coöperation of light and shade, by which the masses and outlines come out. Here all motion is excluded, and that repose prevails which is the character of natural life. But the creative and contemplative mind, in this branch of art, as in all others, is active; the proportions of form excite as if an inward movement, a play of imagination, which wishes to embrace the whole in the parts; and, in fact, nothing can be beautiful which does not awaken and maintain the activity of the mind. The second element of beauty, — that of living forms, — which has for its object painting, sculpture, and the art of dancing, — hovers between natural and spiritual beauty; it consists, likewise, in relations of space, and appears in light and color, but at the same time, it consists in motion and expression, which are the effect and manifestation of mind; nay, even action enters into them as in historical pictures and groups. Music belongs wholly to motion, and the eye has in it no part; it is for the more spiritual sense of the ear, and is devoid of all sensuous material and attraction, except the sound of the voice and of instruments; hence it stands next the mental province. In the movement of tones, and the blending of concord and contrast, it portrays the play of emotions and

feelings, of joy and grief, of hope and fear, of desire and aversion, and of the varying lights and shades within the mind; and by the harmony; into which it melts all, it sheds joy over the soul, and lifts the religious sentiment above the waving play of the lower emotions. Poetry paints this play with the strong colors of thoughts and fancy, in part by the direct utterance of sentiments and feelings, which move the poet's breast, as in lyric poetry, — partly by the indirect representation of human destinies, conditions, dispositions, actions, and endeavors, whereby it excites interest and sympathy, as in epic and dramatic poetry; and it also significantly expresses the harmony of this play of the emotions, by giving the higher, soothing feelings mastery and consciousness. In poetry we find ourselves wholly in the province of mind; it gives us the purest representations of mental beauty, which music only paints with the colors of sounds. In dramatic art, human life appears in full manifestation to eye and ear, the poetry is enlivened by form and motion, by speech and song, and scenic art deceives by the show of reality.

Mental beauty is the only beauty; and even the beauty of nature is its dumb, placid image; but wherein does it consist? It is mental life in its completeness, purity, and harmony, hence in its moral perfection and religious glorification. All art and poetry should, hence, be moral and religious, although the latter word is not to be taken in its strictly ecclesiastical signification; and if the poet and artist wishes to attain his high destiny, he must be full of moral and religious inspiration, and his whole aim must be directed to the highest models. There is also a lower art and poetry,

devoted merely to entertainment; but if these would not be hurtful and degrading in their influence, then they must, at least, not oppose morality and religion. It may, perhaps, be urged that artists and poets are not always exactly patterns of a moral and religious life, and they are justly reproached with a tendency to voluptuousness. But, little as this is to be justified, it must still be considered that the preponderance of imagination, under which they labor, easily leads to luxury; and that the moral energy of the creative power is suppressed. If they will not observe pious feeling in conduct, they must, at least, bear it at heart, in order to represent it in their works; and we would be indulgent enough to reckon these as moral actions.

The freedom of mind, which is requisite to the cultivation of every profession, must be made good, especially in art and poetry, since they move in the department of freedom itself, that is, in moral and spiritual life. Mental freedom here appears, as original, inventive power, in contrast with imitation. Only the original touches, rouses, and moves life; what is imitated leaves the mind cold, and deadens instead of animating it. Our plastic arts languish much from the passion for imitation; even in poetry, especially the dramatic, we still drag the chains of traditional rules; and the most originality prevails in music, which, in modern times, has reached the height of perfection.

The highest destiny of art and poetry is to minister to religious life and to the church, over which the clergy preside. Their profession is the sublimest and most important in all human life, but also the most arduous, and the most difficult to be discharged. The clergyman

must unite in himself the gifts of the scholar and the artist. If he does not embrace the entire compass of the realm of science, he must yet, in order to be master of the sacred truth which he must declare, possess the elements and results of all science, and penetrate and comprehend both philosophy and natural science, as well as history. He must not only illustrate the Christian revelation, in the Bible, by the light of learning, but must be able to recognize the revelation of God in nature, in the human heart, and in history. In order to impart truth, in order to convince and console, he must be provided with knowledge of mankind and experience of the world. As a preacher, he must possess the gift of eloquent representation, which is but one of the arts, whilst by it the religious feelings of inspiration, resignation, devotion, should be awakened, if only to promote the aim of instruction. But the main thing is, for a clergyman not only to possess and control religious life by intellect and utterance, but also to bear it personally in himself, and be its living exemplar. The scholar may fulfil his profession, although not in the most perfect way, even if he grasp the truth only with the understanding, and not with the heart; the artist sets forth the forms shaped by him, and withdraws his person, so that it neither harms nor favors the impression; but the clergyman teaches the truth with emphasis only when he lets its light shine upon his own life, and his representation finds entrance into all hearts only by the inspiration streaming from the heart, by the living power of conviction. He can represent nothing which he is not himself; every means of representation, speech, gesture, expression, is connected with his person; and

if upon this the reflection of an inward pious life does not rest, then all art is deception and hypocrisy.


In the clerical profession, also, free mind, original, individual power of intellect and of feeling, is the vital germ, from which every fruitful influence proceeds. Trusty attachment to known truth, self-denying subjection to divine revelation, renunciation of every error and conceit, mild tolerance of every beneficial form and custom, indulgence towards harmless, especially conservative, prejudices, — sustaining fidelity towards existing institutions, — all are compatible with a living freedom, which, with original power, produces every thing that belongs to religious life, and imparts it immediately from the inmost heart, — which, despising every dead matter, every cramping fetter, owns no truth but what is known and found by itself, and in the archetype of revelation recognizes its own highest law. He who lives in the spirit, lives in freedom; love banishes every fear, and every slavish sense, and faith and hope penetrate the veil which hangs over the Holy of Holies.

WE have reached the end of our meditations; the career is run, the work is finished. It is a sense of dissatisfaction with what I have performed, or regret at the dissolution of a relation which has been so interesting and encouraging to me, or sadness at the perishableness of all things human, or all these together, which aggravates my departure from you. In short, respected hearers, — I confess it, — I do not leave this place with the joyful heart with which I first came before you.

What is finished does not satisfy; for it always falls short of the aim of hope and endeavor; and thus I lose the reward of feeling that I have done what I wished. What is past does not return again, or comes back at least changed; what for me has here passed, perchance, will never return. And how much it cost me! To this work I devoted all the power and zeal which my usual professional pursuits left free: how happy should I feel had I brought forward any thing especially satisfactory! Perhaps I may be pardoned here for indulging a feeling of sadness. But it need not be without consolation, and it is not. All the past encloses within itself a future, and nothing is lost which has been. No hope wholly deceives, and no effort wholly fails of its aim. What, and how much, I have effected,—whether the seed scattered will bear fruit,—the Lord of the harvest knows; but, if it has been the good seed of truth, it will not surely be sown in vain. For me, this fair office is, indeed, over; but let me hope that not all personal bonds between you and me are dissolved. If I have succeeded in deserving your confidence and winning your friendship, then something remains which binds you to me; and I remain forever bound to you by gratitude for the confidence shown me, for the attention you have bestowed upon me, for the kind, cheering manner with which you have received and judged my labors.

THE END.

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